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ABSTRACT 
MANAGING THE AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY REVOLUTION: RESPONSES TO 
TRANSGENIC SEEDS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
MAY 2016 
ALPER YAGCI, B.A., BOGAZICI UNIVERSITY 
M.A., BOGAZICI UNIVERSITY 
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
Directed by: Professor Peter M. Haas 
 
There has been heated debate over transgenic or genetically modified (GM) crops in 
agriculture. Advocates and critics argue over possible economic, environmental, public health 
implications of this technology. This study examines varying policy approaches to regulating 
GM crop cultivation in four developing countries where the technology has large potential 
application. Why have some countries banned GM crop cultivation in their territory while others 
encouraged it? In countries where GM crops were allowed, why have varying systems of 
intellectual property rights (IPR) protection been constructed? To investigate these questions I 
comparatively examine the policy experience (1995-2015) of Argentina, Brazil, Turkey relying 
on original fieldwork and India based on secondary literature. The explanation combines 
structural considerations with a social constructivist understanding of how actors make use of 
ideas to interpret and articulate their interests in a context defined by novelty and uncertainty.  
I find that transnational biotechnology companies lobby developing country governments 
for permission of GM crop cultivation and strict IPR protection so as to be able to charge the 
cultivators technology fees. While public opinion tends to be opposed to these crops, 
associations of big farmers tend to favor their adoption and view the IPR claims by 
 vii 
biotechnology companies as relatively tolerable. Smaller farmers and domestic seed industry, on 
the other hand, seek guarantees from the state that technology adoption conditions will not be 
established to their disadvantage. Which agenda is prioritized in policy-making will depend not 
only on the political weight of each pressure group but also on the statesmen’s management of 
the available knowledge on such questions as how the GM plants work, who they are good for, 
why they may or may not be needed. 
I observe that coalitions of scientists, civil society activists and pro-active bureaucrats are 
influential in shaping the policy vision by generating policy knowledge and ideas offering 
answers to such questions. I call them “epistemic coalitions.” They strategically mix selective 
scientific evidence with social and ideological narratives, under conditions of incomplete 
scientific consensus. I demonstrate that GM-skeptic epistemic coalitions can have a good chance 
at policy influence where the pro-GM producer sector is highly fragmented, but where the 
producer sector is strong the same opposition can be functional in obtaining a domestic producer-
oriented policy by challenging the legitimacy of extensive IPR claims advanced by transnational 
biotechnology firms. 
The study thus provides an empirical account of the political reactions provoked, and 
some of the social-economical outcomes generated, by a controversial agricultural technology. 
On a theoretical level it contributes to debates in political science about the place of ideas, 
cognitive frames and social learning in public policy; and advances the epistemic communities 
research program. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The Question 
If hypothetical Martians had been closely observing the living matter on the planet Earth, 
they would notice something peculiar around the year 1995. Suddenly, DNA molecules of a kind 
that had not existed before would make an appearance. These DNA would consist of genes from 
animals, plants and bacteria spliced and recombined together. The aliens observing our planet 
would further notice that dense colonies of such recombinant DNA would quickly grow and 
stretch like a huge green carpet over the land, in some parts of the planet. In other parts, though, 
the new thing would fail to appear even as years pass. In some places, the carpet of new DNA 
would suddenly end, as if someone drew a line there. Intellectually curious, the alien observer 
could wonder what determined the origin, the pace, and the obviously non-random extent of the 
new matter’s growth, and what its impact on the environment was.  
The alien observer would probably be quick to understand that the human species played 
a major role. Humans invented the new living matter, devised ways to multiply it fast and far, but 
ended up introducing it—insofar as they could control the process—in Argentina but not Turkey, 
embodied in soybeans but not wheat stalks. Seeking a parsimonious explanation, the alien could 
reason the following. Humans often pursue selfish interests, and many are interested in owning 
things as property. A small group of people from the northernmost parts of the planet—
incorporating themselves under names like Monsanto or Syngenta—who owned the property 
rights to the new genetically engineered plants, were very enthusiastic about spreading them 
around; because the further these plants would spread, the greater the rents they hoped they could 
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charge for the use. These were powerful people, and if nothing else intervened, one would expect 
them to get their way globally. However, in order to facilitate the spread, they had to interact 
with and recruit as allies the potentially powerful groups within each national jurisdiction they 
encountered. Sometimes they were successful in doing this. In some settings they were not very 
successful, and the new plants were blocked at the border. In other settings, the local groups got 
the new plants, but did not pay the rents due, it seemed. How come? Why did the local groups in 
different national settings take these divergent decisions? This study tells the story how, 
attempting to explain why. 
For the life of genetically modified (GM) plants is not only a matter of interstellar 
academic interest, nor should it be left solely to students of life sciences. Our political responses 
to this technology will have profound implications on the way agricultural production is 
organized over the next century. Advocates argue that this technology, by producing crops with 
greater yield or better resistance to plagues and drought, could serve as a powerful tool in 
increasing agricultural productivity. It would help meet the needs of a growing world population 
under conditions of ecological stress; and contribute to development of countries where 
agriculture is a prominent economic activity. However, skeptics argue that the effects of GM 
crops on human health and ecosystem integrity are not well understood. Furthermore, they fear 
that these crops come with too many private intellectual property rights (IPR) claims attached to 
them, associated with the few US- and Europe-based transnational corporations (TNCs) 
dominating the biotechnology industry. Against this background, developing countries have 
received wildly diverging advice from policy advocates, ranging from a total prohibition to a full 
embrace of this technology with as few biosafety and commercial regulations as possible. The 
statesmen face the challenge of formulating policies to make the best of the application of this 
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technology and/or preempt its damage, under pressure from local and transnational interest and 
opinion groups. By now it has become obvious that countries with already large-scale GM crop 
cultivation should have an interest in defending liberal standards in GMO (genetically modified 
organisms) regulation (Drezner 2008, Schneider and Urpelainen 2013), but this does not explain 
how countries initially choose to ban, limit or encourage GM crops. Why did they choose the 
particular policies they did? This is the subject. 
More specifically, I pursue two research questions: 
1. Why have countries adopted more and less permissive policies towards GM crop 
cultivation? Certain countries have banned GM cultivation in all or part of their territory, 
or allowed only for a very limited number of crops and with remarkable time lags; while 
others have taken a relatively laissez faire attitude. 
2. In countries where GM farming was allowed, why have varying systems of IPR protection 
been constructed? In certain countries and for certain crops, the biotech TNCs have been 
able to assert property rights over the transgenic constructs embodied in the GM seeds 
and generate billions of dollars in revenue by charging farmers royalty fees. In others, the 
TNCs have exerted less control over how farmers reproduce the seeds; and domestic 
research started to compete with them for technology supply to a greater extent. 
The two questions are not simply additive but complementary to each other. The 
potentially greater enforceability of IPR over GM (as opposed to non-GM) crop varieties is a 
primary reason why these crops have been developed and marketed with great zeal at the first 
place. A patented transgene is like a company logo stamped into plant germplasm for perpetuity, 
serving as a non-erasable marker of property claims even if the matter ends up being reproduced 
by unauthorized parties. Conversely, reasonable—though often exaggerated—concerns over 
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strict IPR enforcement in a context of monopoly have been a major reason for the resistance 
against GM crops. Lastly, where these crops did find acceptance, the threat of strict IPR 
enforcement has generated informality in the GM seed market, as the developing world’s farmers 
sought in this way to access the technology in favorable terms otherwise not available. Informal 
spread of GM seeds raises formidable barriers to effectively implementing official biosafety 
policies that would aim to minimize environmental and public health risks.  
The “international regime complex” (Raustiala and Victor 2004) in this area leaves room 
for countries to adopt divergent policies. On biosafety, World Trade Organization (WTO) rules 
preclude regulations that would discriminate against the trade of GMOs without scientific 
evidence of harm, but the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety allows for precautionary measures in 
case of scientific uncertainty, and at the level of regulatory detail scientific evidence is not 
interpreted by everyone (even all experts) in the same way. On IPR, the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) requires countries to extend intellectual 
property protection to genetic engineering products, but other agreements such as the 
International Union for the Protection of New Varieties (UPOV) conventions might be 
interpreted to contradict TRIPS. Thus we get variation in policies, which is consequential.  
 
Why Pursue This Question 
The stakes in this debate are high. Current wisdom on economic history holds that the 
industrial revolution would not be possible without parallel advances in agricultural productivity; 
and improved crops constituted an essential ingredient of the latter.1 On a list of most important 
                                                 
1 There is a strong case that differences in agricultural labor productivity circa 1800 explains why the industrial 
revolution started where it did; because higher productivity enabled a shift of population to specialized jobs in the 
urban sector (Allen 2000, Huang 2002). Higher agricultural productivity continued to mark the advanced economies 
thereafter, and during the nineteenth century agriculture saw much greater rates of labor productivity change than 
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innovations in American agriculture to date, a 1940 US Department of Agriculture study placed 
hybrid corn as second to none, regarding it as important as the tractor.2 Transgenic seeds carry 
the promise of another such leap, suggesting possibilities for an “agricultural biotechnology 
revolution” that could enhance the ability to grow crops on a hotter, dryer planet. Considering 
potentially far-reaching implications on economic growth, environment and public health, the 
attention paid by political scientists to the political economy of agriculture is far from matching 
the subject’s importance; the attention paid to technological innovation in this area is basically 
nil.3 
The well-known students of GMO politics have been either uninterested in dynamics of 
agricultural production—focusing on the politics of the GM commodities consumed in wealthy 
countries—or they have not adequately addressed the place of IPR in it, as we shall examine in 
greater detail. The dominant approach has been to focus on the divergence of policies between 
the USA (liberal towards GMOs) and the EU (precautionary towards GMOs), and derive 
predictions about how the rest of the world would behave based on ties of dependence on these 
great powers. However, hypotheses that rest on the influence of this divergence to explain 
policies in developing countries perform disappointingly. Secondly, it is doubtful that the nature 
of the trans-Atlantic divergence itself has been correctly understood, consequently, it is difficult 
to apply lessons learned from the literature on the North Atlantic to domestic policy contestation 
in the developing countries. Third, because IPR issues were relatively insignificant when it 
                                                                                                                                                             
manufacturing or services (Maddison 1991: 150). Successful industrialization of South Korea and Taiwan, and later 
on of China, were preceded by significant increases in agricultural labor productivity, food production and food 
security (Wade 1983, 2003, Hayami and Anderson 1986, Storm and Naastepad 2005, Timmer and Akkus 2008), 
whereas industrialization attempts elsewhere were often stalled by inadequate agricultural growth (Lipton 1977, 
Bates 1981, Mathur 1990, Saith 1990, Singh and Tabatabai 1994). 
2 Noted by Gardner (2002:12). 
3 By comparison, there are entire research disciplines devoted to studying the economics and sociology of 
technological innovation—both of which descend from seminal studies of modern seed varieties in the mid-
twentieth century (Ryan and Gross 1943 and Grilliches 1957 respectively). 
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comes to GMO debates in the wealthy countries where this proprietary technology originated 
from, such derivative explanations omit or play down an important dimension of the policy 
debate as it actually unfolded in the developing world. As a result, the GMO-skepticism among 
the developing world’s stakeholders and policymakers is explained by a suspiciously high dose 
of irrationality.  
This is an unjustifiable gap in our knowledge. There is evidence that GM seed adoption 
in developing countries has resulted in significant economic gains.4 There is also suggestive 
evidence that farmers have captured a greater share—in static terms, anyways—of these 
economic gains where biotech TNCs were not allowed to exercise IPR enforcement to their full 
satisfaction.5 The findings of this study will shed light on such policy-relevant questions as why 
some countries have forgone potential economic gains by banning GM seeds, whether GM 
cultivation elsewhere has produced significant environmental or public health damage, what 
political dynamics have allowed for various degrees of IPR enforcement. My purpose is less to 
draw policy lessons than to understand what has happened and under what constraints. 
Apart from its substantive importance, this topic serves as an interesting case to study 
theoretical issues relating to scientific expert input for policy-making, and its relationship to 
NGO activism and interest group lobbying. By examining this case, the study aims at 
contributing to debates in political science about the place of ideas, cognitive frames and social 
learning in comparative national public policy or international cooperation in general (Skocpol 
and Weir 1985, Hall 1989, March and Olsen 1989, Sikkink 1991, Katzenstein et al 1998, Wendt 
1999, Berman 2001, Blyth 2002 and 2003, Parsons 2003, Schmidt 2008, Woll 2008, Abdelal et 
al 2010, Nelson and Katzenstein 2014), and the epistemic communities research program in 
                                                 
4 See Smale et al’s (2009) review and meta-analyses by Finger et al (2011) and Areal et al (2012). 
5 See Demont et al’s (2007) interpretation of their meta-analysis, as well as Raney’s (2006) less systematic inquiry. 
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particular (Ruggie 1975, Adler and Haas 1992, Haas 1992). The epistemic communities research 
program rests on the premise that in areas such as environmental policy, causal ideas and 
associated norms propagated by “epistemic communities” of experts may contribute to better 
policies by changing the way political power holders view an issue, especially if experts are 
perceived as impartial. However, critiques argue that policy knowledge put forward by experts 
may simply rationalize already existing preferences, or it may be ignored when faced with 
powerful material interests (see Cross 2013). Similar criticisms apply to the autonomous causal 
role of ideas and norms in general. Hard and crucial tests through systematic comparative inquiry 
would be necessary to reject this materialistic null hypothesis. To this end, I study the 
competitive interaction of profit- and non-profit oriented civil society actors, scientific experts 
and the public decision-makers they try to influence, with a debate on agricultural technology; 
and I do this in comparative fashion in meaningfully differing agricultural contexts, to provide 
empirical tests. As statesmen faced pressure from international forces and lobbying by interest 
groups, how, if any, did the input of scientific experts and other idea-propagating and norm-
building actors contribute to policy-making? This is the guiding theoretical question of interest. 
 
Research Design and the Argument 
The country cases with the most leverage to answer the research questions would be 
developing countries close to the world’s temperate agricultural zones; where either soy, corn or 
cotton was grown in great quantities at the onset (c. 1995) of the commercial release of GM 
crops (because these three crops are the ones for which GM seed applications have been 
available and therefore biotechnology TNCs would be much interested to market GM seeds 
there). This would be a setting where farmers from the Global South and their political 
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representatives have to negotiate with biotechnology TNCs over terms of access to the 
technology. It excludes advanced industrial countries where these TNCs are headquartered and 
pay taxes to, because there IPR conflicts between farmers and the biotech industry do not hinge 
so much on the international division of labor and cause much political dispute. Also, where the 
farming population is small and agricultural input markets have long been substantially 
conquered by capitalist relations with strictly defined property rights, as it is the case in North 
America, Europe and Japan, the introduction of the GM seeds does not seem like a major turning 
point for the agricultural sector. The definition also excludes small and/or very poor countries 
that are either of little commercial interest to TNCs or reliant on foreign aid and whose policies 
have closely followed international donors’ preferences. In short, at focus are sizeable middle-
income countries with significant autonomy in writing their own policies, but which happen to 
be on the receiving end of an asymmetric relationship of technology exchange, having to manage 
a situation of dependent development.6 Among those one should be particularly interested in 
countries with relatively open polities, where some degree of civil society representation and 
public deliberation exist and can be observed. 
For this end I comparatively examine the policy experience (1995-2015) in Argentina, 
Brazil, Turkey, India. The methods I use are qualitative, although econometric evidence from 
secondary literature will be taken up whenever relevant. I employ process-tracing techniques to 
analyze the paths leading to the formation of particular GMO policy regimes in each country. To 
generate the qualitative data necessary for the analysis I have undertaken fieldwork in Argentina, 
Brazil and Turkey, conducting elite interviews (in Spanish, Portuguese and Turkish as well as 
                                                 
6 This economic-geographic focus locates my study within the tradition of Cardoso and Faletto (1979) and Evans 
(1979, 1995). 
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English) with actors involved in the policy process and collecting documents. I have relied on 
online evidence and secondary literature for India, because of time and resource constraints.  
These countries have been chosen so as to observe policy reactions to a novel technology 
in meaningfully varying settings, and to avoid generalizations from what could be exceptional 
experience. The cases display methodologically useful variation on agrarian structure 
fundamentals that are relevant to generating explanatory variables (and they happen to allow for 
variation on the outcome variable).7 Two of them are land-abundant New World countries with 
settler colonial heritage, where larger, relatively well-capitalized farms dominate the agrarian 
landscape; and crop production is heavily oriented towards exports. The other two are societies 
with ancient agrarian heritage; where, relatively speaking, land scarcity and land fragmentation is 
the norm, and smallholding farmers characterize an agricultural sector that struggles for self-
sufficiency in crop production. The variation in outcomes observed within each pair enables 
comparisons via what John Stuart Mill called as the “method of difference” (where the 
researcher isolates chief variables of interest while holding everything else as relatively 
constant), and the variation between pairs enables “method of agreement” kind of comparisons 
(where the researcher isolates parameters that remain relatively constant across cases while 
everything else varies).8 Process-tracing within each case gives insights otherwise unavailable 
from cross-country comparisons. Chapter III discusses the methodological issues involved. 
The variation on policy reactions to be explained is shown in Table 1. The upper left cell 
of the table is where the biotech TNCs would like to see the world to converge, and that is where 
                                                 
7 There is debate in political science methodology over what kind of variation should inform case selection criteria. 
This issue is discussed in greater detail in Chapter III. 
8 These methods also go by the names “most similar” and “most different” respectively, as called by Przeworski and 
Teune (1970). See Gerring (2011) for a more recent treatment. 
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USA and Canada can be found, but actors in developing countries have mostly resisted going 
there. 
Table 1: The two-dimensional policy regime on GM cultivation as the dependent variable 
  
Biosafety policies 
  
Permissive Restrictive-contested Prohibitive 
IPR policies 
Strong IPR (TNC ideal) Brazil 
Turkey 
Weak IPR Argentina India 
 
The next chapter will introduce the reader to the details of policy challenges relevant to 
regulating GM crop cultivation and will thus make clear what is captured by the dependent 
variable. It would suffice here to note some striking features. In Turkey, a farmer can be put to 
jail for up to twelve years for cultivating any GM crops, in India GM seeds are widely used for 
cotton but not allowed for food crops, in Brazil permission came late after contestation over 
policy due to a combative opposition, whereas in Argentina GM seeds quickly took over almost 
the entire production of commercially significant crop production with little friction with public 
regulation. In terms of IPR; in Argentina once a farmer legally buys a bag of GM seeds, he can 
reproduce them freely in his farm for self-use, in India official price ceilings for GM seeds 
accompany a large informal market in “pirate” seed development and reproduction openly 
tolerated by government authorities, while in Brazil farmers have to pay a tax-like royalty fee to 
the biotech TNC for each subsequent harvest that springs from the original seed purchase. How 
to explain this variant public policy reaction across cases? 
My explanation, detailed in chapter III, sets out by identifying the relevant policy 
stakeholders who would have material interests to be enhanced or endangered by policy change 
in this area. In designing policies, public decision-makers have to respond to lobbying by the 
multinational biotechnology industry interested in collecting technology rents from the adoption 
of GM crops, and a general consumer public worried about negative externalities regarding food 
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safety and the environment. In between there are domestic agricultural producers who have a 
potential interest in accessing new seeds. Among them, while sectorial organizations 
representing big farming interests are generally supportive of permitting GM seeds and relatively 
tolerant towards IPR claims attached to them; small and medium farmers’ preferences on both 
counts are less determinate, because they have a lesser chance of taking a share in pioneer rents 
from new crop adoption and their precarious economic and social position make them more 
sensitive to IPR encroachment over traditional seed saving practices. This implies that the 
position of smaller producers should be open to deliberation and persuasion—they would expect 
guarantees from the state that the terms of access to the technology will not be set to their 
disadvantage or else they may join the ranks of GMO-skeptics. Therefore, in a setting 
characterized by smallholding peasantry, GMO-skeptic opposition activism can have a greater 
chance at policy influence. Conversely, a more consolidated, capitalistic agricultural producer 
sector is expected to be more strongly in favor of permissive policies. In such a setting, an 
opposition orientation towards confronting GMOs altogether as an illegitimate, inappropriate 
technology on biosafety grounds seems doomed to failure. However, an opposition orientation 
towards minimizing biosafety risks from the adoption of GM crops, while questioning the strict 
IPR demands associated with them, may enable the GMO-skeptics to form an alliance with the 
producers.  
In other words, economic structure determines the strength of the local producer sector to 
an important extent, but delimits its interests to a lesser extent. If GMO-skeptic coalitions can 
attach themselves to producer sector discourse, by framing the GMO threat in terms of property 
claims that can be handled rather than purely consumer risks that have to be blocked, they may 
help define those preferences and become influential over policy. If they do not do so, and if the 
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producer sector happens to be strong, the GMO-skeptics become irrelevant, and the TNC gains 
greater chance of materializing its vision by influencing public policies. Therefore, where TNC 
lobbying is a constant, public decisions materialize as a resultant of the political strength of the 
agricultural producers, and the orientation of the influential opposition coalition. The combined 
effect of these two variables is illustrated visually below as Table 2 describing the policy 
trajectory in each case, named from the vantage point of how the TNC experiences it. 
Table 2: Policy processes faced by the TNC depending on two explanatory variables 
    
Opposition orientation 
  
    
Challenging IPR 
restrictions 
Challenging the entire 
technology 
Producer 
sector 
Stronger  
Permission obtained, 
IPR compromised 
(Argentina) 
Opposition overcome 
(Brazil) 
Fragmented  
Limited permission, 
IPR compromised 
(India) 
Opposition prevails 
(Turkey) 
 
The same effect is illustrated below as a decision tree leading to policy choices. In the 
conclusion chapter I will also discuss the social and economic consequences of these policies. 
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Figure 1: Causal pathways to policy choices 
Where we observe that oppositional orientation is making a difference, there is evidence 
for the influence of ideas. Causal ideas, supported with certain associated norms, make a 
difference because actors, even if selfishly oriented towards material gains, are bewildered by 
uncertainty, they do not always know what to expect from new technology, and they need to 
learn their interests. The crucial finding that emerges from my analysis is that ideas—about how 
GM seeds work, and why we may or may not need GM seeds—articulated in opposition 
activists’ discursive and campaign orientation do not automatically follow from the material 
economic setting, and they have an autonomous influence over policy in a manner orthogonal to 
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material variables. Activists exert this ideational influence through the mechanisms of persuasion 
(because they persuade statesmen) and political pressure (because they persuade the public, to 
which the statesmen respond).  
With case studies I provide evidence that scientific and legal experts take part in the 
generation of these ideas and the formation of the particular orientation of GMO-skeptic 
opposition in each country. However, the relationships between scientific experts and the other 
actors they communicate with are causally complex and multidirectional. Experts contribute to 
policy knowledge, both directly in communication with public decision-makers and by 
influencing civil society organizations who then exert pressure on public decisions; but the 
observed influence of the experts probably rests on some selection bias: to some extent decision-
makers and lobbying groups should be selecting which experts to listen to based on prior beliefs 
that rest on non-expert knowledge.  
Therefore, it is difficult to pass a confident judgment in favor of the epistemic community 
hypothesis; but the influence of ideational engagement on the outcomes, and the heavy presence 
of scientific knowledge claims in the arguments made by the parties to the debate, cannot be 
dismissed either. So instead of singling out epistemic community influence as a variable by itself 
I offer the term “epistemic coalition” to describe the broader relationship between activists, the 
scientific knowledge sources they utilize on the one hand, and the public decision-makers they 
try to influence on the other. The coalition brings together scientists, lawyers, civil society 
activists, and pro-active bureaucrats. It strategically mixes selective scientific evidence with 
ideological narratives and social norms to produce truth statements over the nature of the policy 
challenge in question, under conditions of incomplete scientific consensus. In these terms, this 
study documents the struggle between competitive epistemic coalitions that put forward rival 
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kinds of policy knowledge towards policy influence. The policy outcomes observed imply that 
the policy process has been in a wide sense a process of learning and cognitive evolution, but not 
necessarily towards better outcomes; because in formulating a narrative of policy knowledge, 
epistemic coalitions mix scientific and non-scientific ideas, good ideas and bad.  
To identify the policy stakeholders and their expected positions, and to delimit where the 
ideational contribution of epistemic coalitions should come into play, my study builds critically 
on existing studies on the public regulation of GMOs. The analysis in turn provides a more 
comprehensive picture of the policy challenges in this area—especially as it concerns countries 
in the global South—than what is found in the existing literature.  
 
Political Science and the Regulation of GMOs: The Extant Literature 
Research on GMO politics, even though a substantial corpus by now, has often been 
conducted without a clear conversation with general theories in the study of international and 
comparative politics. We can glean the elements of such a conversation from the literature 
though, and map the relevant arguments in circulation as in the following. 
Table 3: Theoretical explanations in the study of policy-making 
  
  
  
  
Nature of causal mechanism 
  
Material Ideational 
Source of 
primary cause 
  
External 
1) Coercion and incentives by 
great powers 
3) Influence of hegemonic 
ideas  
Domestic 
2) Interest groups and polity 
structure 
4) Role of learning, local 
NGOs or experts  
 
Since GMOs gave rise to one of the most important disputes in the history of the 
GATT/WTO between the USA and the EU, most literature studies these two Northern powers, 
based on explanations of the type 2 and 4, and with some success in explaining the policies 
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prevailing in these places (though not without inconsistency and ambiguity on important 
questions about lobbying by the producers). For the rest of the world, the studies have been few, 
mainly of the type 3 and especially 1, and unsatisfactory. No doubt, a comprehensive empirical 
account would have to make use of all these approaches eclectically. While in line with that 
spirit, I will put forward a theoretical framework that emphasizes causation of the type 2 and 4 to 
explain GMO policies in major developing countries. This is not only in order to counterweigh 
against the bias for the role of external influences found in the literature and contribute to more 
complete empirical knowledge accumulation. It also helps with the methodological task of 
isolating countries as cases. Transnational influences over policy, both formal and through 
transnational action networks and such (Keck and Sikkink 1998, Risse 2002), are no doubt 
present. This study is interested in understanding how these external sources of (information, 
knowledge, and material) influence are received, absorbed and translated to local policy 
knowledge in each place in specific ways due to the characteristics of local actors. 
Let me describe each of the four theoretical approaches and how they are relevant to the 
issue at hand.  
 
Type 1 (Material-external) Explanations 
Theories focusing on the ability of great powers to affect other countries through coercive 
and material incentives have a lineage going back to classic theories of imperialism. More recent 
scholarly formulations are divided in terms of how much they appraise the role of a single 
hegemon (Kindleberger 1986, Lake 1993, Ikenberry 2000, Kelley 2007) as opposed to post-
hegemonic great power rivalry and cooperation (Keohane and Nye 1987, Hafner-Burton 2005, 
Drezner 2008). Hegemonic stability theory would predict the preferences of the USA to have an 
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overbearing effect where it matters to the USA. However, with the economic power of the USA 
in relative decline, and the regulation of food and agriculture being an area where the fearsome 
military capabilities of the hegemon has little fungibility, hegemonic pressure is conspicuous by 
its limited bite when it comes to this issue. Attesting to this are the precautionary biosafety 
standards for GMOs prevailing in Europe and elsewhere and the fact that many developing 
countries challenged the US call for strict IPR protection over biotech industry’s (chiefly the US-
based Monsanto’s) proprietary genes. Indeed, this study will provide evidence, through US 
embassy cables available via Wikileaks, that the hegemon’s pressure for certain kinds of policies 
was always present but not sufficient by itself to make countries change course.  
Post-hegemonic great power rivalry is obviously the more relevant variant of the 
external-materialist explanations. This in turn may authorize several theoretical expectations: 
The great economic powers USA and EU may successfully influence third countries through 
rival sanction threats or trade and aid incentivizes, resulting in competing spheres of influence 
(Drezner 2008, Paarlberg 2009, Schneider and Urpelainen 2013). Alternatively, the self-
contradictory regime complex that emerges as a result of great power divergence, wherein 
certain international institutions are favorable in procedural structure or policy content to US 
interests (such as WTO agreements) and others to the EU (such as the Cartagena Protocol), may 
create forum-shopping opportunities and even give room for maneuver to developing countries 
in formulating policies not foreseen by any great power (Alter and Meunier 2009, Helfer 2009). 
Those two are somewhat rival explanations. To the extent that the first one is correct, there 
would be little interest in studying developing country policies because we already know where 
they come from, and there is little hope for changing them in desirable ways without first 
addressing the disagreements between the great powers. If the second one is valid, then the 
 18 
question remains how the preferences of the developing countries (to which end they would use 
forum-shopping opportunities) are generated. 
Schneider and Urpelainen (2014) provide a testable version of the great power influence 
theory. Taking the ratification of the Cartagena Protocol (which the USA opposed and the EU 
favored) as their outcome of interest, they hypothesize that ratification will depend negatively on 
an observed country’s dependence (measured by bilateral trade ties and military alliance) on the 
USA and positively on dependence on the EU. However, out of 39 countries that either were 
particularly enthusiastic early ratifiers of the treaty or remained non-ratifiers, only 22 cases are 
predicted correctly by the theory, and the ratio falls to 8 out of 18 for early ratifiers. In this 
respect the predictive power seems barely distinguishable from that of a random guess. Crucial 
cases such as Mexico, with a high degree of dependence on the USA and an early ratifier (and 
which maintains a ban on GM production for corn, her most important crop) are predicted 
incorrectly. And it is not clear how consequential treaty ratification is for policies actually 
adopted: Brazil is a ratifier, and is the world’s greatest GM crop producer—second only to the 
USA. Most of the world’s GM cotton is produced in India, also a ratifier of the Cartagena 
Protocol, and so on. Hence, the expectation of a simple alignment of policies with major external 
partner performs disappointingly. 
Mainstream explanations based on Northern leadership are also limited by their short 
treatment of how IPR and related corporate strategies complicate the acceptance of GM crops in 
developing countries. Because IPR issues were relatively insignificant in GMO debates in the 
wealthy countries where this proprietary technology originates from, such derivative 
explanations omit or play down this important dimension of the policy debate as it actually 
unfolded in the developing world. Paarlberg (2009) demonstrates that policy-makers in African 
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countries imported the European opposition to GMOs because of ties of dependency such as the 
role of European donors in African agricultural R&D funding, and from this, he hastily 
concludes that corporate IPR over seeds has not been and should not be a source of hesitation in 
the policy debate over GM seed adoption in poorer countries (Paarlberg 2009: 115-116). But 
there is little evidence in his work that during the period under investigation profit-oriented 
biotechnology companies considered Africa’s tropical crop varieties worth investing in, or that 
public consortiums made enough progress in their GM crop development projects to face 
concrete rejections by the policy-makers they would be approaching.9 And when concrete 
proposals for local GM crop adaptation for Africa were about to materialize, disagreements over 
IPR enforcement contributed to their stalling.10 In any case, the theory of great power influence 
over GM agriculture in the third world, whatever its merits are for Africa, applies poorly to 
sizeable “emerging markets” with enough autonomy to write their own policies. 
There is another variant of the great power influence approach which does pay attention 
to IPR issues, favored by those critical scholars who locate the debate within the broader context 
of the expansion of industrial agriculture in the global South since the Green Revolution. Such 
works have characterized the codification, commodification, and exclusive ownership of plant 
germplasm through proprietary technology as an enclosure movement: the enclosure of the 
global commons in plant genetic resources (Kloppenburg 1988, Brooks 2005, Jasanoff 2006, 
May and Sell 2006, Otero 2008, Clapp and Fuchs 2009, May 2009). However, this literature, 
while accurately putting up US and Europe-based proprietary interests for critical analysis, tends 
                                                 
9 In sub-Saharan Africa, major crops were too different from the temperate-zone varieties for which transgenic 
transformations were already available, seed markets were too underdeveloped, and individual countries were too 
small to attract significant investment in technology adaptation in this early period. South Africa, which Paarlberg 
focuses as an exemplary case, is the exception that proves the rule. 
10 About the slow progress in mobilizing international aid for development of GM crops suitable for Africa, 
Paarlberg’s own account points to cost considerations and disagreement over IPR enforcement among the 
(especially private) participants of the project as the most visible obstacle (2009: 165-170). 
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to draw a reified picture of the power of multinational business and their diplomatic supporters (a 
good recent exception is Filomeno 2014). For a refined view, more attention needs to be paid to 
the national interface through which such power is negotiated by domestic actors within 
developing countries, and how the outcomes vary across different settings.  
 
Type 2 (Material-domestic) Explanations 
This is where type 2 explanations, i.e. the study of material constraints within a given 
national setting, become relevant. For most mainstream literature in international political 
economy and comparative politics, such explanations arguably represent the modal approach to 
explaining policy-making. Accordingly, particular country characteristics (defined in terms of 
factor endowments, sectorial composition, or class structure) affect the power and preferences of 
domestic interest groups responding to world markets, and policy then results from the politically 
mediated contestation between these groups. The “open economy politics” research program puts 
emphasis on deterministic theories whereby group positions and the prevailing policy can be 
predicted from the national economy profile (Lake 2009). The “varieties of capitalism” school 
pays more attention to strategic interaction between interest groups and the role of preexisting 
institutional arrangements in directing interaction towards politically desired coordination foci 
(Hall and Soskice 2001). Alternatively, scholars may eschew explaining interest group behavior, 
take alternative policy proposals as an observational given, and limit attention to how the 
institutions of a polity resolve policy contestation. Most political science writing on GMOs takes 
policy divergence between the USA and EU as their topic of interest and, eschewing a political 
economy analysis, employs the last strategy. Consequently, this line of inquiry has successes but 
also limitations. The most comprehensive explanations find the main cause of divergence in 
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institutional (and cultural) differences built into these polities (Ansell and Vogel 2005, Jasanoff 
2006, Pollack and Shaffer 2009). Scholars have been more successful in analyzing how the 
institutional structure of the European Union empowers the anti-GMO member states (Bernauer 
2003, Sheingate 2009) or promotes policy contagion (Tosun 2014) and less so in explaining why 
anti- or pro-GMO preferences predominate in particular states at the first place. The focus on 
institutional (and cultural) dimensions of the policy process leaves out how economic interests, if 
any, weighed themselves on the policy decisions.  
This gap is addressed by economists who explore the possibility that the stringent 
European regulations against GMOs might have an economic function (and, by implication, an 
economic motive). Their findings are mixed but they are often translated in lay wisdom to the 
idea that Europe has blocked the GMOs because of lobbying from its farm sector seeking trade 
protection against more efficient producers across the ocean. However, scholarly evidence does 
not support this view at a close look. Econometric simulations using global trade models suggest 
that while aggregate welfare (not counting any externalities) in Europe would be worse-off by 
banning GM imports, it is not clear that European farmers as an interest group would be better-
off from a ban either: existence of net positive gains to farmers depends on delicate assumptions 
about the completeness of the ban (which, we now know, has remained far from complete), and, 
importantly, the level of existing consumer aversion taken exogenous to farm sector lobbying 
(see Nielsen and Anderson 2001, Nielsen, Robinson, and Theirfelder 2003, van Meijl and van 
Tongeren 2004, and most conclusively Jackson and Anderson 2005). Under such uncertainty 
over marginal gains, it is difficult to believe that European farm sector would actively lobby for 
an anti-GMO position and forego absolute productivity increase, which was more certain.11 From 
                                                 
11 Taking farm size (which is high in Europe in world standards) and farmer education level (likewise high) as the 
main determinants of productivity enhancement from GM crop adoption, van Meijl and van Tongeren (2004) 
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this perspective, while it may be reasonable to think that banning GM commodity imports could 
serve as protectionism once Europe eschewed GM crop cultivation itself (Drezner 2008: 155, 
Graff et al 2015: 677); it remains a mystery why European farm sector would not want GM 
agriculture if they were given the choice before the consumers show their hand. Furthermore, as 
Cadot et al note, “as European agriculture is already heavily subsidized, the rationale for 
‘shifting rents’ away from US farmers [through protection] is unclear” (2001). “In the case of 
maize, European producers neither needed nor wanted import protection [in the form of a GMO 
ban]” (Lynch and Vogel 2001). The Common Agricultural Policy was already providing 
subsidies for this crop, and no substantial change in production level and farm income would 
result from a more permissive biosafety regime, van Meijl and van Tongeren (2004) estimate.12 
In the case of soybeans and cotton, European production was small, and it is not clear which 
economic interest would be enhanced in Europe by substituting imports from USA with imports 
from other places (Tiberghien 2007). 
Empirical studies of European policy-making have not found evidence in support of what 
we could call the producer-induced-protectionism thesis either. Lynch and Vogel (2001) 
conclude against the thesis in their review of the EU policy-making process, and Pollack and 
Schaffer (2009) find the cause of policy in preexisting cultural and institutional features that 
increased the salience of consumer fears. According to Bernauer and Meins (2003) and Ansell et 
al (2005) there is little evidence that European GMO protest is a triumph for protectionist 
producers’ groups. Tiberghien (2007) notes that in the case of France, which became an 
                                                                                                                                                             
estimate that Europe’s productivity enhancement rate from GM seeds would be as high as that of Argentina’s (an 
early and enthusiastic adopter). 
12 Furthermore, as Drezner (2008: 155) reminds: “A large (albeit decreasing) fraction of CAP subsidies are tied to 
production: farmers received a larger subsidy with increased crop yields… If GMOs increased European agricultural 
productivity, the CAP system would mandate an increased outlay of subsidies, posing a considerable strain on the 
EU budget [while benefitting farmers].” 
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important country in upholding the EU moratorium on GM crops, the corn growers federation 
was publicly pro-GMO, “concerned about losing out in a competitive battle over technology;” 
and the peak agricultural organization took a neutral position, whereas the union of small farmers 
joined the anti-GMO coalition—hence the much publicized but unrepresentative example of the 
farmer-politician José Bové. In Switzerland, home to the biotechnology giant Syngenta, farmers 
were at odds with the anti-GMO coalition that came to dominate the country’s agenda. 
According to Tiberghien, in nearly all EU countries, farmer involvement in the debate came after 
the urban-based activist groups already turned the issue into a public debate. As for the next link 
in the industry chain, the food retailers, Bernauer (2003) concludes that they turned to non-GM 
supplies only after 1996 when mandatory labeling was in the horizon and it became apparent that 
the consumers would prefer non-GM products. Contrary to the implicit hypothesis in most 
writing on the matter, European producer sector organizations seemed welcoming to GM seeds 
until European consumers made it clear that they did not want GM food and European policy-
makers chose to adopt precautionary biosafety policies that made farming with GM seeds a less 
viable option. 
 Hence, a clear picture of how domestic interest group interaction weighed itself on 
policy-making cannot be found in the literature on the North Atlantic, where this approach is 
typically considered to be the most appropriate. When it comes to developing countries, the 
implications of such an approach have been explored in passim only. One hypothesis would be 
that developing countries follow the regulatory approach of the countries to which they export 
most of their agricultural commodities, out of market access concerns. However, this hypothesis 
cannot predict variation because virtually all major agricultural markets, including Europe, 
Japan, South Korea, and the increasingly important China, are generally biased against the 
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GMOs. (The major pro-GMO rich countries USA and Canada are not significant markets for 
field crops, instead they are important exporters themselves). On the basis of this hypothesis, 
early commentators had suggested that export farmers and countries they dominate, like 
Argentina and Brazil, would be the first to oppose GM crop cultivation in order not to lose 
markets (Lapan and Moschini 2002, Graff et al 2009). Pretty much the opposite has come true, 
because trends in export markets oscillated and, I would argue, productivity and profitability 
concerns ultimately trumped market access fears where either producers or biotech sector 
lobbying were politically strong enough. By now it has become obvious that countries with 
already significant GM crop cultivation should have an interest in defending liberal standards in 
GMO regulation (Drezner 2008, Schneider and Urpelainen 2013), but this does not explain how 
countries initially opt to ban, limit or encourage GM crop cultivation. 
 Interest group politics, and especially the stances taken by the rural producers have 
perhaps taken longer shrift in advocacy writing than in the scholarly literature on the matter. 
Among policy advocates, critical writers claim that rural producers should be and mostly are 
against GM crops (Shiva 2001), while pro-GMO writers claim the exact opposite (James 2011), 
without presenting precise reasons. The former ignores many instances where rural producers 
have taken a strong stance in favor of the legalization of GM seeds (a fact that leads to the 
question why they have not done so everywhere with equal force). The latter ignores the fact that 
rural producers everywhere have had at least an uneasy relationship with the IPR claims of 
biotechnology companies (a fact that leads to the question why they have been more or less 
successful in “winning” that conflict). It needs to be acknowledged that there may be grounds for 
differentiation of the interests of different kinds and classes of rural producers, and furthermore, 
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that interests can to a significant extent be uncertain, pushing producers in different settings to 
develop different ideas about what will best serve them. 
 
Type 3 and 4 (Idea-based) Explanations 
 The ongoing failure to draw a clear picture of interest group politics suggests that more 
than straightforward material factors need to be taken into account. Type 3 and 4 explanations 
would emphasize that ideas in circulation can make a substantial difference by shaping views on 
an issue for policy stakeholders and public decision-makers alike.  
 In a basic sense, ideas are complementary to otherwise materialistic explanations. 
Mainstream materialistic accounts in political science are founded upon the postulates of the 
rational choice paradigm. But this paradigm, stripped down to its essentials, is agnostic about 
where the preferences come from. Whether to prefer higher corn yields over biodiversity and 
minimized allergenic risk is not a matter of rational choice; it is in the prior realm of values. 
Actors with different values have different preferences, and they can all be equally rational about 
them.13 So, how do actors know what to value most? According to Wendt (1989) ideas in the 
form of definitions of one’s identity guide them towards value preferences. March and Olsen 
(1989) examine institutionalized identities that endow people with principled beliefs about what 
is appropriate or normatively desirable for someone in their position. 
 Furthermore, once actors discover their own social identities; they have to discover the 
world they are living in—how it works and what populates it. Rational choice scholars study 
those situations where a well-institutionalized polity renders the structure of the political game 
                                                 
13 Rational choice modeling is founded upon two minimum rationality assumptions. First, actors can rank-order 
preferences in a consistent manner. This implies the mathematical principle of transitivity (if A > B and B > C then A 
> C). Secondly, actors make choices aimed at getting the best possible outcome according to those preferences. The 
content of the preferences, at this level, does not matter. 
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and the relevant set of rival actors (if not their preferences) common knowledge to everyone. 
However, political life abounds with other kinds of situations and they may be no less important. 
Economic crises (Blyth 2002), discovery of hitherto unknown problems (Haas and Haas 1995) 
and, as examined in this study, ground-breaking technology easily give birth to such situations 
characterized by exasperating levels of complexity and novelty, putting actors at a loss about 
how to orient themselves. 
 In classical rational choice accounts, such situations are viewed through the lenses of 
information, transaction costs and risk. Rational ignorance may ensue because actors refrain 
from acquiring information when the cost of educating oneself on an issue exceeds the potential 
benefit that the information could provide. Still, strategies can be formulated by discounting the 
probability of benefits by the costs of information multiplied by some risk aversion coefficient. 
However, scholars of constructivist political economy have generated fruitful discussion by 
reintroducing the concept of “Knightian” uncertainty as different from any risk (Beckert 1996, 
Blyth 2006, Woll 2008, Nelson and Katzenstein 2014). Under uncertainty, actors are at a loss 
about the causal parameters that move the world and they therefore have no basis to know what 
the objective probability distribution of outcomes may look like.14 The distinction is a fine one, 
and some would insist that the concept of risk can accommodate uncertainty, but perhaps the 
point is that a quantitative increase in information requirements may warrant a qualitative 
distinction: given the bounded computing capacities of real people and the bewildering variety of 
information they have to process, in real-world situations risk estimation can easily collapse into 
muddling through uncertainty.15 In this more behavioral sense of the term at least, the policy-
                                                 
14 The concept originates in economist Frank Knight’s classic work that declared, contra Pigou, that “uncertainty … 
[is not] a gamble on a known math chance” (1933: xiv).  
15 Limits to cognitive processing as understood by Herbert Simon (1982) and Douglass North (1990) are arguably 
along the lines of such behavioral, not truly Knightian, uncertainty. See Woll (2008) for a good discussion. 
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making effort for GMOs comes with considerable uncertainty. At the onset of technology 
introduction in c. 1995, policy stakeholders and public decision-makers face no precedents, have 
limited scientific data, and international law on both biosafety and intellectual property aspects 
of the technology is still emergent.  
 Under such uncertainty, ideas in the form of causal beliefs about how the world works 
become crucial variables. These may be scientific (and social scientific) statements that 
demonstrate the connections between things (Haas 1992, Ida 1993, Blyth 2002, Woll 2008) or 
policy models that provide a blueprint for how to pursue particular political objectives 
(Holzinger and Knill 2005, Marsh and Sharman 2009, Weyland 2005). Actors holding different 
ideas may pursue very different strategies, indeed opposing strategies, in order to serve the same 
broadly defined value because they interpret causal relationships differently. As Iida explains, 
“Disagreement could arise not only from a conflict of interest in underlying preferences but from 
different predictions concerning the consequences of [actions]” (1993).  
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Figure 2: Ideas and Interests 
 Therefore, changing actors’ ideas can lead to a change in their ultimate preferences or the 
strategies they use to pursue them, or both. This is why not only interest groups in the classical 
sense, but idea-generating and idea-propagating agents become crucial in analyzing the politics 
of policy-making. The agents of ideational change include international organizations with a 
mandate to address a problem (Finnemore 1996), public policy entrepreneurs (Roberts and King 
1991, Mintrom 1997), activists organized in NGOs (Keck and Sikkink 1999), or scientists and 
other experts with epistemic authority over a technical issue, or “epistemic communities” (Haas 
1992, Knorr Cetina 1999).  
 Most scholars would agree that the universe does not give to ideas a blank check for 
defining people’s interests, which are also informed by material conditions in ways that do not 
always require a lot of ideational mediation to become intelligible. It is true that “structures do 
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not come with instruction sheets,” as Blyth has commented (2004), but structures—the rainfall to 
your farms, the depth of your ports, the volume of US$ denominated bonds in your treasury or 
the nuclear weapons in your arsenal—do exist, and ideational instruction can ignore them at the 
risk of its own irrelevance. Ideas nonetheless make a difference in helping to choose among the 
structurally relevant options. The average Brazilian farmer would not react to the proposition of 
permitting GM crop cultivation in the same way that the average Austrian music teacher would, 
but still, his interests are not completely delimited by the fact of being a farmer in Brazil and he 
may need to hear ideas on a number of particular policy questions to define and articulate his 
interest on this matter. The situation would be likewise for the statesmen in these countries who 
are taking decisions with some input from these civil society actors. As Craig Parsons writes, 
“ideas, as an autonomous causal factor, thereby select from a range of structural and institutional 
possibilities” (2002: 48). 
 When it comes to the study of the regulation of GMOs; various scholars have noticed the 
crucial role of ideas, discourses, and narratives (Hajer 1995, Scoones 2006 and 2008, Jasanoff 
2011, Newell in passim). It is curious, though, that when the more materialistically-oriented 
scholars discuss the topic, these contributions barely receive notice despite the disappointing 
record of the proposed materialistic hypotheses. Perhaps this is partly because constructivist 
scholarship often does not proceed through methodical selection of comparisons and 
counterfactuals whereby alternative theories can be evaluated. The particular domains where 
ideas make a difference are not always carefully delineated either, but they should be. For 
example, where idea transmission channels between actors are coupled with strong material ties 
it is difficult to distinguish between pretension and true persuasion: Actors may behaviorally 
follow certain ideas because they feel obliged to do so due to material constraints, or it may be 
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the case that economic and institutional ties expose actors to particular ideas instead of others, 
which then lead to a genuine change in belief about what is desirable. European influence on 
GMO policies in Africa (Paarlberg 2009), for example, could be either, or both. As King et al 
advise, “To show that ideas are causally important, it must be demonstrated that a given set of 
ideas held by policymakers, or some aspect of them, affect policies pursued and do not simply 
reflect those policies or their prior material interests” (1994: 191). So long as this task is not 
attended, one can always suspect that we are not explaining the ideational formation of interests 
but merely describing how structurally generated interests look like when we ideographically 
zoom in to their social articulation at a low level of abstraction. To quote Parsons again, one 
needs to seek “counterfactual leverage”: “What was the range of possibilities without these 
ideas? Cross-case comparisons help in this respect, suggesting alternatives in similar situations” 
(2002: 50).  
 This is what I will do in this study. I take countries that form two “most similar” pairs 
with regards to certain agricultural structure characteristics that inform the needs and the political 
power of the producer sector. The variation in outcomes between these pairs attests to the 
strength of such structural factors in delimiting political options. The variation within each pair 
attests to the strength of the particular ideas that were engaged with the policy debate.  
 I will also stress the more local processes of idea generation and circulation, and 
endogenous learning by developing country policy stakeholders and decision-makers themselves. 
In a world where both epistemic communities and NGOs are more and more organized 
transnationally, it is not easy to distinguish between domestic and external sources of ideas, but a 
distinction is analytically useful. When it comes to developing countries, as with the materialistic 
theories, idea-based ones too tend to have a bias for the influence of globally influential actors 
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(Haas 2001, Keck and Sikkink 2014). Type 4 explanations are therefore scarce for our geography 
of interest and we need more of them. 
 For the neglect of the processes of adaptation of global lessons to locally specific, policy-
relevant knowledge leads to misleading conclusions. Both Drezner (2008) and Paarlberg (2009), 
for example, dismiss the role of epistemic community influence over GMO policy-making 
because of the observed variation in regulatory policies despite what they maintain to be a global 
scientific consensus on the desirability of GMOs. This conclusion is problematic not only 
because it anachronistically projects the emergent (and still contested) scientific consensus about 
the safety of GM food back to the mid-1990s when decision-makers had to formulate regulations 
based on scant scientific data. It also fails to distinguish between purely scientific research and 
“regulatory science” (Jasanoff 1995, Irwin et al 1997, Bonneuil, and Levidow 2012). The latter is 
a hybrid practice responsible for producing an actionable, policy-oriented narrative suitable for 
particular locales and issues, and not all of its proposals can be reduced to imperatives of science 
proper, which operates at a more abstract level.  
Consider the following: Many a GM crop variety contains a “marker” gene (necessary to 
complete the process of transgenesis but not required for the performance of the end product) 
that, as a side-effect, confers resistance to a certain class of antibiotic—kanamycin. Kanamycin 
would be the basis for the next wave of drugs treating tuberculosis; and it is not unreasonable to 
suspect that those drugs could be ineffective on consumers of GM food. Since tuberculosis is no 
longer an important problem either for humans or animals in Europe this need not be a concern 
in EU’s GMO approval procedures. However, even when trying to chart a path close to the EU 
paradigm, Turkish policy-makers would have to form their own judgments because Turkey still 
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fights tuberculosis.16 In such a context, Turkey-based experts, even if they are otherwise of lesser 
academic standing, may become particularly important informers for policy stakeholders and 
decision-makers alike.   
The role of ideas in substituting for missing common knowledge explains the surprising 
efficacy of idea-generating and idea-propagating agents in affecting policy—whom I call as 
epistemic coalitions. Epistemic coalitions consist of scientists, civil society activists and 
bureaucrats working across the state-society divide. They strategically mix selective scientific 
evidence with ideological narratives and social norms to produce convincing truth statements 
over the nature of the policy challenge in question, under conditions of incomplete scientific 
consensus. Epistemic coalitions not only help define normatively oriented preferences. They also 
help actors to adopt causal ideas about what may or may not lead them to those preferences. 
They answer questions such as whether kanamycin resistance is bad for you. They answer 
questions like whether the grains GM seeds generate can be replanted as new seeds. (For 
someone worried about helping farmers to retain control over the seeds they use, the answer to 
this question is consequential for the choice of strategy. If you are convinced that GM seeds are 
biologically sterile, for example, you may want to block GM seed cultivation altogether. If not, 
you may hope to deal with the situation through IPR laws).17 This is what is “epistemic” about 
them, or the reason why they are not simply political coalitions. A lot of people involved with 
                                                 
16 This insight comes from a conversation with Ahmet Atalık from the Turkish Chamber of Agricultural Engineers. 
Also see Atalık’s published note “EFSA Skandalı! GDO’ların Ülkemize Girişi Durdurulmalıdır!”, at the Chamber’s 
website, dated 25 February 2011 and last accessed December 2015, 
http://www.zmo.org.tr/genel/bizden_detay.php?kod=15830&tipi=3&sube=3 . For background, see “Antibiotic 
Resistance Genes: A Threat?” in GMO Compass, http://www.gmo-
compass.org/eng/safety/human_health/46.antibiotic_resistance_genes_threat.html, last accessed December 2015. 
17 GM seeds are not necessarily sterile. However, the situation is complicated, because GM seeds of the future may 
be biologically sterile (through “terminator seed” applications), and that in turn depends on IPR law (i.e. whether the 
current ban on “terminator seeds” will remain in place). The situation is explained in detail in chapter II. 
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this debate are confused about such questions, so epistemic coalitions become important. The 
concept is developed further in Chapter III and reviewed in Chapter XIII. 
 
Research Procedures and the Outline of the Dissertation 
Chapter II is intended to serve as a primer on genetic engineering in agriculture, and the 
extent of the public policy challenges it raises regarding both biosafety and IPR issues. The 
reader should consult it as a reference for the terms of the debate.  
Chapter III lays down the methodology and the analysis, and presents the argument in 
detail. It sets out from a theoretical framework, informed by agricultural economics, that delimits 
the relevant actors, lays down certain expectations about their behavior. The chapter concludes 
by summarizing the observable implications of the theoretical framework, and describing the 
research procedures in detail. 
Starting with Chapter IV, I present individual country cases. For these case studies I 
conducted elite interviews with politicians, bureaucrats, private sector representatives, scientists, 
lawyers and NGO activists. Non-random sampling for elite interviews is recommended when the 
goal is “not … to draw a representative sample in order to use interviews to make generalisations 
about the … full population of relevant actors, but rather to obtain the testimony of individuals 
who were most closely involved in the process of interest” (Tansey 2007). This was precisely my 
goal and I have used a non-random “snowball” (or chain-referral) method wherein each 
interviewee supplied names of other potential interview subjects. Interviews were conducted by 
myself in English as well as the native language of each country, Spanish in Argentina, 
Portuguese in Brazil and Turkish in Turkey. To reconstruct an accurate narrative, interviews 
were triangulated with data from documentary evidence (official documents like parliamentary 
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minutes, law drafts, embassy cables accessed via Wikileaks; memos and reports issued by for-
profit and non-profit civil society organizations), press reports, and secondary literature. Where 
possible I relied directly on publicly available information, and referred to interviews only in 
additional support. Among the sources that I consulted, widely available publications are listed 
as bibliographic entries. Other sources, including press items and Wikileaks cables, are to be 
found in footnotes. A chapter is devoted to India, where I did not conduct original fieldwork, but 
which is studied through secondary literature and online evidence. My data collection operations 
are explained in more detail in Chapter III.  
Lastly, in the conclusion chapter I discuss how findings from country case studies 
challenge and improve the analytical framework laid down in the beginning, comment on 
theoretical lessons and briefly consider policy implications of this study. 
But before going any further the reader may want to know what, of consequence, I have 
found in a nutshell. I have found three things. First, both simplistic pro- and anti-GMO narratives 
are wrong in assuming that the technical characteristics of the technology will solely determine 
its reception and impact. It is the legal-institutional package within which the technology is 
delivered to the markets that affect not only whether the technology will enjoy acceptance, but 
also what kind of social outcomes it will generate once it is adopted. While critical scholars may 
have exaggerated fears concerning corporate ownership of technology, they correctly identify a 
major fault line. In the four countries examined here the biosafety and IPR aspects of 
policymaking have been indeed closely linked, concerns over IPR abuse in a context of 
monopoly have complicated GM crop acceptance, and biosafety concerns in turn have become 
instrumental in challenging IPR claims. The resulting policies defy, to varying extents, the TNC 
vision of how the technology should be deployed in the market. Second, this also attests to the 
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fact that in making their policies developing countries have not simply followed Northern 
examples, or acquiesced to pressure from the same, and instead they have made use of a complex 
international regime that leaves room for policy discretion, with significant attention to pleasing 
their own domestic interest and opinion groups. Against theories of political science (mainstream 
or critical) that accord too much influence to external influences, this calls for an appraisal of 
domestic politics in at least the bigger, more powerful developing countries, and more attention 
to connecting the study of international to comparative politics. The third finding concerns the 
relationship between economic factors and dynamics of civil society activism. Economic 
structure determines the strength of the agricultural producer sector to an important extent, but it 
delimits its interests to a lesser extent. If GMO-skeptic epistemic coalitions can attach 
themselves to producer sector discourse, they may help define those interests. If they do not do 
so, and if the producer sector happens to be strong, they risk being irrelevant. There is an 
intellectual implication: While political science shows little sign that agriculture or farmers exist 
in the world, they actually still mean a lot for especially developing countries’ economies, and 
occasionally they are politically influential. More attention needs to be paid to how agricultural 
producers formulate their political interests, and act or fail to act upon them. 
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CHAPTER II 
GENETIC ENGINEERING IN AGRICULTURE: PROMISES, RISKS AND FEARS 
 
The arguments on the different sides of the debate over the use of genetic engineering in 
agriculture are summarized in Table 4 below, classified in issue areas. For the sake of 
consistency and convenience in presentation I subsume these issues under two broad names: 
biosafety and IPR.  Accordingly, food safety and environmental issues are addressed by the 
“biosafety” policy, and questions of socio-economic organization concerns “IPR” policy. The 
dissertation explores the sources of variation on biosafety and IPR policies across countries, 
presuming that these policies are interdependent yet autonomous. I analyze why some countries 
have more permissive (versus restrictive) biosafety policies towards GM crop cultivation, and 
why some give biotechnology companies stronger (versus weaker) IPR protection opportunities 
vis-à-vis farmers. 
Table 4: Potential benefits and risks in the GMO debate 
Policy  Issue Potential benefits  Potential risks  
Biosafety Food safety Biofortified products 
with enhanced 
nutrition value 
New allergens or toxins, transfer of 
antibiotic resistance, digestion 
difficulties for transgenic DNA and 
RNA  
Environment Reduction in 
chemical inputs, soil 
conservation from 
low-tilling techniques 
Biodiversity loss, ecosystem 
evolution with gene flow and rival 
plant replacement 
IPR Economic 
organization 
Lower prices for 
agricultural products 
and/or higher 
profitability for 
agrifood business 
Farmer dependency on 
biotechnology companies, market 
loss from consumer aversion, 
difficulties in segregation 
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The rest of this chapter introduces the reader to the debate in greater detail, summarizes 
the state of the scientific knowledge over these issues and the international regime constraints 
that apply, with the aim of making the stakes over policy clear. 
 
The Promise of Technology: Productivity Increase and Resilience   
The recombinant deoxyribonucleic acid (r-DNA) technique for genetically engineering 
organisms constitutes a modern biotechnology tool for plant-breeding. Plant breeding is the most 
fundamental agricultural technology. As a result of biological evolution every plant comes in 
varieties and sub-varieties that have different genetic compositions, which give them different 
external traits. Effectively, breeding is the selection of genes that are responsible for certain traits 
from within the gene pool of the plant; however, for most of history this was done without any 
knowledge of the genetics underlying the varietal differences. Farmers would plant many 
different seeds (or roots), select the best of the appearing progeny and then replant their seeds (or 
roots), and so on. Genetic engineering, on the other hand, signifies an ability to do selection on 
the molecular level, making breeding work more precise and much faster. Its roots go back to the 
discovery of Mendelian principles of genetic inheritance in 1865, after which specialized 
breeders were able to purposefully “cross” two different varietal lines, each displaying a 
desirable trait that the other did not, in order to obtain a progeny that would display both. This 
could still take a lot of trial-and-error time because the transfer of the desired genetics was an 
issue of considerable luck.  
The invention of r-DNA technique in the 1970s started the age of modern genetic 
engineering. It is now possible, in a lab, to isolate the fragments of DNA expressing the genes 
that carry a desired trait in one plant variety, split the DNA molecule of another variety or plant 
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with other desired traits, and then combine the two partial DNA molecules into a single new 
DNA molecule, which can then be incorporated into desired plant varieties. A complete 
transformation in this way is called a genetic “event;” and the method used to achieve it is 
“transgenesis.” The whole process is what we refer to as “genetic engineering” or “genetic 
modification,” and its product a “GMO.” Food and pharmaceuticals that are derived from GMOs 
are referred to by the adjectives “GM,” “transgenic,” or “biotech”.  Because it is a complicated 
job to develop a working genetic event, and because they express traits that can be of economic 
value, developers typically seek IPR protection for genetic events through patents. 
When used in containment, as for industrial enzymes and drugs, GMOs have been subject 
of relatively little dispute. GM agricultural crops to be released to the environment, however, 
have caused great controversy. While conventional breeding could only cross sexually 
compatible plants; transgenesis can transfer genes from a broader range of sources, even from 
outside the plant kingdom—bacteria, for example. For the developers of this technology, this 
signifies unprecedented capabilities in plant-breeding. An important application would be the 
development of biofortified food, the most famous example so far being the “golden rice.” Rice 
is the staple food for poor people in large parts of Asia, and developing rice varieties with 
improved vitamin A and iron content could be highly desirable since the deficiency in these 
micronutrients are major causes of illness in that part of the world. As the necessary genes for 
such an improvement were not available in the rice gene pool, they had to be introduced from 
elsewhere through genetic engineering.18 Other improvements are for agronomic purposes. Traits 
enabling increased yields and better drought, heat, or virus resistance could be crucial in keeping 
agricultural output robust and consumer prices low as we adapt to climate change and further 
                                                 
18 Potrykus (2001), 
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population increase; and genetic engineering increases the range of expected gains on these 
scores compared to what could be achieved with conventional breeding.19  
In the two decades following their first release around 1995, the majority of commercial 
genetic engineering applications have been biased for improvements that are less visible to those 
outside the sphere of agricultural production: reductions in farm operation costs and management 
time as well as the use of certain toxic chemicals. Among these improvements, insect resistance 
trait—called Bt after the bacteria (Bacillus thuringiensis) from which the insecticidal proteins are 
derived—aims to enable pest management with fewer chemical pesticide applications. Herbicide 
tolerance (HT) trait allows farmers to freely use glyphosate or glufosinate for weed management, 
which are broad-spectrum herbicides that encourage the adoption of low-tilling techniques with 
salutary impacts for soil quality.20 Incorporated into three crops with wide industrial uses—
soybeans for protein, corn for energy and cotton for fiber; these two traits have dominated the 
contribution of genetic engineering to world agriculture so far. In 2012, among all GM crops 
planted worldwide, 59% were HT, 15% were Bt, and 26% were “stacked,” expressing both traits 
at once due to multiple genetic transformations.21 Tables 5 and 6 show the distribution in terms 
of crops.  
 
                                                 
19 Dr. Edmeades, a former leader of the maize drought program at the International Maize and Wheat Improvement 
Center (CIMMYT) estimates that for commercial maize, conventional breeding can deliver a yield increase from 
better drought tolerance of around 1.4% yearly over the next two decades. If complemented with marker-assisted 
selection (a modern biotechnology tool that increases precision in genetic material identification for both transgenic 
and conventional breeding) this could go up to 2%. Based on private company claims of performance, and assuming 
one new transgene will be available every eight year, transgenesis would lift this to 2.7%. See Edmeades (2012: 
240). 
20 For most crops, some tillage to prepare the soil for planting is necessary. Excessive tillage, however, increases the 
susceptibility to soil erosion, causing environmental damage that can last for centuries; and reduced tillage is 
encouraged for soil conservation benefits. Because weed control can be done with HT crops during the post-
emergence phase, farmers can use direct-seeding techniques and the need for pre-seeding tillage is much reduced. 
See Sanvido et al (2007) for details. On the toxicity of glyphosate, see Arancibia (2013) for dissenting views. 
21 James (2012: 216). 
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Table 5: Common GM Crops in 2012 
Crop 
Million 
hectares 
% of total GM 
crop area 
Soybeans (HT) 80.7 47.4 
Corn (stacked) 39.9 23.4 
Cotton (Bt) 18.8 11 
Canola (HT) 9.2 5.4 
Corn (HT) 7.8 4.6 
Corn (Bt) 7.5 4.4 
Cotton (stacked) 3.7 2.2 
Cotton (HT) 1.8 1.1 
Others 0.9 0.5 
Total 170.3 100 
 
Source: James (2012) 
 
Table 6: Share of GM varieties in major crops22 
Crop 
GM area 
in 2012 
(million 
hectares) 
Global 
area in 
2009 
(million 
hectares) 
GM as % 
of global 
area 
Soybeans 80.7 100 81 
Corn 55.1 159 35 
Cotton 24.3 30 81 
 
Source: James (2012) 
In a meta-analysis of 63 studies covering the impacts of the two main GM crop traits and 
three of the main GM crops produced worldwide Areal et al (2012) conclude that GM crops 
perform better than their conventional counterparts with respect to absolute differences in yield 
and input costs, although the average improvement comes with remarkable regional variation, 
allowing for net losses from GM crops in certain settings. These findings echo the overall 
favorable evaluation in Smale et al’s (2009) review. The agronomic gains (by way of pesticide 
                                                 
22 Note that the third column should be a slight overestimation, since it relies on data in the first two columns, which 
come from different years. 
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reduction and/or yield increase) from the Bt trait for insect resistance are especially well 
documented, as would be seen in Finger et al’s (2011) meta-analysis in this area.23 While these 
early applications represent only a part of what this platform technology can deliver, the 
sustainability of the agronomic advantages documented at the earlier stage of the technology is 
not to be taken granted at the face of the wider ecological changes they are bringing about, 
either.24 Still, for all we know, it is reasonable to define GM seeds as a potentially productivity-
enhancing technology. It has been estimated that, although limited in application, GM crops 
increased crop production value by $20 billions for the year 2011.25 The would-be adoption of 
GM rice in China alone could contribute $4 billions annually.26 The non-agricultural reader 
should not mistake these values to be small, as they are improvements at the margin only. (By 
comparison, the world’s largest producer and exporter USA has an annual agricultural GDP of 
around $150 billions). In short, GM crops represent a potentially productivity-enhancing 
technology. 
 
Concerns: Food Safety, Biodiversity, and Economic Organization 
However, GM crops have also raised skepticism and opposition. Concerns have been 
expressed in three issue areas: food safety (is eating GMOs safe for humans?), environmental 
                                                 
23 The rapid spread of HT seeds, on the other hand, is somewhat puzzling. In a study conducted for the Fernandez-
Cornejo and McBride (2002) suggest that its main attraction to farmers seem to be reduction in sheer (farm and 
labor) management time without necessarily decreasing costs. Nevertheless, the cost is a function of the prices for 
glyphosate and the glyphosate-resistant seed. Fernandez-Cornejo and McBride’s (2002) study examines USA at a 
time where both of these inputs enjoyed IPR protection and high prices. In other places and other times, the price 
was significantly lower (as documented in the chapter on Argentina below) hence HT seeds probably functioned as a 
cost-reducing technology for farmers there. 
24 Furthermore, note the reservations about the methodology of impact studies reviewed in these meta-analyses 
(Stone 2012). 
25 Brookes and Barfoot (2013) 
26 Hareau et al (2005). 
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impacts (is growing GM crops safe for the environment?), and socioeconomic organization (who 
will reap the economic benefits from the improvements, and will anybody lose?). 
With regards to food safety, it has been feared that new allergens and toxins can be 
introduced to the food chain by GMOs. Corn incorporating genes from Brazilian nut has been 
barred from human consumption for this reason, since those with an allergy to the Brazilian nut 
could then develop allergic reactions to the corn.27 How demanding the safety tests required to 
monitor such plausible risks before approving a GMO for human or animal consumption is a 
source of disagreement since tests consume time and resources. Furthermore, it has been 
conjectured that the transgressing of previously natural boundaries of gene flow, and with novel 
instruments, might be changing the organisms in ways that we do not fully understand, exposing 
consumers to unmonitored risks—or “unknown unknowns,” as it has been called. For some on 
the anti-GMO camp, this amounts to adequate reason to ban the GMOs altogether. Many others 
would like the freedom to choose if they want to consume GM food or not; however, facilitating 
this freedom can take huge market coordination and regulation efforts, since it requires identity 
preservation systems in agrifood production to make sure that GM and non-GM materials are not 
mixing. Even where in place, such systems do not guarantee complete identity preservation—
“adventitious presence” is almost always a reality. Many national jurisdictions require distinctive 
labels to identify food items that may include in their ingredients more than a certain fraction 
(such as 0.9%) of GM material (of the varieties approved in that jurisdiction). Those advocating 
for greater acceptance of GMOs argue that once a product has been approved by regulatory 
authorities as safe for consumption, labeling serves nothing more than an unnecessary growth in 
logistical difficulties and costs; and that it attaches a sense of inferiority for GM products where 
                                                 
27 See Streit et al (2001). 
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no such thing has been documented. In many food retail markets there is indeed a premium price 
for non-GM items and farmers supplying them have to be careful in keeping their production 
GM-free.28 This is not very easy, nonetheless: the seeds of GM crops can travel with the wind as 
any seed does and “contaminate” fields dedicated to the production of non-GM varieties of the 
same crop; which brings us to the question of ecosystem behavior.  
In this area, the principal concern is the impact of GM crops on biodiversity. Biodiversity 
is essential for the resilience of any ecosystem. The decline in biodiversity especially in areas 
that constitute a given crop’s historic center of origin may mean the loss of valuable genetic 
material that could have supported future improvements for that crop (and possibly in 
pharmaceuticals). GM crops, apart from contaminating non-targeted commercial fields, may also 
cross with wild crop relatives, leading either to the demise of certain plants or the alteration of 
wild plant ecology. For example, a herbicide-tolerant GM crop could confer this property to an 
otherwise undesirable weed, producing a “superweed” that drives out competing plants. Together 
with such unintended colonization of the gene pool; the commercial spread of GM varieties may 
lead to a reduction in the diversity of crop varieties grown, resulting in a decline in biodiversity.  
It should be noted that the relationship of GM crops to biodiversity is essentially 
reflective of the modus operandi of industrial monoculture at large. Where modern commercial 
breeding and capitalist farming are practiced, traditional varieties and “landraces” found in 
dispersed localities are often replaced with a single commercially popular variety, and this 
should be of concern whether it be GM or not.29 Debates in this area center on the question just 
how different the challenge should be in protecting wild plants from non-GM modern varieties as 
opposed to protecting them from GM crops that may or may not display particular survival 
                                                 
28 Jayson et al (2005). 
29 Tripp (2009b: 11-12). 
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advantages due to their genetically engineered traits.30 Before approving a GM crop for 
cultivation in their territory, national jurisdictions require field trials to see how it would behave 
in the local ecosystems of interest. The scale and length of these trials, again, are a point of 
dispute since they are a costly regulatory hurdle on the way to commercialization. Another point 
of dispute is the segregation distance between fields planted with GM crops and surrounding 
fields—required to limit the interaction of GM crops with their environment and thus slowdown 
the emergence of new generations of insects that are immune to the insecticidal trait expressed 
by a widely used GM crop. In approving the cultivation of GM crops, regulatory authorities 
would typically specify such distances, but enforcement is incompletely done in many 
jurisdictions. 
What do the scientists now know about the biosafety risks noted so far? On food safety 
Nicolia et al (2013) note that “[t]he EU funded more than 50 research programs in 2001– 2010, 
for a total budget of 200 million euros, with the intent to gain new scientific evidence addressing 
the public concern on the safety of GE [genetically engineered] crops. A summary report of these 
programs highlighted that the use of biotechnology and of GE plants per se does not imply 
higher risks than classical breeding methods or production technologies (European Commission, 
2010)”.31 When it comes to environmental impacts, the picture seems more mixed. In a review of 
847 scientific papers published during 2002-12 examining the interaction of GM crops with the 
                                                 
30 Engels et al (2006). 
31 Emphasis mine. Nicolia et al (2013) conclude the following about particular risks. About the safety of the 
transgenic DNA inserted into food: The ingestion of transgenic DNA does not imply higher risks than ingestion of 
any other type of DNA because transgenic DNA is digested like any other DNA and horizontal gene transfer of 
transgenic DNA into gastrointestinal bacteria (which could transfer antibiotic resistance) is an extremely rare event. 
About the digestion of transgenic RNA, however, resistance to digestion has been found, and this may be a cause of 
concern, even if, again, statistically rare. About the safety of the proteins encoded by the transgenes: Only two cases 
are known about the potential allergenicity of transgenic proteins, the verified case of the brazil-nut storage protein 
in soybean, which has not been marketed; and the not (positively or negatively) verified case of maize Starlink. The 
authors also note that nutritional equivalence between non-GM and biofortified GM food cannot be assumed from 
substantial equivalence, that 90 day rodent tests are required to establish this, and such studies have been few in 
number.  
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environment; and from which they derive conclusions that are largely supportive of GM 
technology, Nicolia et al (2013) summarize the following impacts: Little or no evidence of 
negative effects of GM crops on non-target species like birds or snakes are reported. Undesirable 
resistance buildup to the transgenic trait among the targeted population has been reported in 
several settings, resulting in glyphosate-resistant weeds and Bt-resistant insects. Gene flow from 
GM crops to both other crops and wild plant relatives has been documented. Hybrid fitness, 
determining the ability of the emerging plants to survive in the wild, varies on a case-by-case 
basis. The resulting pest-resistant wild plant populations are a cause for concern.  
For our purposes it is crucial to note that these scientific data, which have accumulated 
over the course of the last two decades, were largely unavailable in c. 1995, when the need to 
formulate public policies appeared with the commercial release of GM seeds. Stakeholders and 
public decision-makers could reasonably expect both agronomic productivity enhancement from 
the adoption of GM seeds, and associated biosafety safety risks, whose magnitude and exact 
nature were difficult to predict.  
Uncertainty over potential gains and risks was further increased by concerns over a third 
issue area: the potential impacts of growing GM crops on the organization of the agricultural 
economy. Complications in this area mostly stem from the fact that skills for genetic engineering 
are quite scarce and the majority of the commercially available plant genetic transformation 
events have been developed by a few transnational corporations (TNCs) headquartered in the 
Global North. Data shown in Table 7 by the UN Conference on Trade and Development is 
illustrative. Of all transgenic events approved worldwide by national biosafety institutions for 
commercial release by 2005, 85 percent belonged to four firms. The US-based Monsanto alone 
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owned more than half.32 Also noticeable is the importance of company takeovers. In fact, King 
and Schimmelfennig (2005) calculated that 70 per cent of the agricultural biotechnology patents 
held by the top six firms in the USA were obtained through mergers and acquisitions, rather than 
developed by in-house research. 
Table 7: Plant genetic transformation events approved for release, 1992-2005, by subsidiary and 
parent company 
 
Corporation 
Number of 
approvals 
Share in total 
approvals 
Monsanto   35 52% 
Monsanto 22     
Calgene 9     
Asgrow 1     
DeKalb 2     
Upjohn 1     
Bayer Crop Sciences   15 22% 
Aventis 3     
AgrEvo 10     
Agritope 1     
Plant Genetic Systems 1     
Syngenta    3 4% 
Syngenta  1     
Novartis Seeds 1     
Northrup King 1     
Dow   4 6% 
Other   10 15% 
Total   67 100% 
 
Source: UNCTAD (2006) 
Such is the degree of horizontal consolidation. Vertical integration, in which 
biotechnology firms acquire firms developing and marketing particular seed varieties, is also 
relevant. A transgenic event is worthless if not incorporated into seed varieties that are prized by 
farmers in a given ecosystem. (You do not want any insect-resistant cotton; you want your best 
                                                 
32 These data on approved events, while already striking, underestimate the monopoly position enjoyed by 
Monsanto. In some individual countries and for individual crops Monsanto has been the only source, for a long time, 
of the commercially available transgenic events. 
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cotton to be also insect-resistant, among its other qualities). Biotech and seed companies can 
cooperate through license agreements or form joint ventures to put the transgenes into the seeds. 
But with full integration, the biotech industry can hope to better integrate research priorities up- 
and down-stream, better command the value chain by internalizing principal-agent interactions 
and prevent leakages in IPR enforcement, and link biotech products to a package of other 
agricultural inputs in order to maximize profits at the product distribution phase.33 In the case of 
Brazil, for example, most private domestic seed industry was taken over by the biotech TNCs in 
a few years when this country emerged as an important potential user of GM seeds. The major 
deals leading to this outcome are seen in Table 8 below.   
Table 8: Seed company acquisitions in Brazil, 1998-2000 
Buyer 
(parent) Deal description 
Monsanto On 24 November 1997 (closing date of the transaction) Monsanto acquired 
Sementes Agroceres (Brazil) for an undisclosed amount. The acquisition 
brought a company with 30 per cent of the corn seed market in Brazil, one of 
the top corn seed markets in the world.  
On 29 June 1998 (date of announcement) Monsanto declared its intention to 
buy Cargill's International Seed Operations in Central and Latin America 
(Brazil).  
Dow On 7 August 2000 (closing date) Dow Chemical, through its subsidiary Dow 
AgroSciences, acquired Empresa Brasileira de Sementes from AstraZeneca and 
Advanta to strengthen its efforts to build a global network market and 
commercialize seed and biotechnology traits in Brazil.  
On 20 April 1998 (date of announcement) Mycogen (controlled by Dow 
Chemicals Dow AgroSciences) agreed to acquire Dinamilho Carol Productos 
Agricolas Ltda (Brazil) to establish global corn and oil-seed business through 
which to commercialize crop enhancement products.  
On 14 September 1998 (date of announcement), Dow Chemical, through 
Mycogen, agreed to buy Hibridos Colorado and FT Bio-genetica (Brazil). The 
deal, combined with the previous acquisition of Dinamilho Carol Productos, 
allowed Mycogen to become a significant player in the rapidly growing 
Brazilian seed market.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
33 Goldsmith (2001). 
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Bayer/ 
Aventis  
19 November 1998 (closing date), Hoechst Schering AgrEvo GmbH, a unit of 
Hoechst AG (then incorporated into Bayer AG/Aventis Cropscience), acquired 
Granja 4 Irmaos SA, the largest producer in Brazil of rice seeds.  
On 1 May 1999, Hoechst Schering Agrevo GmbH acquired the Brazilian seed 
companies Sementes Ribeiral Ltda and Sementes Fartura Ltda, as well as the 
corn research company Mitla Pesquisa Agricola Ltda, Brazil.  
DuPont/ 
Pioneer  
On 22 March 1999 (closing date), DuPont, through its subsidiary Pioneer Hi- 
Bred International, acquired Dois Macros in Brazil to enhance its soybean lines 
worldwide.  
 
Source: UNCTAD (2006) 
Brazil is not an exceptional case in this regard. Through similar acquisitions in major 
agricultural producer countries, biotech companies have established themselves as the new 
masters of the seed market. By 2006, Monsanto, Dupont and Syngenta were estimated to control 
44 percent of the global commercial seed market (worth $8.5 billions annually)—see table 9 
below. Ten years earlier none of them would appear in a list of top ten seed companies; they 
were simply not part of the business then.34  
Table 9: World's top 10 seed companies, 2006 
Company 
2006 seed revenues 
(US$ millions) 
1) Monsanto (US) $4,028  
2) Dupont (US) $2,781  
3) Syngenta (Switzerland) $1,743  
4) Groupe Limagrain (France) $1,035  
5) Land O'Lakes (US) $756  
6) KWS AG (Germany) $615  
7) Bayer Crop Science (Germany) $430  
8) Delta & Pine Land (US) $418  
9) Sakata (Japan) $401  
10) DLF-Trifolium (Denmark) $352  
 
Source: ETC Group35 
                                                 
34 Compare with the 1996 list at http://www.etcgroup.org/content/worlds-top-10-seed-corporations.  
35 The list is available online at http://www.etcgroup.org/content/top-ten-seed-companies-2007 (last accessed 
September 2014).  
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Horizontal and vertical consolidation in the upstream of agricultural biotechnology 
supply has raised among skeptics the concern that the qualities and the pricing of the available 
GM crop technology might serve (as monopoly theory would predict) rent-maximization motives 
on the part of the technology supplier more than the welfare of the farmers or the consumers, and 
that even if resulting in net total welfare gains, this pro-industry development may not be worth 
taking the GMO-related risks noted above. Facing limited competition, biotechnology pioneers 
chose to focus first on developing GM traits suited to their specific commercial interests; like 
Monsanto’s Roundup Ready trait that makes a crop resistant to Roundup, a glyphosate-based 
herbicide sold by the firm, thus encouraging the greater application of this particular herbicide as 
opposed to others. As a result, genetic traits of direct interest to consumers, like biofortification, 
have been neglected; and as for the fall in consumer prices expected from other traits, it cannot 
be taken for granted as it would be a function of the profits retained in the biotechnology and 
farming sectors. Nelson et al. (1999), for example, calculated that full adoption of GM corn and 
GM soy around the world would result in no more than a 4.9 percent price reduction for corn and 
a 1.7 percent price reduction for soybeans. For the farmers, the concern is over the possibility of 
getting squeezed between high prices for GM seeds whose superior agronomic performance in 
particular ecosystems cannot be guaranteed, and a consumer market with considerable aversion 
to GM products. The impact assessments that document higher (in average) yields from GM 
seeds also note that “[f]indings clearly point to the hypothesis that arrangements for supplying 
seed and purchasing the product … affect … farm [profitability] impacts” (Smale et al 2009).36  
In other words, while farmers can reasonably expect to obtain superior agronomic 
performance from GM seeds, they cannot be confident that this will make their business more 
                                                 
36 Also see Demont et al (2007) and Raney (2006) for supportive assessments. 
 50 
profitable (even in static terms) unless they can access the seeds in favorable terms. With regards 
to access, many farmers dislike the encroachment on their seed reproduction practices by IPR 
(and possibly, biological) restrictions brought by GM seeds. It has been feared that with the 
introduction of GM seeds farmers will not be able to replant harvested seed, and will be 
dependent on the biotech TNCs for continuous seed supply. For these reasons, some national 
jurisdictions require an evaluation of farmer vulnerability in their approval regulations for GM 
crop cultivation. The rationality of this requirement is disputed by those who insist that farmers 
would not adopt seeds that would harm them economically. 
Legal and biological barriers to farmers’ unauthorized reproduction of seeds are 
illustrated in the figure 3 below, and it will be seen that GM seeds do bring new restrictions in 
this area, although there are restrictions that apply regardless of whether the seeds are GM or not.  
 
Figure 3: Legal and biological barriers to the reproduction of seeds 
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The figure visualizes the following facts: It is possible for farmers to reproduce seeds 
from the product of their harvest, unless the original seeds were of the “hybrid” kind, which give 
greater yield but no replantable offspring—and which may be genetically engineered or not. 
Regardless, commercial seeds are protected by legal instruments of intellectual property 
protection such as plant variety protection (PVP) acts, which may prevent farmers from 
reproducing seeds without remunerating the original seed supplier for each subsequent harvest. 
All of this already applied to seed markets prior to the advent of genetic engineering. What the 
latter introduces as novelty in this area is of two kinds. One is biological: “Terminator seeds,” 
properly called as GURT, are seeds that are genetically engineered so as to make their harvest 
biologically sterile and prevent unauthorized reproduction by farmers, and GURT-ification can 
extend to crop varieties for which conventional hybridization was not practically possible (such 
as soy or wheat). Contrary to the beliefs of many anti-GMO activists, GURT is not legal 
anywhere for the time being; and GM seeds can thus be successfully replanted (to repeat, unless 
they are hybrids). Contrary to what has been implied in some pro-GMO writing, though, 
terminator seeds is not a myth or “hoax” either—both the US Department of Agriculture and the 
private companies it cooperated with to develop GURT technology explicitly want it to be 
liberated, and they have already co-written law drafts to make this possible. The second novelty 
genetic engineering introduces is legal, as it opens the way for patent protection. As per the 1995 
TRIPS agreement, WTO member countries have to grant patents for genetic transformation 
events, and this provides the legal basis for the biotechnology companies’ royalty claims on GM 
seeds (which embody patented genetic transformation in their DNA) sold in those countries. An 
industrial patent is a stronger instrument of intellectual property protection than PVP, so patent 
protection helps in ratcheting up IPR standards in this area. Among all these restrictions on 
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farmer’s freedom to reproduce seeds, biological restrictions apply similarly everywhere on our 
planet, whereas legal instruments may come in variations, depending on how countries choose to 
translate the requirements of TRIPS and other agreements into domestic law. In other words, 
what kind of restrictions GM seeds imply for farming practices, while partly determined by 
technical characteristics, is in good part endogenous to policy.  
To fully understand the nature of these restrictions I will present below a somewhat 
technical discussion of how seed provision and use works, since there is much confusion over 
these questions even within the agricultural policy circles. Readers interested in a lesser level of 
detail can have one more glance at the figure above and jump to the next section of this chapter 
for a summary of the policy challenges of interest to this research.  
 
A Closer View of IPR Issues Relating to GM Seeds 
Biological and Institutional Foundations of Seed Markets 
The property claims on GM seeds are part of a relatively recent history of progressive 
commodification of agricultural inputs. Well into the twentieth century, seed was not alienated 
from its user. Farmers would save, exchange, and replant seeds themselves—using “bin-run 
seed” as it is called among American farmers. The difficulties associated with effective seed 
saving meant that particularly skilled farmers would find themselves specializing to some extent 
in multiplying and providing seeds to their neighbors, but there was no market robust enough for 
the establishment of non-farm seed industry.  
A major change came when technological advancement (hybridization) helped the 
corporate sector overcome biological barriers to market development in an important staple crop 
(corn). Corn, just like rye and millet, is a cross-pollinated (allogamous) plant that can 
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“outbreed”: each kernel on an ear of corn may be fertilized with a pollen from a different plant; 
as opposed to self-pollinated (autogamous) crops like wheat or soy that predominantly 
“inbreed”.37 The sexual promiscuity of corn frustrated breeders’ efforts, because it meant that 
any varietal improvement would be permanently lost in a plant generation since each plant was a 
new genetic mix. In the early twentieth century American breeders discovered that by isolating 
inbred corn plants, pure genetic lines could be obtained and certain combinations of these could 
create hybrids that dramatically outyield the source population, a quality called as “hybrid vigor” 
(heterosis). The problem with hybrid vigor was that although the first hybrid cross (F1) was a 
great improvement, the subsequent generations (F2, F3, …) would be increasingly uneven in 
yield, making it necessary to go back to the original combination of the inbred parental lines 
each year. Hence, the farmer could not simply reproduce seeds with hybrid vigor in the field as 
part of the crop growing process. Seed production had to be specialized at the hands of agents 
who kept the inbred parental lines intact (which were therefore maintained as industrial secrets) 
and crossed them anew to produce F1 hybrids for each growing season.
38 By creating a 
permanent market for seed, hybrid vigor thus opened way to the dominance of corporate 
enterprise in crop breeding and seed provision. Because hybrid corn outperformed (in yield) 
available open-pollinated corn varieties, it spread rapidly among farmers after its 
commercialization in 1930s despite the much higher price for the seed and in a couple of decades 
all corn grown in the USA was hybrid. The spread of hybrid corn, incidentally, was also a 
                                                 
37 There is no universal agreement on this terminology. See Tripp (2001: 27-28) and Simmons (1979) for details. 
Also note that after the hybrid revolution, calling any non-hybrid plant variety that breeds true to type as an “open-
pollinated variety” (OPV, as in a wheat OPV) became common parlance within the agricultural community, 
although this seems somewhat misleading as far as the biological basis of plant sexuality is concerned. 
38 On the details of heterosis, see Kloppenburg (1988: 91-129) and Lipton and Longhurst (1989: 39-42). 
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landmark for social sciences, since the attention given to it marked the birth of the sociology39 
and the economics40 of technology diffusion.  
However, the commodification of corn seed, while repeated for sugar beats and sorghum, 
cannot be applied in the same manner to all crops, because heterosis is difficult to achieve with 
naturally inbreeding plants like wheat, rice, soybeans, cotton, barley, or oats.41 For these crops, 
instead of hybrids, farmers continue to save and use seeds that “breed true” (maintain the desired 
traits) when replanted for many generations; keeping the biological barrier to market formation 
intact. To abolish this barrier, private industry has recourse to legal instruments of intellectual 
property rights (IPR) protection. If particular seed varieties are recognized as intellectual 
property, then market institutions can be constructed to either prevent the farmers from saving 
seeds or to remunerate the developers of the property for the seeds saved. This would ensure a 
steady financial return to seed development, and establish a pecuniary incentive for continued 
private investment in this area. 
 
Instruments of Intellectual Property Protection 
Until the genetic engineering revolution, plant variety protection (PVP) remained as the 
legal instrument most relevant to property relations over the seed, since industrial patents were 
typically not applicable to plants and other living organisms. An international convention, called 
UPOV, supports the national PVP acts. The first UPOV was adopted in 1961 and it has since 
been updated several times, becoming progressively stricter in the protection granted to the 
                                                 
39 Ryan and Gross (1943). 
40 Grilliches (1957). 
41 The distinction is not ironclad. Although the production of hybrid cotton is an extremely labor-intensive job that is 
generally deemed uneconomical; hybrid cotton is widely used in India because the seed industry there finds the costs 
manageable. 
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upstream players. Currently, member states can opt either for the 1978 or the 1991 version. In 
the former, “farmer’s privilege” (to save protected seeds for self-use purposes) is recognized, in 
the latter it is left to the discretion of national law. In the former, “researcher’s exemption” (to 
use protected material for research purposes) is recognized, the latter specifies limits to the 
exploitation of “essentially derived varieties” (varieties derived from other protected varieties). 
The former prohibits “double protection” of plants in national law, meaning that any species 
eligible for PVP protection cannot be patented. The latter, formulated in the context of the 
incipient GM revolution, permits such protection; and extends the minimum protection term 
from 15 to 20 years. Progressively stricter protection has been the norm in most national 
legislation too, reflecting the growing power of the plant breeding and seed industry. In the USA, 
the farmer’s privilege was practically eliminated with an amendment to the PVP Act in 1994.42 
Of course, the effective enforcement of IPR requires public and private policing (in the USA, for 
example, Pinkerton detectives have been employed to monitor farmers) as well as civil 
association for market coordination; and practical results may diverge from the legal fiction 
significantly in some settings.  
For late developing countries, coordinated international efforts at improving crop quality 
in sub-tropical and tropical climes, amounting to what has been called a Green Revolution, have 
complemented domestic activities. The efforts started in the 1950s with the introduction of US 
corn hybrids to Central America and East Africa. A more publicized wave came in 1960s with 
the development of highly fertilizer-responsive “dwarf” varieties of wheat primarily in Mexico, 
India, and Pakistan and of rice in East Asia. The work was done at International Agricultural 
Research Centers (IARCs), which were later brought together under the Consultative Group on 
                                                 
42 See Dutfield (2003: 187-191) on plant variety protection. 
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International Agricultural Research (CGIAR)—an organization comprising private organizations 
like the Ford Foundation together with international agencies the UNDP and the FAO as well as 
nation-state governments. The Green Revolution did come to serve market formation on the part 
of Northern industrial interests by increasing the demand for chemical fertilizers and so on, but 
in a context of widespread revolutionary insurgency in the third world, the immediate concerns 
centered around development, not profits. The new varieties were shared nonexclusively with 
national research institutions, which then typically distributed them to farmers through public 
seed provision networks. Research had a certain bias for non-hybrid varieties so that farmers 
could replant the seeds, although many hybrids were also developed.43  
The predominance of public investment and support from non-profit international 
organizations would not last forever. In many developing countries private firms have been 
encouraged by the state to substitute public involvement in first seed distribution and marketing, 
then in seed production, and then breeding work; first with a bias for domestic industry and then 
with a more liberal approach. Turkey eliminated seed import restrictions in 1984.44 India did so 
in 1988, provided that this would finally lead to technology transfer in the form of breeder 
seed/parental lines but eliminated that proviso too in 2002.45 China still maintains significant 
trade restrictions and requires that foreign investment in the development and production of seed 
varieties must be limited to minority shareholder status in joint ventures with Chinese partners.46 
                                                 
43 The Green Revolution aimed at and succeeded in increasing grain yields and preventing the neo-Malthussian 
“population bomb” scenarios in circulation at the time from becoming a reality. More vaguely defined goals towards 
poverty- and inequality-reduction have also been associated with this enterprise, yet such goals remained elusive. 
See Conway and Barbie (1988) and Lipton and Longhurst (1989). 
44 Kizilaslan and Onurlubas (2010). 
45 Murugkar et al (2006). 
46 Linton and Torsekar (2011). 
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In these settings, as (national or transnational) private industry gained the upper hand in seed 
development and provision, the resort to IPR has become increasingly important.  
 
The Novelty of GM Seeds: “Terminator Seeds,” Patents and Higher IPR Standards  
In short, the global history of seed markets has been one in which the means of 
production has been subjected to the industrial capital accumulation cycle through purposeful 
technological and institutional change.47 Genetic engineering pushes the frontier for private 
property relations over the seed in several ways. Because GM varieties are more likely to be 
accepted as human inventions, stronger levels of IPR protection like patents can be relied on 
against unauthorized reproduction. Also, r-DNA methods allow engineering any plant to make 
its offspring unable to germinate, completely abolishing the biological barriers previously left 
ajar by heterosis. Dubbed as “terminator seeds” by opponents, Genetic Use Restriction 
Technology (GURT) is the neutral adjective for such varieties. Various types of GURT have 
been developed so far, including one in which the reproductive faculties of the second generation 
seed can be switched on by the farmer by applying a particular chemical that would be purchased 
as part of the seed package. The rationale of GURT is preventing the unauthorized reproduction 
of proprietary seeds by pirating seed firms or seed-saving farmers, given the unreliability of legal 
and administrative IPR measures in doing so. The biotechnology industry also highlights the 
notion that this technology can diminish undesirable gene flow from GM to non-GM plant 
varieties.48  
A patent on GURT was obtained in the USA in 1998 jointly by the US Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) and Delta & Pine Land, then the world’s biggest cotton seeds company 
                                                 
47 Kloppenburg (1988) is the seminal treatment of this subject. 
48 Kesan (2007). 
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(now owned by Monsanto), yet no GURT seeds have made their way into the market anywhere 
in the world even as of this writing. This has been because of the uproar generated by the GMO-
skeptic activists who find GURT unacceptable, leading to a recommendation by the FAO for a 
moratorium on GURT, which was adopted in the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) in 
2000.49  
From the industry’s viewpoint, though, the desired endpoint of technology development 
is no doubt commercialization, and the first move to secure a beachhead has already been made 
in Brazil through the introduction of a legislative bill—first proposed in 2009 and recirculated in 
2013—to overturn the country’s ban on GURT. A spokesperson from AgroBio, the association 
for promoting GMOs in Brazil, comments that the ban on the GURTs was a concession the 
industry had to make to push for the legalization of the GMOs in the country, but the time to 
move forward has now come, at least for non-food crops like eucalyptus trees.50 Skeptics fear 
that this could be the first step on a slippery slope towards eliminating the ban altogether in 
Brazil, and undermining the international moratorium in the future meetings of the CBD. 
According to a representative from the USDA, the public involvement in the development of the 
GURT was from the beginning aimed at making the technology “widely licensed and made 
expeditiously available to many seed companies,” in order “to increase the value of proprietary 
seed owned by US seed companies and to open up markets in Second and Third World 
countries”.51 While industry competition dynamics would imply that it is not the only plausible 
scenario; as IPR expert Dutfield reminds, “the market for crop seeds to be dominated by a small 
                                                 
49 “Introduction to Terminator Technology,” http://www.banterminator.org/The-Issues/Introduction, last accessed 
April 2014. 
50 Author’s interviews, Sao Paulo, March 2013. Also see Filomeno (2014: 89). 
51 USDA spokesman Willard Phelps quoted in http://www.etcgroup.org/content/us-patent-new-genetic-technology-
will-prevent-farmers-saving-seed, posted 30 March 1998, last accessed April 2014. 
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number of large firms producing only GURT seeds” (2007: 301) in the future is a scenario that 
has to be evaluated seriously. GURT, contrary to what has been claimed, is not a “hoax”.52 
For the time being, though, GURT is not on the market; and technically GM seeds can be 
replanted. (To be exact, this may apply even to some hybrid varieties: the underperforming 
second generations of hybrid GM seeds are saved and replanted by small farmers who may find 
it more profitable than purchasing them anew on the legal market for exorbitant prices).53 Hence, 
the legal and administrative realm of IPR continues to be crucial to the struggle over the 
appropriation of seed. Redesigning the legal realm is not being done in isolated domestic 
settings. Agricultural biotechnology firms have enjoyed diplomatic support as well as cross-
sectoral business solidarity among TNCs in their advocacy for patent rights over plant genetics. 
The culmination of these efforts has been the conclusion of the Agreement on Trade Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) in 1995, as part of the establishment of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO). TRIPS establishes higher global standards for the recognition 
of patent rights and their enforcement without discrimination against foreign patent owners. In 
relation to biotechnology, it requires the WTO member states to recognize gene constructs, 
genetic events and the microorganisms that are the product of genetic engineering as patentable. 
The same is not required for plant varieties per se, but the member states are required to at least 
adopt the UPOV convention described earlier to enforce PVP rights in that area if they have not 
done so already.54  
                                                 
52 Herring (2006) made much out of the fact that “terminator seeds” (GURT) were not owned by Monsanto contrary 
to critiques’ claims at the time, which he called a “hoax.” In some advocacy writing it is also claimed that GURT 
does not exist. In fact, it exists and Monsanto has already acquired acquired patent rights to it.  
53 This is the case with GM hybrid cotton in India. See Lalitha et al (2008). 
54 See Dutfield (2003) for details. 
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In other words, outside a few countries like the USA whose national laws go beyond the 
TRIPS, plants are not being patented yet. But WTO member countries have to grant patents for 
genetic events incorporated with plants, and this provides the legal basis for the biotechnology 
companies’ royalty claims on GM seeds sold in those countries. Upstream players, like biotech 
companies, claim protection over what they share with downstream players like plant breeders 
and seed distributors (unless they already acquired them through vertical integration) and 
ultimately farmers, and they stand to collect royalties per bag of seed sold. The exchange is 
illustrated in the figure below. 
Figure 4: GM crops, IPR and value exchange 
What is the commercial volume of this exchange? It is a significant sum. In 2012, when 
Monsanto and Brazilian farmer associations found themselves in court for disagreements over 
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the appropriate level and form of charging for GM soybean seeds, it was demanded that 
Monsanto pay back to farmers royalties collected over the past few years amounting to 14 billion 
Brazilian reais, which would make almost 7 billion US dollars at that time. (By comparison, 
when the USA’s biggest privately owned company Cargill—which also happens to be in 
agrifood business but which has sold its seed interests to Monsanto—had its most profitable year 
to date in 2008, its annual profit stood at $4 billions).55 In other words, the contestation over IPR 
in seeds raises passionate debates not only because it challenges existing principles and practices 
regarding farmers’ control over their means of production but also because it concerns the 
appropriation of a significant economic surplus. 
 
Policy Challenge and the Relevant International Regime  
What the International Law Says 
Faced with divergent views, policy-makers have to legislate and execute, at the very 
least, a system for biosafety regulation for approving particular GM crop varieties for 1) 
consumption as food, 2) animal feed, and 3) cultivation in the country’s territory. Approval is 
typically granted more easily for animal feed than for food. Certain countries bar GM crop 
cultivation in their own territory while being open to approving GMOs for consumption if they 
are to be imported. If cultivation approvals are granted, then appropriate systems (statutory and 
otherwise) for IPR protection will be demanded by the biotechnology industry; since GM seeds 
are products of expensive research endeavors, and conventional institutions for seed provision 
and remuneration found in developing countries are deemed inadequate for ensuring a satisfying 
                                                 
55 Murphy et al (2012: 25). Cargill, Inc., is a private, i.e. “unlisted” company held by a small number of shareholders 
and does not offer its company shares to the general public on the stock market. If it were a public company it would 
rank at number 12 in the USA in gross revenues. “Cargill,” Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cargill, last 
accessed December 2015.  
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rate of financial return. The question of regulation may first enter the public agenda upon a 
company’s application to register a seed variety that it reports as GM (public seed registries for 
quality control and other purposes have been universal regulatory practice for many decades) or 
launch research towards that goal in the country. The US biosafety regulation for the GMOs, 
established in 1986, is an early example that has changed little since then. Many other countries 
started to work on their regulations in the 1990s upon first being contacted by companies, 
typically Monsanto’s local subsidiaries or partnerships. The introduction of regulation may, 
alternatively, predate any such application as policy-makers decide to follow earlier country 
examples; or it may lag behind adoption on the ground as policy-makers may be unable to decide 
on a framework until they discover that certain GM crops have already spread among their 
country’s farmers without official approval. The conclusion of the Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety in 2000, and the capacitation programs sponsored by the UNEP-GEF (United Nations 
Environment Programme – Global Environment Facility) thereafter gave most developing 
countries the impetus and the legal resources to start building a biosafety framework.  
The international regime that guides this effort remains highly contested. The Cartagena 
Protocol is the major agreement in the area; however, it has not been ratified by the USA—the 
world hegemon and the top producer of GM and other crops. This is because the Protocol (article 
11.8) states that “[l]ack of scientific certainty due to insufficient relevant scientific information 
and knowledge regarding the extent of the potential adverse effects of an LMO [living modified 
organism, i.e. GMO] on biodiversity, taking into account risks to human health,” may authorize 
states to take “appropriate decisions” to regulate (commodity or seed) imports in order to 
minimize potential adverse effects. Potential contradictions of such a “precautionary principle” 
with WTO’s trade agreements were recognized at the time of the making of the Protocol, but 
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were not satisfactorily resolved. An international dispute arose when, relying on the 
precautionary principle, the EU practically stopped considering new approvals of GM crops 
either for cultivation or consumption in June 1999. In May 2003 the US-led party of three 
countries (with Canada and Argentina) filed complaints with the WTO that the EU’s de facto 
moratorium on new approvals, as well as the national bans on all GMOs in some EU member 
states, had no scientific basis and amounted to an unjustified non-tariff barrier against their GM 
agricultural exports. In September 2006, having produced the longest panel report in WTO’s 
history with over a thousand pages, the WTO Dispute Settlement Panel solved the legal question 
before it by deciding that “unnecessary delays” occurring in EU approvals were indeed in 
violation of WTO law but it did not pass a judgment on the legality of the approval procedures 
themselves or the appropriateness of the precautionary principle. The result was that the EU did 
end its de facto moratorium but did not change course from a relatively stringent regulatory 
regime.56 The disagreements between the USA and the EU gives rise to an international regime 
complex where international institutions functioning in different areas of relevance to GMO 
regulation may generate overlapping sources of authority and contradictory imperatives. The 
complex is tabulated below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
56 For details of contestation at the WTO level see Young and Holmes (2005), Peterson (2010), Bonneuil and 
Levidow (2012).  
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Table 10: The international regime complex for the regulation of GM crop cultivation 
    Field 
    Biosafety IPR 
Regime 
World Trade 
Organization 
(WTO) 
Agreement on the 
Application of Sanitary 
and Phytosanitary 
Measures (SPS) 
Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS) 
Convention on 
Biological 
Diversity 
(CBD) 
The Cartagena Protocol 
on Biosafety 
The Nagoya Protocol on Access to 
Genetic Resources 
Food and 
Agriculture 
Organization 
(FAO) 
Codex Alimentarius International Treaty on Plant 
Genetic Resources for Food and 
Agriculture (ITPGRFA)  
World 
Intellectual 
Property 
Organization 
(WIPO) 
  International Union for the 
Protection of New Varieties of 
Plants (UPOV) 1978 and 1991 
Conventions  
 
Source: Author’s elaboration, also see Dutfield (2003), Raustiala and Victor (2004), Helfer 
(2009), Peterson (2010) 
 
Scholars disagree over whether a fragmented international regime complex furthers or 
hampers global governance (Drezner 2008 and 2011, Gehring and Faude 2014); however it is 
obvious that such a state of affairs militates against the upholding of one global standard for all 
countries. In short, the international regime for GMO regulation, even decades after the 
commercial release of the technology, leaves much to the discretion of national-policy makers; 
and this allows for the variation in developing country policies under analysis here. 
 
The Range of Policies Observed 
 Due to the high trade value and public scrutiny surrounding the GMO debate, there are a 
number of sources through which policies in this area can be observed and compared. In few 
countries such as Ecuador, Turkey and Venezuela the cultivation of GM plants is completely 
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banned by law. Given WTO rules, it seems more difficult to categorically ban the consumption 
of GMOs (for food or feed), but stringent regulations are typically found. (Contrary to 
widespread impression, EU law does not ban GMOs either for consumption or cultivation, but 
subjects them to a special case-by-case approval procedure). A limited list with some exemplary 
countries is below.  
Table 11: Biosafety policies for GMOs around the world, c. 2014 
Argentina is the third largest grower of biotech crops in the world, after the United States and Brazil. 
GMOs are regulated in Argentina under the Law on Seeds and Phytogenetic Creations and the Law on 
the Promotion of the Development and Production of Modern Biotechnology, and under administrative 
regulations issued by the Secretary of Agriculture, Livestock, Fisheries and Food. Argentina has not 
ratified the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. 
Belgium is considered to have an intermediate level of restrictions on GMOs, although public opinion 
tends to generally be hostile to GMOs. Most of Belgium’s regulation of GMOs is directly or indirectly 
derived from European regulations. Overall, regulation of GMOs in Belgium is mostly focused on 
authorization requirements prior to their production, use, or distribution; on mandatory technical 
requirements to limit the potential release of GMOs into non-GMO fields; and on information and 
transparency measures. 
In Brazil, GMOs are governed by a law that defines the concept of a GMO and sets rules for the 
laboratories that work with them. Additionally, it establishes authorization procedures for GMO 
research, and establishes rules for the production and marketing of GMOs, restrictions on their release 
into the environment, regimes for their cultivation, requirements for reporting their release, inspections 
and monitoring of GMO research activities and their commercial release, implementing authorities and 
authorizing procedures for their release, and restrictions on GMOs in foodstuffs. Finally, it provides for 
the punishment of administrative violations and criminal offenses. 
Canada regulates products derived from biotechnology processes as part of its existing regulatory 
framework for “novel products.” The focus is on the traits expressed in the products and not on the 
method used to introduce those traits. The Canadian Food Inspection Agency is responsible for 
regulating GM plants and approving GM feed for animals. Health Canada is mandated to assess the 
safety of foods for human consumption, including GMOs in foodstuff, and for authorizing them to be 
sold in Canada. Advertising or labeling the presence of GMOs in particular food is voluntary unless 
there is a health or safety concern. 
In China, restrictions on GMOs are primarily provided by the agricultural GMO regulations enacted by 
the State Council in 2001 and relevant administrative rules. The agricultural GMO regulations regulate 
not only crops, but also animals, microorganisms, and products derived from these sources. The testing, 
production, and marketing of GMOs in China are subject to government approval. Foreign companies 
that export GMOs to the PRC, including GMOs as raw materials, must apply to the Ministry of 
Agriculture and obtain GMO Safety Certificates. 
Egypt takes a permissive approach to GMOs, and its public policy does not oppose growing, importing, 
and exporting genetically modified crops. Egyptian activists have voiced their rejection of this policy. 
Egyptian laws do not contain restrictions on researching, producing, or marketing genetically modified 
crops and food products. The country also has no restrictions on releasing genetically modified 
organisms into the environment. A draft law on biosafety was not approved by the Egyptian Parliament. 
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The growth and sale of GMOs are permitted in England and Wales, subject to an intensive 
authorization process that occurs primarily at the European Union level. Most legislation in England and 
Wales that applies to GMOs is implementing legislation for EU law. The general attitude in England is 
averse to GM products; however, a slight shift in attitude towards GM products has recently been 
reported, and the UK government’s policy indicates a more receptive attitude towards these products. 
The production and sale of certain GMOs are legal in France, but are subject to very restrictive rules. 
French legislation supplements the broader framework of European regulation with national rules that 
provide additional restrictions, particularly focused on the potential release of GMOs in the 
environment, and on labeling requirements for GM products. As a result of both public hostility to 
GMOs and these legal restrictions, there are currently no GM crops grown in France, even though 
France imports substantial amounts of GMOs from abroad. 
Germany discourages the cultivation of GM crops to the extent possible within the already stringent 
European Union legislation on GMOs. Germany imposes strict liability for accidental contamination 
with GMOs, and has tough and methodically enforced controls over the release of GMOs. 
Israeli law permits the development and growth of GMOs for research purposes in accordance with 
requirements established by subsidiary legislation. Although GMO growth is not permitted for 
commercial purposes, GMO products may be imported, sold, and used in the production of food and 
pharmaceuticals in Israel. Israel’s religious kashrut authority has determined that the use of GMO 
ingredients in food does not affect its kosher status because GMOs are only used in “microscopic” 
proportions. To date, legislation specifically regulating the labeling of GMO components in food does 
not appear to have been passed. 
As a member of the European Union, Italy has been implementing European directives concerning 
GMOs over the last two decades, but at a rather reluctant pace. In fact, as reflected by GMO legislation 
in Italy, Italian public opinion has shifted from a decidedly general opposition to the introduction of 
GMOs into a more recent open acceptance of them.  The Italian Constitutional Court has ruled that the 
national government is constrained from encroaching on the power of regional governments to establish 
their own regimes on GMOs. As a consequence, some regions have enacted slightly more permissive 
regimes than others. 
Japan enacted the Cartagena Act in 2003 to implement the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the 
Convention on Biological Diversity. Although it is legal to plant GM crops in Japan if certain 
procedures are followed, no commercial planting of GM crops (aside from ornamental flowers) is 
occurring in Japan at this time, mainly because the general public is skeptical about the safety of GM 
crops. Nevertheless, Japan is one of largest importers of GMO foods, though labeling is required if GM 
crops are used in food in certain cases. 
Although Lebanon ratified the Convention on Biological Diversity in 1994 and the Cartagena Protocol 
in 2008, it has not yet adopted policies dealing with GMOs. While there are some existing laws that are 
indirectly relevant to this subject matter it is fair to say that no comprehensive legal regime on this issue 
exists at this time. 
Mexico’s Law on Biosecurity of Genetically Modified Organisms is a federal law that provides rules 
concerning GMOs, and is aimed at preventing, avoiding, or reducing the risks that these activities may 
cause. The GMO Law provides that violations of its provisions or its regulations are punishable with 
civil penalties. Mexico’s Federal Criminal Code provides that an individual who, in contravention of 
applicable law, commercializes, transports, stores, or releases into the environment a GMO that 
negatively alters or may alter the components, structure, or functioning of natural ecosystems is 
punishable with imprisonment of one to nine years and a fine. 
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Although the Netherlands was the first European Union Member State to have legal coexistence 
guidelines on genetically engineered (GE) crops, commercial production of GM crops has not yet taken 
place. While the government and the agriculture sector take a pragmatic approach toward the import and 
use of GM products, public opinion is divided as to whether GM foods pose health risks. Activities 
involving GMOs are for research purposes in laboratories or field trials, and are tightly regulated, in 
particular through EU Directives made applicable in the Netherlands. Prior risk assessment and 
subsequent monitoring and reporting are necessary for all GMO-related activities. Criminal penalties 
and administrative sanctions may be applied to violations of licensing requirements. 
The importation, development, testing, and release of GMOs are strictly regulated in New Zealand. 
Such activities must be approved by the Environmental Protection Authority, which is required to take 
into account environmental, economic, social, cultural, and public health considerations. GM techniques 
have been approved for use in research involving both plants and animals, subject to various controls. 
There are currently no GM commercial crops, though imported food and ingredients derived from 
GMOs must be approved by a food safety authority and clearly labeled on packaging before sale. 
Criminal and civil penalties may be applied in relation to breaches of the legislation, and offenders may 
be ordered to mitigate or remedy any adverse effect on people or the environment. 
Norway is one of the most restrictive importers of GM products and does not produce GMOs. As 
Norway is only part of the European Economic Area and not a full European Union Member it is not 
bound by EU Directives but generally implements EU Directives nonetheless. There are several EU-
approved GMOs that are specifically illegal in Norway. Following a recent regime shift in Norway it is 
yet unclear whether Norway’s position on GMOs might change. 
Cultivation of transgenic plants for commercial use is not allowed in the Russian Federation. However, 
several types of GM food and feed lines that have passed the procedure of state registration and control 
are allowed to be imported, processed, and used for food or feed production. Research on genetically 
engineered animals is not supported by the government. Russia recently adopted an approval procedure 
for release of GMOs into the environment, which brings the country closer to possible cultivation of 
GM plants. Currently, eighteen GM food lines and fourteen GM feed lines are approved and registered 
in Russia.  
The primary legislation in South Africa dealing with GMOs, including their contained use, trial release, 
commercial release, and import and export is the Genetically Modified Organisms Act of 1997 (GMO 
Act) and its subsidiary legislation. The GMO Act places various restrictions on the research, production, 
and marketing of GMOs, including requiring permits, risk assessments, notification to the public, 
registration, and demonstrated safety to the environment.  The GMO Act imposes civil liability on 
people who conduct GMO-related activities for damage they cause and criminalizes various acts, 
including violations of its provisions or refusing to cooperate with the regulatory bodies. 
Korea signed the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety in 2000 and enacted implementing legislation the 
following year. Importing, cultivating, researching, and developing GMOs are permitted, as long as 
applicable procedures are observed. Even though more and more research on GMOs is being performed, 
people are still concerned. As yet, there has been no authorized GMO cultivation within Korea. 
Restrictions on GMO food include a safety assessment in addition to a risk assessment and approval 
procedure. Sellers of GM food must follow labeling requirements. 
Swedes, both consumers and producers, are very conscious of GMOs. GMO use is limited and almost 
exclusively used in animal fodder products. The use of GMOs in food is a sensitive topic that generates 
strong public opinion. A majority of Swedes consider it important that their milk is GMO free, and dairy 
farmers therefore avoid GMOs in their fodder. Sweden, as a European Union Member, has adopted a 
case-by-case analysis for each GMO. One GM potato for industrial use has been approved for 
cultivation in Sweden, but currently no GMOs are being produced. 
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GMOs are regulated in the United States under the Coordinated Framework for Regulation of 
Biotechnology, published in 1986, pursuant to previously existing statutory authority regulating 
conventional products, with a focus on the nature of the products rather than the process in which they 
are produced. The form of regulation varies depending on the type of GMO involved. Plant GMOs are 
regulated by the US Department of Agriculture’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service under the 
Plant Protection Act. GMOs in food, drugs, and biological products are regulated by the Food and Drug 
Administration under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the Public Health Service Act. 
GMO pesticides and microorganisms are regulated by the Environmental Protection Agency pursuant to 
the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act and the Toxic Substances Control Act. 
The European Union (EU) has in place a comprehensive and strict legal regime for GMOs, food and 
feed made from GMOs, and food/feed consisting or containing GMOs. The EU’s legislation and policy 
on GMOs is designed to prevent any adverse effects on the environment and the health and safety of 
humans and animals, and it reflects concerns expressed by skeptical consumers, farmers, and 
environmentalists. GMOs and food or feed made from GMOs can be marketed in or imported into the 
EU, provided that they are authorized after passing strict evaluation and safety assessment requirements 
that are imposed on a case-by-case basis. Since 2001 the EU has had a de facto moratorium on GMO 
approvals, but a September 2013 decision of the General Court of the EU may put an end to the 
moratorium. While marketing and importing GMOs and food and feed produced with GMOs are 
regulated at the EU level, the cultivation of GMOs is an area left to the EU Members. Liability issues 
and compensation schemes for individuals fall primarily within the domain of the EU Member States. In 
general, the EU espouses the principle that the polluter pays.  
 
Source: US Library of Congress57  
 
 My case studies are selected on the basis of agrarian structure characteristics that may 
serve as explanatory variables (discussed in detail in the following chapter) for the choice of the 
regulatory regime, which is the outcome that I aim to explain. The sample produces interesting 
variation on this outcome. In Turkey, a farmer can be put to jail for up to twelve years for 
cultivating any GM crops, in India GM seeds are widely used for cotton but not allowed for food 
crops, in Brazil permission came late, whereas in Argentina GM seeds quickly took over almost 
the entire production of commercially significant crop production with little friction caused by 
public regulation. In terms of IPR; in Argentina once a farmer legally buys a bag of GM seeds, 
he can reproduce them freely in his farm for self-use, in India official price ceilings for GM 
seeds accompany a large informal market in “pirate” GM seed development and reproduction 
                                                 
57 “Restrictions on Genetically Modified Organisms,” The Law Library of Congress, Global Legal Research Center, 
March 2014, http://www.loc.gov/law/help/restrictions-on-gmos/restrictions-on-gmos.pdf. This list has been 
reproduced from the summary version of the report available at http://www.loc.gov/law/help/restrictions-on-gmos/.  
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openly tolerated by government authorities, while in Brazil farmers have to pay a tax-like royalty 
fee to the biotech TNC for each subsequent harvest that springs from the original seed purchase. 
These differences were tabulated in summary form in the Table 1 above. Below they are seen in 
greater detail.  
Table 12: Regulation of GM crop cultivation across cases 
  First 
approval of 
GM crop 
cultivation 
GM crops 
approved 
for 
cultivation 
Economic 
risk an 
official 
approval 
criterion 
Labeling 
of GM 
food 
products 
Share of 
GM in total 
cultivation, 
c.2010 
Author's 
classification 
Argentina 1996 Soy, corn, 
cotton 
No No >90% of 
soy, corn, 
cotton 
Permissive 
Brazil 2003 Soy, corn, 
cotton 
Yes Yes Soy: 75%, 
corn: 56%, 
cotton 25% 
Contested 
India 2002 Cotton Yes No Cotton: 93% Contested 
Turkey None None N/A Yes Officially 
none 
Prohibitive 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration, see case studies for details and James (2011) for GM cultivation 
ratios 
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Table 13: Management of IPR applying to GM seeds across cases 
          
Author's 
classification   
Price 
ceilings for 
GM seeds 
Gov’t tolerance 
for illegal seed 
use 
Point of 
delivery royalty 
collection 
Gov’t legal 
conflict with 
TNC over IPR 
Argentina No Yes No 
Federal 
government Weak IPR 
Brazil No Yes Yes No Strong IPR 
India Yes Yes No 
Local 
governments Weak IPR 
Turkey 
GM seeds 
banned N/A N/A N/A N/A 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration, see case studies for details 
 
In the following chapters I describe in greater detail these policy regime elements and 
analyze their causes by tracing the policy-making process. Certain common dynamics underpin 
the policy experience in all cases. All of the countries were approached with offers of local GM 
crop adaptation by biotech TNCs anxious to gain entry to these large agricultural production 
markets. In all, the salience of GMOs as a debate topic was generated first by urban-based NGOs 
and their official interlocutors at the health and environment bureaucracy worried over food 
safety and biodiversity risks. Contrary to the picture that emerges from much writing on Europe 
so far, broad-brush cultural differences seem to explain little: Public opinion surveys suggest that 
consumers everywhere have been suspicious of GM food, and if given clear choices they would 
not prefer it. The key to understanding the acceptance of GM agriculture is not the absence of 
opposition but the existence of well-organized producer groups in favor of it.  
The political efficacy of the producer sector, in turn, was complicated everywhere by the 
medium and smaller farmers’ (and, to some extent, the domestic seed industry’s) concerns over 
the terms of access to technology. Those who raised the strongest objections to the IPR 
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restrictions attached to GM seed use and reproduction were the middle-farmers organizations 
FAA and CONINAGRO in Argentina (and not the SRA of the big landed oligarchy), the family 
farm syndicates of Rio Grande do Sul in Brazil (and not APROSOJA or FAMATO of Mato 
Grosso state where bigger farmers prevail), the middle peasants’ chamber ZOB in Turkey (and 
not the ABÇ of the capitalist farming region Çukurova). When adequately persuaded by 
epistemic coalitions, some of these organizations turned against the technology altogether and, 
joined by organizations representing rural workers, denounced GM seeds as instruments of 
foreign exploitation.  
Possible monopoly abuse in respect to the control and pricing of the technology was 
among the top considerations of policymakers everywhere as they tried to design regulatory 
systems. Argentinian and Indian cases provide striking examples of government agencies 
publicizing concerns over the biosafety of GM crops immediately before important negotiation 
rounds between the farmer organizations and the biotech TNCs, implying the threat of restrictive 
biosafety policies to preempt commercially disadvantageous agreements. Wikileaks cables reveal 
that the TNCs enjoyed diplomatic support from US politicians and Foreign Service in their 
attempts at influencing policy towards the direction of permissive biosafety and strong IPR. 
Contrary to both the anti- and pro-GMO accounts that exaggerate Northern influence on policy-
making in the Global South, these sizeable “middlebrow” countries have not simply acquiesced 
to these demands and instead generated policies that defied, to varying extents, the corporate 
vision of how the technology should be deployed in the market. Both direct confrontation (as in 
the trials between the Government of Argentina58 and Monsanto over who owns the transgenes 
embodied in Argentina’s agricultural exports) and selective omission (inadequate state capacity 
                                                 
58 The government got involved as amicus curiae in support of firms sued by Monsanto in Europe for importing 
from Argentina soybeans with Monsanto’s allegedly unremunerated intellectual property. 
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as an excuse for non-policing the “pirate” seed sector in India) have been used to this end by 
governments, animated by ideas of national development and anxious to court politically 
influential domestic groups. While critical scholarship reifies transnational corporate control 
over GM crops as a non-negotiable constant, and leading pro-GMO writers hastily dismiss it as a 
chimera, the issue has been in fact a field of real contestation with variable policy choices. 
Within the discussion of each country case, and briefly in the conclusion chapter, the 
regulatory policy choices will also become explanatory variables in a parallel analysis, as I will 
examine suggestive evidence about the socioeconomic consequences of the introduction (or 
prohibition) of GM agriculture in each place, but this will remain as an “editorial” task. The main 
aim of this study is to describe and explain the choice of the regulatory regime itself. 
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CHAPTER III 
ANALYZING CONTESTATION OVER POLICY 
 
The Argument and The Research Design: A summary 
Why have countries adopted more and less permissive policies towards farming with GM 
seeds? In countries where GM farming was allowed, why have varying systems of IPR 
protection been constructed?  
My theoretical framework amounts to a simple argument. Because there is high economic 
value at stake with this policy question, the economic structure of each setting makes a 
difference by giving actors, especially agricultural sector organizations, different degrees of 
political power. But because there is a lot of scientific and legal uncertainty surrounding the 
impact of technology, economic structure requires interpretation, and ideas too make an 
important difference, through the agency of epistemic coalitions, by helping partially 
autonomous state managers to select from structurally relevant political options. With such a 
framework we learn about both what constrained policy-makers’ options, and how they have 
made use of their options. Let me summarize the analysis, and the rest of this chapter will 
explain it in detail. 
I set out to explain regulatory policy behavior following the worldwide introduction of 
the GM seeds in c. 1995. For this task, first, out of the population of all countries in the world 
(with the scope condition that my research questions are more relevant, and my answers are more 
applicable, to developing countries), I differentiate country cases  (in the table below) in terms of 
the most obvious, though surprisingly overlooked, variable: In those countries where soy, corn, 
or cotton—these are the most important crops for which GM varieties came to be developed—
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were not grown in large quantities prior to the introduction of the GM technology, consumer 
sector opposition to GM seeds will have an easier time in determining policy because the 
constituency for permissive policies is small. Neither the biotech companies will invest much in 
lobbying for policy change there, nor the rural producers will find the issue much relevant. It 
would not be surprising to find that the resulting policies have been responsive to Great Power 
pressure or otherwise varying strongly with randomly distributed ideas, because in the absence of 
clear economic interests these settings are “most likely” cases for such ideational takeover. 
Table 14: The variation guiding research design 
Population Samples divided by explanatory variables Outcome 
All 
countries 
Non-grower countries 
Of little 
interest 
Growers of soy, 
corn, or cotton 
Stronger agricultural sector Varies 
Fragmented agricultural sector Varies 
 
I focus on the more interesting puzzle of varying policy regimes in important grower 
countries.59 In such a setting, the new technology will be likely to find more advocates because 
there is, if nothing else, a strong incentive for the biotech TNCs to enter the market as a seed 
                                                 
59 This is a method of case selection that works through identification of most and least likely cases as deduced by a 
theory that connects the independent variables (IV) and the dependent variable (DV) (in this case agricultural 
production characteristics and GMO regulation respectively). There is debate in political science methodology over 
whether case selection should be informed by the variation on the DV at all. The highly influential King et al (1994) 
advise avoiding case selection on the DV if possible and otherwise correcting it with within-case observations 
through process tracing. However, whenever they discuss real examples of social science work, their criticism 
appears to be against the more specific practice of selecting a sample with no DV variation. They also praise (King 
et al 1995: 477, 479) as examples that confirm their rules of scientific inference those works that either explicitly 
(Bates 1981) or implicitly (Lijphart 1975) choose their case(s) both on the DV and the explanatory IV based on prior 
expectations derived either from theory or previous literature—suggesting that their purist advice is impractical for 
qualitative research. Other methodologists have criticized their quasi-experimental research design logic as being 
problematic when applied to observational data, whether large- or small-N (Brady 2010). Furthermore, 
methodological advice developed specifically for small-N research argues for other case selection methods. In this 
line of thinking, scholars set out from the distribution of cases in a (at least) 2-dimensional plane defined by the DV 
and (at least) one IV, either actually known from prior large-N analysis (Lieberman 2005, Seawright and Gerring 
2008), or deductively derived from theory (Rogowski 1995, 2010, McKeown 2010), in order to choose those cases 
that would maximize inferential leverage—such as anomalies, outliers, or influential cases. Most actual qualitative 
research seem to informally follow one of these kinds of non-random selection with a “folk Bayesian” approach.  
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supplier, and any success of the opposition to the TNCs (either in biosafety policies and IPR) is 
in itself surprising. Certain variables that may seem like good candidates to explain the variation 
of policies across this setting, such as factor endowments or export market imperatives actually 
should not have a systematic effect one way or another. Instead, I propose that the structure of 
the agricultural producer sector helps explain the puzzle. Where small farmers numerically 
dominate the agrarian landscape (as in Turkey and India), we get a producer sector facing greater 
uncertainty about what to expect from the new technology’s socioeconomic impact (because 
smaller farmers have a lesser chance of taking a share in pioneer rents and their precarious 
economic and social position make them more sensitive to IPR encroachment over traditional 
seed saving practices), and greater problems of collective action in articulating its interests and 
getting favorable public policies. In such a setting, the opposition to GM crops has a higher 
chance at policy influence. However, I observe that there is still interesting variation across such 
cases: some countries find it necessary to ban GM crops in order to protect their consumers and 
small farmers from perceived risks of this technology, others do not. Likewise, in countries 
where a greater portion of agricultural production is dominated by big farmers (as in Argentina 
and Brazil), we get varying approaches especially in IPR enforcement: some countries allow 
farmers saving and replanting patented GM seeds, others require them to pay royalty fees to 
biotech companies for doing so. Thus material structural factors help me splitting the universe 
into smaller samples of roughly “most similar” cases, comprising two pairs.60 Those factors 
should explain most of the variation of outcome between pairs, and variation of outcome within 
                                                 
60 Of course, these countries are all very different from each other. The differences between India and Turkey are 
greater than their commonalities in every conceivable way. What this particular methodological term implies is that 
the cases have similar values on certain explanatory variables designated as important by theory. Differences on 
other values, unless they are associated meaningfully with both the relevant explanatory variables and the outcome 
variable, are not necessarily consequential in our estimation of causal relationships. I am following the terminology 
in Gerring (2011). 
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each pair (which is a “least likely” observation) attests to strength of the particular ideas that 
were engaged with the policy debate. These ideas help determine the way in which the 
government will exercise state autonomy and formulate particular policies. 
Table 15: Country experience based on two variables  
    
Opposition orientation 
  
    
Challenging IPR 
restrictions 
Challenging the entire 
technology 
Producer 
sector 
Stronger  
Permissive biosafety, 
weak IPR: Argentina 
 
Intermediate biosafety, 
strong IPR: Brazil 
Fragmented  
Intermediate 
biosafety, weak IPR: 
India 
Prohibitive biosafety: 
Turkey 
 
Two implications immediately relevant to policy advocacy arise from this analysis. As a 
descriptive inference, I argue that opposition to GMOs originates from and spearheaded by the 
consumer sector mostly, and rural producers are coopted (if at all) as an ally thanks to IPR 
concerns. As a causal inference, I suggest that opposition to GMOs is likely to be doomed to 
irrelevance if it does not take into account the extent and the nature of the demands of the 
producer sector. Nonetheless, GMO-skeptic opposition can help obtaining a producer-oriented 
solution by challenging the legitimacy of strong IPR claims over GM crops by transnational 
biotechnology firms. The empirical chapters of this dissertation provide evidence on which I 
build up these inferences. In the conclusion chapter I will discuss their wider theoretical 
implications. 
The rest of this chapter is a detailed exposition of the summary above. It justifies the 
propositions that lead to this sample splitting, and discusses why and how ideas make a 
difference. The presentation of the theoretical framework starts by identifying three stakeholders 
(consumer NGOs, domestic producer sector, and the biotech TNC) relevant to the policy and 
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what kind of policy stance is to be expected from each. It continues by discussing various ways 
in which governments can respond to stakeholder pressure, and where agents of ideational 
change (which I call “epistemic coalitions”) come into play. It then undertakes a detailed 
discussion of the economic conditions that shape stakeholder position and efficacy, thus 
constraining the domain of ideas in particular ways in different settings. The chapter then ends 
with a methodology section detailing the empirical research procedures. 
 
Theoretical Framework: Interest, Ideas, and Interaction 
Identifying the Policy Stakeholders 
I take public regulation mainly as a society-centered process driven by organized interest 
groups (Stigler 1971), and recognize partial autonomy for the state (Evans et al 1985). The 
working assumption is that policy-making state managers are primarily responding to the 
interests of the powerful stakeholders, and trying to reconcile them towards the achievement of 
personal, institutional, and national goals. 
To understand the potential fault lines within the civil society I set out by recognizing 
that GM crops is a technology that promises significant productivity increase in agricultural 
production.61 These benefits are to be received disproportionately by the biotech TNC and the 
domestic “producer sector”—including the whole of the production chain from agroindustry to 
farmers and retailers and represented at the policy circles through sectorial associations. Equally 
important is the fact that GM crops have raised fears of environmental and public health damage 
(as well as philosophical or religious offence) that may not be captured in short-term welfare 
accounting. We can think of the risk of such damage as a negative externality that would be 
                                                 
61 For an overview, and available evidence about this promise, see Chapter II. 
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borne by a “consumer sector” in a wide sense—including everyone outside the producer sector 
and represented chiefly through NGOs advocating for consumer rights and environmental 
preservation. Of course, productivity increases could imply consumer benefits from increased 
product quality and lower prices but early in the technology’s lifetime these benefits were highly 
uncertain or not there yet, because priority was given to genetic engineering traits that allowed 
producers to save input costs or labor time.62 Therefore producers will be more interested in 
permissive policies towards GM crops, while skepticism will be greater among the consumers. 
For this proposition to make sense, neither it is necessary for all producers to expect to be 
winners from GM crop adoption nor the consumer sector needs to see them as overall 
undesirable; what matters is the existence of some perceived negative externality that is not 
reflected in the producer sectors’ production costs.   
However, whether to permit GM crops or not is not the only policy decision to make. 
Appropriate systems for IPR protection will be demanded by the biotechnology TNCs to supply 
the technology so that they can get a desirable return to their R&D investments. This question 
drives a wedge between the domestic producers and the biotech TNC. We know that the latter—
through press releases and the activities of the representative associations they form—have been 
quite clear in revealing their preferred scenario: one in which public regulation towards GM crop 
cultivation is rather permissive, and strict IPRs are enforced over the seeds used by farmers, 
together allowing the collection of a large sum in technology rents. However, if the TNCs push 
too hard for a strong IPR regime, a backlash can occur in the form of restrictive adoption policies 
favored by domestic actors worried over the abuse of IPRs. The TNCs face a strategic dilemma 
with regards to how to best enforce IPRs while not endangering technology acceptance. 
                                                 
62 See chapter II. 
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For the producers I expect two parameters to be relevant in structuring relevant options: 
Regardless of particular preferences about the matter, they would like to be the ones to decide 
whether they will incorporate GM seeds into their production chain, and they should not pay too 
much for this foreign technology. Consequently, a dilemma arises. If producer associations, 
fearful of strong IPR, join hands with the GMO-skeptic consumer sector NGOs, they may lose 
access to the technology because of restrictive and prohibitive policies. If producers support the 
TNC advocacy for greater toleration of GMOs, this time they may witness the formation of a 
regime with strong IPR enforcement to the liking of the TNCs. 
Hence, the biotech TNC, domestic producers, and consumers find themselves in rivalry 
over the ideal policy. For clearer, more precise presentation of this three-stakeholder 
configuration, below I use spatial theoretic form, where the policy question is illustrated as a set 
of points in 2-dimensional Euclidian space: the horizontal axis represents IPR policy and the 
vertical axis represents biosafety restrictions.63 The point Q denotes the status quo in c. 1995, 
when GM seeds become globally available but have not been domestically approved or regulated 
yet. Allowing the status quo to drift without policy intervention is far from ideal for all 
stakeholders because it could result in informal (unremunerated) dissemination of GM seeds and 
thus foregone rents for the biotech TNC; biosafety risks for the consumers; and risk of market 
loss due to consumer aversion for the producers as well as unexpected ecosystem interactions. 
Any policy move from the status quo towards one of the intersection sets (“winsets”) would 
enjoy the support of two stakeholders, as it would bring policy closer to both their ideal points.  
                                                 
63 For an introduction to spatial theory, which provides the tools for this visual exercise, see de Vries (1999). 
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Figure 5: Policy dimensions and stakeholders 
In the figure 5 above, each stakeholder has a most preferred position in the policy space, 
and they are indifferent to policies that are equidistant to that “bliss point”. However, the claim 
in this exercise is not that, empirically, any of the points are likely to have the exact coordinates 
and any of the circles are likely to have the exact shapes as illustrated, but rather to show how the 
relative positions of the stakeholders with respect to each other in a two-dimensional policy 
space make certain policy coalitions plausible in the search for a winset that could defeat the 
status quo. Actually, the indifference curves will be drawn elliptically if a stakeholder gives more 
importance to either of the two dimensions of the policy. This is done in figure 6 below for the 
producer sector in dashed lines. The two resulting ellipses denote different producer sector 
profiles, one particularly biosafety-intolerant and less sensitive to any change in IPR policy (i.e. 
a move towards stricter biosafety is more undesirable than an equal-distance move towards 
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stricter IPR policies) and a particularly IPR-intolerant one (vice versa). Being biosafety-
intolerant enlarges the winset producers can share with the biotech companies, in other words, 
gives them greater common ground.  Being IPR-intolerant gives the producers greater common 
ground with the consumer sector. It is not unreasonable to think that in most settings capitalist 
farmers and agribusiness will be closer to the former type, whereas smaller, more precarious 
rural producers will be closer to the latter type. I will substantiate this thought further below, and 
bracket it as an assumption for the moment.  
 
Figure 6: Different kinds of producers 
The possibility of such redrawn circles would be in line with the notion that producers of 
different classes, or in different settings, may have different interpretations of their interests. 
However, such interpretations will vary within certain bounds: regardless of their support for 
particular policy forms, the majority of the domestic producers will want to be given a relatively 
 82 
free hand in their choice of production technology without being restricted by government 
bureaucrats or corporate lawyers. They will never be as enthusiastic about strict IPR laws as 
biotech TNCs are or as enthusiastic about strict biosafety laws as the consumer sector NGOs are. 
In other words, the producer bliss point, however defined, will remain to the south of the 
consumers, and to the west of the biotech TNC, while the biotech bliss point remains to the 
southeast of the unregulated status quo. The same kind of “bounded room for interpretation” can 
be assumed for all stakeholders. To reflect this notion, in the figure below the first figure is 
redrawn, but this time all circles are dashed, and bliss points are left undrawn, to denote the 
partial indeterminacy in stakeholders’ positions. 
 
Figure 7: Partial indeterminacy in stakeholder positions 
 
 
 83 
So long as these relative positions are taken, three arguments follow: 
1) There is a range of policies that could be desirable to consumers and domestic 
producers yet for the biotech firm are too lacking in IPR protection or too precautionary. 
2) There is a range of policies that could be desirable to domestic producers and the 
biotech firm yet for the consumers are not precautionary enough at any IPR protection 
rate.  
3) There is a range of policies that could be desirable to consumers and the biotech firm 
yet for the producers are too precautionary or too stringent in IPR protection.64  
These are descriptive propositions, but they are not trivial. By identifying the policy 
question and the relevant stakeholders in this way, I am already departing from previous 
literature on GMO regulation. In mainstream political science writing on the matter, what 
appears here as a 2-dimensional plane is reduced to a single-dimension line extending from more 
to less precaution towards the new technology, IPR being omitted as an issue. In most critical 
writing there is again only a line, wherein the two policy questions are assumed to be one and the 
same—saying yes to the new technology invariably brings about undesirable forms of IPR. In 
the former line of thinking there is often effectively two stakeholders—post-materialist 
consumers on the one side, and on the other side a productive sector undifferentiated between 
                                                 
64 While the first two arguments may appear less problematic, the last one requires some explanation. These are 
points where a level of IPR protection satisficing for the biotech industry combine with demanding—though not 
prohibitive—biosafety standards acceptable to the consumers. Such standards, by requiring lengthy, resource-
consuming tests, bar the entry of smaller biotech firms into the market for GM seed technology and help protect the 
rents of the few TNCs which are able to staff huge labs, field lawyers in several markets and enjoy economies of 
scale. From the vantage point of the domestic producers the same translates to a limited offer of GM seed 
technology—all herbicide-tolerance and no drought-resistance, for example—and monopoly/oligopoly prices for it. 
The idea that demanding biosafety standards may serve as an entry barrier in the biotech market is widely shared 
within the industry, as revealed in interviews conducted by the author, and is supported by available market 
research. According to McDougal’s (2011) survey the overall cost of producing a new transgenic plant is US$136 
million, of which regulatory issues is the longest single phase in product development and is estimated to account 
for 25.8% and 36.7% of total cost and time involved respectively. Also see Pray et al (2005). 
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domestic actors (let alone different kinds of them) and the monopolistic TNC. In the latter, again 
there are two stakeholders, this time differentiated between the TNC as an exploitative foreign 
actor and everybody else. These identifications are misleadingly simplistic, and the one I present 
above, I argue, makes better sense of the historical experience so far. It also generates policy 
implications that run counter to the ones found in these studies. It suggests, for example, there is 
some contradiction in simultaneously arguing for “strong biosafety regulation” and for a vision 
where “farmer seed supply should function free of state interference with strong community 
control” (Shiva et al 1999).  
 
The Relationship of Stakeholders to the Public Decision-maker 
So far this has been a descriptive identification exercise regarding what kind of policy 
stance can be expected from each policy stakeholder, without a predictive component in respect 
to which policy will prevail. Rival predictive theories of government could be compatible with 
the propositions above. To consider the range of such theories, think of the above map as a 
dartboard, the government a dart player, and the prevailing policy as the point where the dart 
strikes the board. Now, the government can throw the dart in different ways. 
1) Random history: The dart is thrown completely randomly, as if by a monkey who does 
not know how dart is played. A pure version of a “garbage can model” of policy could come 
close to this unrealistic scenario. 
2) Bureaucratic autonomy: The government has a target point fixated in his mind, chosen 
purposefully but in complete autonomy from any stakeholders, as a “developmental state” ideal 
type would have it. Insofar as the targeted point is closer to some stakeholder’s position, this is 
not a result of compelling political pressure from the latter.  
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3) Government capture: The government targets to satisfy one stakeholder only. This can 
be understood broadly as even including electoral populism: if the government believes that 
serving the consumer sector will return the greatest political benefit, it will become a perfect 
agent of the consumers.  
4) Pluralist interest group politics: The government aims to satisfy two of the stakeholder 
groups by targeting a winset.  
Any of these theories can be infused with uncertainty about the government’s capabilities 
in delivering policies. Consider the following possibility: the government is, and knows himself 
to be, a highly imperfect player in the sense that he can only roughly approximate his targets in 
any dart-throwing attempt. In other words, between the point purposefully chosen by the 
government as the target and the point where the dart actually lands, there is room for random 
variation. Anticipating this, a pluralist government, for example, would throw the dart towards 
the biggest winset (if there is one), hoping that it will land somewhere in it. 
Furthermore, uncertainty can be extended to the government’s capabilities in getting 
intelligence about the stakeholders’ positions—like a drunk player whose sight is blurred. In real 
life, this can easily result from transaction costs of government-stakeholder communication, or 
even from the fact that the stakeholders themselves may be imprecise and confused about their 
own position (only to realize ex post facto with greater certainty if the prevailing policy has been 
serving their interests). This would add a status quo bias in government targeting: alienating 
stakeholders (any more than they were already alienated) with policies formulated on the basis of 
imperfect intelligence is less likely if such policies depart little from the status quo. 
Path dependence can be infused to any of these theories too. Consider the following 
dynamic model: The government is given two dart-throwing attempts. The positions of the 
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stakeholders are fully revealed only after the first dart is thrown, through their reactions. The 
second dart then has to be thrown with the condition that it cannot land closer to the status quo 
ante than to the first dart landing point, because the government has committed itself to a certain 
course of action with words and deeds until then. (This may be the case even if the ruling party 
changes because laws, once enacted, tend to be sticky). An initial choice constraints the domain 
of later choice(s). 
Again, different models of government behavior are implicit in existing literature on the 
matter. Initially, GMO regulation looked like an area in which the governments could form 
science-based autonomous decisions, but because various events have turned the issue to a high-
profile debate, policies turned out to be more responsive to politicized pressure. Political 
economists hypothesize that European policy was captured by farmers (and largely find that it 
was not). Political scientists imagine developing country decision-makers as being captured by a 
single agenda—satisfying the closest Great Power (but fail to present compelling evidence for 
it). Critical writers fear that governments will be captured by the biotech TNCs (without 
allowing for the possibility of variation). Having reduced the policy space to a line, and omitted 
important stakeholders, existing literature expects a rather simple government capture scenario in 
one way or another. I argue that except in closed authoritarian regimes and very small economies 
a form of pluralist politics is a more realistic way to understand governmental decision-making. 
The government is a drunk dart player whose hands are trembling and whose sight is slighted. 
But he does not lack purpose. He cares about pleasing the maximum number of stakeholders, 
allowing for some limited degree of autonomy. Even if one stakeholder looms largest in the 
government’s political calculations, the decision will seek to find a winset in which that 
stakeholder reaches a common ground with another. 
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The argument that follows is that a government, if animated by a desire to please the 
maximum number of relevant stakeholders, could have several (here three) directions to go, and 
with that condition he could please each stakeholder (but not all of them simultaneously) in one 
of several (here two) plausible ways. The choice of which direction, and which way, remains 
open. In a certain technical sense, the policy choice becomes a problem of coordination. Given 
several zones where the government and a majority of the stakeholders could converge on a 
policy, i.e. there is no unique equilibrium solution imposed by some set of material conditions, 
how to define a common goal and orient strategies? This is where ideas in circulation make a 
difference by providing a roadmap. 
 
Deciding Under Uncertainty: Ideational Contribution of Epistemic Coalitions 
Ideas become influential for actor orientation by filling in for what cannot be surely 
known. Let us say that that the government wants to seek a solution that would please the 
domestic producers in some way. But where are they exactly? At which point in the broadly 
identifiable southwest region of the stakeholder map would the majority of the producers be 
found, and do the preferences across this stakeholder category really have a consistency to 
imagine a single indifference curve (however approximate) for the entire sector? It is true that 
many countries have peak associations representing the agricultural producer sector, and they 
take part in policy-making to articulate the demands of the sector. However, such associations 
are always contested both internally and by rival organizations. For example, peak associations 
are often criticized as being at the service of an unholy alliance of big landowners and 
agribusiness interests, while family agriculture and marginalized rural communities are left to 
tend for themselves politically. Identifying where the majority of the rural producers stand, and 
 88 
with which other stakeholder they share a larger winset, is a challenge. Governments often lack 
good information about this kind of questions. Under conditions of uncertainty induced by 
technological innovation, they also lack the knowledge to confidently impose their own view of 
what is best for the sector. Furthermore, many producers themselves may be unsure about how to 
position themselves. The science, the technology and the law of GMOs confuse a lot of people. 
Anthropologists report that farmers are often unable to identify different kinds of seed varieties 
they use.65 Fieldwork reveals that people are often confused about the technical question of 
whether GM seeds are biologically capable of reproduction after one generation, which is 
consequential for IPR enforcement.66 The legal tools available for IPR enforcement have also not 
been transparent, because the release of GM crops coincided with the launch of a new global IPR 
regime embodied in the 1995 TRIPS agreement and it has taken a long time of gestation until 
many implications become clear. Because both the economic gains from GM seeds and their 
negative externalities were far from clearly understood in the early phase of the technology, 
deliberation and persuasion played an essential role in guiding all stakeholders as well as the 
policymaking statesmen insofar as the latter could act on their autonomous preferences.  
In short, to understand the game they are playing, and identify their preferred scenarios 
and the strategic path that leads to it, the actors have to make up for missing knowledge. Social 
narratives that embody ideas approximating true knowledge serve the purpose by filling in for 
what cannot be surely known. Such ideational social narratives provide scripts that are claimed 
to describe the true identity of the other actors and the nature of their relationships. The scripts 
evoke abstract leitmotifs like “science,” “life,” “progress” or “imperialism” to endow legitimacy 
on their descriptions about “what the poor farmers really want,” “the truth about the GMOs,” 
                                                 
65 Tripp (2001), Stone (2007) 
66 Author’s interviews. See chapters below for details. 
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“Monsanto’s hidden agenda” or “the rich world conspiracy behind Greenpeace,” and the like. 
When actors adopt ideas, they engage in learning—an update in beliefs about how the world 
works, and consequently, in a change of conduct. 
The role of ideas in substituting for missing knowledge explains the surprising efficacy of 
idea-generating agents in affecting policy. The picture about policy-making in developing 
countries that we are more accustomed to see is one in which concerns over things like 
biodiversity preservation, food safety, or local community practices are easily discarded under 
the damning weight of the economic development imperative.67 The policy debate over the 
GMOs, however, provoked in many developing countries consequential civil society activism 
preoccupied with what could be seen as “first world problems.”  
I call the collectivity of these surprisingly efficacious idea-generating agents as epistemic 
coalitions. Episteme is “a dominant way of looking at social reality, a set of shared symbols and 
references, mutual expectations and a mutual predictability of intention” (Ruggie 1975: 569-70). 
An epistemic coalition consist of epistemic brokers: scientists, civil society activists and 
bureaucrats; working across the state-society divide. They strategically mix selective scientific 
evidence with ideological narratives and social norms to produce convincing truth statements 
over the nature of the policy challenge in question, under conditions of incomplete scientific 
consensus. 
The concept of epistemic coalition has to be differentiated from a number of neighboring 
terms that are used to describe agents responsible for driving change in policy processes. One is 
the “advocacy coalition,” consisting of “actors at various levels of government active in policy 
formulation and implementation, as well as journalists, researchers, and policy analysts who play 
                                                 
67 Drezner (2008: 40) stylizes this observation as regulation being a “luxury good” (with high income-elasticity of 
demand). 
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important roles in the generation, dissemination, and evaluation of policy ideas” (Sabatier 1988: 
131). Hajer’s (1995) “discourse coalitions” consist of actors linked loosely through storylines 
that are seen as the vehicles for change, placing emphasis on the importance of connotations 
generated by language. Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) “transnational advocacy networks” turn the 
attention to civil society activists and their trans-border interaction in constructing advocacy 
coalitions of global reach and salience.  
Epistemic coalitions builds on the central insights contained in each of these concepts, 
namely, the centrality of coalition structure, the need to utilize appropriate discursive frames to 
enlist support for the coalition, and participation of agents across the state-society and interstate 
boundaries. However in none of these concepts expert knowledge is demarcated as an important 
constituent of the mechanism inducing cognitive and policy change. For that we have to engage 
with the concept of epistemic community (Haas 1992, 2001, 2015). Epistemic communities 
research program investigates the relationship between scientific knowledge and political power, 
setting out from the premise that in areas such as environmental policy-making and coordination, 
ideas propagated by epistemic communities may contribute to better policy outcomes by 
changing the way political power holders view an issue. Epistemic communities consist of 
experts “responsible for developing and circulating causal ideas and some associated normative 
beliefs, and thus helping to create … interests and preferences, as well as helping to identify 
legitimate participants in the policy process and influencing the form of negotiated outcomes by 
shaping how conflicts of interest will be resolved” (Haas 2001: 11579). With the epistemic 
coalition concept I build on the epistemic community by focusing on agents utilizing expert 
knowledge to change causal beliefs in order to influence policy, but relax some of the 
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assumptions about what defines such agents and include a broader set of participants. The 
coalition is wider than the community.  
First, I relax the clear demarcation of the experts (representing “knowledge”) from 
politicians and interest groups (representing “power”). Expert knowledge is not only found in 
academic institutions, it is distributed to some extent in political institutions and the wider civil 
society too. For example, many bureaucrats and even the elected politicians paying attention to 
the GMO regulation have advanced degrees in agricultural, biological or medical sciences. The 
same often applies to the secretariat of private sector associations, and sometimes to the very 
businessmen that lead the association. Likewise, professional scientists working on agricultural 
genetic engineering applications are often not only that, and instead they move through the 
evolving doors between research institutes, for-profit industry, and regulatory agencies to assume 
different roles, sometimes simultaneously.  
Secondly, the epistemic community research has paid much attention to how expert 
consensus translates to policy knowledge and policy change, and relatively little to the 
interaction between rival expert groups vying to become the authority in their area (Haas 1999 
and Bernstein 2002 are exceptions). However, representatives of expert knowledge often clash 
not only with power but also with each other. The picture of a unified consensual science 
speaking truth to power can be improved by recognizing the plural and contested set of 
appropriate technologies that scientific truth warrants. I emphasize that epistemic coalitions are 
almost always found in disagreement with rival epistemic coalitions, and such disagreement is 
how they define their boundaries at the first place.  
Therefore, the concept of epistemic coalition invites attention to the strategic interaction 
of competitive coalitions, each with their own attempt at recruiting some expert knowledge in 
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support of their policy agenda. Such coalitions will consist of scientists, civil society activists 
and pro-active bureaucrats; working across the state-society divide and generating ideas and 
narratives that both help define the stakeholders’ interests and influence the institutional 
aggregation of interests into public decisions. The differences of epistemic coalition from 
neighboring concepts, and what this may imply for the literature, are discussed further in the 
conclusion chapter. 
I have argued earlier that the universe does not give to ideas a blank check for defining 
people’s interests, which are also informed by material conditions in ways that do not always 
require a lot of ideational mediation to become intelligible. Epistemic coalitions can be highly 
resourceful and inventive, but they will have a harder time affecting stakeholders and 
policymakers if their arguments do not have a good match with the economic setting—either the 
arguments will not be found persuasive, or the public salience of the argument will not rise to a 
level that can fuel action-oriented mobilization. Economic structure helps select the set of ideas 
that have a higher chance of appealing to the actors. The logic is illustrated simply below. 
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Figure 8: Ideas and economic structure 
What are the relevant economic-structural characteristics that could play a role in 
constraining the domain of ideas by shaping stakeholder positions? In order to evaluate the 
argument that epistemic coalitions are having a contribution to policy, and analyze the limits of 
their contribution, we need a sub-theory of what the world could look like in their absence. 
Below I provide one, and here it is in a nutshell: Economic structure determines the strength of 
the producer sector to an important extent, but delimits its interests to a lesser extent, especially 
because much remains uncertain about what small farmers can expect from the technology. If 
GMO-skeptic epistemic coalitions can attach themselves to producer sector discourse, they may 
help define those interests. If they do not do so, and if the producer sector happens to be strong, 
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they risk being ultimately irrelevant. And a more consolidated, capitalist producer sector is 
expected to be stronger politically. Now let me explain this in greater detail. 
 
The Economic Context of Decision-Making 
I have noted above that GM seed technology comes with the promise of productivity and 
profit increase for the agricultural producer sector, and the risk of negative externalities to the 
consumers that are not reflected in short-term production costs. On this consideration, it is 
reasonable to take the producer sector as potential lobbyers for permissive policies; and expect 
them to be influential over policy in countries where they are politically strong. 
How to identify producer sector strength? The share of agriculture in national 
employment or economic output would not help, as these are typically indicators of economic 
underdevelopment and nothing else. A more nuanced approach is necessary, which should start 
by identifying the appropriate sub-sector. Most important for policy are producers of those crops 
for which genetic engineering has been most relevant. A country might have an important 
producer sector thriving on cocoa and bananas, like Ecuador, but these are commodities where 
GM crop technology has been (and likely to remain) irrelevant. Such a country’s government 
could go so far as passing constitutional provisions to ban GM seeds without politically 
alienating farmers or the biotech industry, like Ecuador did.68 But countries that are major 
producers of the chief GM crops—corn, soy, cotton—seen in the table 10 below, are those where 
the economic gains from adoption, and by implication the opportunity costs of non-adoption, 
would amount to large sums. Note that in the production of these essential crops no single 
country enjoys a price-setting monopoly. Widespread adoption of the productivity-enhancing 
                                                 
68 See article 401 of Ecuador’s 2008 Constitution. 
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technology would be expected to lead to some decrease in commodity prices in time;69 and 
because there is no guarantee that rival producers will not adopt the technology, producers in any 
single country could be expected to be anxious to gain access to the technology as quickly as 
possible. The biotech TNCs too would have an interest in pushing GM varieties into these large 
seed markets, and they would be strong lobbyists there. Delays or defeats of permissive policies 
in these places (as observed to some extent in India, for some time Brazil, and most extremely, 
Turkey) would appear as puzzles on this ground.70 
Table 16: Producers of major crops of interest (million tones) in c. 2003-2004 
World ranking Soy Corn Cotton 
1 US (82.8) US (280) China (50.9) 
2 Brazil (50.2) China (131) USA (36.4) 
3 Argentina (38.3) Brazil (34.9) India (26.4) 
4 China (16.9) Mexico (20.5) Pakistan (18.9) 
5 India (6) Argentina (19.5) Uzbekistan (10.3) 
6  N/A India (14.5) Turkey (9.5) 
 
Source: Fukuda-Parr (2007: 30). 
One major lesson from research in agricultural economics is the role of factor 
endowments (land, labor, capital) in inducing particular kinds of innovation adoption. In 
countries with different factor endowments, different technological traits will be more attractive 
to the producer sector, as innovation will be sought to compensate for the scarce production 
factor.71 It makes sense to characterize some GM traits as land-augmenting and others as labor-
saving, relatively speaking: herbicide-tolerant (HT) seeds are labor-saving;72 whereas insect-
                                                 
69 Levins and Cochrane (1996), Graff et al (2015: 676). 
70 I borrow this insight from Fukuda-Parr (2007). 
71 Hayami and Ruttan (1971). 
72 Weed control is a labor-intensive job that requires the management of a complex cycle of herbicide application 
and/or farm labor to manually displace weeds, adjusted for the timing of tillage, planting, and harvest. With the 
herbicide tolerance trait, weed control can be done with glyphosate-based herbicides during the post-weed 
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resistant seeds, like those which incorporate the Bt genetic event, are land-augmenting.73 HT 
seeds should be the focus of lobbying efforts in land-abundant countries, and Bt seeds in those 
that are relatively land-scarce. This insight alerts us about what to look for while tracing the 
policy process, by specifying the particular GM technology of interest. (Indeed, the New World 
producers were primarily attracted to HT seeds, whereas Turkish and Indian producers were 
interested in Bt seeds). However, the point is; there are GM technologies that are attractive to 
both types of countries, and factor endowment in itself should not be a big determinant of policy 
demand. The puzzle would remain. 
The composition of the producer sector should help explain the puzzle. The logic of 
collective action suggests that a policy choice will enjoy efficacious political support when it 
promises great benefits to be captured by a small number of players because the potential 
beneficiaries will each have a lot to gain from pressuring the government and face fewer 
problems of coordination while doing so.74 Hence, a producer sector that displays greater 
concentration may have a higher chance of getting its way. To develop a meaningful composite 
measure of concentration across the entire agribusiness production chain (even when we leave 
the biotech TNCs out as an external constant) would probably be impossible. One has to rely on 
select actors and crude measures. I focus on agricultural land and farmers. Where small farmers 
numerically dominate the agrarian landscape, we get a producer sector with high fragmentation, 
which should be encountering greater problems of collective action in articulating its interests 
                                                                                                                                                             
emergence phase and the need for pre-seeding tillage is much reduced. Although the total herbicide applied can 
increase, the task becomes simpler. As a result both farm management time and the labor employed for weed control 
are expected to decrease. See Fernandez-Cornejo and McBride (2000). 
73 See Tripp (2009a) for a discussion in the context of cotton. 
74 Olson (1965), Becker (1983). 
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and getting favorable public policies. Where most agricultural production is concentrated in big 
farms, the producer sector will be better suited to articulate its interests.75  
Not only the ability to organize, but preferences too may differ between big farmers and 
small; because their expected gains (per unit land) from GM seed adoption may be different. 
Yes, GM crop technology should be scale-neutral at a purely technical level, since seed is a 
divisible input that should not come with increasing returns to scale. However, the history of 
agricultural innovations should lead us to doubt whether any technology can be scale-neutral 
once we leave the purely technical terrain. The Green Revolution seed varieties were supposed to 
be scale-neutral too, but in many settings they were first and more extensively adopted in larger 
farms.76 Because any innovation is risky, the greater ability to accommodate risk with easier 
access to credit may be the reason for big farmers’ pioneering behavior. Information may be 
more readily available to the operators of big farms too. In the US context agricultural surveys 
have found that larger farms and a higher education level explains which farmers adopted GM 
seed varieties first.77 Hence, big farmers may anticipate being early adopters of the novel 
technology and reaping rents before adoption becomes universal and the cost-price squeeze due 
to increase production starts to bite farmers across the board.78 The smaller farmers’ attitude 
towards the new technology should be less determinate due to uncertainty over terms of access to 
a new technology and its possible impacts. In short, due to both stronger organizational 
capabilities and clearer preferences, where big farmers dominate agricultural production to a 
greater extent we may expect overall producer demand for permissive policies to be stronger. By 
                                                 
75 Bates (1981), de Janvry (1981), Varshney (1993), Birner and Resnick (2010). 
76 Lipton and Lipherst (1989). 
77 Fernandez-Cornejo and McBride (2000). 
78 Levins and Cochrane (1996), Goldsmith (2001), Micheels and Gow (2013), Graff et al (2015: 676). 
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implication, demand for biosafety regulations to restrict or ban GM crop cultivation should 
remain weaker (relative to the opposite demand) in such settings.  
Strong IPR over GM seeds generates a further axis of differentiation among the producer 
sector. For millennia, farmers have freely saved seeds from harvests to reproduce an essential 
means of production in-house and the “farmer’s privilege” to do so was an important part of the 
international IPR regime until the invention of the GM seeds. IPR claims over GM seeds pose a 
challenge to established practice by advocating for a restriction of free seed saving. Hence, strict 
IPR over seed leads to not only higher input prices (which are certain, whereas realization of 
superior performance in particular ecosystems is not),79 but also less farmer control over the 
production process. This should be more important for small and medium farmers than big ones, 
not necessarily for strictly technical reasons of efficient scale but because of imperfect credit 
markets and similar institutional phenomena. Seed saving is more common practice among small 
and medium farmers to save on input costs in bad years; whereas big capitalist farmers are likely 
to be willing to invest in the most expensive seeds every year thanks to greater ability to 
accommodate risk.80 When strict IPR protection encroaches on free seed saving, smaller farmers 
would be agitated more. Also, if there is integration within agroindustrial input markets in a way 
that allows companies marketing GM seeds to tie these sales to a package of other inputs like 
herbicides, small farmers may incur disproportionate cost penalties when seed reproduction 
cannot be undertaken in the farm anymore and is dependent on such external suppliers.81 
Therefore, big farm interests could see IPR claims by TNCs as relatively tolerable, even if they 
are not enthusiastic supporters of such claims. Smaller farmers as well as the domestic seed 
                                                 
79 See Finger et al’s (2012) meta-analysis. 
80 Tripp (2001), Edmeades (2012: 260). 
81 Goldsmith (2001: 1314-17) discusses how a uniform input pricing strategy and product bundling combined with 
heterogeneous demand can lead to regressive welfare impacts on smaller producers. 
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sector, on the other hand, would seek direction from the government and guarantees that the 
adoption of the technology will not be to their disadvantage. The implication of this point is that 
where small farmers numerically dominate the agrarian landscape, we get a producer sector 
facing greater uncertainty about what to expect from the new technology’s socioeconomic 
impact, and any support they could be expected to display in favor of permissive policies would 
be qualified, and perhaps cancelled out, by concerns over IPR.  
Turning to our sample, data demonstrates that in Argentina and Brazil a larger part of 
agricultural production is dominated by a small number of big operators compared to India and 
Turkey, see Table 11. 
Table 17: Agrarian structure, c. 1988-199682 
 
Mean farm 
size (ha) 
Farm size 
distribution 
Gini 
Ratio of 
small 
farms (%) 
Land held 
by small 
farms (%) 
Argentina 468.97 0.83 15.1 1 
Brazil 73.09 0.85 36.8 1 
Turkey 5.76 0.61 67.9 22.1 
India 1.55 0.58 76.2 29 
 
Source: Eastwood et al 2004 reporting FAO World Agricultural Census 
 
As an empirical correlate, in the New World cases the political clout of the agricultural 
sector in general is further enhanced by the fact that it is an important generator of export 
revenues, as seen in Table 12. Anti-GMO opposition, if it is chiefly originating from the 
consumer sector, would have a harder time in influencing policy in those settings. 
 
 
                                                 
82 Small farm is defined as  <2ha in India, <5ha for the rest. The figures refer to data from 1988 for Argentina, 1996 
for Brazil, and 1991 for Turkey and India. Because farm surveys are not administered in uniform fashion around the 
world, the figures may not be directly comparable, but they will give an idea about the differences in the average 
size and distribution of agricultural holdings in these places. 
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Table 18: Agriculture in economic context, c. 2000 
c. 2000 
Agricultural 
land (ha per 
person) 
Food & agr raw 
materials as % of 
total exports 
Argentina 4.72 42.9 
Brazil 1.53 26.5 
Turkey 0.57 14 
India 0.18 11.8 
 
Source: FAO and World Bank 
 
Note that this last proposition is based on political instead of purely market mechanisms. 
Relying on the latter, some commentators had hypothesized that export farmers and countries 
they dominate, like Argentina and Brazil, would be the first to oppose GM crop cultivation in 
order not to lose markets (Lapan and Moschini 2002, Graff et al 2009). Pretty much the opposite 
have come true. This is because export orientation can simultaneously activate contrary causal 
mechanisms too: the export competitiveness imperative may attune farmers to productivity 
concerns to a greater extent than what would be the case if farmers were mainly producing for a 
protected domestic market. And signals from various export markets may suggest a variety of 
policy directions. Hence, the directly economic rationale of export orientation is unclear as far as 
policy direction is concerned. The political economy rationale, however, looks clearer. The 
structural dependence of the state on capital83 should be more pronounced when it comes to 
export-oriented sectors,84 since exports help balance the current account bill and attenuate the 
need for foreign borrowing, and exports seem to generate better-paying jobs85 and contribute to 
                                                 
83 Przeworski and Wallerstein (1988). 
84 For a classic treatment of this notion (although using different terms), see Hirschman (1969). 
85 This has been found as a comparison across the US manufacturing sectors (Riker 2010).  
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economic growth more than home-market activity.86 All else being constant, export-oriented 
farmers would be politically more important farmers. 
The point is that, due to both class structure and export-orientation, the agricultural sector 
is stronger politically in the New World cases compared to Turkey or India. Literature on the 
economic and political history of these places indeed attests to a more cohesive, better organized, 
and politically influential agricultural producer sector in the New World cases. A brief overview 
of this literature is in order. 
“[T]he conventional way of understanding Argentine political history” is that it is “one of 
those Latin American countries where landowners most controlled the state, at least until well 
into the twentieth century” (Safford 1995: 177, also see Furtado 1963 and 1970, deJanvry 1981). 
Some scholars, such as Halperin Donghi (1995) challenge this narrative by pointing that the 
landed class in Argentina has not enjoyed the effective political power that could be expected 
from their central position in the country’s economy and often had a conflictual relationship to 
the state. Still, even if they have not enjoyed “class hegemony” in this sense, they enjoyed a 
“natural hegemony” (Safford 1995: 177 paraphrasing Halperin Donghi): The landed class was 
either secure enough in its economic position to tolerate the installation of a democratic regime 
or it effected a return to authoritarianism and a prominent role for the conservative parties when 
the control of the state apparatus was seen important for purposes of influencing economic, tax, 
and spending policies; thus generating the turbulent history of conflict (Huber 1995: 12-13). In 
any event, the rural landed class, not only as a propertied elite but also qua agricultural producers 
directly involved in the production of exportable commodities, has been a formative actor in 
modern Argentine politics. The producers have maintained a boardroom pattern of consultative 
                                                 
86 This is attested by both macro-level data on national growth rates, and micro evidence regarding productivity 
improvements for exporting firms. See Winters (2004) for an extensive discussion. 
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relationship with the state that is known as La Mesa de Enlace (“the contact desk”) where 
associations like the Sociedad Rural or Federacion Agraria have a chance to directly articulate 
policy preferences to state managers (Lattuada 2006). 
Turning to Brazil, during the Old Republic “[a]gricultural producers and exporters 
dominated the national Congress and held key decision-making positions within the 
administration.” After the establishment of the New State, although enjoying less autonomy 
“landlords continued to play a very important political role under Vargas and during the period 
of restricted democracy from 1945 to 1964” (Huber and Stephens 1995: 196-197). During the 
two decades when the military monopolized political power, the agricultural elites were not as 
central to national politics as they were in Argentina, but “landlords were left in the position of 
ultimate authority on their estates and mostly also controlled local politics” (Huber and Stephens 
1995: 197). The return to democracy enabled the agricultural producers to reestablish themselves 
as an interest group with the ability to influence economic policy-making through organized 
political pressure along a dense policy network. Speaking of the period since the early 1990s 
onwards, Mueller notes “a dramatic increase in the number and scope of agribusiness 
organizations … [V]irtually all segments of agribusiness have specific associations, and most of 
them have composed particular agricultural networks… Together with the official agricultural 
institutions … and with less formal but important organizations such as the Rural Group of 
Congressmen (the Bancada Ruralista) and the Democratic Rural Union, they compose a broad 
agricultural policy network” (Mueller 2009: 139). 
The Turkish case provides a much different picture. Several classic works explain the 
relatively high autonomy of the Turkish state apparatus with the historical absence of a class of 
landed nobility, and the resulting symbiotic relationship between the state and politically 
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submissive smallholding peasantry—a relationship that the Ottomans did much to cultivate and 
the Republican regime inherited (Mardin 1969, Keyder 1987, İslamoğlu-İnan 1994). These 
conditions have made it difficult for the emergence of an export-oriented capitalistic farming 
sector, save but in certain coastal pockets, and sustained the smallholding pattern (Jacoby 2008, 
Pamuk 2009). The coming of multiparty electoral politics in the 1950s ushered an era of 
populism and conferred on the rural population a new kind of importance (Anderson 2006). This 
meant that the farming population had the option of reacting to public policies through elections, 
however, the fungibility of that mechanisms for policy influence has been muted by the fact that 
the closed-list electoral system with multi-member districts exposes parties, not individual 
candidates, to the electoral reward and punishment cycle. Maybe more important is that the 
agricultural producers did not become a formative actor that drafted policies through organized 
interest group influence. Can and Sakarya explain the associational failures of the Turkish 
agricultural sector by noting that the impetus for association did not come bottom-up through 
popular demands, and instead it has been provided by the state (2012: 27). The chief farmer 
organization is the Turkish Union of Chambers of Agriculture (Türkiye Ziraat Odaları Birliği, 
TZOB), instituted by the state between 1958-63, and required by law to have a Chamber in every 
town and a delegate in every village in the country. The organizational weakness of the TZOB 
and its limited influence over agricultural policy is a matter of consensus in the literature on 
Turkish agriculture policy (Önal 2010). Member dues, seen as a tax by most farmers, are paid 
infrequently, and it makes TZOB dependent on the state for financial resources. Governments 
have repeatedly used the threat of withdrawing the TZOB’s power to issue “farmer authorization 
documents” as a stick to discipline the organization’s leaders (farmers need these documents to 
claim government subsidies and the authority to issue them is a major source of income for the 
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organization). Inan et al (2005, n.p., translation mine) conclude that “in putting agricultural 
problems on the national policy agenda and influencing the decisions of the legislature and the 
executive”, the TZOB’s power is “much more limited compared to the non-agricultural 
chambers of commerce and industry in Turkey or agricultural chambers in Europe”. Turkish 
agricultural producers have neither the parliamentary bancada ruralista available to their 
Brazilian counterparts nor the corporatist mesa de enlace available to the Argentine.  
It is more difficult to generalize about the Indian agricultural producers’ degree of 
influence over agricultural policy due to the vast size and diversity of the Indian countryside, and 
the geographical fragmentation that characterizes the country’s political movements and 
organizations. In his now-classic treatment of agrarian transition in Asia, for example, Byres 
notes that there are several “agrarian questions”, instead of the agrarian question, for a country 
like India (1989: 6). This very fragmentation, though, can be thought to make it difficult for the 
articulation of a national policy space that a producer class can have access to and hope to 
influence (Kohli 2004). Rural class structure and land ownership and operating patterns add a 
further vector of fragmentation. It is true that in pre-colonial and colonial times, Indian rural 
elites have had greater autonomy from the vicissitudes of the state, and greater chance to 
differentiate themselves from the peasantry than it was the case in Turkey. This may lead one to 
view the Indian rural class structure as being closer to the Latin American cases. However, in 
much everything else, the Indian agricultural sector joins the Turkish case in being characterized 
by smallholding peasantry. The large estates of the zamindars that were once frequent in the 
Indian countryside were not plantations or “Junker farms” running on hired labor; they were 
mostly divided and rented out to sharecropping tenants (Binswanger et al 1993). The rural 
gentry, including many former zamindars, have acted as an agrarian elite; enjoying a dominant 
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position in the countryside by leasing out land and extending credit to tenant-farmers or tax-
farming on behalf of remote centers of political authority. But they have not been an agricultural 
elite in the way that Brazilian coffee barons or the Argentinean growers and ranchers have 
been—their power and wealth have had a much more mediated connection to agricultural 
production, which is the domain of their tenant-farmers. The Indian “Green Revolution” from the 
1960s onwards, despite criticisms about its regional biases, was an affair that was remarkable in 
its attention to this latter class. Birner and Resnick state that “In the case of India, the explicit 
political focus on smallholders in launching the Green Revolution is well documented… The 
Minister of Agriculture who masterminded India’s Green Revolution, Subramaniam, [aimed at] a 
smallholder-based agricultural intensification—a goal that he had to defend strongly against 
internal critics and against advisors from both the United States” (2010: 1443-1444). It is telling 
that the political energy of Indian rural populism and its organizations, like the Shetkari 
Sanghatana in Maharashtra, BKU in Uttar Pradesh, TVS in Tamil Nadu, or KRRS in Karnataka, 
have not been directed towards breaking up and replacing a rural propertied class, but towards 
influencing the state in the form of demands for infrastructure provision and subsidies (Brass 
1994). And the degree of that influence is generally recognized as being muted by cross-cutting 
cleavages of caste and ethnicity among the rural population, and in decline compared to its peak 
in the 1980s (Varshney 1997, Omveldt 2005). Indian agricultural sector power remains mostly 
an affair of rural popular sector mobilization, and it is limited by that fact. 
In short, throughout the twentieth century, landowners and farmers in Argentina and 
Brazil have often been formative actors shaping not only agricultural and economic policy but 
even national politics, whereas in Turkey and India they have held defensive positions, trying to 
secure the state’s paternalistic attention at most. 
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To summarize, then, this section then has provided us with a comparison strategy 
regarding the material setting of policy struggles. Where most of the domestic agricultural 
production is being done in big farms by export-oriented capitalist farmers, a TNC-domestic 
producer alliance for permissive policies for GM crop cultivation would be more likely and 
efficacious. Where smallholding peasantry dominates, the domestic producers would be less 
interested, and less able, to politically defend such an alliance position, because their potential 
gains from technology permission is uncertain (which rests on agricultural microeconomics) and 
at best small compared to the costs of political mobilization (which follows from collective 
action theory). A more consolidated, capitalist producer sector is expected to be more strongly in 
favor of permissive biosafety policies. In other words, economic structure determines the 
strength of the producer sector to an important extent, but delimits its interests to a lesser extent, 
especially because much remains uncertain about what small farmers can expect from the 
technology. If GMO-skeptic epistemic coalitions can attach themselves to producer sector 
discourse, they may help define those interests. If they do not do so, and if the producer sector 
happens to be strong, they risk being irrelevant. 
Agricultural sector data, and the literature on the political history of each place reviewed 
above, suggests that we would expect to find a strong domestic producer sector in Argentina and 
Brazil, which form “most similar” cases in this particular respect. We would find the opposite in 
Turkey and India, which are likewise “most similar” to each other, and “most different” from the 
others.87 These expectations inform my strategies of comparison. In the New World cases, 
stronger lobbying from interest groups would be present in favor of GM crops, in the Old World 
cases, lobbying would be weaker. How did the opposition groups position themselves in these 
                                                 
87 I am using to the methodological terminology in Gerring (2011). 
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respective settings, and how did the public decision-makers respond? Differences between the 
experiences of most similar cases will attest to the ability of the epistemic coalitions in 
influencing the government, the differences between the most different cases will attest to the 
limits of what the epistemic coalitions can do given particular economic setting constraints. 
Tables 2 and 15 illustrate the processes and outcomes observed across these cases in terms of 
these two differences. 
 
From Theory to Research 
Observable Implications of the Argument 
After all, the theoretical framework amounts to a simple argument. Because there is high 
economic value at stake with this policy question, the economic structure of each setting makes a 
difference by giving actors different degrees of political power. But because there is a lot of 
scientific and legal uncertainty surrounding the impact of technology, economic structure 
requires interpretation, and ideas too make a difference, through the agency of epistemic 
coalitions, by helping autonomous state managers to select from structurally relevant political 
options. With such a framework we learn about both what constrained policy-makers’ options, 
and how they have made use of their options.  
However, the particular theoretical form of the argument I have presented is more 
specific, allowing for concrete implications and letting me denote with some clarity what the 
world would look like if I were wrong. So, to the extent that my argument is correct, we should 
observe:  
1. That lobbying for permissive policies has an economic logic. 
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1.1. Biotech companies approach regulatory agencies first for the approval of GM varieties 
of crops that are produced in large quantities in a given country, and focus their lobbying 
activities there. 
1.2. Domestic producers of these crops are more inclined for permissive policies than 
producers of other commodities. 
2. That opposition to the technology is mainly coming from outside the producer sector. 
2.1. Opposition to GM crops originates from and spearheaded by urban-based consumer 
sector NGOs; rural producers are coopted to the opposition (if at all) later. Biosafety 
concerns receive much greater attention in the opposition articulated by consumer sector 
NGOs.  
2.2. Any producer opposition to GMOs incorporates ideas revolving around the 
undesirability of stricter IPR that are coupled with them, and consumer aversion fears. 
3. That there is an IPR conflict introduced by the technology, and this qualifies producer sector 
positions. 
3.1. Biotech TNCs finding themselves in a monopoly position aim to extract uncompetitive 
rents through royalty fees. This should manifest itself as high mark-up rates evinced by 
vastly different (across time, space, or negotiation round) royalty fees emerging from 
negotiations between biotech and farmers.  
3.2. Among the farm organizations, those who raise the strongest objections to the IPR 
restrictions and alleged monopoly practices are associations that represent smaller and 
medium farmers and peasants.  
3.3. Where the latter kind of producers are numerically dominating, the producer sector 
support for permissive biosafety policies is weaker.  
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4. That decision-makers care about pleasing the producer sector, among other things. 
4.1. The interests of the producers have an explicit place in policy-makers’ public discourse, 
and in their personal testimony about the policy-making process. 
4.2. The particular way in which the producer interests will be served is open to 
interpretation, as evinced by policy-makers holding different ideas about this question. 
4.3. Where the producer sector support for permissive policies is strong, there is little chance 
for anti-GMO opposition to obtain precautionary biosafety policies. GMO-skeptic 
opposition can nonetheless help obtaining a producer-oriented solution by challenging 
the legitimacy of strong IPR claims over GM crops by transnational biotechnology 
firms. 
5. That decision-makers make use of ideas in the form of scientific, economic, legal truth 
statements (not necessarily corresponding to true descriptions of the world, as far as we can 
objectively tell) to inform their decisions. 
5.1. Policy-makers in comparable material settings with different ideas, or same policy-
makers holding different ideas across time arrive at different decisions. 
5.2. Policy-makers justify their decisions (in public discourse and personal testimony) by the 
said truth statements. 
5.3. These truth statements are perceived by policy-makers as informing (national, sectorial, 
partisan) interests, instead of conceived as completely rival sources of behavior. 
 
Research Methodology 
The above-described implications of the argument arise at various levels of analysis: 
some should be observable in the form of cross-country differences, some in the temporal 
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progression of policy processes, and some in the more micro behavior of organizations or 
individuals that stand as stakeholders and public decision-makers. Being careful about such 
multi-level implications enables me to populate what may look like an (n=4) research design 
with many more observations. As King et al reminds “By adding new observations from 
different levels of analysis, we can generate multiple tests of [a theory’s] implications” (1994). 
For example, the implications 3.2 and 3.3 should have observable traces in both cross-country 
outcomes (have Turkish farmers been as enthusiastic supporters of GM seeds as Argentinian 
ones?), and in more micro behavior across within-country geography (did smaller Rio Grande do 
Sul farmers present greater challenges to the TNCs IPR claims than the bigger Mato Grosso 
farmers in Brazil?) or organizational terrain (did the FAA—representing the medium and smaller 
farmers of Argentina—present greater such challenge than the more agribusiness oriented SRA? 
etc).  
This is why my research proceeds not simply as a variation-finding comparison across 
countries, but buttresses the comparison with detailed case studies of each, in order to trace the 
decision-making process to verify that the imputed causal mechanisms were indeed in play 
(Hedström and Swedberg 1998, Collier 2011, Bennett and Checkel 2014). As King et al state, 
“process tracing and other approaches to the elaboration of causal mechanisms increase the 
number of theoretically relevant observations… By providing more observations relevant to the 
implications of a theory, such a method can help to overcome the dilemmas of small-n research 
and enable investigators and their readers to increase their confidence in the findings of social 
science” (1994). 
Simple cross-country comparison with a “nationalistic” focus is also inadequate, by itself, 
to deal with questions of international interaction by way of competition or diffusion. Policy-
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making on GMOs does not occur in isolated settings, instead, what happens in one country 
affects what comes afterwards in other places by setting up policy examples and legal 
precedents, generating influential ideas, or changing the global market structure. From the 
vantage point of transnational actors like Monsanto and Greenpeace, the policy contestation 
occurs through a series of interlinked games played sequentially in different settings. They 
therefore adjust their position in each setting with an eye towards what has been going on in 
others, effectively creating a network where ideas, information and resources travel between 
countries. In large-N comparative studies utilizing regression methods such network effects 
arising from the lack of independence between cases are by implication relegated to the error 
term, and even if it is recognized that estimation efficiency (i.e. precision) is thus reduced it is 
assumed that the effects are not of a kind that would bias the coefficients (i.e. accuracy). The 
accuracy of findings from such studies thus rests on the assumption that the cases are effectively 
independent, which is often problematic.88 In process-tracing analyses nested in small-N 
comparison, on the other hand, the danger is not the lack of independence per se, but that “the 
researcher will fail to identify a lack of independence between cases and will consequently reach 
false conclusions” (George and Bennett 2005: 34). In other words, the problem is not that what 
happens in Argentina affects what happens in Brazil—it always will; the problem is that the 
researcher does not notice this and attributes too much causal influence to something else 
happening solely in Brazil. Fortunately, “[p]rocess-tracing can inductively uncover linkages 
between cases” (George and Bennett 2005: 34). With elite interviews the researcher can ask 
Brazilian policy-makers whether they were responding to events in Argentina. Even where such 
                                                 
88 Network analysis of large-N data, on the other hand, is still a small (albeit growing) research body in political 
science, its typical application has not been to questions of country-level variation, and most research with this 
method remains descriptive. Sophisticated models that are able to analyze both network interaction and comparative 
covariation (such as Exponential Random Graph Models) are, as far as empirical application is concerned, at their 
infancy (see Cranmer and Desmarais 2011).  
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testimonies are missing, the researcher can work like a careful historian on the basis of press 
reports and the like to take note of the sequentiality of events in different settings, with an eye 
towards “smoking gun” evidence about connections between them (Mahoney and Goertz 2006). 
Verifying these connections may require revisions on lessons otherwise generated on the basis of 
the “nationalistic” cross-country comparison. Such corrections to ensure inferential accuracy 
may reduce the parsimony of the ultimate explanation—but methodological choices always 
come with trade-offs, and this is a necessary one.89 
Therefore, variation-finding comparison buttressed with process-tracing can contribute to 
our understanding of causal mechanisms. This is what I do in this study. Furthermore, while 
presenting its original data in qualitative fashion, this study makes use of a good deal of 
quantitative, econometric evidence in the form of public opinion surveys, and studies examining 
the impact of GM seed technology on crop yields, farm incomes, and the like. Such data has 
been cited whenever relevant in order to demonstrate the following non-obvious stylized facts 
that ground my theoretical propositions: 1) consumers everywhere have a bias towards GM crops 
(they prefer non-GM food over GM food) and often favor the banning of GM seeds; 2) farmers 
have a more favorable attitude towards GM crops compared to the consumers; 3) Adoption of 
GM crops on average result in increases in farm productivity (higher yields and/or fewer 
chemical inputs); 4) whether farmers profit from the productivity increase depends on 
arrangements (such as IPR regulations) that determine the GM seed price. These data are drawn 
from available secondary literature. I will now describe the sources of the original data I am 
bringing in support of my observations. 
 
                                                 
89 Przeworski and Teune (1970: 20-23). 
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Sources and Use of Data 
The research started with a survey of the secondary literature, and identification of the 
country cases that would have leverage in advancing the study. Once countries were selected, 
first, a timeline of major events relevant to the GMO regulation for each country was prepared, 
structured around legislative and judicial initiatives. In doing so, the foremost primary source 
proved to be the US Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) 
reports, which are unclassified observations on agricultural policy-making in countries of 
interest, prepared by USDA attaches to the US embassies and consulates in those places.90 A 
similar source was the partly classified US embassy cables that became publicly available via 
Wikileaks.91 Because the USA is an agricultural powerhouse, and home to the world’s foremost 
biotech company, it has high stakes in correctly observing what is going on in major seed and 
commodity markets around the world, and because it is the world hegemon it has unique 
capabilities in doing so—no one can easily ignore a conversation request from a US diplomat. 
Hence these documents are very helpful in establishing the main events in the storyline of each 
country’s policy trajectory and the main actors involved in the making of those events. It could 
be conjectured that, colored by the perceptions of the functionaries of a pro-GMO country, the 
information in these reports could be biased. While such probable bias should be kept in mind 
while reading these reports; also remember that these are not public relations communiqués and 
instead intended primarily (in the case of Wikileaks cables exclusively) for internal use. Indeed, 
they do seem concerned with reporting objectively. For example, while the reporters from Brazil 
                                                 
90 These reports are available from USDA FAS Global Agricultural Information Network database at 
http://gain.fas.usda.gov/Pages/Default.aspx (last accessed December 2015). 
91 These cables can be searched at the Wikileaks database at 
https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/?qproject[]=ps&qproject[]=cg&qproject[]=cc&qproject[]=fp&q=#result (last 
accessed December 2015). 
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inform that the leaders of the farm associations they have met are generally highly supportive of 
allowing GM seeds,92 reporters from Turkey note no such observation, suggesting that Turkish 
farmer sector representatives were uninterested, ineffective, or ambiguous. This makes sense 
because interviews I conducted in these countries, and press reports and the like, also point to the 
same. Hence, the magnitude of the bias in US Embassy reporting does not seem large, and it 
should not really be a damning problem so long as we know the direction of the bias, which we 
do (USA is pro-GMO).93 
 Once a timeline was established, actors relevant to policy were identified. A list of 
relevant organizations have been prepared in partly inductively, based on US foreign service data 
described above, and in part deductively, based on my theoretical framework about policy 
stakeholders. Organizations that I defined above as “consumer sector NGOs”—active on public 
interest issues such as consumer rights, health, and environmental preservation are easy to 
identify and observe. Because their modus operandi is based on publicizing their views as much 
as possible, information about their activity is accessible through their own websites or press 
reports on them. The “producer sector” and government organizations themselves can be more 
opaque, so particular effort has been made to identify and access interview subjects in these 
places in order to understand the stances such organizations took, and any consequences their 
activity had. A production chain approach has been utilized to map the producer organizations 
and the public institutions they interacted with. An exemplary table covering main organizations 
through Argentinian grain (soy, corn) production chain is available as Appendix A. 
                                                 
92 USDA FAS GAIN report #BR1623, “Update of Biotech Issues in Brazil,” dated 7 November 2001, 
http://apps.fas.usda.gov/gainfiles/200111/130682651.pdf. 
93 For a discussion on how an increase in bias generated by the introduction of additional data can be justified by the 
accompanying increase in estimation efficiency, see King et al (1994: 66-74). 
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 I have undertaken original fieldwork in three countries (Argentina, Brazil, Turkey) to 
access these institutions through elite interviews. (Elite interviews are not interviews with the 
social elite; they are interviews with people—be they workers, farmers or lawyers—who have 
unique value for accessing certain kinds of information). Non-random sampling for elite 
interviews is recommended when the goal is “not … to draw a representative sample in order to 
use interviews to make generalisations about the … full population of relevant actors, but rather 
to obtain the testimony of individuals who were most closely involved in the process of interest” 
(Tansey 2007: 767). This was precisely my goal, and once obtaining some initial access I have 
used a non-random “snowball” (or chain-referral) method wherein each interviewee supplied 
names of other potential interview subjects within the regulatory universe relevant to the policy 
process. Also, I made lists of relevant individuals similar to the institutional list described above, 
which I then used to contact individuals and/or search the Internet about their activity. The lists 
were prepared primarily by identifying the participants to policy-oriented conferences and 
workshops, generally available from the documents relating to such events. This was particularly 
useful for identifying scientific and legal experts, because experts like to go to conferences and 
workshops. An exemplary list for the case of Brazil (listing the participants to a major workshop 
organized by Brazil’s biosafety regulation commission CTNBio, openly available from the same) 
is available as Appendix B. 
Once in the field, semi-structured interviews were conducted by myself, in English, 
Spanish, Turkish and in a few cases Portuguese, but below I report all quotations in English 
unless particularly evocative or ambiguous language requires the inclusion of the original. Some 
of the interviews were tape-recorded, some of them were not, because not everyone consented to 
be tape-recorded. The same goes for revealing names. A total of 39 individuals were interviewed 
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in person in Argentina (Buenos Aires and Rosario), 32 in Brazil (Sao Paulo, Campinas, Brasilia 
and Rio de Janeiro), and 25 in Turkey (Istanbul, Ankara, Adana); including bureaucrats, business 
and farm sector representatives, scientists and activists. Some of the interviews gave me the 
opportunity to visit research facilities and farms and observe the work being done. I also 
followed the press. Periodicals specializing in agriculture and agribusiness, such as Campo in 
Argentina, and Valor Econômico or AgroDBO in Brazil, were especially useful. 
Interviews can be highly valuable sources of data, but they can also be misleading. 
People may forget things, hold subjective views, or lie (Fontana and Frey 1994, Yow 2014). For 
this reason, where possible I relied directly on publicly available information (already pointing to 
what has been divulged in the interview), and referred to interviews only in additional support. 
This both serves to make information more credible, and expose interview subjects less. To make 
information more credible, interviews have also been triangulated with other interviews and data 
from elsewhere. This was particularly important for interviews with actors with a high stake in 
the game, and in conflictual positions, whose opinions on GMO regulation disagree strongly 
with other actors. So, if it appeared from an interview with person/organization A that A is 
highly critical of person/organization B, then my next mission was to try and have an interview 
with B. If their accounts agreed on some information (better still, if I was also able to find 
information about those events in printed sources), then I would have high confidence that the 
information is true.  
Here is a brief example of how this was done: In Turkey, the initial bureaucratic input for 
the design of the biosafety regime seems to have had a path-dependent effect on events 
afterwards, so it was necessary to identify the sources of the early bureaucratic approach. I 
started with interviews in the Ministry of Agriculture’s various units, which revealed that the unit 
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called TAGEM had been the bureaucratic pioneer. I interviewed the anti-GMO NGOs, and they 
told me that they had most contact with bureaucrats at TAGEM. I asked Monsanto 
representatives, who are highly critical of Turkey’s biosafety regime, and they pointed towards 
TAGEM. I searched the US foreign service data, which yielded in an embassy cable, that 
“Unfortunately, Turkey's official expertise in the sector appears to be limited to one key 
individual—the Head of Dept of the Biotechnology Group at TAGEM—who has controlled the 
direction and restrictive nature of the legislation”.94 The head at the time was Vehbi Eser, named 
as such by all the interviewees. I then contacted Dr. Eser and had a three-hour interview with 
him, to ask him about the sources of his views, his interactions with the relevant opinion and 
interest groups, and the consequences. This example shows that although biased by subjective 
views, interviews can be triangulated with each other and other sources of data to obtain credible 
information. 
                                                 
94 US Ankara Embassy cable (ref: 05Ankara 862) to Washington DC, dated February 5, 2005, last accessed at 
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/02/05ANKARA862.html in July 2014. 
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Figure 9: Interview triangulation 
Due to time and resource constraints, for India I have relied on online documents and 
evidence from secondary literature, which is fortunately extensive, and mostly produced in 
English. In terms of richness of information, this is bound to introduce some imbalance between 
the cases. In a particular methodological sense, though, this limitation is actually an opportunity. 
The case of India serves as a limited test of the propositions developed on the basis of original 
fieldwork, on evidence produced by other authors. High-profile studies of Indian policy-making, 
cited in chapter VII, are available to check whether my analytical reconstruction of the Indian 
policy process is accurate, and readers are advised to consult them. 
King et al remind that “investigators often take down the scaffolding after putting up their 
intellectual buildings, leaving little trace of the agony and uncertainty of construction” (1994: 
13). Needless to say, so is the case here. Although described as a neat sequence above, the 
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research processes have actually progressed in a reiterative fashion in which the researcher 
constantly goes back and forth between different kinds of data, and between empirics and 
theoretical (re)consideration. 
Below I present the country cases, starting with the case of Argentina in the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER IV 
THE CASE OF ARGENTINA 
 
Introduction 
Argentina has been a country with enthusiastic acceptance of GM seeds, joining the USA 
and Canada in being the first to launch large-scale GM agricultural production in 1996. By 
2008/09, GM seeds were sown in more than 90 percent of the land devoted to soybean, corn, and 
cotton production.95 Public policies remained permissive throughout. With no specific biosafety 
law, the system regulating the approval of GM seed varieties materialized as a result of a series 
of executive decisions over the course of two decades. There is no sign that Argentina will ratify 
the Cartagena Protocol for Biosafety, which calls for the precautionary principle in the regulation 
of GMOs. No labeling of GM food or feed is required, and there is no segregation of GM from 
non-GM agricultural production. 
The adoption of GM seeds coincided with a period of boom in Argentina’s agricultural 
production, which, as agricultural economists conclude, both supported and was in turn helped 
by the introduction of the new seeds.96 The soybean complex, especially, became a cornerstone 
of the country’s reorientation as an agricultural export platform. Soy products (grain, soymeal, or 
oil) accounted for nearly a quarter of the country’s export revenues by the end of the 2000s. 
While almost all soy production was made with the “Roundup Ready” (RR) seeds genetically 
modified to be resistant to glyphosate-based herbicides, however; the developer of this 
transgenic event, Monsanto, could not manage to extract the technology rents it aimed for, 
                                                 
95 See “Cultivos aprobados y adopción” section at ArgenBio’s website for visualized annual data, 
http://www.argenbio.org/index.php?action=cultivos&opt=5  
96 Sztulwark (2012: 102-104). 
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because the farmers continued to supply seeds in-farm or from unauthorized agents. Legal and 
administrative change towards stricter IPR would be necessary to extinguish this practice. 
None of Argentina’s peak agricultural sector organizations were ready to concede to 
stricter IPR demands over seeds without a serious negotiation. In these negotiations 
Monsanto’s—in collaboration with the local seed industry—proposals came to no fruition as the 
TNC failed to earn the trust of her interlocutors. As a result, while the biochemical 
transformations the technology embodied were much celebrated in Argentina, the corporate view 
of who legitimately owned the technology did not find acceptance. Claims for the necessity of 
strong IPR to sustain innovation were confronted by an epistemic coalition of farm associations 
and activists with a discourse of anti-monopoly and anti-imperialism. It was feared, as a 
spokesperson from Federación Agraria Argentina (FAA) commented, “the business of the few 
[wound] end up transforming this technology into an enemy of the common [good]”.97  
Amid competing pressure by various interest and opinion groups, the government 
ultimately sided with the farmer associations seeking access to inputs with low prices. A 
consensus has been effectively reached: the Argentinian agricultural producers would have 
favorable access to GM seeds, and the government, already retaining a lot of the agrarian rent for 
itself through taxes, would resist using its power to back IPR claims over the seeds. The TNCs 
would tolerate the weak IPR regime to maintain access to the large Argentine market. In the 
meantime, crucially, the government would defend the GM production complex against critics 
questioning its environmental and public health impacts.  
Argentina, then, invented a distinctly Argentinian path in commercializing GM seeds that 
satisfied neither corporate nor ecological-critical views in the global debate. While it is intuitive 
                                                 
97 “La nueva ley de semillas sacudió todo el espectro rural,” La Nación, 29 September 2012. 
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that a well-organized sector of commercially oriented, well-capitalized farmers pushed its weight 
towards a permissive biosafety regime, and the government readily agreed with an eye on 
agricultural export revenues; the IPR conflict brought powerful actors into confrontation with 
each other and its resolution required a considerable degree of ideational inventiveness. 
“Productivismo,” and Peronist ideas that located claims towards stricter IPR within a frame of 
anti-imperialism played important roles.  
Below I trace the process leading to the emergence of Argentina’s peculiar path, based on 
data from archival research (official documents, position papers by industry associations, 
publications by the NGOs, US embassy cables, newspapers) and elite interviews (with politicians 
and bureaucrats, industry spokespeople from farming and seed sectors, activists and scientists) 
conducted in Spanish from October 2012 to February 2013. 
 
The Formation of a Permissive Biosafety Regime 
Institutions From Scratch 
Argentina’s early launch of GM agricultural production, ready for marketing by 1996, is 
the combined outcome of suitable economic geography and political will supported with 
scientific input. The country was one of the first to be approached by the biotech TNCs. As the 
largest temperate-zone country in the Southern hemisphere, Argentina is a favorite site for seed 
development and multiplication during Northern winters. Crop varieties suitable to the US and 
European ecosystems could be adapted to Argentina with relatively little work, and the country’s 
well-developed plant-breeding and seed industry was capable of the task. This made Argentina 
an important open-air laboratory for testing the new technology; and as a major agricultural 
producer and exporter Argentina would be an important seed market on its own right, too. 
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However, as Gabriela Levitus (PhD, biologist), the director of the biotechnology industry 
association ArgenBio, argues; the early introduction of GM agriculture in Argentina cannot be 
solely explained by a conjunction of transnational interests. “Probably from a purely economistic 
perspective Brazil always had more potential as a soy and corn production platform than 
Argentina, and the transnationals must have approached Brazil at around the same time—Brazil 
had a larger seed market than Argentina. But Argentina quickly turned this into action because of 
a unique situation: there was a high-level political decision to go forward”.98 Indeed, while in 
Brazil the clearing of GM seeds for agricultural production took major legislative change and 
court battles spread over nearly a decade, during which a divided and much confused political 
community discussed whether the technology was appropriate for the country; the determination 
of the Argentinian statesmen and the scientists they worked with provided a more suitable policy 
environment for the TNCs at the early phase. 
The experience began in 1991 when INASE, the public agency in charge of overseeing 
the seed market, began receiving applications for the registration of GM seed varieties in 
soybeans, corn and cotton. INASE functionaries called the Secretariat of Agriculture, as they did 
not know how to deal with this new technology, and the Secretariat called on a meeting of 
scientists. The deliberations ended up with the creation of the National Advisory Committee on 
Agricultural Biotechnology (CONABIA) in October 1991 to advise the Secretariat of 
Agriculture for the approval of GM plant and animal varieties.99 This was one of the first of its 
kind in the world. The then-Secretary of Agriculture Marcelo Regúnaga, who played a leadership 
role in the creation of the Committee, recalls: “This pioneering character implied that, at the 
moment of the design of the biosecurity system instruments, not many international antecedents 
                                                 
98 Author’s interview with Gabriela Levitus (Buenos Aires, January 2013). 
99 Pellegrini (2013). Supportive information comes from author’s interviews at CONABIA. 
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could be relied on in this area”.100 At the time, the talks on the Cartagena Protocol for Biosafety 
had not begun, and the meetings of the Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture 
(IICA) provided the only venue for exchange of information and policy experience. CONABIA’s 
founding secretary Carmen Vicién (agricultural engineer and MS in rural economics) emphasizes 
that “the system was built piece-by-piece and perfected in the subsequent years”.101  
The regulatory system had CONABIA at its center, which received and processed the 
applications for GM crop varieties, authorized field trials, and asked for input from other 
agencies for required tests.102 No socioeconomic evaluation of possible impacts on agricultural 
practice and farm communities was required. If no problems were found in environmental and 
food safety grounds, and if the variety in question was also cleared for consumption in important 
export markets, the Secretariat of Agriculture would finalize the approval of GM variety’s 
cultivation upon the CONABIA’s recommendation. CONABIA was conceived as a forum 
enlisting participants from public regulatory and scientific institutes as well as from the private 
sector. Biotechnology TNCs are not formally represented, but in fact their agents dominate the 
private sector presence in the committee wearing the hat of experts from industry associations. 
Therefore the question of whether the industry regulates itself has been raised.103 The mixed 
public-private nature of CONABIA and its centrality to Argentina’s regulatory system remains 
                                                 
100 Regunaga et al (2003). 
101 Vicién (2003). 
102 SENASA (National Service for Agro-alimentary Safety and Quality) would evaluate the food safety tests, and the 
DMA (Direction of Agricultural Markets) would examine whether the variety in consideration was also approved 
for cultivation in foreign markets like Europe. 
103 “Since 2008 there are two representatives from the Seed Chamber (ASA) to CONABIA – one of them belongs to 
Syngenta and the other one to Dow AgroSciences. On behalf of the Chamber of Fertilizers (CASAFE) there is a 
representative who belongs to Monsanto and the other one to Bayer CropScience. CONABIA also receives experts 
from the Argentinean Biotechnology Forum [ArgenBio]–one of these experts is a directive from Pioneer and the 
other one from Biosidus (a local biotech company) … are the transnational companies just regulating their own 
activity?” (Pellegrini 2013: 133) 
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intact, despite some organizational changes in time reflecting the ever-increasing importance for 
GM agriculture for Argentina and the gradual sophistication of the bureaucracy in charge of it.104  
 
Deciding Amidst Uncertainty 
The fact that at the time of the formation of the regulatory system there was not yet a 
global public debate on the GMOs can be thought to have made the job for the Argentinian 
policy-makers easier, as they felt little public pressure in justifying the policy design, on the one 
hand. On the other hand, however, scientific uncertainty was all the greater for the same reason; 
forcing the policy-makers to form convictions in the dark, with potentially great risks of harming 
public health and the economy. As of this writing, scientists worldwide still complain about the 
absence of properly designed long-term studies examining the impact of GM food consumption; 
at the time, they were harder to come by. There was no large-scale cultivation of GM crops 
elsewhere in the world to observe ecosystemic impacts. Should Argentina go forward and 
become the first country in the South to allow GM crop cultivation? Somewhere between 
scientific assessments and political convictions, a leap of faith should be made in order to 
promote an action-oriented understanding of the phenomenon; but who is going to take the first 
step? As Gabriela Levitus from ArgenBio puts it in characteristically Argentine fashion, 
“Someone has to take a decision and ‘make the play’ [jugarse] … Someone has to ‘put on the 
trousers’ [ponerse los pantalones] and act like a man!”105  
                                                 
104 The executive secretariat of CONABIA grew into a Biotechnology Office in 2004, and in 2008 it was converted 
into a higher-profile unit called the Direction of Biotechnology. The Argentinian regulatory system is described by 
Martín Lema, the head of the Direction of Biotechnology at 
http://bch.cbd.int/onlineconferences/portal_art26/se_forum_discussiongroups.shtml?threadid=2122. Supportive 
information comes from the author’s interview with Lema (Buenos Aires, December 2012). 
105 Author’s interview with Gabriela Levitus, (Buenos Aires, January 2013). 
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 Interviews suggest that Ms. Carmen Vicién, the expert chairing the CONABIA, took a 
good deal of initiative at that moment. Remembering the decision to approve the commercial 
cultivation of a genetically modified crop for the first time in Argentina, one observer notes, 
“When the decision to liberate the ‘RR’ soybeans came up there were still doubts and worries. 
The CONABIA experts went and talked to the Felipe Solá [Secretary of Agriculture 1993-99], 
and said ‘It looks good to us, but there may still be a part [of the evaluation] that is missing, 
maybe we should also do this and that, etc. Solá said to them ‘I am willing to sign this, but you 
are the experts, you have to take a decision and tell me whether this is good or bad’… It was the 
CONABIA people who took the responsibility to go forward, Vicién being a chief figure… What 
they did was historical”.106 One of the CONABIA assessors at the time recalls: “When the first 
applications came, Carmen Vicién was the person who promoted a lot of things. Regunaga 
[Secretary of Agriculture 1991-1993 and 2001] was supportive all along. But it was Vicién who 
convinced Felipe Solá that this was going to be a good thing, with strategic value for 
Argentina”.107 
 Carmen Vicién sees herself as one among a larger group who approached the issue with a 
foremost concern for agricultural productivity: “There was a group of people at the National 
Institute for Agricultural Technology (INTA), the Secretariat of Agriculture, and the private 
sector who thought that this technology could be useful for the country”.108 It seems that a 
desperate need to expand agricultural production made itself felt to this community due to 
economic circumstances. Under the President Carlos Menem, the early 1990s were a particularly 
hard time for the Argentine economy. In a context of heavy debt service and massive downsizing 
                                                 
106 Author’s interview with Gabriela Levitus, (Buenos Aires, January 2013). 
107 Author’s interview with Moises Burachik (Buenos Aires, February 2013). 
108 Author’s interview with Carmen Vicién (Buenos Aires, December 2012). 
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of the public sector, agriculture would inevitably be an important sector in leading the country’s 
new export-oriented development direction; and it was important to mobilize productive 
improvements in this sector since public subsidies were being withdrawn. Referring to this 
context, observers note that the initiative has an important component that originated from the 
agricultural bureaucracy, from people concerned with increasing Argentina’s productivity.109 
The economic situation might have pushed the statesmen and experts to respond more positively 
to technological innovation and bet on the possibility of potential productivity increases when 
doubts arose. Maybe it made a difference that the Secretary did not choose a biochemist (like 
several of the coordinators of Brazil’s CTNBio so far) or a physician (like the chairman of 
Turkey’s National Biosafety Council) to lead the regulatory agency CONABIA but chose 
Carmen Vicién, who was an agronomist and probably more inclined to approach the issue from a 
productivity perspective for that reason. Vicién herself notes that the kind of knowledge 
available to the upper echelon of the bureaucracy mattered: “The Secretary of Agriculture was an 
agricultural engineer, who had also worked as university faculty, so he was familiar with the 
issue and there were people around him who understood agricultural technology”.110 
 Following soybeans; GM varieties of corn and cotton too were approved around the turn 
of the century, and Argentina quickly became the second greatest grower GM crops after the 
USA. It should be noted that the permissive nature of the Argentinian biosafety regime are not 
reflective of the preferences of the general public. In a 2004 survey, 51% of the public said they 
prefer to consume non-GM food even if it costs more, while 22% would prefer the cheaper 
product. Only 12% said they believe GM crops benefit the population, while 51% said they 
                                                 
109 Author’s interview with Gabriela Levitus, (Buenos Aires, January 2013), and Monica Pequeño, Coordinator at 
the National Seed Institute INASE (Buenos Aires, January 2013). 
110 Author’s interview with Carmen Vicién (Buenos Aires, December 2012). 
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believe big corporations, especially foreign ones, are the main beneficiaries.111 The permissive 
policies were a response to favorable lobbying by the biotech TNCs, seed industry association 
ARPOV and farmer associations like SRA, CRA, and FAA (Newell 2009, Filomeno 2014) 
mediated by epistemic brokers like Dr. Vicien who stood convinced that the scientific risks did 
not outweigh the benefits. 
 
Sharing Value from GM Crops: The Case of Soybeans 
 Understanding stakeholder positions around the evolving challenges for Argentina’s GM 
crop cultivation policies, requires some knowledge of the material impacts of this technology. 
Below I summarize how genetically modified “RR” soybeans have spread, and what impact they 
have had. RR soybeans is the world’s most common GM crop, so this will also serve as 
particularly informative example for the market dynamics underpinning this policy subject. 
 
The Impact of GM Soy Adoption 
Glyphosate-resistant “RR” soybeans were officially approved for cultivation in 1996 and 
they immediately took off with a rapid diffusion pattern among the farmers, coinciding with a 
period of boom in Argentinian soybean agriculture. As seen in the table below, in just half a 
decade of GM seed adoption the Argentinian soybean production more than doubled; and the 
country became the world’s top exporter of soy.112 
 
                                                 
111 Reported in Alicia Diamante and Juan Izquierdo, Manejo y gestión de la Biotecnología Agrícola apropiada para 
pequeños productores: Estudio de Caso Argentina, April 2004, http://www.argenbio.org/adc/uploads/pdf/ 
manejo_y_gestion.doc, last accessed December 2015. 
112 The main driver of the dramatic expansion of soy agriculture has been its profitability over other crops due to 
rising prices in the world market. However, Rodriguez’ multivariate regression analysis finds that the share of GM 
cultivation had a positive effect on the expansion of soybean cultivation, independently from the price received for 
soy (2010: 192-94), suggesting that GM seeds were a catalyst of the farmers’ rush for soy. 
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Table 19: The spread of GM soybean production in Argentina 
Season 
Total soy 
cultivation 
area (ha) 
Low-tilling / 
Total 
cultivation (%) 
Glyphosate 
consumptio
n (lt) 
RR soy / Total 
cultivation (%) 
Total soy 
production 
(tn) 
1994/95 6,011,240 28 5,000,000 0 12,133,000 
1995/96 6,002,155 36 7,620,000 0 12,448,200 
1996/97 6,669,500 43 12,630,000 1 11,004,890 
1997/98 7,162,250 45 28,520,000 25 18,732,172 
1998/99 8,400,000 45 45,430,000 57 20,000,000 
1999/00 8,790,500 57 60,970,000 76 20,206,600 
2000/01 10,665,000 62 82,350,000 87 26,882,912 
2001/02 11,639,240 77 81,499,870 93 30,000,000 
 
Source: Bisang and Sztulwark (2006)113 
 
To evaluate the performance of the seeds, one should take into account the wider 
technological package that incorporates low-till planting (in which weed management is 
primarily done in the post-weed emergence phase), glyphosate (a herbicide class that is 
particularly suitable for this activity, originally developed by Monsanto under the Roundup 
brand), and seeds that are genetically modified to be glyphosate-resistant (hence the name 
Roundup Ready). Based on a 2001 survey, Qaim and Traxler (2005, with similar results in Penna 
and Lema 2003) find that while the use of RR seeds had no significant impact on soybean yields, 
and it increased glyphosate applications; it decreased other herbicide applications and the overall 
herbicide cost per hectare, leading to an income advantage for the farmer. Impression from the 
field and research in other settings (such as Fernandez-Cornejo and McBride 2002 for the USA) 
suggest that a major reason for adopting the “low-till—glyphosate—RR seed package” is the 
sheer ease of more simplified weed management. 
                                                 
113 The authors report glyphosate consumption erroneously, omitting a digit in certain years, which I have corrected 
based on data from CASAFE.  
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Not all consequences of the GM soybean boom in Argentina have been salutary. First, it 
has created a public health problem in the form of glyphosate intoxication (possibly associated 
with higher cancer rates) in periurban areas close to soybean fields. That herbicide usage per unit 
land may be decreasing is of little significance to communities exposed to the toxic chemical 
when total spraying is increasing enormously in absolute terms as the entire country turns in to a 
giant soy farm.114 Secondly, the technological package utilized leads to reduced labor 
employment for weed management. While precisely a reason for adoption for capitalist farmers, 
and matched by a certain increase in the employment of more skilled labor of agricultural 
engineers and the like, this is a cause for distress for rural laborers and a social problem.115  
 Nonetheless, from a narrow economic perspective focusing on aggregate output, the 
soybean boom supported by the GM seed technological package has been a blessing for the 
country, generating huge export revenues. After accounting for reduced labor employment and 
the loss of output due to crops replaced by soy, the rather critical Rodriguez concludes that “for 
the case of Argentina there is little place for doubt … [T]he incorporation of GM soy seeds 
enabled increasing the total wealth generated by the [agricultural] sector” (2010: 232). 
In short, In Argentina the GM seeds seem to have displaced unskilled labor, made 
agriculture more profitable for the producer by reducing herbicide cost per hectare, and thus 
increased the land rent. The response of the market has been investment in agricultural land116 
and production of more soybeans. In generating these outcomes, the agronomic characteristics of 
the genetically modified seed mattered, but so did its price, together with the price of glyphosate, 
                                                 
114 Arancibia (2010) details the social repercussions of glyphosate consumption in Argentina. 
115 Rodriguez (2010: 232). 
116 Rodriguez (2010: 240), Sztulwark (2012: 105), Clapp (2014), Supportive information comes from Author’s 
interview with Sociedad Rural Argentina (SRA) economist Ezequiel G. de Freijo (Buenos Aires, February 2013). 
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both of which have remained low in Argentina due to reasons that have been subject of 
significant political dispute, as explained below. 
 
Price, Profitability, and the Causes of an IPR Conflict 
 The genetically modified RR soybean seeds have remained widely accessible and 
inexpensive in Argentina after their introduction; so much so that in 2000 a General Accounting 
Office investigation for the US Congress looked into the case, upon the American Soybean 
Association’s complaint that Argentinian producers were able to outcompete Americans in 
global markets thanks to more favorable access to similar seeds.117 A substantial difference was 
indeed found between the price of soybean seeds sold in the two countries—they were half as 
cheap in Argentina. 
Table 20: Seed price, comparing the USA and Argentina 
  
  
Bt Corn (US$ / bag) RR Soy (US$ / bag) 
US Argentina US Argentina 
1996-2001 average price 86 80 17 9 
% of US price 
 
93 
 
51 
 
Source: Goldsmith et al (2006) 
 
Argentinian farmers were able to access the seeds in favorable terms for two reasons: 
first, the existence of an informal seed market in competition with the biotech TNC’s authorized 
agents, and secondly, the biotech TNC’s problems with obtaining and enforcing a patent for the 
biotech innovation. 
The informal seed market, in turn, comprises two types of activity. First, there is the 
phenomenon of farmer-saved seed. Soybean is a self-pollinated (autogamous) crop that 
                                                 
117 United States General Accounting Office Testimony Before the Committee on Agriculture, House of 
Representatives, “Information on Prices of Genetically Modified Seeds in the United States and Argentina,” June 
29, 2000, available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/110/108525.pdf, last accessed December 2015. 
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predominantly inbreeds for reproduction, meaning that the farmer can save the product of the 
harvest in order to produce new seeds in-farm, rather than purchasing them anew each season. Of 
course, farm-saved seed comes (although with some cost for storage and the like) much cheaper 
for the farmer than seeds purchased on the official market. 
Secondly, there is what is known in Argentina as the bolsa blanca (“white bag”) 
phenomenon, i.e. seeds sold by unauthorized agents without legal sales certificates and with no 
contracts with biotechnology companies. Because these agents pay no royalties upstream, they 
can afford to supply the seeds more cheaply than what formal market contracts would require. 
While seed saving for self-use purposes is legal in Argentina, bolsa blanca is by definition 
illegal, and opinion is divided as to its exact nature, some arguing that it is primarily the result of 
the farmers’ abuse of the right to seed saving (when you have a good harvest, you obtain too 
many seeds and sell some to your neighbors, and so on) and others arguing that it emerges 
mainly because the very firms subcontracted by the TNCs for multiplying and selling seeds 
legally are also involved in bolsa blanca sales for extra profits.118 The head of INASE (the public 
agency for seed market regulation) argues that the high official prices charged for the GM 
varieties was a major reason for the explosion of bolsa blanca sales, which has put a pressure on 
the seed price since then.119 As seen in the table below, the formal seed market share in soybean 
seeds decreased significantly after the introduction of the GM variety in 1996. (And the industry 
accuses the INASE for not diligently policing bolsa blanca because of clientelistic ties between 
unauthorized seed multiplicators and their political patrons within the government).120  
                                                 
118 Author’s impression at the 3rd Congreso Nacional e Internacional de Agrobiotecnología, Propiedad Intelectual y 
Políticas Públicas (Rosario, October 23-25, 2012). 
119 Oscar Costamagna, “Bolsa Blanca: la responsabilidad es compartida,” Tiempo Agropecuario, July 2004, p.2; 
cited in Also Casella, “Regalía Individual y Regalía Global,” CANPO, http://www.grupocanpo.org/1/index.php/ley-
de-semillas/276-regalia-individual-y-regalia-global, last accessed September 2014. 
120 Author’s interviews. 
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Table 21: Soybean seed market in Argentina 
  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Average price ($US/bag) 7.7 8.2 11 8 7 10.7 
Total market value ($US millions) 170 180 292 251 195 364 
Formal seed industry share (%) 52 47 35 30 25 20 
 
Source: Goldsmith et al (2006) 
 
From the vantage point of the biotechnology company, the informal market is only one 
part of the problem of rent appropriation. The recognition of patent rights is the other part. The 
informal seed market should be reduced to a minimum, so that royalties passed from authorized 
seed distributors upstream to the biotech company for each bag of seeds sold (as per their license 
agreements) can be maximized. But also the patent rights over the transgenic event should be 
secured, in order to have a solid backing for such agreements and as an instrument for charging 
farmers directly in the event that the formal seed market fails. Hypothetically, the biotechnology 
company with a patent over the transgenic event can intercept the soy at some point in the 
production chain and demand royalty payment for the value added by the proprietary technology 
regardless of how the seeds were obtained (as they did in Brazil) (although the legitimacy of this 
practice would be contested).121 
 In Argentina, Monsanto has been able to solve neither of these problems satisfactorily, as 
we will see in detail below. The informal seed market has remained big, and a patent over the 
transgenic event for RR (40-3-2) could not be obtained. The price of the seed for the farmer 
remained low. So did the price of glyphosate, because Monsanto was not able to defend its 
monopoly on the production of this chemical either. Before narrating how these failures have 
                                                 
121 Farmer organization CONINAGRO, for example, holds the position that the patent law applies only to license 
agreements between the biotechnology and the seed firms, and not to farmers’ purchase of seeds. Roberto Seifert, 
“La nueva ley de semillas sacudió todo el espectro rural,” La Nacion, 29 September 2012, 
http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1512410-la-nueva-ley-de-semillas-sacudio-todo-el-espectro-rural.    
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unfolded, two major consequences of the low input prices should be emphasized. The first is that 
it facilitated the very rapid expansion of the GM soybean production, serving as a catalyst for 
technology acceptance.122 Secondly, low input price meant that the farmers have been able to 
capture most of the economic gains from the introduction of the GM soybeans. Especially useful 
in this regard is a comparison, available in the tables below, with GM corn, which is a cross-
pollinated (allogamous) plant whose seeds are hybrids that cannot be reproduced in-farm without 
losing vigor, and GM cotton, over which patent rights have been secured by the biotech industry 
and the much smaller seed market is easier to inspect and control. Researchers arrive in different 
figures depending on the particular methodology and the time frame examined, but it seems clear 
that it was in soybeans that the farmers have been able to capture the greatest economic gains, 
because appropriation of technology rents have been difficult on the part of the biotechnology 
and seed industry sectors. Because the soybean market is much larger than that for any other 
crop in Argentina, this outcome is very important for the actors involved, and it defines the 
character of the GM crop production in the country.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
122 In a study that examines why the adoption of GM cotton in Argentina occurred relatively slowly, Qaim and de 
Janvry (2003) show that although the technology significantly reduces insecticide applications and increases yields, 
net benefits for Argentine farmers who adopted the new seeds were rather small because of its high price. They 
point to the contrast with the RR soy in this regard: “Unlike GM soybeans, which are not patented in Argentina and 
are marketed by different seed companies, Monsanto was granted a national patent over Bt cotton technology, and 
[Monsanto’s local joint venture] Genética Mandiyú is the sole provider of Bt seeds. Farmers have to pay US $103 
per hectare for Bt cotton seeds, which is more than four times the price of conventional varieties” (2003: 815).  
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Table 22: Rents from GM crops in Argentina, according to Sztulwark (2012) 123 
  Innovation rents captured 
  RR soy (1996-2006) Bt corn (1998-2006) 
Agricultural producers 87.9% 35.2% 
Seed industry 10.9% 19.2% 
Biotechnology industry 1.2% 45.5% 
Total innovation rent (million US$) 2,434 249 
 
Table 23: Rents from GM crops in Argentina, according to Trigo and Cap (2003) 124 
 
  
RR soy 
(1996-2001) 
Bt corn 
(1998-2003) 
Bt cotton 
(1998-2003) 
Benefits to growers  46.4% 21.1% 16.8% 
Benefits to technology suppliers  53.6% 78.9% 83.2% 
Total benefits (million US$) 9,648  400  16  
 
In short, low input prices helped turn Argentina into the first Southern country to adopt 
large-scale GM crop cultivation, and one in which farmers were able to reap significant 
economic gains as a result. However, this has occurred despite the efforts of the biotechnology 
industry to extinguish the practices that set the terms of favorable access. Monsanto has tried to 
ban farmer-saved seed, police out bolsa blanca, claim royalties on Argentinian soybean exports, 
and evoke anti-dumping cases to keep the price of glyphosate from falling, with significant 
lobbying support from the government of the USA. These efforts failed to result to their 
satisfaction of because the Argentinian state refused to side with the TNC against the farmers. 
                                                 
123 Sztulwark (2012) calculates the cost of innovation to the producers as the price difference (per unit cultivated 
area) between the GM and conventional seed multiplied by the area cultivated with the GM seed. The innovation 
rent is calculated as the productivity gains (on the basis of a 24-30 US$ per hectare cost reduction from GM seeds) 
minus the cost of innovation. The rents captured by the seed industry are calculated on the basis of revenues from 
formal seed sales. The rents to the biotechnology industry are calculated on the basis of the royalties they charge the 
seed distributors for each bag of GM seeds legally sold. 
124 Trigo and Cap (2003) calculate the benefits to the technology suppliers on the basis of revenues from the seeds 
sold, for the cases of Bt corn and Bt cotton. For RR soybeans, revenues from glyphosate sales are also added to 
these benefits. This is misleading as far as the total welfare gains from the GM seed usage is concerned, if the net 
input cost increase from additional glyphosate usage (accounting for the replacement of other herbicides) is not 
being subtracted from the benefits to the grower, and the authors do not mention such an adjustment. 
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An epistemic coalition coalescing around productivist, anti-imperialist ideas supported the 
government action. In the image below I illustrate the connections between particular 
government (non)actions, the behavior of the market, and the economic outcomes. In the next 
sections I describe and trace these connections in detail, and analyze the sources of the 
government conduct. 
 
Figure 10: Institutional infrastructure of technology impact in Argentina 
 
IPR Conflict in the Open: TNC, Farmers, and the Government Reaction 
Maneuvers of the Biotech TNC 
At the introduction phase of GM crops in Argentina, Monsanto was not able to assert 
IPR. The major reason was that Monsanto was denied a patent in Argentina for glyphosate-
resistant soybeans by the National Institute of Industrial Property (INPI). This happened as a 
result of legal novelty and complexity combined with a political will at the Executive and 
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Judiciary branches to make use of available legal sources with an anti-TNC bias. TRIPS clauses 
were interpreted in a way that rendered Monsanto’s patent application late and invalid.125  
Moreover, Monsanto itself had a liberal attitude towards the reproduction of the 
technology at its introduction phase. Interviews with industry sources reveal that there was much 
uncertainty around regulatory survival and user acceptance at the time, and work had to be done 
first to secure those objectives. Miguel Angel Rapela, an Argentinian IPR lawyer and once 
chairman of the International Seed Federation, remembers being asked in the mid-1990s about 
the likely share of GM seeds in the Argentinian soy market in the near future. He expected the 
share to stabilize at around 50 percent, with the GM varieties constituting only one of the options 
in the market.126 A Monsanto director comments, “It was a process of learning about this new 
business. I think that the importance of patent applications around the world, the globalization of 
                                                 
125 This is a summary evaluation, and the details are complicated. At the heart of Monsanto’s troubles is the fact that 
it was the Argentinian firm Nidera Seeds which developed the local variety of the glyphosate-resistant “Roundup 
Ready” (RR) soybeans and applied for biosafety approval, while it was Monsanto who made a patent application for 
the transgenic event (40-3-2) that these soybeans embodied. That Nidera came to work on the event freely is the 
fortuitous outcome of a series of uncoordinated business decisions by several firms, through which Nidera came to 
acquire in 1991 the Argentinian division of the American seed company Asgrow and exclusive rights to the latter’s 
technology stock, which happened to include Monsanto’s transgenic event due to their previous collaborations in the 
USA. The knowledge transfer was complete when the agricultural engineer Rodolfo Rossi, the head of Asgrow’s 
R&D division also made his move to Nidera and continued his work on GM plants suited to Argentinian climes. 
Monsanto made a patent application for the transgenic event only towards the end of the biosafety evaluation of 
Nidera’s application, on 3 April 1995, and the National Institute of Industrial Property (INPI) decided that the 
application came in too late and refused to grant a patent. If had been granted, Monsanto would have had a 
“revalidation” for Argentina of its patent already obtained in the USA. INPI’s rejection was based on a recent 
change in the patent revalidation regime and it was controversial. With Argentina’s adherence to the TRIPS 
agreement, the time window for a “pipeline patent” revalidation application was determined as one year after the 
original patent. Monsanto’s revalidation application came four years after the original patent grant in the US (July 
1990) and hence the INPI rejected it. Nonetheless, it was not a straightforward decision, as there was controversy 
over just when the said TRIPS clause entered into effect in Argentina. The company sustained that this should not 
have been before the enactment of the New Patent Law (no: 24.481) in October 1995, which implemented 
Argentina’s TRIPS responsibilities, and according to this line of reasoning the revalidation should have got through. 
However, INPI relied on a Supreme Court decision determining that the treaty had already entered into force on 1 
January 1995 (with the ratification of the Law 24.425), arguing any application made afterwards—like that of 
Monsanto—would be bound by its clauses. Lawyers comment that the Supreme Court decision itself is not an 
automatic, purely technical decision, and it also affected important legal disputes in pharmaceuticals. See Newell 
(2009), Sztulwark (2012) and Filomeno (2014). Supportive information comes from the author’s interviews with 
Rodolfo Rossi, IP lawyer Vanessa Lowenstein, and other industry sources (Buenos Aires, 2012). 
126 Author’s interview with Miguel Rapela (Buenos Aires, December 2012). 
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all this, were not inside the minds of those who ran the company at the time”.127 So, at this stage 
technology acceptance was more important than technology rents. Besides, the widespread 
adoption of glyphosate-resistant GM seeds would be great news for what was Monsanto’s chief 
business at the time: the sale of the company’s brand of glyphosate “Roundup,” which the 
farmers could then use abundantly for weed management without fear of harming their soy 
(hence the name of the seed, “Roundup Ready”). Pushing for an uncontested dissemination of 
GM seeds, and thus creating a wider market for glyphosate should have made business sense.128  
However, after widespread acceptance, Monsanto started to take a more aggressive 
stance in asserting IPR, for several reasons. One reason was the wider context of the country’s 
changing economic fortunes. Starting from January 2002 the Argentinian peso was massively 
devaluated against US dollar, together with some of Monsanto’s local assets.129 That year the 
company’s revenues in Argentina declined by 30 percent.130 Currency devaluation would also 
turn the terms of trade in favor of export commodities, thus enhancing the agricultural rent. In 
this context, Monsanto’s directors might have felt that they could act more aggressively to cut a 
greater part of this rent. 
Secondly, the firm’s patent for glyphosate expired in 2000 and major rivals emerged in 
that business line soon.131 By 2001 China became the major source of glyphosate and the price 
                                                 
127 Author’s interviews at Monsanto Argentina (Buenos Aires, January and February 2013). 
128 Rodriguez (2008: 496). Supportive information from author’s interviews. 
129 Indebted agricultural producers were running their operations by receiving credit from input suppliers in kind, to 
be paid back in Argentine pesos after the harvest. Currency devaluation meant the devaluation of the producers’ 
debt, meaning a loss for the industry. Author’s interviews with industry sources. 
130 “Monsanto Puts $40m Argentine investment on hold,” ICIS, 17 October 2013, 
http://www.icis.com/Articles/2003/10/17/527146/monsanto-puts-40m-argentine-investment-on-hold.html, last 
accessed October 2014. 
131 The company actually never had a patent for glyphosate in Argentina, but it did have one in the US lasting until 
September 2000, which was helping indirectly: In the absence of the opportunity to sell glyphosate in the large US 
market, no major rival had entered this business, leaving Monsanto as a virtual monopolist on glyphosate, in 
Argentina as in the world. See Sztulwark and Braude (2009). 
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was less than a third of its 1993/94 level.132 Monsanto demanded an anti-dumping case against 
China, in order to be able to charge a higher price for glyphosate. On February 2, 2004 the 
Argentinian Ministry of Interior decided against the case. Around two weeks ago, perhaps as a 
warning that was hoped to affect the Ministry’s decision, the company had announced that it was 
terminating seed research and marketing in Argentina until seeing improvements in IPR 
protection, and it was going to introduce its new improved variety of RR2 soybean seeds in 
Brazil (which had taken anti-dumping measures on Chinese glyphosate) but not in Argentina. 
But the Minister would defend its decision as being in the “interest of society … because it 
protected the competitiveness of an industry vital to the development of the Argentine 
economy”.133 It seems that Monsanto decided to go after capturing a greater share of the value in 
seed after starting to lose its lucrative business in glyphosate.134 By this time, the company had 
also gone through organizational changes that got it rid of its older focus on chemicals and made 
it a “life sciences” company with an interest in capitalizing on its plant biotechnology 
knowledge.135 
Lastly, the private company’s aggression was conditioned by the power asymmetry 
between the North and South American agricultural interest groups. We have noted above that 
US soybean producers were protesting against the high GM seed prices in their country vis-à-vis 
                                                 
132 Trigo et al (2002). 
133 “Argentina Denies Monsanto Glyphosate Dumping Charge,” ICIS, 4 February 2004, 
http://www.icis.com/Articles/2004/02/04/555437/argentina-denies-monsanto-glyphosate-dumping-charge.html, last 
accessed October 2014. 
134 Various industry sources concur with this assessment. 
135 Monsanto used to be a chemicals company. After a series of mergers and acquisitions, during which Monsanto 
first bought many of the major seed companies of the world, and then was taken over itself by a pharmaceutical firm 
which rid it of its chemicals division, Monsanto metamorphosed into an actor specialized in agriculture. The 
reorientation was complete when Monsanto was reestablished as a separate company in 2002. See “Company 
History,” on Monsanto’s website, http://www.monsanto.com/whoweare/Pages/monsanto-history.aspx, last accessed 
October 2014. 
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Argentina.136 This should provide the background not only to Monsanto’s newfound aggression 
but also to the high-profile involvement of US officials in pressuring the Argentinian 
government for a new approach to IPR for seeds in mid-2000s—a pressure vividly documented 
in Wikileaks cables.137  
The company’s efforts at asserting IPRs unfolded at various levels. First, and most 
controversially, there have been alleged reports of individual farmers and cooperatives receiving 
notices from the company, demanding that they agree to a payment deal with Monsanto or face 
adverse legal consequences—a bluff, it seems, because seed saving was permitted under the 
current Seed Law, which was made in accordance with the UPOV 1978 Convention, and no 
patent relating to soy seeds was validated.138 Furthermore, and less confrontationally, Monsanto 
joined hands with the leading firms in the Argentinian seed industry, under the sector 
organization ARPOV, in an effort to establish a system of good practice through voluntary 
agreements with farmers. With the agreement, farmers pledge to buy seeds only from authorized 
agents, not resell them, use them in accordance with the proper instructions (and the package of 
advertised inputs), and pay “extended royalties” for their saved progeny; in return for a guarantee 
of high quality products and better technical support. But because only a part of the farm sector 
participates in this voluntary market institution, and in order to have more room for maneuver in 
determining the price; the TNC-local capital coalition also tried to enlist coercive state power for 
                                                 
136 In the US; Monsanto increased the price of its soybean seeds (in which it effectively controlled the majority of 
the market) as soon as it had to cut the price of glyphosate against emerging rivalry. In Argentina, however, the 
higher the seed price was set, the smaller the share of certified sales became. So, addressing the issue of IPR was in 
order  (Sztulwark and Braude 2009). 
137 A summary of highlights from these cables is available from Santiago O’Donnell, “El Santo Preferido de la 
Embajada,” Pagina 12, 3 March 2011, http://www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/elpais/1-163369-2011-03-03.html. 
138 Industry sources relate a case in Casilda, Santa Fe, where a local farm association received such a warning (it was 
not clarified if the company involved was Monsanto or another firms invested in proprietary seeds). When the 
association turned to courts to ask for a legal opinion, the company—having learned it—asked them to drop the case 
because it was desisting from making charges and the issue came to a close. Also see Rodriguez (2008).  
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better policing of bolsa blanca through the National Seed Institute (INASE) and for legislating 
restrictions on seed saving by farmers. The closure of the informal seed market in this way 
would have increased both the revenues of authorized seed suppliers and the royalties they 
passed upstream to the biotechnology industry. But the state would require some consent from 
the farmers in order to establish such a system. How did the farmers respond? 
 
Farmers’ Reaction 
Throughout most of the twentieth century, Argentinian agricultural producers have 
maintained a boardroom pattern of consultative relationship with the state that is known as la 
mesa de enlace (which could be translated as “the contact desk”). For many decades now, the 
private sector presence at the mesa has comprised four peak organizations. The SRA (Sociedad 
Rural de Argentina) is the most influential one. Founded in 1866 by large landowners of the 
pampas who also had interests in finance and trade, the SRA has been described as “more than a 
professional association, … a reference for the Argentine upper class,” and “[having functioned] 
as a de facto Ministry of Agriculture before a real one was created” (Filomeno 2012: 140-41). 
CRA (Confederaciones Rurales Argentinas) was founded in 1942 to represent the medium and 
large rural producers from the interior of the country against the overwhelming influence of the 
SRA, though it largely converged with the latter in its political stance with the rise of Peronism. 
FAA was founded in 1912 by smaller producers—mostly tenants in the pampas of the Santa Fe 
province and the interior Buenos Aires—who saw their interests in conflict with the SRA and the 
trading companies; and it espouses a discourse that is antithetical to the more liberal economics 
associated with the SRA. It was joined in 1956 by CONINAGRO (Confederación 
Intercooperativa Agropecuaria), a national organization created by cooperatives of medium and 
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small rural producers. In short, the four peak organizations are distinguished from each other by 
crosscutting cleavages of geography and class, but a coalition pattern uniting the big landed 
interests associated with the SRA and CRA on the one hand; and the comparatively smaller rural 
actors around FAA and CONINAGRO on the other, is generally recognized.139 
Starting from the early 2000s, the politics of the country’s macroeconomic orientation 
brought these peak organizations closer to each other than ever. The global commodity boom 
had dramatically increased the profitability of export agriculture. In this context, the successive 
Kirchner governments stepped in to tax agricultural exports, in order to direct resources to 
domestic consumption and to subsidize the manufacturing sector. Agricultural producers were 
disgruntled: what the Peronist government saw as windfall revenues to be redistributed they were 
seeing as a legitimate market outcome. The climax of the dispute came in 2008 when Cristina 
Kirchner’s government tried to introduce mobile tax rates for commodity exports that would 
move together with the world price of the commodity. In response, the sector organizations 
joined hands for a major protest, complete with road blockades, that paralyzed the economy for 
weeks.140 Even though this particular tax measure was then defeated in the Congress, persisting 
government retentions produced a context where agricultural producers would not be welcoming 
moves restricting their access to cheap inputs with new IPR measures.141 The peak organizations 
had their differences in how they viewed IPRs, but none were ready to concede without a serious 
negotiation. 
                                                 
139 I borrow the description of la mesa de enlace from Filomeno (2012), who relies largely on Lattuada’s (2006) 
research on this topic. Supportive information comes from my interviews at the Argentinian rural sector 
organizations (Buenos Aires and Rosario, October 2012-February 2013). 
140 For a detailed treatment see Giarracca and Teubal (2010). 
141 Various industry sources concur with this assessment. Also see Filomeno (2012). 
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Various ideas for reforming legislation in order to introduce stricter IPR over seeds, 
negotiated by the stakeholders with the mediation of the Secretariat of Agriculture (which is a 
branch of the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Fisheries), can be summarized in terms of 
two approaches. 142  The first, which started to be discussed in 2003, was oriented towards 
suppressing the practice of seed saving. It proposed to limit the right to seed saving to the seed 
quantity originally purchased, aiming to curtail unauthorized seed multiplication for sales 
purposes. An alternative proposal, which was found by farmer organizations as a more grave 
attack on the existing practice, would base the limitation on a certain cultivation area (50 ha for 
the producers of grains and oilseeds like soybeans, for example), barring farmers operating on 
bigger land from saving enough seeds for their own use. Furthermore, the biotechnology industry 
entertained the idea of banning seed saving altogether when GM seed varieties were in question. 
Reform proposals following this earlier approach came to no fruition due to a clear rejection by 
the farmer organizations (especially the FAA) who did not want to lose the farmer’s right to seed 
saving. 
The second approach, materialized in public discussions from 2005 onwards, was 
oriented towards creating a “global royalty” (regalía global) system that would enable effective 
remuneration to the industry without directly dealing with seed saving. Following already 
existing models in Europe, the project would create a fund out of fees charged on the farmer’s 
sale of wheat and soy. The fees would be reimbursed to farmers when they bought seeds 
officially. The remaining money accumulating in the fund would be shared by seed companies 
                                                 
142 I borrow the classification in terms of two approaches, and the basic description of each, from Aldo Pedro 
Casella, professor of agrarian law and an external consultant to the FAA. See Casella (2008), as well as Casella’s 
contributions within FAA’s 2005 (February, printed in Rosario) publication Patentamiento y regalías en semillas: 
Un país que resigna soberanía. Accionar y posición de Federación Agraria Argentina. Supportive information 
comes from my interview with Also Casella (Rosario, February 2013) and the head of the ASA; Miguel Rapela 
(Buenos Aires, December 2012). 
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owning the plant variety protection (PVP) rights to the proprietary seed varieties in use, and 5 
percent would be retained by the state to subsidize public research for areas and plants neglected 
by the private sector. In effect, the system would be charging seed-saving farmers a fee in order 
to remunerate and subsidize private and public plant-breeding research. 
 This approach, while coming close to achieving an agreement, seems to have fallen 
through because of a lack of trust between the parties involved. The seed/biotechnology 
industries wanted to introduce alongside the global royalty system a cultivation area limitation 
(65 ha) above which seed saving would be prohibited regardless (40 percent of agricultural 
producers, and 80 percent of all production would then be covered by the ban), and require all 
farmers to purchase seeds anew after three years. There were those within the SRA—the 
organization representing big farming interests—who demanded the size limitation to be set at a 
higher level, and also questioned the need for seed renewal after three years, arguing that the 
opportunity of maintaining profits on existing varieties in this way would precisely disincentivize 
research for new seed development on the part of the industry.143 Also, the SRA leadership, 
while in principle favoring the idea of a subsidy for public research in order to “break 
monopolies in seed supply,” did not seem to trust the government to use the public retention for 
the declared purposes.144 Sources from SRA comment that farmers generally did not like the idea 
of global royalties because it resembled a tax in its form while the sector was already resentful of 
the government retentions on exports.145 The more left-wing FAA was not comfortable with the 
                                                 
143 See SRA President Lucioano Miguens’ remarks reported in “La Sociedad Rural Discrepa con el Proyecto Official 
para Semillas,” Infocampo, January 28, 2005, http://infocampo.com.ar/nota/campo/1179/la-sociedad-rural-discrepa-
con-el-proyecto-oficial-para-semillas, last accessed September 2014. 
144 See SRA vicepresident Hugo Luis Biolcatti’s remarks reported in “Relativa conformidad con el proyecto oficial 
de pago de regalia,” Infocampo, January 26, 2005, http://infocampo.com.ar/nota/campo/1171/relativa-conformidad-
con-el-proyecto-oficial-de-pago-de-regalias; last accessed September 2014. 
145 Author’s interviews at SRA headquarters (Buenos Aires, February 2013). 
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idea that state power was being called forth in order to establish what is in essence a guarantee of 
remuneration for the private seed industry. A lawyer working with the FAA comments that “The 
cost of administration of the system, for example, would be met by the fund… This is a capture 
of state power for private interest protection”.146  
 Maybe more importantly for the success of the project, while domestic seed companies 
were divided in their support, Monsanto was not enthusiastic about a system that was not 
clarifying the status of the property claims relating to transgenic events. In FAA circles the 
impression was that the TNC was more interested in establishing control than in remuneration 
and prices per se.147 Indeed, even SRA, which generally adopts a less inflammatory rhetoric 
towards the TNCs, was questioning Monsanto’s sincerity about coming to a reasonable 
agreement with farmers.148 Farmer organizations have never been sure, if this kind of system is 
put in place, that Monsanto would not be unilaterally trying to charge them for the transgenic 
event—in addition to what they would be paying to the fund for the germplasm owned by the 
seed firms.149 It is difficult to determine with certainty who said exactly what; but it is obvious 
that the TNC failed to earn the trust of the Argentine farm sector organizations—a failure that 
worked against the credibility of seed reform proposals.  
 As the biotechnology/seed industry coalition found it difficult to change the rules for the 
seed market due to farmer opposition, Monsanto decided to take a different approach and go 
alone by intercepting soy export shipments to claim royalties. This time, they found themselves 
with direct confrontation with the Argentinian state, as narrated below.  
                                                 
146 Author’s interview with Aldo Casella. 
147 Ibid. 
148 See SRA quotes in both Infocampo citations above. 
149 Interviews with industry sources. Confusion and disagreement on this matter was still a dark cloud over the 
negotiations in 2012. See “La nueva ley de semillas sacudió todo el espectro rural,” La Nacion, 29 September 2012. 
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Government Response 
By 2005, glyphosate-resistant RR soybean was king in Argentina, contributing to 
employment and taxes alike and making good publicity for the global legitimacy of the 
technology, but Monsanto was unable to derive much profit from it. Support from the 
Argentinian state was not forthcoming. The Ministry of Agriculture could not, or would not, 
convince the farmer organizations to agree on paying royalties for the seeds in one way or 
another. Several members of the US administration stepped in to discuss Monsanto’s complaints. 
During the discussions with American partners the Argentinian government officials maintained 
that in the absence of a patent the charging of royalty fees on behalf of Monsanto was a private 
affair with the farmers and there was not much that they could do. Interviews with Monsanto 
employees at the time and Wikileaks cables alike reveal that Miguel Santiago Campos, who 
served as the Secretary of Agriculture during the critical period of 2003-2007, was believed to be 
withholding support and even actively obstructing the negotiations.150  
“I was the person who signed the approval for Monsanto’s glyphosate-resistant corn, 
their first GM corn in our country” a frustrated Campos remembers. “The very same week they 
came to me and revealed their intention to make a claim in European ports to take a share from 
Argentinian soy exports”.151 By that time several drafts for a new seed law had been negotiated 
to no avail. In September 2004 Monsanto made public the threat of blocking Argentina’s soy 
exports to Europe—where the company did have a patent for glyphosate-resistant soy—if no 
resolution to the conflict was found soon. Although declaring this idea as “extortive” and 
“unacceptable,” the Secretariat of Agriculture agreed to come up with a plan for royalty 
                                                 
150 US Buenos Aires Embassy cable (ref: 07BUENOSAIRES254) to Washington DC, dated 8 February 2007, last 
accessed at http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07BUENOSAIRES254_a.html in October 2014. 
151 Author’s interview with Miguel Santiago Campos, Buenos Aires, January 2013. 
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collection in forty-five days. That the company had just managed to agree with Brazilian and 
Paraguayan soy producers on royalty collection was no doubt a factor.152 However, the 
negotiations with the producer organizations in Argentina came to no fruition.  
Starting from March 2005, Monsanto initiated customs proceedings in Netherlands, 
Denmark, Spain and UK ports to detain ships carrying soy grain, soy oil or soymeal from 
Argentina, claiming that the cargo contained the company’s infringed intellectual property. The 
cargo belonged to European branches of transnational commodity traders, whom Monsanto 
asked to pay a royalty of US$ 15 per ton of imports, warning that if they did not agree more 
ships would be detained. In a few months Monsanto started legal proceedings in these countries 
to obtain court decisions and oblige a royalty payment. 
What happened in Europe was important for several reasons. The proceedings would take 
at least a year and the judicial uncertainty could turn European importers away from Argentina. 
At the time Europe imported 11 million tons of soy from Argentina annually and US$ 2.5-3 
billions were at stake.153 Furthermore, in the case of an agreement to pay royalties, the cost 
would be surely passed back to Argentinian producers. Although the company argued that the 
royalty fee was just symbolic of the recognition of a property right, Rodriguez estimates that, 
equating to around 1.6 billions of Argentinian pesos per year it would mean the extraction of 17 
percent of all agrarian rent associated with soy production in Argentina (2008: 500-501). 
Secondly, the handling of the trials would be of definitive nature to IPR law. Not only 
would crucial articles of the European Commission Directive 99/44 on biotechnological 
inventions be tested for the first time but also the case would constitute a reference point for 
legal and political discussions over IPR around the world. Bernard Remiche, a Belgian lawyer 
                                                 
152 Filomeno (2012); Sztulwark and Braude (2009). 
153 Remiche (2008). 
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who participated in the trials, remarks that if Monsanto’s argument won the case, “the cow that 
eats the soymeal, the ham that comes from the cow, and the restaurant that sells the ham” could 
be liable to the company’s property claims.154  
To many observers the act seemed an ominous step in consolidating corporate control 
over the global agrifood chain from the soil to the table. It reinforced Monsanto’s image as the 
Darth Wader of the new agribusiness model. Inside the company quarters the atmosphere was 
different, though. “It was a great headache. There was intense discussion within the company 
about the decision to go to Europe. We, the Argentinians working here at the Argentina 
subsidiary [fully owned by the St Louis, Missouri-based Monsanto], opposed the idea. But the 
US headquarters felt obliged to make a move because of the US Congress’ inquiries into the 
company’s activities in Argentina”.155 The US legal norms, and the power of the US farm lobby, 
forced the company to take all possible measures to demonstrate that there was no price 
discrimination against American producers. Using patent rights in Europe to push for an 
agreement was seen as one thing that could be done.  
Back in Argentina, there was as much confusion about the proper response. The trials 
were officially between Monsanto and the importing firms in Europe. But the results would 
determine the terms for the country’s most crucial export activity. The biggest agrarian 
organization, SRA, believed that the soy farmers had hardly any choice but to come to an 
agreement with the company.156 However, the Argentinian government decided to get legally 
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involved as a third party (amicus curiae) and make a case against Monsanto. It was far from 
being a straightforward decision. “Because of the technicality of the issue, no one outside the 
Secretariat of Agriculture understood the importance of these trials. The general perception, 
especially at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and at the Treasury, was that we were going to lose 
and we had to give in,” recalls one of Argentina’s lawyers. The diplomatic embarrassment and 
the sheer workload of the engagement with the trials caused a constant revision of the 
commitment. But partly thanks to lobbying by the FAA, the government authorities stood 
convinced that winning the case would be crucial for Argentina’s economic interests. “Campos 
[secretary of agriculture] was an agronomist, he understood the technology, and he understood 
what is at stake—that was important”.157  
The legal case made was equal parts techno-scientific and ethical-normative. Whether 
any transgenic DNA could be found in soy oil originating from transgenic soybean seeds was 
discussed, as well as whether a company’s European patent rights over the transgenic seeds 
extended to semi-processed commodities imported from elsewhere. In the end the effort paid 
back. The government obtained a favorable declaration from the Internal Market and Services 
Directorate-General of the European Commission in August 2006. In the following couple of 
years, all the trials ended with judgments against Monsanto.158  
All of this has happened despite considerable pressure on the government in the 
diplomatic circles. Monsanto’s business in the country has been among the highlighted 
discussion items during President Cristina Kirchner’s several talks with the American 
                                                 
157 Interview with Vanessa Lowenstein, IPR lawyer (Buenos Aires, February 2013). 
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administration.159 The pressure for policy change was not exclusively from “foreign” sources. 
There have been influential figures within the agricultural bureaucracy who saw strengthening of 
IPR as a requirement for sustaining innovation. Trying to build legitimacy for the seed market 
reform by decoupling it from the debate over the transgenics, they stressed that the reform would 
increase the returns to seed firms investing in plant-breeding research—many of which were 
domestic—regardless of whether the seeds they developed featured transgenic events or not. By 
2012, the renewed efforts for reform gave rise to visible cleavages within the administration. The 
Subsecretariat of Family Agriculture—an agency focusing on the needs of indigeneous 
communities and small peasantry—confronted the Secretariat of Agriculture by declaring its 
veto for any proposal that would restrict seed saving. Notwithstanding such internal 
disagreements, however; the overall result the Argentine press was observing was an inertia 
against change towards stricter IPR: liberal, pro-agrarian La Nación commented that over this 
issue for once the Peronist Kirchner government was in unison with the farm sector.160  
It seems that taking measures that would give a greater slice of the agrarian rent to the 
foreign biotechnology industry seemed like something that the government could pass on. The 
Kirchner governments saw their job as the reconstruction of Argentina’s national industries after 
a long period of involution and a final collapse in the 1999 crisis, and fighting income inequality 
that stood at levels unprecedented in the country’s history. The government cadres’ 
understanding of what would be feasible and legitimate in this task departed dramatically from 
that of transnational capital. An essay by Enrique M. Martínez, the president of INTI (the public 
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agency to promote advances in industrial technology), originally published on INTI’s news 
bulletin and circulating in discussions among specialists, gives an insight.161 In announcing his 
organization’s position on agrarian debates the bureaucrat argued—reminiscent of Gereffi and 
Korzeniewicz’s (1994) academic work—that global capitalism was running on global value 
chains. Dominant transnational actors appropriated the majority of the value generated thanks to 
their command of proprietary knowledge or brand rights. The extant mode of agricultural 
production in Argentina displayed one such chain. The grower had to buy inputs like seeds, 
herbicides and fertilizers from monopolistic firms and sell his produce to export handlers that 
were likewise highly concentrated. In such a context the State had to intervene with taxes and 
other measures to extract value from the chain and spread it among the links, but first and 
foremost to the weakest ones, i.e. the peasantry (“chacarero común”). Otherwise, there would 
have been little difference from the days when a few British processors were handling Argentine 
livestock and also determining the country’s agricultural policy. The argument is exemplary of 
the reasoning the government cadres used to justify the policies to themselves and their 
supporters. 
In the end, the IPR regime for GM soybeans in Argentina has remained unchanged, to the 
dissatisfaction of the TNC and their diplomatic supporters. But things may change in the future. 
As more TNCs enter Argentina with their GM seed varieties and apply downward pressure on 
prices, perils of monopoly have been becoming less relevant. TNCs other than Monsanto have 
evaded taking an equally confrontational attitude against Argentinian civil or public 
organizations, although they too have experienced certain problems in enforcing patents and the 
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informal seed market is still a major problem in securing returns to investment.162 Also, as 
domestic firms develop genetic engineering skills, public authorities may become more 
convinced by the argument for stronger IPR and have an easier time justifying a reform in that 
direction.163 (This, at least, is the expectation at the leading South American biotechnology firm 
Bioceres as they place their bet on investing in transgenic plant research).164  
In other words, the day may come when it will no longer be justified to call Argentina as 
a case of weak IPR. If and when that happens, it will be interesting to discuss what exactly has 
tipped the balance. In either case, however, it will remain of great significance that during nearly 
two decades of the introduction of GM seeds, while commodity prices in global markets stood at 
record levels, the Argentine farmers were able to access inputs in favorable terms as they 
expanded production and financed the country’s economic development with enormous export 
revenues and taxes. And the struggle so far has already ruled out certain options for the future. 
An overly expansive legal interpretation of patents rights over transgenes, for example, was a 
casualty at the European theatre of Argentina’s confrontation with Monsanto.  
Argentinean domestic producers thus stand as the current winner of their conflict with the 
Monsanto. Against activists from the consumer sector, they did not have a great conflict on 
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biosafety to begin with. As the director of the biotechnology industry association ArgenBio 
comments, “Even those NGOs who oppose biotechnology have little activity in this area, even 
those which have much more visibility in other countries”.165 A one month-TV campaign 
instigated by Greenpeace Argentina in July 2001 was the major action against transgenic 
products the country saw.166 The bureaucrats at SENASA (public agency responsible for food 
safety inspection, including transgenics) comment that they were able to win over the 
Greenpeace activists by inviting them for a day-long workshop in which the activists could see 
and understand the methods used by the agency in its decisions.167 
What eventually became a topic of heated public debate in the country was not the safety 
of the GM food itself but the impacts of glyphosate spraying, which is a crucial input in the GM 
soy (and much of GM corn) production method. National attention to this issue was provoked by 
an activist group called “the mothers of Ituzaingó”.168 The mothers were from a neighborhood in 
the city of Cordoba that was bordering soybean farms, and they believed that glyphosate 
exposure was the cause of widespread cancer in their community. (Conducting their own 
independent survey with the help of local physicians they demonstrated about 200 cases of 
cancer among 5000 inhabitants). 
 Provoking inconclusive responses from the government authorities, the mothers’ 
persistent activism over the years has been supported by organizations like the Foundation for 
Environmental Protection (FUNAM) and Grupo de Reflexion Rural—a left-wing intellectual 
movement questioning the virtues of the country’s agribusiness orientation. In April 2009, 
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experimental findings by Dr. Andrés Carrasco associating glyphosate exposure to embryo 
malformations made the front pages of Argentine newspapers, and Carrasco was quoted to say, 
“Science is urged by powerful economic interests, and not by the quest for truth and the welfare 
of the people.” During the public debate that ensued afterwards, the Minister of Science and 
Technology felt obliged to address the issue on TV. The government responded with 
commissioning some surveys of the scientific evidence on the impacts of glyphosate, but has not 
acted on them. Although there are court decisions and provincial laws—hardly implemented—
that ban glyphosate spraying within 2500m of urban areas, the federal government has resisted 
enacting a law, and the toxicological classification of glyphosate (“low toxicity, implying no 
risk”) has not been changed either.169  
 
Conclusion: Assessing Epistemic Coalition Input 
In Argentina, the rapid spread of glyphosate-resistant GM seeds has displaced unskilled 
labor, made agriculture more profitable for the producer by reducing herbicide cost per hectare, 
and thus increased the land rent. The response of the market has been investment in land and 
increased agricultural production. Impact assessments suggest that the domestic farmers captured 
a greater share of the gains from the boom than the biotechnology TNCs did. In generating these 
outcomes, the technical quality of the transgenic event did matter, but two institutional 
constructions were also crucial: The price of the glyphosate-resistant GM seed, and the price of 
glyphosate, both of which have remained low in Argentina due to reasons that have been subject 
of significant political dispute.  
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In these political disputes, amid competing pressure by various interest and opinion 
groups, the government ultimately sided with the farmer associations seeking favorable access to 
inputs. The emerging consensus was that the Argentine agricultural producers would have 
favorable access to GM seeds, and the government, already retaining a lot of the agrarian rent for 
itself through taxes, would resist using its power to back IPR claims over the seeds. In the 
meantime, crucially, the government would defend the GM production complex against critics 
questioning its environmental and public health impacts. But the public awareness over the 
dangers of unrestrained glyphosate spraying has been growing. Argentina’s permissive policy 
regime for GM agricultural production, hitherto resting on a feigned ignorance of environmental 
externalities, may have to take a direction towards a more hands-on approach, forcing the 
agricultural sector to internalize the costs. 
In Argentina the material interests underpinning the policy debates are quite concrete and 
openly articulated, and one can talk of epistemic coalition input in a relatively weak sense, 
involving mostly legal expertise. Early in the debate, in the 1990s, an epistemic coalition in favor 
of what is called in Argentina as “productivismo,” i.e. support for national developmental 
productive capacity, biased the public decision-makers to build a permissive biosafety regime 
and err on the side of going forward with GM crop approvals when they had doubts. This 
coalition included members of the agricultural bureaucracy and regulatory scientists like Carmen 
Vicien. When GM crop cultivation began, and reasons for a potential IPR conflict with the 
biotech TNC emerged, lawyers became the defining figures in the dominant epistemic coalition. 
Argentinean lawyers like Aldo Casella and Vanessa Lowenstein, and the European partners they 
worked with, like Bernard Remiche, were influential in forming, or reinforcing, beliefs about the 
illegitimacy of the expansive IPR demands of the biotech TNC. Pro-active bureaucrats like the 
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Secretary of Agriculture Miguel Campos (who was an upper-level bureaucrat under the Ministry 
of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries) or Enrique Martinez of the National Institute for 
Industrial Technology (INTI) also took part in the coalition. Conversely, at the ministries of 
Treasury and Foreign Affairs where TNC influence is always held with great esteem, there were 
the assumption that Argentina’s national interest lied in going along with the TNC demands 
rather than risking a major confrontation, and that the Argentinean side would not have the 
legally stronger case in a confrontation. Instead of simply appealing to interests, epistemic 
coalitions put forward their stances in terms of understanding and knowledge, and accuse their 
detractors for not knowing enough, or not understanding well enough. Talking supportively 
about Campos’ position in this debate, for example, lawyer Lowenstein says, “he was an 
agronomist, he understood the technology, and he understood what is at stake—that was 
important … Because of the technicality of the issue, no one outside the Secretariat of 
Agriculture understood the importance of these trials”.170 
The combination of a strong, cohesive, well-articulated agricultural sector; the presence 
of epistemic brokers who were interested in questioning the IPR demands of the biotech TNC, 
and the absence of a major opposition questioning the biosafety of GMOs, makes Argentina a 
somewhat overdetermined case disposed to generate a pro-domestic producer policy choice. The 
case of Brazil, where there was a robust, active, confrontational anti-GMO mobilization among 
consumer NGOs, shows more clearly the limits of what an opposition to GMOs can achieve in 
the presence of a strong domestic producer sector, but also the limits of what the domestic 
producers can do vis-à-vis the biotech TNC in the absence of supportive epistemic brokers and 
allies. 
                                                 
170 Author’s interviews. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE CASE OF BRAZIL 
 
Introduction 
 “Two people were shot dead and eight wounded Sunday in a clash between members of 
landless peoples' organizations and armed guards protecting a farm owned by the Swiss-owned 
biotech company Syngenta Seeds in Santa Tereza do Oeste, a small town about 340 miles west 
of Curitiba, the capital of Parana state. In addition to wanting the land for settlement, the landless 
movements that agitate for agrarian reform oppose and sometimes target companies like 
Syngenta that work with genetically modified organisms (GMOs)”. Thus reported the US 
consulate in Sao Paulo with a cable to Washington DC in 2007.171 At that time Brazil was at a 
crossroads regarding its policy regime on GMOs. During the previous decade the country saw a 
regulatory, judicial and political battle over whether to go forward with GM agriculture. By early 
2007 a backlog of 500 transgenic events were waiting for the government’s approval for 
commercial release.  
 Earlier, it had seemed as if GM agriculture could easily have bright prospects in this 
country. Brazil is one of the world’s major agricultural producers and exporters, and one with 
land and water resources that may allow for a significant expansion of agriculture still. On the 
north-south axis, the country spans several climatic zones. Southern Brazil joins Uruguay and 
Argentina’s Rioplatense provinces to comprise a temperate and mildly wet zone that is well 
suited for grain and soybean production. GM seed varieties available from Argentina could be 
readily used in the states of Rio Grande do Sul, Santa Catarina, and Parana, and it would take a 
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few years to adapt them to the more tropical climes of further north. Befitting the geographic 
placement of the two countries, therefore, it would seem logical that Brazil follow Argentina by 
a couple of years of time lag, roughly speaking, in its exposure to GM seeds and the formation of 
its policy regime. And such was the case initially. By 1995 Brazil had a permissive Biosafety 
Law put in place, setting up a National Technical Commission of Biosafety (CTNBio) to decide 
on GM crop approvals. Before this regime could produce tangible results however, its 
functioning was interrupted due to an effective anti-GMO coalition of statesmen, scientists and 
activists, who were concerned over environmental preservation and consumer rights as well as 
socioeconomic issues like landless peasants’ access to resources. The anti-GMO coalition used 
courts to challenge CTNBio’s authority to decide on GMO approvals and also mobilized their 
representatives in the same commission to veto any approvals. While the federal government had 
to rely on provisional measures to annually legalize the harvest from actually existing GM 
cultivation on the ground, anti-GMO governors declared their states GMO-free. Brazil thus came 
to have a contested policy regime. The contest would take nearly a decade for its resolution with 
a new Biosafety Law in 2005-07 in favor of a relatively permissive regime for GM agriculture. 
In the meantime, the biotech TNC and the farmers, which had previously formed a coalition to 
push through the technology through regulatory hurdles, found themselves in disagreement over 
how to manage royalty fees concerning the intellectual property over the seeds (the payment of 7 
billion US dollars were at stake). Once the biosafety contestation was resolved largely in favor of 
GMOs, the opposition became increasingly irrelevant to policy, and farmers found themselves 
alone in their disagreements over IPR relating to the seeds provided by the biotech TNCs. So the 
IPR dimension of the policy debate also witnessed contestation, but the results of the 
contestation remained largely favoring the TNC position. A system of royalty collection on grain 
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delivery that started to work despite the farmers’ opposition returned technology rents to the 
TNC. As a result, while the technology seems to be working well agronomically, impact studies 
can barely document net profit improvement for the farmers from the adoption of GM seeds (da 
Silveira and de Carvalho Borges 2007). Had there been a different kind of epistemic coalition, 
centering on an opposition to the property claims associated with the technology and generating 
public mobilization for that purpose, the government reaction to the TNC IPR enforcement 
maneuvers, and the economic impact of the technology for the farmers, could have been 
different. 
Below I trace the process of Brazil’s policy trajectory, based on data from archival 
research (official documents, position papers by industry associations, publications by the NGOs, 
US embassy cables, newspapers) and elite interviews (with politicians and bureaucrats, industry 
spokespeople from farming and seed sectors, activists and scientists) conducted in Portuguese 
and Spanish from February 2013 to May 2013. 
 
The Contested Biosafety Regime 
Technocratic Input Faces Opposition 
 The issue of genetic engineering arrived at the gates of the Brazilian regulatory universe 
as a primarily medical concern. Two figures were influential in the early design of the Brazilian 
biosafety regime (indeed they would go on to become the first two presidents of the CTNBio): 
Laila Macedo (formerly Oda), a microbiologist working at Brazil’s chief public health research 
institute Fundação Oswaldo Cruz, and Luis Antonio Barreto de Castro (emphatically known as 
Luis ABC in Brazil’s agricultural circles), a plant scientist at the public agricultural research 
corporation EMBRAPA. Laila Macedo tells, “In the late 1980s and early 1990s there was a 
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biosafety law draft in circulation. At the time it was seen more as an issue of r-DNA research for 
pharmaceutical purposes. Agriculture was not the focus. So the Congressional commission sent 
the draft to the health institute, and the head of the institute sent it to me. We started to work on it 
and then realized its relevance to agriculture, so we teamed up with EMBRAPA”.172 At the latter 
Luis ABC became involved as he was already heading a unit for molecular research towards 
developing biofortified soy. 
 These figures envisioned an enabling regulation that would open the way for research and 
commercialization in the area without much interference from the non-scientific bureaucracy. 
“The bill [we created] featured a powerful CTNBio directly under the president. The idea was to 
evade inter-ministerial competition”.173 Although co-sponsored by the vice-president of the 
republic, however, the bill would not pass unchanged. In a bid for organizational 
aggrandizement, the Ministry of Science and Technology wanted to integrate the CTNBio into 
its own organization, and convinced President Cardoso to make that change.174 In the end, the 
commission turned out to be weaker than originally intended, and its organizational location 
invited conflict with rival bodies such as the Ministry of Environment, due to disagreements over 
where each organization’s bailiwick ended.  
 Only in retrospect these potential fault lines emerge. Despite arguing over organizational 
structure, official circles were dominated by a pro- GMO attitude, dubbed as the “Cardoso 
consensus” (Jepson et al 2008) after the pro-business President. The biotech industry welcomed 
the formation of the regulatory commission, as it opened the way forward for GM agriculture. So 
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Monsanto applied for the approval of its glyphosate-resistant (Roundup Ready) soybeans for 
cultivation in Brazil. Commercialization would occur though a deal with the public corporation 
EMBRAPA, which provided the suitable local seed variety. (In the meanwhile, Monsanto was 
buying the leading private seed companies FT Sementes and Agroceres to improve its own 
germplasm stock in Brazil).175 In 1998 CTNBio issued the approval. Ministers of Agriculture 
(Francisco Turra) and Science and Technology (Carlos Bresser-Pereira) were supportive of 
going forward, so was the CNA (Confederação Nacional da Agricultura—the peak association of 
representing farmer-agribusiness integration).176 Before this approval was put into effect, 
however, the decision was challenged in courts by opposition. 
 The opposition was two-pronged. On the official side there was the Ministry of 
Environment, and the Ministry of Health. These organizations were not only alarmed by what 
they saw as overreach into their regulatory territory, but also informed by the precautionary 
skepticism of certain scientists among their ranks, leading the Minister of Environment (Jose 
Sarney Filho) to speak critically of GMOs. A later chair of CTNBio comments: “During the time 
of the biosafety conflict there was some disagreement among the scientific community. 
Agronomists were all in favor. But some others were more precautious. There were those 
molecular and genetic scientists who were themselves studying processes related to genetic 
engineering, but who were precautious about possible impacts outside the lab once the GMOs 
are released to the environment”.177 On the civil society front, the major consumer rights 
organization IDEC and Greenpeace were the focal point of activism. Launching a highly 
publicized consumer campaign “Brazil free from GMOs,” these organizations “adopted the 
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European anti-GM discourse … directly challenging the depoliticized technical approach 
characteristic of the Cardoso consensus” (Jepson et al 2008). 
 The opposition also came in stages. At first consumer rights and environmental 
preservation were the main concerns. Once such concerns turned GMOs into a contestable topic 
and a GMO-skeptic discourse was put into circulation, actors questioning Brazil’s capitalist, 
export-oriented agricultural development trajectory got on board with the debate. These actors 
were chiefly the landless people’s organization MST, the agricultural workers union CONTAG, 
and the human rights organization Terra de Direitos. Observers at the US Embassy noted, 
“[t]hese groups allege that biotechnology will be damaging to small farmers because of increased 
dependence on this technology and the high cost of GMO seed”.178 As an observer comments, 
“The Vía Campesina movement, to which the MST is linked, talks, for example, of food rights 
and food sovereignty and the need for peasants to be independent of the clutches of global 
agribusiness. For the marginalized rural poor in Brazil this chimes well with many of their 
concerns. Even when they often know little about GM crops, seeing Monsanto as the enemy, 
allied to a Brazilian state reluctant to engage in any meaningful rural reform, produces a 
convincing storyline to which people have signed up in numbers” (Scoones 2008).  
 
Biosafety Debate: Opinions and Interest Groups  
 The opposition prompted court action in 1999. The legal issue was whether CTNBio had 
the authority to approve crops without requesting an environmental impact assessment (EIA), 
demonstrating that transgenic organisms posed no threat to the environment. The consumer 
organization IDEC filed a lawsuit arguing that GM soy was substantially different than 
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conventional soybeans (which is a claim at scientific truth)179 and by constitutional measures 
only the environmental ministry could issue a report permitting its release to the environment. 
Later the ministry’s own administrative arm for environmental protection (IBAMA) and 
Greenpeace joined in support. During the course of the trials other legal grounds were also 
evoked: insect-resistant crops should be considered a subject of the previous legislation on 
pesticides, commercialization of GM crops could not occur without labeling of GM food, etc. In 
response a federal judge issued a restraining order against the commercial release of GM 
soybeans and thus began a period of practical moratorium on Brazil’s GM crop approvals. The 
moratorium involved lawsuits going on in various courts spanning Brazil’s federal structure, 
attempts by state governors to declare their territory GM-free, Congressional debate over a new 
law to clarify areas of bureaucratic responsibility, and attempts by a weakened Cardoso 
administration to go around the courts and the Congress by executive decrees (details of the 
judicial, legislative and executive action in this period can be found elsewhere).180   
 The debate was not handled only through legal arguments. The courts were presented 
with arguments about the desirability of GMOs, or the lack thereof. Biosafety was the main 
ground of concerns. One judge was led to describe GMOs as “organisms that could give rise to a 
strange civilization of aliens with venomous physiognomy, to compromise definitely, in real 
terms, and not fictitious, the survival of future generations of our planet”.181 In the eyes of many, 
                                                 
179 Establishing “substantial equivalence” between GM and non-GM varieties of a plant is an important part of most, 
including Brazilian, biosafety approval procedures. 
180 A good account is provided in Jepson et al (2008). Further details are available in Portuguese in Menache (2000) 
and in English at USDA FAS GAIN report #BR1623, “Update of Biotech Issues in Brazil,” dated 7 November 2001, 
http://apps.fas.usda.gov/gainfiles/200111/130682651.pdf. 
181 “[O]rganismos que darão origem a uma esquisita civilização de aliens hospedeiros com fisionomia peçonhenta, 
a comprometer definitivamente, em termos reais, e não fictícios, a sobrevivência das futuras gerações de nosso 
planeta” (translation mine), quoted in a letter sent on 26 August 2003 by Luis Antonio Barreta de Castro, the first 
chair of CTNBio, to his sucessor Erney Camargo, reproduced in www.inovação.unicamp.br/colunistas/colunistas-
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the fact that the technology was to be supplied by a TNC with questionable reputation was a 
factor that added to the salience of biosafety risks. Luis ABC; the chair of the CTNBio 
complained that the radical factions of the campaign …“accuses, judges, and condemns [the pro-
GMO advocates] through veritably fascistic lenses … as if scientifically defending the 
transgenics would immediately be in the service of the multinationals”.182 Monsanto’s lead 
lawyer in Brazil (who had an abortive attempt to become a Catholic priest before studying law), 
recalls: “According to the activists, we were Monsatan! I, once preparing to become a priest, had 
become the devil’s advocate, in their narrative”.183 It should be noted that the opposition did not 
only come from radical activists—the prestigious Brazilian Society for the Progression of 
Science (SBPC) too was criticizing CTNBio for rushing the decision for the approval of 
Monsanto’s GM soy without adequate scientific data.184 
 It was the activists, however, who also took the debate from the courtrooms and to the 
public. In June 2000 IDEC announced that eleven GM food products were on the shelves of 
Brazilian supermarkets. Through the latter part of 2000 and into 2001, Greenpeace led protests at 
supermarkets across the country.185 “The World Social Forum in Porto Alegre in January 2001 
was an important focus for protest, and continued to be so in the follow-up events of 2002 and 
2003, attracting many international activists from around the world. In 2001, over 1,000 MST 
workers invaded a Monsanto experimental farm in Rio Grande do Sul, destroying five acres of 
                                                                                                                                                             
luiz-abc.shtml with the title “Apocalípticos levaram o Brasil a cinco anos de obscurantismo,”  Last accessed April 
2013. 
182 “Esta facção radical, ... julga e condena com base em ótica fascista própria... Se algum dia seguir pelo caminho 
que escolhi, de defender cientificamente os transgênicos, estará imediatamente a serviço das multinacionais”. Luis 
Antonio Barreta de Castro, Ibid. 
183 Author’s interview with Alcides Morali (Sao Paulo, April 2013). 
184 This view was articulated by Dr. Glaci Zancan, the vice-president of SBPC, in a seminar organized by the 
Brazilian Senate during 8-10 June 1999. For background see Menasche (2000) and the transcribed text is available 
at https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/soc.culture.brazil/01fFR-_8g8Y, last accessed December 2015. 
185 Scoones (2008) 
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GM soybeans. They were joined by the French farmer activist José Bové, who was arrested for 
participating. Anti-GM mobilization now hit the international press and attention increased with 
the Action- Aid-facilitated citizens’ jury in Fortaleza” (Scoones 2008). NGO activism was 
effective in creating public awareness and popularizing the opposition. In summer 2001, 
Greenpeace commissioned a national survey (to be conducted by “the most important opinion 
survey institute in Brazil,” observes the US embassy) about the public acceptance of GMOs in 
Brazil. “The results of the survey indicate that 74 percent of the Brazilian population prefers 
conventional food products rather than those produced with GMOs because they don’t have 
sufficient information about the possible health risks and environmental impact. Also, 67 percent 
of the people interviewed believe that planting of GMO crops should be prohibited”.186  
 In the meantime, despite the public opposition among the consumers, and an ongoing 
moratorium on GM crops, “much of the legal maneuvering in elite circles was irrelevant to what 
was growing in the ground” (Herring 2007: 142). A report issued in 2002 by a Congressman 
exposed widespread planting of GM soy in southern Brazil despite the legal moratorium that 
prevented any varieties to be officially released in the country. Herbicide-tolerant (HT) soybean 
seeds (of the same kind Monsanto had filed for approval in Brazil) had been smuggled from 
Argentina, and were being reproduced and re-crossed by Brazilian producers. The farmers 
seemed to find the simplification and greater flexibility of crop management provided by HT 
seeds attractive.187 Comparing the above quoted public opinion survey with views within the 
agricultural sector, the US embassy attachés observed that “[t]here is no reliable survey of 
                                                 
186 USDA FAS GAIN report #BR1623, “Update of Biotech Issues in Brazil,” dated 7 November 2001, 
http://apps.fas.usda.gov/gainfiles/200111/130682651.pdf. 
187 This is the conclusion inferred by da Silveira and de Carvalho Borges (2007) based on the results of a farm 
impact study by Roessing and Lazzarotto published in 2005. The latter finds some reduction in input costs offset by 
payment of technology fees to the biotech company and slightly lower yields, with little net pecuniary gain for the 
farmers overall. Supportive information comes from author’s interviews. 
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Brazilian farmers’ perceptions of GMOs. However, most leaders of farm organizations support 
the approval of GMOs in Brazil to remain competitive with Argentine and American farmers ... 
Most traders of agricultural products in Brazil advocate the planting of both GMOs and non- 
GMOs in Brazil [in order to take advantage of premium prices for non-GM food in niche 
markets]”.188 Around the same time, a survey conducted on behalf of the chief agricultural 
producers association CNA suggested an 80 percent acceptance (opinion-wise) rate of GM crops 
among Brazilian farmers, while among the food processing industry, who would be exposed 
more directly to consumer aversion, acceptance was lower.189 
 The Cardoso administration was known for its neoliberal, pro-business attitude and 
enjoyed warm relations with agribusiness, with a good showing of bancada ruralista (the name 
conventionally given to the political representation of big agriculture in Brazil) politicians among 
their ranks.190 The administration tried to fight off the NGO-led opposition and perhaps send a 
message to the courts by displaying unity and resolve. A joint inter-ministerial declaration was 
issued in support of the pro-GMO agenda and the CTNBio’s authority over the matter. The 
environmental minister José Sarney Filho too was forced into submission despite his initial 
misgivings and the fact that his ministry’s bureaucrats were involved with the opposition.191 But 
the administration was weakened by corruption scandals and general dissatisfaction with the 
economy, and so it was unable to muster strength for a major initiative in the Congress towards a 
conclusive rearrangement of the biosafety regime. The resolution of the conflict had to wait for 
the emergence of a new political equilibrium with the Workers Party (PT) taking the Presidency 
                                                 
188 USDA FAS GAIN report #BR1623, “Update of Biotech Issues in Brazil,” dated 7 November 2001, 
http://apps.fas.usda.gov/gainfiles/200111/130682651.pdf. 
189 USDA FAS GAIN report #BR5618 “Annual Agricultural Biotechnology Report,” dated 12 July 2005, 
http://apps.fas.usda.gov/gainfiles/200507/146130270.pdf  
190 Filomeno (2014), Jepson et al (2008). 
191 Jepson et al (2008). 
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from January 2003. PT’s ascendancy presents an interesting political variable because the party 
came to power promising to block the GMOs, but it would end up establishing a new, more 
permissive biosafety regime, due to pressure from soy growers and supportive opinions from 
influential scientists (added to the constant lobbying by the TNCs). This is explained in the next 
section. 
 
The Workers’ Party Resolves the Debate, Unexpectedly 
 Initially, a PT government looked like the last thing the biotech industry would have 
wanted, as the party’s stance on GM agriculture was all but supportive. Both the NGOs oriented 
towards the biosafety agenda and the agrarian opposition centering around the MST and 
CONTAG had organic relationship with the party, and provided it with rank and file. During 
Cardoso’s term in office, PT-ruled states had provided bastions for the anti-GMO opposition. In 
the southernmost state of Rio Grande do Sul (RS), PT-affiliated governor Dutra declared the 
state GM-free in 1999 and, with an effort to thwart the smuggling of GM seeds from Argentina, 
began to set up a certification system for conventional crops to guarantee the commodity chain 
for European markets. State officials also mounted legal cases against biotechnology companies 
conducting experiments in their state and challenged CTNBio’s exclusive jurisdiction over 
biosafety governance by reclaiming authority through environmental regulation in their 
territory.192 State deputies from PT proposed to make Rio de Janeiro and Santa Catarina too 
legally GM-free.193 When PT leader Lula da Silva became President, observers expected such an 
approach to become influential on a national scale. 
                                                 
192 Jepson et al (2008). 
193 Menache (2000). 
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 However, the PT administration ultimately took a different path. The change in policy 
was triggered by events in export markets but not in a way that vindicates straightforward 
“market power” predictions. (Main markets for Brazilian soybean is shown in table 24 below). 
At the time, most exports went to the EU, where despite a precautionary regulatory framework 
GM soybeans were not banned, yet there was a premium price for non-GM soy in the market. 
China was the second, but rapidly growing, export destination, and its government had 
maintained an ambiguous attitude in its GMO policy, itself waiting for the clarification of 
broader international trends. Then, in early 2002, China imposed biosafety rules that required all 
importers to issue a safety certificate stating whether they were handling GM food. If anything, 
this was a move towards a more demanding regulatory regime on behalf of China. (Indeed, as 
late as in 2014 Brazil’s foreign ministry was complaining that the adoption of GM seeds was 
creating problems in exporting to China).194 Yet, at the time it had the side effect of partially 
legitimating the cultivation of GM crops because it forced the Brazilian government to choose 
between ordering the incineration of the soybean harvest in the southern states, which was 
known to be GM, or officially recognize its existence despite the ongoing moratorium. 
Table 24: Soybean exports from Brazil, 2000 
Destination 
Share 
in total 
EU 64% 
China 15% 
Other 11% 
Japan 5% 
Norway 5% 
 
Source: Brown-Lima et al (2010) 
 
                                                 
194 “UPDATE 1-Monsanto, soy exporter royalties dispute rages on in Brazil,” Reuters, 23 October 2014, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/23/brazil-monsanto-exporters-idUSL2N0SI32220141023 
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 To deal with the situation without hurting farmers and exports to China, in March 2003 
Lula signed a presidential decree to recognize and temporarily permit the sale of GM soybeans, 
exempting that year’s harvest from regulatory provisions under the 1995 Biosafety Law.195 
Similar decrees were issued during the next couple of years too, provisionally legalizing the 
cultivation of GM soy until a new law was made, while also decreasing the 4% threshold 
previously established for tolerance for GM food products in Brazil,196 reflecting an ongoing 
ambiguity on behalf of the administration. For all sides to the debate the ambiguity was far from 
ideal. For Monsanto, it presented a mixed blessing because with each harvest the provisionary 
decrees were legitimating GM crop cultivation little by little, however without fully recognizing 
the TNC’s right to collect royalty fees for the seeds, which had been disseminated illegally. 
Agricultural Minister Roberto Rodriguez (an industry leader himself, as the former president of 
the agribusiness association ABAG-Associação Brasileira do Agribusiness) was promising that 
the government would not leave domestic producers in legal limbo. The pressure for the 
liberation of GM seeds at least among capitalist producers was such that one idea in circulation 
at the time was to include the issue within a law package that would allow government 
redistribution of private land, a proposal agribusiness otherwise detested— in other words, the 
issue of GM seeds was seen important enough to become a quid pro quo for agrarian reform.197 
On the other hand, Environment Minister Marina Silva, who enjoyed a strong personal 
                                                 
195 Author’s interview with then Minister of Agriculture Roberto Rodriguez (Sao Paulo, April 2013). 
196 USDA FAS GAIN report #BR3613 “Brazil Approves Biotech Soybeans,” dated 1 October 2003, 
http://apps.fas.usda.gov/gainfiles/200310/145986266.pdf. 
197 The law under question would be the Provisional Measure 192, which the Congress was asked to vote into law. 
“The measure has been under debate because some congressmen want the text changed to prohibit government 
purchase of land that has been invaded by the landless movement. Many invasions occur as a way to force the 
government to purchase and redistribute certain tracks of land. Including biotech soybean planting in this 
controversial PM is seen as a way for the President to force Congress to pass the bill, since there is significant 
political pressure to liberate biotech soybean plantings.” USDA FAS GAIN report #BR4624 “Senate Passage of 
Biosafety Bill,” dated 8 November 2004, http://apps.fas.usda.gov/gainfiles/200410/146117670.pdf.  
 170 
following, was vigorously opposed to the GMOs, and arguing for a total ban, in alliance with 
consumer organizations, Greenpeace, and landless peasants movement MST.198 A new law was 
needed to break the impasse, for which the government had to take a clear stance. 
 That stance was taken with the passing of a completely new Biosafety Law in March 
2005. The law clarified the CTNBio’s authority over the regulation of GMOs, opening way for 
the approval of new varieties. It established a more scientific basis for this authority by requiring 
all members to have PhD-level academic credentials in relevant scientific fields and thus 
eliminating the previously existing seats for the representatives of both consumer and business 
groups. Implementation regulations augmented the maximum limit of glyphosate residual 
tolerated in food products 50 times, from 0,2 mg/kg to 10 mg/kg, freeing the farmers’ hand in 
abundantly applying glyphosate with their glyphosate-resistant seeds.199 Although it would take 
two more years of contestation to make CTNBio fully functional, during which the sides 
continued to combat over decision rules within the commission to create an institution to their 
own liking,200 the spirit and the direction of the law was already clear. The consumer 
                                                 
198 Ibid. 
199 Other countries like UK similarly increased glyphosate tolerance in food once approving GM crop cultivation. 
The scientific consultation relating to the Brazilian decision is explained in the SINDAG’s (agrochemicals industry 
association) memo “Considerações sobre: Comentários do Eng. Agr. Valdir Izidoro Silveira, Assistente Técnico da 
Vigilância Sanitária/Divisão de Alimentos da Secretaria de Estado da Saúde do Paraná na data de 28 de março de 
2006”, available at http://www.mma.gov.br/port/conama/processos/5FDD59FA/ParecerSINDAG-
DrValdir_3103.pdf, last accessed July 2015. 
200 A more permissive draft of the law was changed at seven points due to objections by the President. Although this 
was lower than the sixteen changes that Marina Silva had asked for, it was also not ideal for the pro-GMO side. The 
law changed the composition of CTNBio from 18 to 27 members and required 2/3 majority for decision-making. 
Both the US observers and the major agricultural producers association CNA saw this as a concession to the 
opposition. Because the latter was able to find enough dissenting members within the commission, no GM variety 
approval decisions could be taken until March 2007. Things changed that month when Lula signed a new law 
changing the decision rule within CTNBio. Shortly afterwards the first GM corn varieties were approved after 
having waited for 9 years for a decision. Also, originally, a Conselho Nacional de Biossegurança (CNBS), 
consisting of ministers of the government, had the authority to revise and if necessary override CTNBio approvals. 
In June 2008, this role was also eliminated, with CTNBio scientific decisions becoming conclusive. The contestation 
over Brazil’s biosafety regime for GMOs was then practically over. For views of the actors mentioned see Getúlio 
Pernambuco, “Biotecnologia: Inviabilizadas comercialização e pesquisa de OGMs,” Canal do Produtor, 13 January 
2004, available at http://www.canaldoprodutor.com.br/comunicacao/artigos/biotecnologia-inviabilizadas-
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organization IDEC, which had spearheaded the court action against GMOs, declared in a few 
weeks that with this new law “the transgenic lobby has won.”201 
 What led to this belated, contested victory? Insiders explain the change in the PT 
administration’s attitude with the combination of two things: pressure from major agricultural 
producers, and the supportive views presented by the scientists from relevant public institutions. 
A regulatory affairs manager at the Bayer Crop Sciences (a biotech TNC) comments that “all in 
all, it was mainly the growers’ pressure to the Ministry of Agriculture which changed the game. 
Scientists like Walter Colli were influential in accelerating things”.202 Dr. Colli agrees.203 A 
lawyer from Monsanto thinks that “President Lula was convinced by EMBRAPA’s [Brazil’s 
prestigious public agricultural research institution] positive presentations on the issue”.204 
Earlier, EMBRAPA had a GMO-skeptic constituency among its experts,205 the union of workers 
associated with the institution explicitly took part in the anti-GMO platform,206 and the chair 
Clayton Campanhola was known to be precautious.207 By mid-2000s, however, an attitude more 
in favor of GMOs started to dominate EMBRAPA. A paper by Dr. Mauricio Antonio Lopes was 
                                                                                                                                                             
comercializacao-e-pesquisa-de-ogms (last accessed December 2015), “Venceu o lobby dos transgênicos,” Revista do 
IDEC, April 2005, available at http://www.idec.org.br/uploads/revistas_materias/pdfs/2005-04-ed87-politicas-
biosseguranca.pdf; USDA FAS GAIN report #BR1623, “President Signs Regulatory Decree on Biosafety Law,” 
dated 29 November 2005, http://apps.fas.usda.gov/gainfiles/200512/146131664.pdf. Supportive information comes 
from the author’s interviews. 
201 “Venceu o lobby dos transgênicos,” Revista do IDEC, April 2005.  
202 Author’s interview with Denis Lima (Sao Paulo, March 2013). 
203 Author’s interview with Walter Colli (Brasilia, May 2013). 
204 Author’s interview with Alcides Morali (Sao Paulo, April 2013). 
205 Author’s interviews with Elibio Rech (EMBRAPA) (Brasilia, May 2013), Leila Macedo (CTNBio) (Rio de 
Janeiro, April 2013), Alcides Morali (Monsanto) (Sao Pulo, April 2013). 
206 SINPAF (Sindicato dos Funcionários da EMBRAPA) joined the anti-GMO coalition in June 2000, with a 
manifesto titled “Razões para dizer não aos transgênicos na agricultura.” See Menasche (2000). 
207 Author’s interview with Elibio Rech (Brasilia, May 2013), a molecular biologist at EMBRAPA. 
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important in changing the discussion—he later became EMBRAPA’s president.208 The then-
Minister of Agriculture Roberto Rodriguez argues that official presentations by a group of 
experts led by the prestigious plant scientist Dr. Ernesto Paterniani was influential in legitimizing 
the producer sector’s demand towards a more permissive regime: “The role of the academics was 
fundamental in convincing the government and the Congress”.209  
 Hence, the pressure from agricultural producers put the liberalization of GMOs on the 
agenda, and the support of influential scientists was a necessary ingredient to move it forward. 
The result was a change in the views about the desirability of GM crop cultivation held at the top 
echelons of the government, such that agricultural production agenda practically defeated the 
agenda associated most strongly with the ministry of environment. Roberto Rodriguez recalls: 
“After all this debate, there was a cabinet meeting with all the ministers where Lula announced 
the new law opening way for GMO approvals. One of the ministers objected, ‘But Sir, the 
opposition to the GMOs is in our party program!’ to which President Lula responded, ‘The 
party’s program says one thing, but the country’s program prefers something else’”.210 The 
Minister of Environment Marina Silva later resigned because of her growing isolation within the 
government due to her views on GM crops in addition to other environmental issues. She was 
also going to leave the PT to start a green movement towards a bid for her own Presidency. 
 Thus, the biosafety regime was liberalized. In a few years most soy and corn grown in 
Brazil was GM. Due to the enormous size of the country’s land under cultivation, this made 
Brazil the largest producer of GM crops after the USA. 
                                                 
208 Author’s interview with Antonio Marcio Buainain, an agricultural economist who has worked with FAO, among 
other institutions (Campinas, March 2013). 
209 Author’s interview with Roberto Rodriguez (Sao Paulo, April 2013). 
210 Author’s interview with Rodriguez. whose original words (for quoting Lula) at this point were in Spanish: “‘la 
programática del partido dice algo, pero la programática del país prefiere otra cosa.”  
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Table 25: Share of GM cultivation for major crops in Brazil, c. 2010 
Crop Area cultivated 
with GM seeds 
Soy 75% 
Corn 56% 
Cotton 25% 
 
Source: James (2011) 
 
 Once GM seeds became free, the issue of the appropriation of the surplus they generated 
came to fore. Farmers and Monsanto found themselves in disagreement. Their interaction, with 
interventions from the courts and the government, led to the formation of an IPR regime that has 
been largely supportive of Monsanto’s demands, to the dissent of important farm groups. This is 
explained in the next section. 
 
The IPR Regime: TNC Ascendant 
The Legacy of the Biosafety Debate 
 The contestation over the biosafety regime, which lasted roughly from 1998 to 2005-
2007, occurred around an axis where consumer rights, environmental, and landless peasant 
movements were on one side, together with public institutions (such as the ministries of 
Environment and Health) to which they enjoyed greater access; and on the other side were 
commercially-oriented farmers (especially of soy, especially from the South) and the biotech 
industry, supported by favorable public institutions (such as the Ministry of Agriculture); with 
scientific experts and their institutions (such as EMBRAPA) playing a pivotal role and 
increasingly siding with the latter. During this time, there was little evidence of dialogue and 
idea exchange between the farmers and the opposition. Consumer organizations like IDEC, and 
 174 
Greenpeace, were of manifestly urban nature.211 It does not seem to have helped for a dialogue 
that they recruited the landless movement (MST) and the National Confederation of Agriculture 
Workers (CONTAG) for the cause. The herbicide-tolerant GM seeds the farmers were 
embracing were displacing hired labor by making weed management simpler—if anything this 
presented an objective difference in interest between the landless rural workers and farmers.212 
Besides, the two classes have been separated by more insurmountable differences in their vision 
over land relations and agrarian development at large. All in all, the opposition and the farmers 
have remained disconnected. Once the biosafety contestation was resolved largely in favor of 
GMOs, the opposition became increasingly irrelevant to policy, and farmers found themselves 
alone in their disagreements over IPR relating to the seeds provided by the biotech TNCs. As a 
close observer of IPR debates in Brazil concludes, “[r]arely have attempts been made to link soy 
growers’ demands to broader issues, such as national or food sovereignty. These links could give 
birth to a broader coalition against Monsanto … There is no collaboration between APROSOJA-
RS, APROSOJA-MT [regional soy grower organizations] and NGOs or rural social movements” 
(Filomeno 2014: 104). 
 
The Mechanics of Collecting Technology Rents 
 Once it hit the national news that GM soy seeds embodying Roundup Ready technology 
smuggled from Argentina were spreading in southern Brazil and the government was forced to 
do something about it, Monsanto started considering a number of alternatives for monetizing its 
intellectual property here. They were also, as in Argentina, under pressure from the US farm 
                                                 
211 Newell (2008). 
212 The labor-displacing effect of HT seeds has been documented for the case of Argentina (Rodriguez 2010: 232). 
This effect is matched with an increase in the employment of more skilled labor in logistics (to handle the increased 
production) and agricultural engineering (to handle the technology). 
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lobby to prevent the Brazilian farmers’ free access to a technology for which US farmers were 
paying. In Brazil, technology fees could not be collected as part of seed sales because GM seed 
sales were not legal yet, neither it was obvious that they would ever be. Besides, even if seeds 
were legal, farmers could avoid paying by planting saved seed, as they were already doing in 
Argentina. Consequently, Monsanto’s Brazilian legal team conceived of the idea of charging 
unlicensed Roundup-Ready growers an “indemnification fee” for having used the patented 
technology, at the point where they would deliver their grain to trading companies storing, 
processing and transporting the product to (mostly export) markets. For this plan to work, the 
trading companies stood as the gatekeepers, so they had to be negotiated first. Initially, they were 
not predisposed to get involved in a distributional conflict to help monetize Monsanto’s 
intellectual property. “They said, ‘We support your intellectual problem, but this is your 
problem’,” recalls Rick Greubel, then president of Monsanto Brazil.213 
 However, the company began tracking ships leaving southern Brazilian ports, eventually 
intercepting a ship in the port of Trieste, Italy, carrying a large shipment of soybeans. Local 
customs action, maybe leading to trials, would be taken on the ground that the shipment 
contained Monsanto’s unremunerated intellectual property. The trading company decided to 
negotiate and the result was an indemnity fee agreement. As in many other countries, Brazil’s 
agricultural commodity exports are handled by the four multinational “ABCD” traders (ADM, 
Bunge, Cargill, Dreyfus)—given this concentrated structure, it was possible for Monsanto to 
come to an agreement with all of them (and the smaller processors and cooperatives they work 
                                                 
213 Interview with Rick Greubel reported in Bell and Shelman (2006: 8). 
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with) quickly. As a result, Monsanto was able to structure a royalty collection scheme based on a 
contractual arrangement illustrated in the following figure.214  
 
Figure 11: Mechanism for collecting tech fees, from de Avila Monteiro and Zylbersztajn (2011) 
 
 In this point of delivery (PoD) system, processors/traders collect the royalties on the 
genetic technology based on the ton of soybean grain delivered by farmers, keeping a percentage 
of the royalties as compensation, and passing the rest to the biotech TNC. To deliver their grain 
to the trader, the farmers agree to pay royalty or have their grain tested for GM content (which, if 
found positive, would result in a higher indemnity fee). Once the biosafety conflict was over and 
GM seeds were legally for sale in Brazil, the farmers were also given the choice of either paying 
the royalty at the point of grain delivery or showing invoices documenting that they purchased 
                                                 
214 Bell and Shelman (2006), de Avila Monteiro and Zylbersztajn (2011), and author’s interviews within the 
industry. 
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the season’s seed through a contract with Monsanto (in which the technology fee would be 
internalized into the seed price already, but at a lower rate, thus giving the farmers an incentive 
to purchase seeds with a contract each season rather than reproducing them in farm).215 For this 
additional step to work, local seed distributors were another actor that Monsanto needed to get on 
board. At first, ABRASEM (seed sector association) issued a public note alerting its members to 
abusive aspects of contracts being presented by Monsanto to local seed companies that multiply 
and sell GM seeds, recommending that such contracts should not be signed. However, after a 
round of negotiations, Monsanto agreed to assign a larger share of the royalties to local seed 
companies, which resulted in ABRASEM supporting the system.216  
 But what about the farmers’ view on this exchange? It seems fair to say that for the 
farmers the situation emerged as a fait accompli. It is highly likely that many of the farmers who 
were exchanging the illegal Roundup Ready seeds—which spread even to MST settlements—
were doing so without necessarily knowing that the variety had been bred with R-DNA methods, 
or giving much thought to the idea that they could be charged technology fees at one point. 
Monsanto issued newspaper ads only in 2003 notifying farmers that Roundup-Ready soybeans 
were protected by patents and the company would be charging for the right to use the 
technology.217 According to APROSOJA-RS (soy growers association of Rio Grande do Sul), 
FARSUL (agricultural federation of Rio Grande do Sul), and the FETAGRS (agricultural 
workers association of Rio Grande do Sul), the system was imposed unilaterally by the 
company.218 Rick Greubel, then president of Monsanto Brazil, comments “If there was one error 
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in our execution it was that we focused too much only on the exporters early in the process”.219 
Monsanto’s strategy of setting up the system without a prior negotiation with the farmers 
attracted criticism of otherwise sympathetic observers within the industry and policy circles, and 
provoked reaction from farmers, as explained in the next section below. 
 
Farmer Reaction to the IPR Regime 
 As soon as the PoD system started working dissatisfaction arose among farmers 
regarding both the form and the level of royalty collection. In part, the reaction is due to the 
sense of imposition of external control. As a soy grower from Sao Paulo’s interior explains, it is 
“the feeling that this whole thing is too compulsory, like a tax. When the soybean enters the 
storage house, part of it is automatically confiscated [by the local cooperative] to pay for the 
royalty—they register it under my name not as the 1000 which I delivered, but 1000 minus the 
royalty share”.220 In part, the reaction is due to the fact that such control enables the technology-
supplier to benefit from situations of doubt. As noted above, after a certain point farmers were 
required to show invoices to document that they obtained the seeds legally from Monsanto or 
pay indemnity fees. If a farmer, having already paid for the technology as part of such seed 
purchase, delivers more grain than what would, based on the average calculation established by 
Monsanto, spring from the amount of legally purchased seed, the surplus is then declared as the 
product of illegally obtained seeds and becomes subject to the higher indemnity fee. This 
punishes the more efficient farmers who are able to make their inputs perform above the 
average.221  
                                                 
219 Interview with Rick Greubel reported in Bell and Shelman (2006: 8). 
220 Author’s interviews (Campinas, March 2013). 
221 Author’s interviews. 
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 The reaction is also in part due to the level of fees, which are determined in ways that 
look arbitrary or exorbitant to farmers—not an unreasonable suspicion given conditions of 
monopoly. The monopolist does not calculate the price on the basis of the cost of production of 
the technology, as a perfectly competitive market would have it, but on the advantages that the 
technology provides to the user.222 As advantages vary, the royalty rate is changed: Monsanto 
attempts to increase it in years of a good harvest, while farmers may think that it is the weather 
and other factors that were responsible for the surplus. During the 2003/04 soy season Monsanto 
agreed to charge R$0.60 per soybean bag of 60 kilos, but wanted to double the value to R$1.20 
for 2004/05. In reaction, soy growers pressured the government to add clauses in that year’s 
provisional measure (the new Biosafety Law was still not officially in place) that could be 
interpreted to preclude royalty collection.223 A cooperative of medium and smaller producers in 
Campo Novo, Rio Grande do Sul also started court action and obtained in January 2005 an 
injunction stating that producers cannot be compelled to pay royalties, because they had the right 
to save seeds under Brazilian laws, which was, however, overruled one month later by a higher 
court.224 These measures are evidence of challenge against the TNC’s methods, and the farmers’ 
dissatisfaction, but by and large royalty collection has continued. 
 It is telling that the anti-GMO opposition enlisting consumer, environmental and rural 
workers organizations did not engage closely with these disagreements, and instead, at a remove 
from most farmers, constructed the socioeconomic dimension of its narrative on a vague 
                                                 
222 This insight is borrowed from agricultural economist José Maria da Silveira (author’s interview, Campinas, 
March 2013. Indeed, in the Indian context (where the relevant technology is the insect-resistant Bt seeds), according 
to the press, a top representative of the company explained that the trait value charged is relative to the additional 
income that farmers earn from Bt seeds. See Latha Jishnu, “An Odd Royalty Calculus,” Business Standard, 24 June 
2010, http://www.gmwatch.org/index.php/news/archive/2010/12317-monsantos-odd-royalty-calculus. 
223 Provisional Measure 223, which became Article 7 of Law 11,092/05. See USDA FAS GAIN report #BR5601, 
“President Signs Law for 2004/2005 Biotech-Soybean Crop,” dated 14 January 2005, 
http://www.fas.usda.gov/gainfiles/200501/146118494.pdf 
224 Filemeno (2014: 91). 
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opposition to the multinationals, plus the “Terminator” (GURT) seeds, the fears connoted to 
which seem to go beyond questions of economic distribution.225 Their activism in that area 
should not be dismissed as inconsequential—the 2005 Biosafety Law opening way for GM seeds 
banned the GURT not as a foregone conclusion but as a concession to the opposition226 (and 
there are already law drafts to overturn the ban).227 However, the opposition did not lend its 
support to the court action challenging Monsanto’s methods for collecting royalties for the GM 
seed technology because, unlike most farmers, they have framed the technology itself as 
illegitimate and undesirable.  
 
Government Intervention, or Lack Thereof 
 The role the government chose to play in this conflict becomes particularly interesting 
when the case of Brazil is put in comparison with Argentina. Why was Monsanto successful in 
establishing this PoD system in Brazil and not in Argentina? When I asked this question to my 
interview subjects in Argentina, many offered a cultural explanation, arguing that there is a 
culture of respect for private rights in Brazil while in Argentina there is not. Monsanto’s 
Brazilian team does not think so: “Everybody thought that it would be too difficult to organize, 
especially in a place like Brazil where the culture does not favor private property rights”.228 In 
chapter IV, it was shown that Monsanto tried to intercept Argentinian ships at the European ports 
                                                 
225 “On 22 March 2006, a day of action against terminator technology was declared in which, for example, 300 rural 
workers demonstrated in Curitiba against the suspension of the moratorium preventing the cultivation of terminator 
seeds. The decision of the 8th meeting of the Conference of the Parties of the Convention on Biological Diversity 
(CBD) held in Curitiba, Paraná to uphold the moratorium on the use of terminator seeds was used by Vía Campesina 
to lend credibility and support to this campaign” (Newell 2008). 
226 This is the opinion of the spokespeople from the biotech industry’s representative institution in Brazil, 
AGROBIO (author’s interviews, Sao Paulo, March 2013).  
227 Filomeno (2014: 89). 
228 Interview with Rick Greubel reported in Bell and Shelman (2006: 8). 
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to force the Argentinian producer sector for a similar royalty collection agreement. Differently, 
in Argentina the government got involved and lent its weight to the opposing side. Jerry Steiner, 
Monsanto’s executive vice president of commercial acceptance at the global level, credits the 
successful implementation of PoD in Brazil in part to the important role that political leaders 
played: “The turning point came when the politicians decided to allow us to pursue this as a 
commercial issue instead of turning it into a political debate. Government leaders were 
committed to getting a system in place and even facilitated several meetings between the 
parties”.229 Indeed, the Brazilian Ministry of Agriculture, while being relatively pro-active for a 
permissive bio-safety regime legalizing GM seeds, did not took a side in the debate over the 
royalty fees and this allowed Monsanto’s (a wealthy, unitary actor; enjoying the diplomatic 
support of the USA) power to predominate.   
 The imperatives of the existing IPR laws were not crystal clear about how to deal with 
this novel situation. The Law of Industrial Property forbade patents on the whole or parts of 
living beings, but it allowed (in line with the TRIPS agreement) patents on biotechnological 
processes that create GM plants, thus possibly extending protection to products obtained through 
these processes. On the other hand, Law of Protection of Cultivars and the Law of Seeds 
recognized (in line with UPOV 1978 convention) the right of rural producers to save seeds and 
even allowed producers to exchange seeds among themselves, but with the PoD payment system 
Monsanto was getting around this issue and charging royalties regardless.230 The laws left 
enough room for interpretation for a decisive government to impose a policy if need be. Earlier, 
Minister Rodriguez had spoken in favor of a system where royalty fees would be charged only as 
part of seed sale contracts—an idea more acceptable to the producers—and not on the basis of 
                                                 
229 Interview with Jerry Steiner reported in Bell and Shelman (2006: 10). 
230 See Filomeno (2014) for the details of these laws. 
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the grain delivered, in a joint statement with the Argentinian Secretary of Agriculture. 
Afterwards, however, no concrete action was taken by the Brazilian state.231 Minister Rodriguez 
explains, “My approach always is to have clear laws, and then to let the private market actors 
play their own game… My friend Miguel Campos, as Argentina’s Secretary of Agriculture, took 
a fight with Monsanto. He tried to convince the ministers of six South American countries to 
sign a common memorandum following his own policy of siding with the producers against 
Monsanto in the royalty collection conflict. I saw that all the other countries wanted to stick to a 
liberal position of non-interference and I also remained in that position”.232 Given the great 
weight a combined Brazilian and Argentinian initiative would carry within South America, 
Rodriguez’ “policy-taking” approach is somewhat curious. According to Newell, behind this 
turnabout was aggressive lobbying by Monsanto on the Brazilian government, which was 
concerned with not harming its own bargaining position by declaring support to Argentina 
(2009: 43). According to APROSOJA-MT (the soy growers federation of Mato Grosso state, 
where the seeds spread later than in Rio Grande do Sul), the Brazilian government mistakenly 
assumed, based on the statements of a few rural leaders, that most soy producers had agreed with 
the method of payment designed by the biotech TNC.233 According to a mid-level bureaucrat 
from the Minister of Agriculture, the inconsistences in the Brazilian government’s reception of 
the GMOs prevented them to develop a conscious strategy on the IPR front: “The government 
wouldn’t be able to take part in the negotiation over something that was not legal…The 
government could not get involved in the matter in a consistent strategic manner, and when you 
                                                 
231 The sequence of contradictory public positions is described in greater detail in Filomeno  
(2015: 57-58, 93). 
232 Author’s interview with Roberto Rodriguez (Sao Paulo, March 2013).  
233 Filomeno (2014: 93). 
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don’t have your strategy, you become an object of somebody else’s strategy. Monsanto followed 
a very clever strategy”.234 
 
IPR Conflict in Courts 
 Upon being denied the support of the executive, some producer organizations took the 
matter to courts. Several lawsuits can be subsumed under two broad challenges to the TNC’s 
interpretation of property rights. One challenge came from soy producers of the southern state of 
Rio Grande do Sul (RS), where the GM seeds made their first entry to Brazil. RS is a region of 
medium and small farmers (in Brazilian standards),235 traditionally oriented somewhat towards 
the left of the Brazilian political spectrum. In early 2009, a coalition of about three hundred and 
fifty local producer associations in RS started a class action against Monsanto, objecting to the 
entire system of royalty collection, and claiming the right to save seeds at no charge. They 
argued that the The Law of Protection of Cultivars recognized their right to save seeds, and 
therefore patent protection Monsanto evoked (on the basis of the Law of Industrial Property) to 
back royalty charges was invalid, because UPOV convention of 1978, to which Brazil was a 
party, prohibits “double protection”—meaning that any species eligible for cultivar protection 
laws cannot be simultaneously protected by a stricter instrument such as an industrial patent.236 
The associations were asking back all royalties extracted since 2004, amounting to R$14 billions. 
(Monsanto’s argument is that genetic transformation processes are Industrial Property, while 
                                                 
234 Author’s interviews at the Ministry of Agriculture (Brasilia, May 2013). 
235 Median rural property in the state of Rio Grande do Sul is 2,000 acres (de Avila Monteiro and Zylbersztajn 2011: 
35). Compare with footnote 238. 
236 Filomeno (2014: 94). Supportive information comes from the author’s interview with Néri Perin, the lawyer for 
the class action (Brasilia, May 2013).  
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Protection of Cultivars applies to the germplasm, so there is no double protection).237 Initially the 
producers gained ground when a judge decided in their favor in April 2012, ordering Monsanto 
to stop collecting royalties, and return those collected since 2004 or pay back a minimum of 
US$2 billion.238 Monsanto, however, has appealed the decision. 
 The second challenge came from the Mato Grosso state (MT), where GM seeds spread 
later. MT is a region of frontier colonization where new tracts of the Amazonian forest are 
claimed for agriculture every year, resulting in much larger land holdings than in RS, and where 
in-farm seed saving is less common.239 In September 2012, FAMATO, the peak agricultural 
federation of this state, started a lawsuit with a somewhat more technical focus, aimed at, it 
seems, gaining bargaining power against Monsanto and preventing abuse. The focus of the 
argument was an examination concluding that Monsanto’s patents on the transgenic RR and 
RRBt technologies had actually expired in 2010. The organization demanded from Monsanto a 
refund of royalties paid after the expiration in double amount. (Monsanto’s argument is that the 
“pipeline patents” mechanism in Brazilian law would actually imply a later expiry date). In June 
2013, Brazilian Superior Court of Justice confirmed the patent expiry thesis.240 The TNC is now 
questioning the constitutionality of elements of the Law of Industrial Property on which the 
                                                 
237 On the prohibition of double protection in IPR, see Dutfield (2003). 
238 “Monsanto may lose GM soya royalties throughout Brazil,” Nature, 15 June 2012, 
http://www.nature.com/news/monsanto-may-lose-gm-soya-royalties-throughout-brazil-1.10837 
239 Median rural property in the state of Mato Grosso has approximately 8,000 acres. By 2005, saved seeds were 
58% of soybean seeds in Brazil’s Midwest region including MT, compared to 90% in the south (de Avila Monteiro 
and Zylbersztajn 2011: 35). Climate and soil conditions should be partly responsible for the big difference in seed 
saving, as it is less economical to do so in more tropical climes. 
240 On pipeline patents see “Brazil: Monsanto defeated,” 4 June 2013, http://iptango.blogspot.jp/2013/06/brazil-
monsanto-defeated.html (last accessed December 2015). 
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decision is based; in the meantime producers are paying royalties to an independent deposit 
account.241 
 In response to these initiatives reflecting widespread farmer dissent and risking the 
payment of billions of dollars in refunds, Monsanto has offered, in negotiations with major 
producer organizations, to give Brazilian farmers a discount on the much awaited new generation 
RR2 Intacta seeds (of 18.5 reais, equaling US$8.15, per hectare, or 16 percent off the 115 reais 
per hectare price) if they signed an agreement promising not to sue the company for royalties 
paid in previous years. Initially the offer was not received well. Glauber Silveira, head of 
Brazil’s soybean growers association APROSOJA, said farmers should not sign and should 
continue pursuing royalty claims in court: “We believe producers are being tricked into signing a 
contract that will get them trapped to Monsanto for every new technology”.242 After negotiations, 
however, in April 2013 it was announced that the nation-wide soy growers federation 
APROSOJA dropped its own lawsuit against Monsanto, and FAMATO from Mato Grosso 
expressed support,243 while the Rio Grande do Sul chapter of APROSOJA remained opposed.244 
“Although the contract could be seen as a compromise in which soy growers obtained a discount 
because of their partially successful efforts in courts, it was a short term gain at the expense of 
the long-term rights of farmers as users of IP[intellectual property]-goods” (Filomeno 2014: 
100). As of this writing, various lawsuits are currently in progress, challenging particular patents, 
                                                 
241 Filomeno (2014: 99). 
242 “Monsanto Modified-Seed Royalty Agreement Opposed by Groups,” Bloomberg Business, 20 February 2013, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-02-20/monsanto-modified-seed-royalty-accord-opposed-by-brazil-
groups.  
243 “Brazil soy group says to end legal dispute with Monsanto,” Reuters, 9 August 2013, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/09/monsanto-brazil-lawsuit-idUSL1N0GA00720130809  
244 Filomeno (2014: 100). 
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the restrictive contracts Monsanto is offering in return of providing access to the new seeds, or 
the entire system.  
 
The Exit Reaction and the Case for Conventional Seeds 
 So, IPR rules over GM seeds remains in favor of TNC demands. As a result, a good 
portion of Brazilian farmers are spending an effort to keep their production non-GM. They are 
motivated by the pull factor of the premium price for non-GM output in export markets, and the 
push factor of high royalty fees for GM inputs. However, because the biotech TNCs have by now 
purchased the major seed companies in Brazil, and through their operations have been promoting 
almost exclusively the development of patented GM seed varieties, farmers are increasingly 
finding it difficult to find elite non-GM seeds.245 Under these conditions, keeping a robust supply 
of non-GM seed requires explicit market coordination efforts. ABRANGE is an association that 
devotes itself to the task of constructing a parallel production chain, called Soja Livre (“Free 
Soy”), by connecting farmers and retail chains interested in non-GM soy production and also 
suppliers of inputs compatible with this kind of production. ABRANGE executive director 
Ricardo Tatesuzi de Sousa explains, “Having a substantial non-GM seed option is necessary for 
the market to regulate itself, so to say, by balancing the prices. It’s an issue of having the right to 
choose. That’s why the motto for our Soja Livre program is ‘cultive sua liberdade de escolha’ 
                                                 
245 Author’s interviews with industry and Ministry of Agriculture sources. Also see Filomeno, who notes that 
“According to sources from APROSOJA-MT and ABRANGE, there were indications that Monsanto had been 
encouraging local seed multipliers to reduce the proportion of non-GM seeds produced” (2012). Similar complains 
have been articulated in the US context. A survey (Gray 2010) in the agriculture-intensive counties of Illinois (USA) 
asked farmers in 2009-2010 if they had access to high-quality corn seeds that were not genetically modified to 
contain Monsanto's Bt insecticide trait. In all seven counties, at least 32 percent of farmers said “no,” and in one 
county the figure was 47 percent. 
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[cultivate your freedom of choice]. In the USA and Argentina you don’t have that choice any 
more”.246  
For ABRANGE, the major source of non-GM seed lines is the public agricultural 
research institute EMBRAPA—“no one else does it anymore,” Sousa argues. EMBRAPA not 
only continues to work on breeding non-GM plant varieties, but also invests in public interest-
oriented biotechnology research, such as the development of biofortified beans that would, when 
ready, be supplied to farmers free of royalty fees or other subsidized forms.247 EMBRAPA is run 
as a state economic enterprise and ranks among the country’s biggest companies. However, since 
it has been experiencing problems with generating investment capital, the big debate in Brazilian 
agriculture currently is whether EMBRAPA should be partially privatized—biotech TNCs are 
known to be interested. For the many opponents of this idea, such an action could jeopardize the 
“country’s interests and food sovereignty”.248 The president of the National Union of 
Agricultural Research and Development Workers (SINPAF) comments that a privatized 
EMBRAPA would be pressured only to invest in the most profitable areas of agribusiness; and 
the needs of family agriculture, which corresponds mostly to the production of domestically 
consumed foodstuff, would be marginalized in research priorities.249 
For the time being though, through EMBRAPA, Brazil is regarded as the developing 
world’s biggest agricultural research spender outside China. It seems that where agricultural 
producers are pressured in one area, breathing space is sought and to some extent found 
                                                 
246 Author’s interview with Ricardo Tatesuzi de Sousa (Sao Paulo, March 2013). Also see ABRANGE president 
César Borges de Sousa’s article “Mitos transgênicos,” Valor Economico, 12 April 2012, 
http://www.valor.com.br/opiniao/2664802/mitos-transgenicos, last accessed December 2015.  
247 Author’s interview with Filipe Teixeira, EMBRAPA’s Head of Business Secretariat (Brasilia, May 2013). 
248 “EMBRAPA vive dilema por competitividade,” Valor Economico, 21 March 2012, 
http://www.valor.com.br/empresas/2579668/embrapa-vive-dilema-por-competitividade, last accessed December 
2015. 
249 Quoted in ibid. 
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somewhere else. In the USA, Monsanto represents “national capital” and has enjoyed strong 
state support in IPR despite some resentment from the farm sector, which otherwise enjoys high 
net production subsidies.250 In Argentina, the government compensates the farm sector for heavy 
taxation of agriculture by keeping weak IPR rules over agricultural inputs despite TNC pressure. 
In Brazil, in response to tight IPR rules that come about mostly due to TNC pressure, public 
research and development in inputs is promoted far more extensively than in Argentina. 
 
Conclusion: Assessing Epistemic Coalition Input 
Brazil has had a contested policy regime. The contestation over biosafety legislation, 
which lasted roughly from 1998 to 2005-2007, occurred around an axis where consumer rights, 
environmental, and landless peasant movements were on one side, together with public 
institutions (such as the ministries of Environment and Health) to which they enjoyed greater 
access; and on the other side were commercially-oriented farmers (especially of soy, especially 
from Southern Brazil) and the biotech industry, supported by favorable public institutions (such 
as the Ministry of Agriculture); with scientific experts and their institutions (such as 
EMBRAPA) playing a pivotal role and increasingly siding with the latter. The opposition 
enlisted some members of the agricultural research and development community; and 
respectable scientists disagreed over whether initial GM approval tests were made too hastily. 
Initially the opposition managed to put a halt on approvals and generated doubts about whether 
                                                 
250 142 patent infringement suits against 410 farmers and 56 small businesses in more than 27 US states; in which 
the firm has won more than $23 millions from its targets, are reported in “Monsanto vs. U.S. Farmers,” a report by 
the Center for Food Safety, 2005, available at 
http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/files/cfsmonsantovsfarmerreport11305.pdf, last accessed December 2015. In 
2009, the US Department of Justice began investigating whether the company's activities in the soybean seed 
markets were breaking anti-trust rules. In November 2012 Monsanto announced that it had received official 
notification that the inquiry was closed without any enforcement action. See “Monsanto Notified that U.S. 
Department of Justice Has Concluded Its Inquiry,” Monsanto, 
http://www.monsanto.com/newsviews/pages/monsanto-notified-that-us-department-of-justice-has-concluded-its-
inquiry.aspx, last accessed December 2015. 
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Brazil would ever allow GM crop cultivation. However, the pressure from agricultural producers 
put the liberalization of GMOs on the agenda, and the support of influential scientists, such as 
Walter Colli, Mauricio Antonio Lopes, Ernesto Paterniani, was a necessary ingredient to move it 
forward. The result was a change in the views about the desirability of GM crop cultivation held 
at the top echelons of the government, such that agricultural production agenda practically 
defeated the agenda associated most strongly with the ministry of environment. Both the way the 
opposition became influential, and the way it was defeated are characterized by epistemic 
coalition-type ideational struggle around the policy choice. 
During this time, there was little evidence of dialogue and idea exchange between the 
farmers and the opposition. Once the biosafety contestation was resolved largely in favor of 
GMOs, the opposition became increasingly irrelevant to policy, and farmers found themselves 
alone in their disagreements over IPR relating to the seeds provided by the biotech TNCs. Under 
the supposedly left-wing PT government, “state autonomy” was realized against the greater part 
of the public, and PT’s own base, who opposed GMOs; but not against the TNC, who asked for 
and got strict IPR. A system of royalty collection on grain delivery that started to work despite 
the farmers’ opposition returned technology rents to the TNC. As a result, while the technology 
seems to be working well agronomically, impact studies can barely document net profit 
improvement for the farmers from the adoption of GM seeds (da Silveira and de Carvalho 
Borges 2007). Had there been a different kind of epistemic coalition, centering on an opposition 
to the property claims associated with the technology and generating public mobilization for that 
purpose, government reaction to the TNC IPR enforcement maneuvers, and the economic impact 
of the technology for the farmers, could have been different. 
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The case of Brazil, where there was a robust, active, confrontational anti-GMO 
mobilization among consumer NGOs, shows clearly the limits of what an opposition to GMOs 
can achieve in the presence of a strong domestic producer sector. This leads to the conclusion 
that a frontal campaign against the GMOs is likely to be doomed to irrelevance where the 
domestic producers are strong because the stars are then aligned for permissive policies as two 
favorable stakeholders meet. The case of Brazil also shows the limits of what the domestic 
producers can do vis-a-vis the biotech TNC in the absence of supportive epistemic brokers and 
allies. 
The next chapter examines the case of Turkey where civil society mobilization similar to 
the one observed in Brazil launched a confrontational anti-GMO campaign, and in the absence of 
a well-organized producer sector in favor of the adoption of the new technology, managed to get 
GM crop cultivation banned. 
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CHAPTER VI 
THE CASE OF TURKEY 
 
Introduction 
The regulation of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) entered Turkey’s public 
agenda in the late 1990s and, after a decade of stalemate between competing pressure groups 
amidst intense public debate, it ended up being resolved with complete prohibition of GM crop 
cultivation in Turkish territory by the 2010 Biosecurity Law. The Minister of Agriculture Mehdi 
Eker describes the outcome: “We have banned GM farming by law. We are conservative and not 
liberal on this question. Because Turkey’s ecology, geography, agri-strategic value requires 
that”.251 Why did Eker’s pro-business government, while adopting “liberal” regulations on many 
other economic questions, choose to block GM farming categorically? What processes led the 
government to decide that Turkey’s said qualities required such an extreme—compared to 
policies elsewhere, even most countries within the neighboring European Union (EU)—
measure?  
The outcome is intellectually puzzling. In previous decades, Turkey had been one of the 
major adopters of the Green Revolution seed varieties. When it came to GM seeds, there were 
economic interests to be served by a permissive regulatory regime. Turkey is one of the world’s 
top cotton producers and one of the top importers too, due to high demand from its large textile 
and clothing industry. The UNDP and WB expert Fukuda-Parr (2007) expresses surprise that 
Turkey did not adopt large-scale GM cotton farming despite the large potential productivity 
gains. The country is also an important producer of corn and struggles to attain self-sufficiency 
                                                 
251 Bakan Eker: ‘GDO’da Muhafazakarız.’ Haberler. January 11, 2012. http://www.haberler.com/gdo-da-
muhafazakariz-3259828-haberi/  
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in that crop. Seeing the potential market, transnational biotech corporations (TNCs) approached 
Turkish authorities for field trials of GM cotton and corn varieties in 1998. As will be discussed 
in detail below, the major association of industrially oriented farmers expressed interest in these 
varieties and opined that they could be a viable option. The agrifood industry similarly opposed 
strict restrictions regarding what kind of ingredients they would be allowed to use. The US 
embassy actively lobbied for a permissive regime. In the end, however, these actors saw defeat. 
Why did the statesmen become convinced that the public interest laid elsewhere? When the 
rather prohibitive Biosecurity Law was voted in the Parliament, the only opposition was on the 
grounds that the law was too lax. How come?  
Let us dispel two possible explanations of Turkey’s prohibition of GM farming that may 
immediately come to mind. First, is it somehow because Turkish society is predominantly 
Muslim? In fact, despite that an Islamic anti-GMO movement (gathered around the NGO Gıda 
Güvenliği Hareketi) has existed in Turkey, arguing that GMOs are the devil’s work and their 
consumption is religiously forbidden; such opposition emerged rather late, after the tone of the 
policy debate had already been set up through years of activism by a left-leaning, secular 
movement. Besides, the anti-GMO argument of this particular Islamist group is far from being a 
universally recognized imperative of Islam in or outside Turkey.252 Other Muslim countries like 
Egypt and Iran, where religious considerations normally carry much greater weight in public 
decision-making than in Turkey’s secular polity, have been permissive to GM farming, even 
experimenting with ambitious programs for R&D in this area.253 In any case, archival research 
and elite interviews demonstrate that religious justifications played only a minor role in policy 
                                                 
252 Worldwide, scholars of Muslim creed and jurisprudence are as much divided among themselves as those of other 
monotheistic religions, and prestigious institutions like the International Islamic Fiqh Academy hold that there are 
no rules within Islam against genetic engineering (Omobowale et al 2009).  
253 See annual ISAAA (International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech Applications) briefs. 
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debates over the GMOs in Turkey.254 In short, it is not clear that Islam would require Turkey to 
ban GM farming, nor did the government ban GM farming because of such a belief.  
A second line of thinking could center on the influence of the GMO-skeptic Europe. Was 
Turkey’s prohibitive regime caused by its EU membership prospects? We have to qualify the 
answer and note three facts in this regard. First, even though enthusiasm for EU accession 
influenced policy-making in Turkey in the early 2000s, it soon became clear that membership 
would not become a serious prospect until the day the diplomatic-military conflict over Cyprus 
would end, and faced with such unlikely odds the Turkish government put the harmonization of 
Turkish law with EU norms in the back burner by the mid-decade. Had the process continued in 
full force, conformity over the regulation of the GMOs would be the least of their concerns, 
given many other higher-profile political issues awaiting resolution. If the Turkish regulations 
ended up taking the European framework as a model to some extent, this should be understood 
not as the working of an international constraint but as a product of choice—a choice not 
repeated for many other issue areas that would actually matter more for EU membership 
prospects.255 Furthermore, even though some European countries have maintained a national 
moratorium against GM cultivation in their territory, this was not required by EU law; and 
farmers in countries like Spain, Poland and Germany have been growing GM crops. When 
European observers attended the study groups for drafting Turkey’s biosafety law, they noted 
that it was going to a direction too stringent.256 Thirdly, however, Europe influenced Turkey in 
                                                 
254 In addition, Veltri and Suerdem’s (2011) formal content analysis of Turkish newspaper articles on the GMO 
debate demonstrates that Islam as a worldview was associated with two different representative frames, one 
weighing benefits and risks against each other and arguing for a mild precautionary stance justified with religious 
prudency, and the other viewing the GMOs, among other things, as part of a Jewish conspiracy to capture the 
world’s food sources. 
255 See Cengiz and Hoffman (2014) for a scholarly update on EU-Turkey relations. 
256 See opinions by Rodolphe de Borchgrave, a market analyst who had participated in auditing EFSA, and Dr. Piet 
van der Meer, a biologist who had served EU and member governments in the capacity of consultant, expressed in a 
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the sense that the anti-GMO opposition built on ideas and advocacy strategies used earlier by the 
European opposition groups in constructing their influential narrative, in which, interestingly, the 
EU institutions did not fare favorably. European and Turkish opposition groups alike have 
viewed EFSA (EU agency responsible for GMO monitoring) as the biotechnology TNCs’ 
“puppet” for being too permissive.257 In short, the EU would not require Turkey to ban GM 
farming, nor did the government have to care much about what the EU would require. The 
influence over Turkish policy-making came not so much from the EU institutions themselves as 
from an EU-skeptic European public.  
Therefore neither Islam nor Europe determined Turkey’s choice. This chapter 
demonstrates that Turkey’s prohibition of GM farming (and its rather restrictive regime of 
approvals for GMOs at large) was the outcome of an ideational battle over how GM seeds work, 
what they are good for, and why they may or may not be needed. The majority of the farm 
sector, consisting of small producers that are weak and dependent on State for their organization, 
never articulated a clear view over the GM crops, even though they became the protagonists of 
narratives told by other, urban-based groups. A concern for preserving biological diversity made 
statesmen and domestic scientists skeptic towards the potential gains from the GM crops. It was 
feared that GM seeds would make Turkish farmers dependent on transnational biotechnology 
corporations (TNCs) for seed supply through biological and/or intellectual property rights (IPR) 
restrictions. These concerns were joined by popular fears over the food safety risks from GM 
food, addressed masterfully by an epistemic coalition of activists that constructed a 
                                                                                                                                                             
January 2010 workshop organized by the Federation of Food Industry Associations in Ankara, available in print as 
GDO Gerçeği: Gıda Sanayisinde Biyoteknoloji—Ulusal Biyogüvenlik Yasası Tasarısı Çalıştayı Notları. Ankara, 
2010. 
257 Baykan (2012) analyses the connections between the European and Turkish anti-GMO groups. The subject will 
be taken in greater detail below. 
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comprehensive anti-GMO narrative that tapped on social norms, ideology and selective scientific 
evidence. The narrative became a causal factor in the making of policy in part because the 
statesmen were convinced by its truth, and in part because the narrative held an important sway 
among the public, pushing the statesmen to send a clear message by taking extreme measures.  
In this chapter I trace the process leading to the emergence of Turkey’s particular policy 
regime, based on data from archival research (official documents and their drafts, position papers 
by industry associations, publications by the NGOs, US embassy cables, newspapers) and elite 
interviews (with politicians and bureaucrats, industry spokespeople from agrifood, farming, and 
seed sectors, activists and scientists) conducted in Turkish over the course of 2011-2014. 
  
Introducing GM Crops: Bureaucrats, Experts and the Civil Society 
Initial Reception by the Bureaucracy 
In 1998, Mehmet Uyanık was heading the Department for Seed Affairs at the Ministry of 
Agriculture when an American company presented a dossier for importing a GM corn seed 
variety. At the time, the country had no public regulations regarding the production and 
consumption of GMOs.258 Agricultural scientists and practitioners had little familiarity with 
them. Basic science in biotechnology was still at an infant stage. When Turkish Academy of 
Scientific and Technological Research (TÜBİTAK), upon its establishment in 1982, prepared a 
twenty-year vision for the country’s science policy for the 1983-2003 period, biotechnology was 
not among the highlighted priority areas. Advanced research in biotechnology, starting with the 
                                                 
258 Author’s interview with Mehmet Uyanık (July 2012, Ankara). For conventional seeds, Turkey typically required 
performance tests to one year, allowed companies to submit data from their own tests, and readily approved almost 
all varieties proposed for registration (Gisselquist et al 2002). 
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establishment of the Middle Eastern Technical University’s multidisciplinary institute in 1989, 
was far from generating a robust research output yet.259  
Given the relatively low degree of scientific capacity overall, it was not surprising that 
the state bureaucracy’s knowledge regarding the GM crops was rather thin. The Ministry of 
Environment saw it fit to leave GMO regulation to the Ministry of Agriculture, and within 
Agriculture, the Directorate-General of Agricultural Research (Tarımsal Araştırmalar Genel 
Müdürlüğü, TAGEM) was considered to be the appropriate address to handle the issue, partly 
because TAGEM was Turkey’s national focal point for the UN Convention on Biological 
Diversity and the ongoing talks for the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety.260 This decision proved 
to be fateful, as the TAGEM bureaucrat Vehbi Eser (PhD, plant-breeding) would assume in time 
a defining role in Turkey’s response to GM crops, not so much due to the official weight of his 
position as a mid-level bureaucrat, which was quite limited; but due to knowledge he held in a 
rather esoteric subject and the self-confident and pro-active manner in which he asserted his 
knowledge in conversations with his interlocutors inside and outside the state bureaucracy.261 
The Embassy of the decisively pro-GMO USA would later describe Eser’s role in striking terms: 
“Unfortunately, Turkey's official expertise in the sector appears to be limited to one key 
individual—the Head of Dept of the Biotechnology Group at TAGEM—who has controlled the 
direction and restrictive nature of the legislation and is expected to angle for the position of head 
                                                 
259 Haspolat (2004). 
260 Bureaucrat Ercan Velioğlu’s comments in a workshop organized by the Ekoloji Kolektifi, the proceedings of 
which were later published as Görünmez Elin Ekolojisi (Ankara, 2009). Supportive information comes from my 
interviews at the Ministry of Agriculture (2011-2012, Ankara). 
261 Author’s interviews with statesmen, industry and farmer representatives, and NGOs, (2011-13, Ankara and 
Istanbul). 
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of the new biotechnology agency”.262 Dr. Eser has held a deeply skeptical view of GM crops’ 
environmental impact as well as the motives of the TNCs that develop these varieties, and he 
admits that participation in Cartagena meetings was very influential in his view of the subject: 
“We learned a lot there”.263  
That information about the GMOs within the agricultural bureaucracy was limited, and 
that the available information was concentrated at a unit highly influenced by the Cartagena 
Protocol’s biodiversity-oriented framing of the issue provided the GM crops an unwelcoming 
policy environment from the start. The non-cooperative relations between the TNCs and the mid-
level bureaucracy made it difficult for the TNCs to communicate their vision and form an 
alliance with the farmers. A crucial case in point is the predicament of GM crop field trials. 
Finding the GM seed case on its desk, TAGEM decided that special field trials would be 
undertaken for GM seed varieties to see how they would perform in Turkey’s ecosystems before 
a full approval procedure could be formulated.264 Permissions were granted, to be carried out 
during 1998-2000, to the American firms Monsanto and Pioneer Hi-Bred for field trials of three 
crops—cotton, corn, and potato, genetically modified to express herbicide- or insect-resistance.  
One strategy of the biotechnology TNCs worldwide has been to communicate promising 
results from GM seed field trials to the farming community and thus generate local demand for 
the seeds in order to exert public pressure in favor of permissive policies. (TNCs have even been 
accused of staging faits accomplis whereby illegally distributed GM seeds gain widespread use 
before any regulations are officially adopted). In Turkey, the results of field trials have never 
reached the public, and their outcome remains a mystery in the agricultural community. The 
                                                 
262 US Ankara Embassy cable (ref: 05Ankara 862) to Washington DC, dated February 5, 2005, last accessed at 
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/02/05ANKARA862.html in July 2014. 
263 Author’s interview with Vehbi Eser (August 2012, Ankara). 
264 Haspolat (2004). 
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common understanding is that the Ministry of Agriculture withheld the results and never 
publicized them; but various actors impute different reasons for this. Anti-GMO activists like 
Ahmet Atalık from the Chamber of Agricultural Engineers believe that the Ministry shared the 
companies’ desire for positive results but that the trials demonstrated the failure of the GM 
varieties, so together they opted for secrecy.265 The author’s interviews, however, point to a very 
different picture: relations between the TNCs and the Ministry (especially TAGEM) are marked 
by mutual suspicion. Monsanto wanted to turn the trials into a public event and invite high-level 
bureaucrats including the Minister of Agriculture Hüsnü Yusuf Gökalp (PhD, agronomist) 
himself, in addition to representatives from the influential Adana Farmers’ Union. Apparently 
they were prevented from doing so due to lack of cooperation by TAGEM, which was officially 
responsible for the trials and which wanted to keep the GM seed issue under its bailiwick. 
Bureaucratic sources, on the other hand, assert that the results were not disclosed because the 
companies breached certain terms of the agreement in their conduct relating to the trials.266  
Pro-GM advocates furthermore claim that the seeds performed rather well in trials. Aktas 
and Yurdakul (2005), in a working paper that seems to have gone unnoticed in public debates, 
cite some results on trials for Bt corn in Çukurova.267 These results indicate that the GM seeds 
were associated with yield increases (due to reduced damage by pests) of around 30-35% 
compared to non-GM high-yield hybrid seeds. The projected impact on farmer’s gross profit 
would be uncertain, though: if increased production translated to lower commodity prices by 
around 30%, farmer profits would actually decline under the price differentials assumed for the 
                                                 
265 Quoted in Baykan (2012: 191). Supportive information comes from my interview with Ahmet Atalık (Ankara, 
August 2011). 
266 Author’s interviews. Note that, fearful of the unauthorized release of GM varieties, Ministry of Environment 
issued a communiqué in June 1999 asking governors to inspect the production and sale of unregistered seeds. 
267 The authors report the source of the results as “Şen et al (2002), cited in Koç (2003)”. 
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expensive GM seeds. These trial results, if correct, encapsulated the policy conundrum faced by 
the policy maker concerned with national economic interests. The technology promised 
productivity increases, but whether Turkish farmers could reap economic benefits from it would 
depend on the monopolistic/oligopolistic pricing strategies of the technology supplying TNCs.   
As TAGEM bureaucrats were ambivalent about the results, advice was sought at a higher 
level. In late 1999, the State Planning Organization formed a special expert committee to discuss 
the available information and develop a national policy for biotechnology and biosecurity, in 
order to provide input for Turkey’s 8th Five-Year Development Plan. The report is worth looking 
at in some detail, as it is a striking attempt by the state to solicit expert consensus on the matter 
viewed comprehensively as a policy question.268  
 
The Official Experts 
The committee’s final report, co-written by more than a dozen participants and reflecting 
the diversity in their opinions, is marked with an ambivalence in its framing of genetic 
engineering applications, torn between viewing them as inherently perilous and arguing for a 
blockade on the one hand, and promoting national capabilities in this potentially strategic area to 
preempt foreign monopoly, on the other. The report states that “GMOs’ impacts on the 
environment and human health cannot be determined with scientific precision yet and debate 
continues over the existence and the magnitude of the associated risks. However, instead of 
waiting for these debates to come to conclusion and uncertainty to disappear, [we] recognize the 
need for accepting the Precautionary Principle and already setting up the normative framework 
accordingly” (p, 29). At the same time, and somewhat in contradiction with the report’s highly 
                                                 
268 Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı, Sekizinci Beş Yıllık Kalkınma Planı Biyoteknoloji ve Biyogüvenlik Özel İhtisas 
Komisyonu Raporu, Ankara, 2000. 
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suspicious framing of the virtues of GMOs, it is predicted that genetic engineering applications 
in agriculture will continue to grow in importance, and Turkey too should launch an initiative for 
scientific progress and industrial growth in this area, making it a priority area before and over 
pharmaceutical biotechnology. Misgivings about foreign corporate control over the technology is 
the dominant sentiment running through the report, so much so that, in an opinion appended to 
the report, chemical scientists Tunçer Özdamar and Pınar Çalık criticize the selection of 
agricultural biotechnology as a priority area for public research not least because “the words 
‘priority area,’ being reminiscent of the propaganda language used by foreign corporations, is ill-
suited to the spirit of this report,” p. 56). 
The State Planning Organization’s expert panel, then, displayed a conviction that there 
was high scientific uncertainty regarding the virtues of the technology, that foreign ownership 
made the uncertainty all the more ominous; and that Turkey should nevertheless invest in this 
area to attain national capabilities. Perhaps some of the participants thought that TNCs were not 
to be trusted for all the relevant information regarding the risks associated with the products they 
were marketing, but access to information would be easier when the products can be developed 
domestically—added by the confidence that public biosafety monitoring capacity would improve 
enough by the time when such domestic production capacity was reached. Maybe others had a 
purely nationalist bias hidden behind the risk discourse: Public health and biodiversity risks were 
of significance only when there were no organized domestic interests marketing the products 
generating the risk. (Both ways of thinking would ultimately influence policy: arguments by the 
MPs participating in the Parliamentary debate for the Biosafety Law draft show as much, as will 
be seen below). In any case, TNC control through IPRs, by magnifying the fears associated with 
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scientific uncertainty, made permission for the GM crops a non-attractive option for the time 
being.  
Consequently, Turkey abandoned GM crop field trials, and public decisions regarding the 
matter were postponed until the making of a comprehensive law on biosafety. Work on such a 
law began in September 2002 under the auspices of the UN Environmental Program Global 
Environmental Facility’s (UNEP-GEF) biosafety program and a team at TAGEM, again, was in 
charge of the effort. EU regulations were taken as a source of ideas, although there was no 
obligation to model Turkey’s regulations after the European model.269 By 2004, the project 
resulted in a law draft that was circulated for discussion within the government.270 The draft—a 
detailed 80 articles laid out in 23 pages excluding the appendices—marked a regulatory approach 
that was obviously precautionary. “Zones of genetic diversity” would be established and GM 
cultivation would not be allowed close to these zones as well as close to areas devoted to organic 
agriculture. Those who applied for approval of GMOs for either cultivation or consumption 
(read, firms marketing them) would be responsible for any harm to consumers and the 
environment that resulted because of the defects of the organism, “including defects that were 
not noticed with the extant knowledge and technology at the time of commercialization;” and the 
burden of proof for harm was defined in a loose manner.271  
The text thus laid down many reservations about GM crop cultivation but, crucially, did 
not yet categorically ban it. It should be fair to count this draft, prepared with little input from the 
NGOs,272 as a reflection of the autonomous preferences of the small bureaucratic circle that 
                                                 
269 Arzu Önal and Birgül Güner from the core bureaucratic team preparing the draft make this point clear (author’s 
interviews, August 2011 and July 2012, Ankara). 
270 2004 draft, titled Ulusal Biyogüvenlik Kanun Taslağı, obtained from TAGEM.  
271 See articles 36 and 33(e). 
272 For a list of organizations participating in the workshops see the document described above. 
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disproportionately controlled knowledge over the matter at this early stage, before the issue 
became a matter of public debate.  
 
Enter Civil Society 
Turkey’s agricultural bureaucracy thus proved a difficult partner for the biotechnology 
TNCs. Soon, the regulatory process saw engagement from a combative civil society platform, 
and this further intensified the resistance to the GMOs and locked Turkey’s policy regime into a 
prohibitive path.  
Up until 2004, there was no indication that the larger public had heard of the GMOs. A 
few alarming articles appeared in small environmental magazines. Ecology-minded activists 
interested in the local and organic food movement were organizing workshops to share 
information among themselves, and by the turn of 2004 they decided to launch a movement 
dedicated to the GMOs. Among them, Arca Atay, Levent Gürsel and Mebruke Mayram penned a 
manifesto and started to invite NGOs to take part in a No-To-GMO Platform.273 Describing GM 
cultivation as a totalitarian technique that destroys all other (ecological, etc.) forms of 
agriculture, the manifesto called for the prohibition of GM seeds.274 
Although motivated by a political vision that characterized GMOs as an instrument for 
the undesirable expansion of the corporate industrial-agricultural complex, the Platform activists 
recognized the need to engage with the scientific arguments for and against this technology. 
Levent Gürsel Alev, one of the initiators of the movement, says “The scientists who talk to the 
                                                 
273 The founding of the No-To-GMO Platform and the progression of their activities is narrated in Baykan (2012). 
Supportive information comes from the author’s interviews with Fevzi Özlüer from Ekoloji Kolektifi (Ankara, 
August 2011), Uygar Özesmi from Greenpeace Mediterranean (İstanbul, August 2011), Ahmet Atalık from the 
Chamber of Agricultural Engineers (Istanbul, August 2011). 
274 The “Yaşam Patentlenemez” declaration is available at http://bianet.org/english/print/41053, posted August 21, 
2004. Also see http://www.greenpeace.org/turkey/tr/news/gdo-ya-hay-r-platformu-kuruldu/    
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media claim that the GMOs are not proved harmful for the health [sic]. We want to know what is 
[actually] going on in order to refute this argument”.275 Expert knowledge would be required and 
the activists formed three committees in the areas of science, health, and law to scan the 
technical literature on these matters—their efforts would culminate in the organization of a 
national conference in 2008.276 Scientific research on the particular characteristics of Turkey’s 
plant biodiversity or population epidemiology (like the idea that resistance to the Kanamycin 
class antibiotics, a possible side-effect of the consumption of GMOs by humans, would be a 
particularly serious problem for Turks because of greater incidence of tuberculosis in among 
their number) have been cited in order to argue for a precautionary regime. The joining of the 
influential Chamber of Agricultural Engineers in 2005 was important in giving the Platform 
access to greater expertise. The Chamber’s chairman Gökhan Günaydın (PhD in economics, with 
prior training as agronomist) would later launch a career as a politician partly building on his 
vocal stance on the GMO debate and related environmental and food safety issues. 
The Platform was homegrown but transnational sources helped shaped its experience 
both through ideational inspiration and, to a lesser extent, organizational support. The impetus 
for action that gave the Platform publicity in Turkey came when the transnational environmental 
organization Friends of Earth (FoE), in anticipation that the USA would turn the EU’s ongoing 
moratorium on the GMOs to a trade dispute at the WTO, launched a “Bite Back” campaign to 
publicize arguments against the GMOs and shift the ground for debate. As part of the campaign 
the FoE would tour Europe with a giant “monster tomato” balloon (referring to the GM Flavr 
Savr tomatoes marketed in the USA). Turkey was not included in the plan, until Turkish activists 
noticed it and wanted to stage their own version. The initial point of contact came in March 2004 
                                                 
275 Interview with Levent Gürsel Alev, quoted in Baykan (2012). 
276 Ekoloji Kolektifi, Görünmez Elin Ekolojisi (Ankara, 2009). 
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when a Turkish environmentalist group attended meetings with the FoE during a visit to 
Brussels. When they returned to Turkey, the Platform decided to work on a monster tomato tour 
in Turkey.277 
The “monster tomato” toured Turkey during September and October 2004. The campaign 
received media attention and provided the context to insert food scientist Candan Gurakan’s 
research documenting transgenes in tomatoes and corn sold in the country. The finding was 
framed in national news with the titles “Frankenstein food” and “poison”;278 and a public outcry 
ensued. When the Platform’s tour ended with a concert in the capital of the nation, the Minister 
of Agriculture Sami Eken felt the need to meet the activists at the demonstration site and give an 
appeasing talk. The campaign was concluded with a demand for broader public discussion for 
the biosafety regulatory framework in the Parliament. The Parliament would respond by calling a 
public hearing in March 2005.  
In the meantime, however, the mainstream media’s attention gave the Platform’s views 
exposure to a degree that they probably had not expected. While this was good news for the 
cause, a certain shift in focus also occurred. The initial ecological, anti-capitalist orientation of 
the core members of the Platform faded into the background in the reception of the message, as 
the public was much more interested in a possible food scare.279 Popular soccer commentator 
Erman Toroğlu was heard pontificating on the perils of the GMOs amid his warnings that 
vegetables with growth hormones could (undesirably) lead to homosexuality. (Thanks to his 
popularity and past work as groceries wholesaler Toroğlu also found a seat in the Parliament’s 
                                                 
277 Baykan (2012). 
278 Hülya Ünlü, Akşam, October 21, 2004.  
279 Fevzi Özlüer from the Ecology Collective, an early initiator of the Platform stresses this point. Author’s 
interview. 
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public hearing).280 The monster tomato image, and popular commentary handled carelessly by 
the mainstream media led to widespread public fear about GM vegetables—although in fact 
GMOs are much more relevant to field crops like cotton, corn and soy. With vegetable sales 
collapsing, and growers burning the maquettes of Erman Toroğlu in protest;281 farm and agrifood 
interests found themselves having to form opinions regarding the GMO debate and weigh in on 
the regulatory process to protect their interests. 
 
What About Producer Interests? 
Agrifood Industry: Reluctant Lobbyists 
Providing more than a tenth of the country’s industrial output and employment, Turkey’s 
agrifood industry (processors who handle agricultural commodities and process them into food 
and feed) is large and thriving. The sector’s political representation is handled by the Federation 
Of Food And Drink Industry Associations Of Turkey (TGDF),282 led by a small number of large 
firms, including the American Cargill. How did the sector position itself vis-à-vis the GMO 
debate? 
Biotechnology TNCs expected the agrifood industry to help push for a more permissive 
regime. Hamit Esin, Monsanto’s regulatory manager in Turkey recalls, “During the 1998-2003 
period Monsanto became infamous in Europe for going aggressively and all alone against the 
public. We in Turkey did not want to face the same predicament and sought to form a broader 
coalition”.283 The agrifood industry could be a natural ally because a restrictive regime 
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encompassing the production and consumption of the GMOs would mean not only lost business 
opportunities in the seed market but also difficulties in supply chain management for food and 
feed processors. To Monsanto it was obvious from the work being done at the Ministry of 
Agriculture’s TAGEM unit that such a regime was in the making, and they tried to mobilize the 
agrifood industry, especially poultry interests (which relied on imported soy and corn for feed) to 
pay attention to the regulatory process. There was not much response, however. The industry’s 
regular point of contact at the Ministry was the Directorate-General of Protection and Control 
(Koruma ve Kontrol Genel Müdürlüğü) overviewing issues of food safety and imports; and 
seeing little action there, they did not want to disturb the status quo, which was just fine with no 
regulations on the matter and no public attention. 
However, the status quo was not as safe as they assumed. In 2000, after the 
Biotechnology Expert Committee’s report discussed above, the Ministry of Agriculture not only 
discontinued the field trials but also began writing a decree that would demand GMO-free 
certificates for all food and feed imports to Turkey. “Unawares of the complexities of identity 
preservation of non-GM ingredients; the Ministry folks thought that this was just an ordinary 
certificate, whereas it would actually raise the costs of imports dramatically,” Esin comments.284 
When this regulation was heard of, the feed industry panicked and called for a close-doors 
meeting with the participation of scientists, and thus convinced the Ministry bureaucrats that it 
would not be feasible to implement the regulation as intended. The US Embassy observes that 
the industry became much more engaged with the regulation process afterwards. One thing they 
fought for was ending TAGEM’s monopoly on the issue and getting the Directorate-General of 
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Protection and Control to develop expertise and acclaim a greater role.285 (The Embassy itself 
would become actively involved to make sure that GMO regulations would not prejudice imports 
from the USA). 
Once the No-To-GMO Platform started a public debate over the matter and calls for 
complete prohibition of GMOs were made, it was obvious that the industry had to take a high-
profile stance. In December 2004, responding to the Monster Tomato campaign, the TGDF 
organized a public conference for a discussion of the GMOs, and publicized the proceedings 
under the title “The GMO Truth.” In the preface to the publication, biotechnology scientist Selim 
Çetiner highlighted that the conference was held with the participation “not of the American 
firms that produce this technology but of qualified experts from EU countries where there is the 
greatest consumer reaction to this technology.” Çetiner was quick to note that contrary to 
widespread belief the EU regulations allowed production and consumption of the GMOs, and 
countries like Spain produced much of their corn in this way.286  
Food industry leader Rint Akyüz says, “Our conference delayed the finalization of the 
regulatory regime by five years because they [bureaucracy] realized that they did not know about 
the various dimensions of the issue. They did not know the costs entailed”.287 After some rounds 
of public consultation the government responded by shelving the law-making effort, probably 
waiting for the public attention to subside and the worldwide trends and international rules to 
materialize a bit more—the resolution of the trade dispute between the USA and the EU would 
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be particularly important.288 Public attention would never completely fade away, however; the 
activists were bent on ensuring that. In 2008, the No-To-GMO Platform started another 
campaign called “Food, Water, Seed are Rights, No to GMOs.” Again, it was the food safety 
aspect that caught greater attention and caused a public questioning of the delay in the making of 
a biosafety law. By this point, exclusively food safety-focused NGOs, such as the Europe-
inspired Slow Food Turkey (Fikir Sahibi Damaklar) or the Halal-oriented Food Safety 
Movement (Gıda Güvenliği Hareketi), and individuals such as Professor Kenan Demirkol 
(medical doctor), started to dominate public debates with their highly visible output.289 Surveys 
showed that a great majority of the public was aware of the GMOs (Tuna and Ozdemir 2009), 
and 64 percent would not buy such food if given the choice (Basaran et al 2004). 
After the campaign, a skirmish ensued along previously established lines. First, to 
appease the public the Ministry of Agriculture issued a decree banning the production and 
importation of all GMOs. Stakeholders from all sides protested, arguing that the issue required a 
proper law and not a hastily drawn-up bureaucratic decree, and the latter was repealed in courts. 
The agrifood industry organized another conference to provide input for the law to be made. 
In the end, with its lobbying efforts the agrifood industry managed to preempt the most 
undesirable parts of the regulatory bill, and maintain a case-by-case approval regime for the 
import of food and feed containing GMOs (while banning their cultivation in Turkey) when the 
Biosafety Law became official in 2010, but the design of the regime is far from making the 
industry happy. TGDF regularly complains about the rising input costs.290 An industry-sponsored 
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study estimates the cost of regulation at $1 billion.291 Although the anti-GMO activists seeking a 
complete ban on GM food imagine a state bureaucracy succumbing to the wishes of the food 
industry, what the latter has achieved is more fairly described as damage control. The industry 
had to fight an uphill battle to convince the public and the state bureaucracy in a debate started 
by the anti-GMO camp. As the US Embassy observes, “The affected industries [have been] late 
to act in lobbying the government for more rational [i.e. pro-GMO] legislation”.292  
Furthermore, the industry was only able to prevent the worst from their viewpoint in GM 
import approvals, and it did not provide the kind of support Monsanto hoped for a coalition to 
advocate the introduction of GM agricultural production in Turkey. Hüseyin Arslan, the CEO of 
the leading commodity trader Arbel, recalls that in the late 1990s “scientists from certain US and 
Canadian institutions contacted us to tell that they could help us [preparing] for GM production, 
and that this could benefit our firm. We opposed the idea because of complications that could 
arise in the future”.293 Reminding that the industry prefers to supply their ingredients from 
wherever it is cheaper, another industry leader explains that “We do not have specific interests 
relating to whether GM crops are grown in our country. Those who could actually have an 
interest, like the seed industry, have remained passive. When there is so much controversy over 
the matter, we are not going to stick our neck out”.294  
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292 US Ankara Embassy cable (ref: 04Ankara5980) to Washington DC, dated October 21, 2004, last accessed at 
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2004/10/04ANKARA5980.html in July 2014. 
293 Osman Arolat, GDO Tartışması ‘Kayan Gündeme’ Konu Olunca. Dünya. January 24, 2009. 
http://www.dunya.com/gdo-tartismasi-kayan-gundeme-konu-olunca-72555yy.htm. 
294 Author’s interview. 
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Domestic Seed Industry: Infant Industry Protection and Competing Visions 
But where did the domestic seed industry see its interest? And were their preferences 
influential on policy? Research reveals that what the domestic seed industry would gain and lose 
was indeed an important consideration for policy making, but their interest was understood to be 
competitive, instead of complementary, to that of the TNCs; as a result of interaction between 
the private firms and their interlocutors in the public bureaucracy. 
Turkey’s fledgling private industry has been growing with the state’s support. In the 
2000s the plant-breeding and seed industry received a push by the state (under the JDP 
government that would come to prohibit GM seeds), through regulations that opened way for 
fully capitalistic market relations in seed supply. In 2006, while the drafts of the Biosafety Law 
were being hotly debated, Turkey replaced its four decades-old Seed Law with a new one. 
Together with the Plant Breeder’s Rights Law adopted two years earlier, and the ratification of 
the UPOV 1991 Convention soon after, this amounted to a major change towards stricter IPRs. 
The laws make plant variety protection explicit, rule out the production and exchange of seeds 
that are not registered and certified, and they require seed trade to be practiced by authorized 
commercial agents only. Seed saving and exchange between farmers are exempt from these 
requirements if they remain for self-use purposes and magnitudes and do not become trade 
practice.295 So far, the state has used the carrot of subsidies instead of the stick of policing in 
order to encourage farmers to use certified seeds purchased from their proper authorized 
suppliers.296 Farmers are paid higher in support payments if they can document their use of 
certified seeds (in addition; production subsidies are allotted directly to the seed industry). In 
                                                 
295 For an evaluation of developments in seed market regulation see Dr. Süleyman Karahan, PANKOBİRLİK, Türk 
Tohumculuğu ve Tohumculuk Sistemleri, 2011. 
296 Also see Atalan-Helicke and Mansfield (2012: 137-38). 
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cotton, for example, the difference paid is 20 percent of the prim paid to the farmer, and this 
indirect subsidy of the seed industry received a domestic bias in 2012 when imported seeds were 
excluded from this practice.297 
Activists criticized these policies as steps in extinguishing local, ecologically sustainable 
farm practice to please corporate industrial interests. However, unlike in the case of the GMO 
regulation they were not able to influence policy; because both the domestic seed industry and 
the agricultural bureaucracy viewed the issue differently in this case: Corporate control over the 
farmer’s seed is not the same if it is practiced by the domestic industry, which would have no 
chance in developing GM varieties but which constitutes a formidable player in non-GM seeds 
for a number of crops including corn and cotton. 
The infant industry protection argument has indeed been voiced by the seed industry 
during the GMO debate. Chairman of the Turkish Association of Seed Industry (TÜRKTED) 
Mete Kömeağaç says, “unfortunately, Turkey is not ready for GMO technology… If we start to 
import GMOs before preparing ourselves technologically, we will be in the position of potential 
buyers, but if develop our own technology, we can sit at the negotiating table with better 
footing”.298 Industry leader Fahri Harmanşah explains nicely: “If the use of GM corn had been 
allowed in our country, [seeds of] domestic corn hybrids would lose out in competition. That is 
why our interests currently require a restriction … We should nonetheless prepare for the GM 
                                                 
297 Gümrük ve Ticaret Bakanlığı Kooperatifçilik Genel Müdürlüğü 2012 Yılı Pamuk Raporu. January 2013. See 
page 29. Also in 2012, new restrictions for seed importation were adopted. This is Turkish Seed Industry 
Association’s (TÜRKTED) interpretation of the Ministry of Agriculture’s regulation “Tohumculuk İthalatı 
Uygulama Genelgesi (2012/1).” Report obtained from TÜRKTED. 
298 “Experts Agree Turkey Needs a Bio-Security Law, But Clash Over Content,” Today’s Zaman, June 14, 2009, 
http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail.action;jsessionid=SeMSUh+GP0VVO04G7rtblUr+?newsId=177993&col
umnistId=0. 
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technology and develop the capacity to use them in the future … It is possible that the Bt 
varieties could be useful to Turkey’s agriculture”.299  
It is not clear if the industry leaders had held this view before GMO-skepticism was 
already influential on policy circles. The key bureaucrat behind the policy, Vehbi Eser, talks 
about having had to convince the industry that liberalization of GM seeds would not be in their 
interest.300 Also, support for the idea has not been universally shared across the industry—there 
are those who question the wisdom of pursuing nationalist protection in an age of globalization, 
or the odds that the national industry can learn to compete in modern biotechnology applications 
without first apprenticing to the TNCs.301 But it is certain that the bureaucracy and some of the 
industry leaders converged at one point on the idea that promotion of the domestic seed sector 
should be a public policy priority; and blocking GM seeds as a protectionist measure, at least 
temporarily, could help.  
Nonetheless, the industry was not able to foresee the extreme character the finalized law 
was going to take—pushed by the urge to appease the public outrage against the GMOs—and it 
was not altogether happy with the result. For example, the Biosafety Law established a zero 
tolerance policy towards the import of unapproved varieties of GMOs. This rule exposes seed 
firms importing research and breeding material to the risk of breaching the law because of 
adventitious presence of GM material, thus discouraging research activity. Sector leaders fear 
                                                 
299 Author’s interview with Fahri Harmanşah (August 2012, Ankara). Harmanşah is the manager and partner of 
Tasaco Seeds. He chairs the Association of Fertilizer Importers, is a board member at TÜRKTED and TSÜAB, and 
he formerly served at the Ministry of Agriculture. 
300 Author’s interview with Vehbi Eser. 
301 Especially see the publication by TÜRKTED, titled Türkiye Tohum Sektörü, dated May 2009, and available at 
http://www.turkted.org.tr/images/yayin_isf.pdf. Supportive information comes form the author’s interviews, see the 
previous footnotes in this section.  
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that because of such extreme restrictions the industry will start to lose ground, overturning the 
progress made over the last decades.302 
 
Farmers: The Silent Protagonists 
Farmers, while appearing as the protagonist of the narratives told by other actors, were 
the relatively silent stakeholder in the debate. Overall, farm sector, consisting mostly of small 
producers that are highly dependent on the state and with a low degree of institutionalization in 
their organization, has not been articulate in policy advocacy.  
The formally most representative farmer organization is the Turkish Union of Chambers 
of Agriculture (Türkiye Ziraat Odaları Birliği, TZOB). TZOB is a corporatist organization that 
was instituted by the state between 1958-63, and required by law to have a Chamber in every 
town and a delegate in every village in the country. The organizational weakness of the TZOB 
and its limited influence over agricultural policy is a matter of consensus in the literature on 
Turkish agrarian structure. Member dues, seen as a tax by most farmers, are paid infrequently, 
and it makes TZOB dependent on the state for financial resources.303 Interviewees across the 
pro- and anti-GMO divide concur in recalling that the TZOB as an organization had no concrete 
position on the GMOs and had almost no engagement with the policy debate. Zeki Ertugay 
(PhD, food science), a politician active in the making of policy, says, “In our agricultural sector, 
producer organization exists only in theory, not in practice. TZOB has been deficient in 
articulating the economic rights of the sector it is supposed to represent”.304 This evaluation was 
repeated with only slight variation in words by spokespeople from the state bureaucracy, non-
                                                 
302 Reported by the former Minister of Agriculture Sami Güçlü in an interview. “Bir yol açılması gerekiyordu biz o 
yolu açmaya çalıştık,” Tohum (4), January 2012.  
303 Inan et al (2005). 
304 Author’s phone interview with Zeki Ertugay, July 2012. 
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farm private sector, and the No-to-GMO Platform, even if they disagree over how the interest in 
question should be conceived. Observers note that the TZOB’s attention is too much focused on 
maintaining good relations with the governments and ensuring satisficing commodity support 
programs to be preoccupied with complex matters relating to productivity, technology and 
biodiversity.  
Other farm sector organizations, lacking a similar degree of geographical width and 
vertical penetration, are by definition associated with more special interests, although they may 
be much more cohesive. Founded in 1930s Adana Farmers’ Union (Adana Çiftçiler Birliği, 
AÇB) is the oldest among them and probably the most influential, deriving its importance from 
the Adana (Çukurova) region’s strategic place in Turkey’s economy. (Regularly supplying more 
than a quarter of all the country’s yearly corn and cotton and tightly integrated with 
manufacturing, Adana carries great weight in agricultural policy).305 AÇB has been described as 
the chief organization of big, commercially oriented farming in the country, and a representative 
of the collision of interests among agroindustry, big farm, and agrifood sectors.306 AÇB’s 
secretary Oana Çorat has been a rare voice by publicly questioning the idea that completely 
banning the GM seeds would be Turkey’s best choice, and arguing that Turkish cotton and corn 
farmers could definitely use help from GM (especially Bt) varieties. Çorat comments that AÇB 
took part in official meetings with the state bureaucracy to push for a more permissive regime, 
but ultimately proved unable to have sufficient influence, faced with a GMO-skeptic bureaucracy 
and vocal opposition from the NGOs.307 
                                                 
305 Güngör (2005). 
306 See, for example Sadettin İnan, “150 Bin Çiftçiyi Yok Sayan Çiftçi Birliği,” Milli Gazete, March 13, 2014. 
307 Author’s phone interview with Oana Çorat (June 2014). Çorat’s views were previously publicized by Gila 
Benmayor, “Adanalı Çiftçinin Derdi Türban Değil GDO,” Hürriyet, February 8, 2008. 
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It is telling that once the debate seemed to be lost for certainty and the 2010 law banned 
GM farming in Turkey, the AÇB had to shift the focus of its discourse and started criticizing the 
fact that while Turkish farmers cannot use GM seeds they nonetheless have to compete with 
commodity imports originating (and maybe gaining advantages) from such seeds, amounting to 
unfair competition.308 Cotton producers from the export-oriented Aegean region too went 
through a similar strategy readjustment. Although lamenting that the GM seed ban amounts to 
foregone cost reduction opportunities, they have sought to “turn this disadvantage into an 
advantage at the marketing stage,” the Chairman of the Izmir Commodity Exchange explains, by 
initiating a project for branding Turkish cotton and textiles as GM-free.309 This kind of 
repositioning should be seen as an indication that the regulatory regime is not a function of 
protectionist interests advocated by the farm sector, because it did not originate from their 
demands and they do not appreciate it as a protective shield.  
There are farm sector organizations that took an active stance supporting the No-To-
GMOs Platform, like the Confederation of Farmer Unions (Çiftçi-Sen). A left-wing organization 
that enlists with the transnational peasants coalition Via Campesina and seeks to advocate for 
small farmers’ interests, Çiftçi-Sen was formally created in 2008 and has since struggled to 
prove to courts its right to existence because Turkish law did not seem to have place for an 
independent farmers’ union besides the state-sponsored TZOB discussed above. Çiftçi-Sen’s 
public voice is largely confined to the activities of its leader Abdullah Aysu, who has been a 
vocal critique of neoliberal market reform in the agricultural sector. With regard to the 
commodification of the seed through certification requirements and so on, he writes that 
                                                 
308 Ibid.  
309 Interview with Barış Kocagöz, President of the National Cotton Council and The Izmir Commodity Exchange. 
“‘Made in Turkey’ Üstelik GDO’suz,” Radikal, December 15, 2010.  
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“[p]reventing the farmer from saving and using seeds derived from his own produce, i.e. the 
capture of the seed by corporations, means the capture of agriculture by corporations”.310 With 
regards to the GM seeds, Aysu argues that they are unable to reproduce; and because they oblige 
the farmer to purchase them anew yearly they reduce the farmers to highly dependent workers of 
the corporations, in addition to destroying biodiversity.311  
The last farm sector group that has to be considered is the organic and ecological 
producers. In the early 2000s, before the GMO issue became a topic of full-fledged public 
debate, commercially oriented organic producers organized themselves as the Association of the 
Producers and Industrialists of Organic Products (ORGÜDER) and started to apply pressure to 
try and receive public recognition and subsidies with the Organic Agriculture Law of 2004. 
Organic producers also started to propagate the idea, around the agricultural bureaucracy circles, 
that Turkey is uniquely well suited for organic production and its expansion should be actively 
encouraged by public policies and protected from threats to its survival. The policy makers came 
to interpret GMOs to be one such threat (which is not a straightforward conclusion—the US law, 
for example, allows GM contamination in certified organic products). Those stakeholders who 
complain about the overly restrictive regime on the production and consumption of the GMOs in 
Turkey are of the impression that promoting organic production was one of the motives behind 
the making of the regime.312 Vehbi Eser, the key bureaucrat behind the regulatory approach 
argued that being liberal on GMOs would contradict the promotion of organic products.313 In the 
                                                 
310 Aysu (2009). 
311 “Aysu ‘GDO’ların Adı Katır Tohumudur’,” Karasaban, June 17, 2009. http://www.karasaban.net/aysu-gdolarin-
adi-katir-tohumudur/  
312 Author’s interviews with Hamit Esin, Rint Akyüz.  
313 Athor’s interview with Vehbi Eser. 
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Parliamentary debate on the Biosafety Law, members of the Parliament argued that GMOs 
should be banned in order to promote Turkey’s brand value as an organic production site.314 
However, the organic producers themselves are hardly responsible for the anti-GMO 
discourse. The sector’s chief interest organization ORGÜDER’s chairman Şerif Sümerli notes 
that while public demand for organic products has increased together with the GMO scare, 
“GMOs are the tip of the iceberg… Not that I am an advocate of the GMOs but there are greater 
threats to food safety [from pesticides etc.] than the GMO threat”.315 ORGÜDER has tenuous 
connections with the No-To-GMO Platform, not enlisting as a member and joining hands with 
them only for events that have commercial promotional value such as organic agriculture fairs. 
Also, even if the organic producers had put their full weight on the debate, their economic 
significance would be far from ensuring their efficacy. Organic agriculture (officially recognized 
as such) is practiced on only 0.5 percent of Turkey’s agricultural land.316 Organic food represents 
less than 1 percent of all gross sales in food.317 In other words, if the promotion of organic 
products is one motive behind Turkey’s ban on GM farming, this hardly came by as a result of 
lobbying by interest groups invested in such production, because their current economic 
significance is small and evidence of lobbying is not clear. The motivation was instead created 
by a political vision, espoused by the policy makers, that organic production should attain greater 
significance in Turkey’s future and the idea that GM seeds would not have a place in that vision. 
 
 
                                                 
314 See remarks by the MPs Mehmet Serdaroğlu, Ramazan Kerim Özkan, Zeki Ertugay, Eşref Karaibrahim during 
the Parliamentary debate on the Biosafety Law, 17-18 March 2010, described in detail below. 
315 Interview with Şerif Ayhan Sümerli, “Orgüder Başkanı: GDO Buzdağının Görünen Kısmı,” 
http://www.organikturkiye.com.tr/2014/03/orguder-baskani-gdo-buzdaginin-gorunen-kismi/ 
316 Official figures for 2008, Karakoç and Baykan (2009). 
317 Figure provided by ORGÜDER chairman Sümerli, see the interview cited above.  
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The Lawmaker Decides 
The Turkish Parliament discussed the National Biosecurity Law on 17-18 March 2010, to 
decide on a regulatory regime for the cultivation and import of GM agricultural products. With 
regards to the import of GM products, it established a National Biosafety Council to grant 
approvals for use in food and feed. The Council would rely for its decisions on both a scientific 
assessment of public health and environmental risks, and a socioeconomic analysis of possible 
impacts on farmers and biological diversity; and grant approvals after determining “no risk” on 
these scores.318 This is a rather extreme formulation of the Precautionary Principle. With regards 
to the cultivation of GM crops it established a total ban, the breach of which would be punishable 
by a jail sentence of twelve years. This is clearly a radical statement, compared to policies in 
other countries. The official justification for the law delivered to the Parliament noted that with 
genetic engineering “plant varieties turn into products of technology and [therefore] become 
more expensive, and for some the need for renewing their seeds every year become a reality; 
leading to socioeconomic risks like increased possibility of harm to producers and consumers, 
threat to the survival of local [plant] species and varieties, and increased foreign dependency in 
agricultural production.” Asserting that Turkey is one of the world’s most important countries in 
terms of biodiversity, it puts forward the preservation of biodiversity a chief motivation for 
making the law. The justification cites the Cartagena Protocol and harmonization with the EU 
law as major considerations.319 
                                                 
318 The language of “no risk” is found in the Section 1 of the Article 3 of the Law. Since this makes as little sense in 
Turkish as it does in English—because arguably there is never no risk—the readers may refer to the more detailed 
Article 5 to better understand what the risk assessment is expected to demonstrate. In any case the expectations are 
demanding—not least because the approval is not confined to the scientific risk assessment and requires an 
evaluation of socioeconomic risks and benefits. See Law no 5977, published in the Official Gazette no 27533 on 
March 26, 2010. 
319 This text, as well as the other quotes and paraphrases from the Parliamentary discussion in this section rely on the 
minutes of the 74th and 75th General Assembly sessions of the 23rd Parliament, accessed at the official website, and 
translated by the author. See 
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Turkish parliamentary debates typically feature partisan brinkmanship in which the 
government and the opposition parties are locked into categorically opposing whatever argument 
that may come from the other side. On the GMO debate, however, the lines were much closer. 
As Vahap Seçer from the opposition Republican People’s Party (RPP), an agronomist by 
profession, put it on the floor, “It’s kind of funny that this draft is in part to our liking too, since 
it prohibits the production of GMOs.” In their support for the ban opposition MPs also drew on 
ideas associated with biodiversity preservation and paid even greater attention to IPR issues. 
Seçer explained that “the supply of GM seeds is under the monopoly of a handful of TNCs… 
Therefore, if we had liberalized the production of GMOs in our territory we would have been left 
at the mercy of this monopoly, and economic dependency would ensue”. Hüseyin Yıldız from 
RPP informed that “compared to conventional seeds, GM seeds are 25-100 percent more 
expensive and because they need to be renewed on a yearly basis small farmers will be affected 
negatively. That most innovations in modern biotechnology are protected by patents causes 
countries which do not produce but only utilize the technology to pay great sums.” 
The idea that GM seeds have to be renewed on a yearly basis, repeated again and again 
by the activists, was also a popular one in the parliamentary debate. In fact, in a narrow technical 
sense GM seeds are not different from other seeds in whether they have to be renewed on a 
yearly basis, as discussed earlier in this work. Hybrid seeds have to be purchased yearly, but they 
can be GM or non-GM. GM seeds of the GURT (pejoratively, “terminator”) type are unable to 
germinate and would have to be repurchased yearly but they are not in offer anywhere in the 
                                                                                                                                                             
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/tutanak_g_sd.birlesim_baslangic?P4=20603&P5=B&PAGE1=1&PAGE2=76 
for the 74th session and 
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/tutanak_g_sd.birlesim_baslangic?P4=20605&P5=B&PAGE1=1&PAGE2=60 
for the 75th. Print copies are found at Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi volume 64. 
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world. It is true that IPR can be exercised more strictly over GM seeds to prevent replanting, but 
this is to an important extent up to what the state institutions will legislate and execute.  
Turkish MPs, however, seemed to hold the erroneous belief that the need for 
repurchasing GM seeds yearly is a strict biological necessity. Gürol Ergin from RPP (PhD in 
agricultural engineering) opined that “[b]ecause of the terminator genes they carry, GM seeds 
have to be purchased from the supplying firm every year and they are 25 percent more expensive 
compared to non-GM seeds… Farmers will be harmed.” 
The erroneous belief caused confusion over how to fine-tune the law. A major point of 
dispute during the debate was whether it made sense to allow the transit passage of GM seed 
cargo through Turkish territory while keeping a ban on the cultivation of such seeds. Several 
MPs feared that GM seeds could be (accidentally) released to the environment during the 
passage and then germinate, contaminating conventional farms or wild plant populations. The 
fear, of course, would require the assumption that GM seeds are able to germinate, contrary to 
what many MPs believed; and several among the latter were the same ones who articulated the 
fear of contamination. Trying to add up these various concerns in an attack against the GMOs, 
Ramazan Kerim Özkan from RPP (veterinary physician) realized on the spot that he was 
contradicting himself and virtually started to mumble, ending his speech in unintelligible 
manner.320  
 In short, GMO-skepticism was the hegemonic attitude at the Parliament, shared by MPs 
from all convictions, although the attitude was built on highly imperfect knowledge over the 
matter. There was, nevertheless, also support for the idea that Turkey should not “miss the train” 
in this area of technological progress. The somewhat self-contradictory aspiration that had 
                                                 
320 See p. 97 in Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi volume 64, session 74, March 17, 2010. 
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marked the State Planning Organization’s expert panel a decade ago surfaced at the Parliament 
too, then: Adopting a precautionary stance towards the GMOs and preventing the biotech TNCs 
to establish control over seed production; while developing national capabilities in this area in 
the meanwhile in order to become commercially competitive in time and better oversee the risks.  
Yet, it was not clear what kind of legislation could enable such a strategy and the 
discussed draft would not do it. While the law would ban the cultivation of GM crops in Turkey; 
imports of GMOs would be legal, if under a demanding approval regime. Several MPs were 
aware that this opened doors to foreign commodities that Turkish farmers themselves would not 
be allowed to produce. Opposition MPs proposed an amendment that would also ban the import 
and consumption of GMOs but this was rejected. It was clear to the government that such a move 
would not only be opposed by the agrifood industry seeking cheaper ingredients but also put 
Turkey at the risk of facing retaliation from the USA and possible sanctions at the WTO.321 
Squeezed between the Scylla of GMO-skeptic ideas and a public excessively influenced by them, 
and the Charybdis of international constraints on the other, the government had found itself in a 
corner that was in clear contradiction with the protectionist ideal—with which many within its 
own agricultural bureaucracy sympathized. We have seen above that influential corn and cotton 
farmers have expressed similar complaints. 
Furthermore, given the high penalties for any accidental release to the environment, 
incentives for research in agricultural biotechnology were clearly being reduced. Mehmet Akif 
Paksoy (agronomist) from the Nationalist Action Party (NAP) described the outcome 
evocatively: “After passing this law, maybe it will be possible to protect our biological resources 
                                                 
321 Earlier, the US State Department had communicated to the Turkish government concerns about the potential of 
the draft biosafety law to hinder trade and violate Turkey’s WTO commitments, see US Ankara Embassy cable (ref: 
05Ankara 862) to Washington DC, dated February 5, 2005, last accessed at 
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/02/05ANKARA862.html in July 2014. Supportive information comes from the 
author’s interviews within the Ministry of Agriculture. 
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but it will be more difficult to develop new varieties using modern biotechnology. It will be more 
difficult for our universities and research institutes to bring in research material from abroad. The 
current draft neither creates additional funds for such institutes nor does it lay out regulations for 
organizing them in a new way.” 
 
Conclusion: Assessing Epistemic Coalition Input 
Turkey’s prohibition of GM farming (and its rather restrictive regime of approvals for 
GMOs at large) was the outcome of an ideational battle over what the GM crops are good for, 
and why they may (not) be needed. A concern for preserving biodiversity, coupled with the 
expectation that GM seeds would open the country’s plant genetic resources to biopiracy by the 
TNCs and make Turkish farmers dependent on these TNCs for seed supply made statesmen and 
domestic scientists skeptic towards the potential gains from the GM crops. These concerns were 
later joined by popular fears over the food safety risks from GM food, exploited masterfully by 
an epistemic coalition of activists that constructed a comprehensive anti-GMO narrative that 
tapped on social norms, ideology and selective scientific evidence. The narrative became a 
causal factor in the making of policy in part because the statesmen were convinced by its truth, 
and in part because the narrative held an important sway among the public, pushing the 
statesmen to send a clear message by taking extreme measures.  
Protest from economic stakeholders modified the outcome only to a certain extent, and 
instead of being the architects of policy they had to be the ones to readjust their position. Big, 
commercially-oriented farmers and the agrifood industry, having lost the ideational battle, have 
tried to turn Turkey’s “GM-free” identity into an advantage, although making clear that this 
would not be their first choice. The majority of the farm sector, consisting of small producers 
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that are weak and dependent on state for their organization, never articulated a clear view over 
the GM crops, even if they became the protagonists of narratives told by other, mainly urban-
based groups. The domestic seed industry is imagined by some to be the future beneficiary of the 
infant industry protection provided by the ban on GM seeds, but to some extent the industry had 
to be convinced by state bureaucrats that the vision made sense for them.  
As Douglass North notes, “social scientists have incorporated the costliness of 
information in their models, but have not come to grips with the subjective mental constructs by 
which individuals process information and arrive at conclusions that shape their choices” (1990: 
111). In Turkey, available mental constructs by which the actors processed information and 
understood their interests were delimited by the fact that the argument against the GM crops 
arrived earlier than the argument for it and had more passionate advocates. Information about 
GMOs within the bureaucracy was initially concentrated at a unit highly influenced by the 
Cartagena Protocol’s biodiversity-oriented framing of the issue—providing the GM crops an 
unwelcoming policy environment. Field trials showing productivity gains were never publicized. 
The non-cooperative attitude of the bureaucracy made it difficult for the TNCs to communicate 
their vision and form an alliance with the farmers, empowering the ideas held by skeptics.  
The Turkish bureaucracy’s mistrust towards the few TNCs owning the IPR to the GM 
seed technology was not unfounded or unique—as seen in the previous chapters; but their 
reaction was of a special kind. Turkish decision makers thought that expensive GM seeds were 
inappropriate for the resource-poor, small-farmer dominated Turkish countryside; but the same 
seeds have been permitted and used by even poorer, smaller farmers in the structurally similar 
Indian case. Access to seeds in India were established in ways that defied the corporate vision of 
proper IPR protection. The Indian government refused to back the TNCs’ IPR claims, at times 
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actively resisting them, animated by ideas of rural development that had a different focus than 
the kind of biosafety concerns that characterized the influential epistemic coalition in Turkey. 
The next chapter examines this reaction. 
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CHAPTER VII 
THE CASE OF INDIA 
 
Introduction 
India is a case where a fragmented rural producer sector with limited political power 
struggled to exert influence on the government, yet the policy process unfolded in a different 
way than the “most similar” Turkish case: the government allowed GM seeds for the hugely 
important cotton, while regulating relevant IPR in heterodox ways. This, I argue, has been 
because of a different kind of policy engagement observed for the GMO-skeptic epistemic 
coalition, which stayed focused on the needs of the farmers and the countryside rather than 
prioritizing consumer fears as in Turkey. In this chapter I will narrate India’s policy experience 
with GM seeds to highlight these variables, namely; the structure of the rural producer sector, the 
formation and engagement strategies of the oppositional epistemic coalition, and the 
governmental response, based mostly on secondary literature.  
To a limited extent, then, this chapter also serves as a test of the propositions developed 
on the basis of original fieldwork in Argentina, Brazil and Turkey on a separate case, via 
evidence produced by other authors. We should be observing not only a match between the 
above-described variables, but the following specific propositions about the policy process that 
were listed earlier, and which I will repeat here in summary form (see Chapter III for details): 
1. That lobbying for permissive policies has an economic logic. 
2. That opposition to the technology is mainly coming from outside the producer sector. 
3. That there is an IPR conflict introduced by the technology, and this qualifies producer 
sector positions. 
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4. That public decision-makers care about pleasing the producer sector, among other things. 
5. That decision-makers make use of ideas in the form of scientific, economic, legal truth 
statements (not necessarily corresponding to true descriptions of the world, as far as we 
can objectively tell) to inform their decisions. 
 
The Material Context: Cotton Agriculture and Rural Sector Politics 
Literature on post-independence Indian political economy concurs that the Indian 
countryside was the victim of an urban bias in government policies during the Nehru period, and 
enjoyed little political power. Starting from the late 1960s, the urban bias was somewhat 
reversed with policies associated with the “Green Revolution,” more as a result of preemptive, 
paternalistic statecraft—supported by the United States government, American foundations, and 
institutions like the World Bank—than owing to organized political pressure exerted by rural 
actors themselves (Rubinoff 1997).  
Only in the 1980s did rural populism—embodied in rural organizations such as Mahendra 
Singh Tikait-led BKU—became a significant, formative force in institutionalized politics. 
Observers disagree to what extent this force was representing a broad sectoral coalition 
(Varshney 1997) as opposed to being a vehicle of the rural upper classes (Rao 1996). In any 
event, the increase in the salience of rural demands was on top of a very low base to begin with, 
and what it achieved in terms of policy concessions seems to have been the prevention of 
deterioration in farm economic returns in a context of technological slowdown, rather than net 
improvements (Varshney 1993). And the political influence of rural populism ultimately waned 
in the 1990s. India specialists explain this with the greater salience of competing identity 
cleavages for the political orientation of the rural population (Basu and Kohli 1997, Ray and 
 227 
Katzenstein 2005). In a critical instance, “when, in the campaign for the 1991 general elections, 
three different constructions of India’s basic conflicts were presented to the electorate as 
competing choices for the future map of Indian politics—the urban-rural divide led by Devi Lal, 
the upper versus lower caste construction led by V. P. Singh, and a Hindu versus Muslim 
construction by L. K. Advani—the latter two literally consumed the first” (Varshney 1997: 
1739).  
Consequently, “[s]ince the implementation of reservations under the Mandal Report in 
1990 … and the subsequent Ayodhya agitation, agricultural issues have been pushed to the 
background. Even though regional parties dominated by farmers came to power in Delhi in 1996, 
they were outpolled by entities that emphasized cultural issues” (Rubinoff 1997). By the turn of 
the century, “autonomous, grassroots farmers' movements of the sort Tikait led in the 1980s 
[had] practically ceased to exist” (Damodaran 2011). In short, when agricultural biotechnology 
emerged as a policy question in the 1990s, the rural producer sector was politically weak, 
defensive, and highly fragmented—both in terms of landholding patterns and such, and along 
lines of regional, ethno-religious, caste differences. “By the 1990s small-marginal farmers, with 
80 per cent of the holdings and about 40 per cent of the cultivated land, came to numerically 
dominate Indian agriculture but yet ended up in a precarious position because of technological as 
much as policy changes over which they had no control due to lack of adequate political power” 
(Reddy and Mishra 2009: 13-14). 
The picture is not much different in the particular case of cotton, which is of greatest 
interest to our discussion. Indian cotton production is huge, whetting the appetite of 
biotechnology firms interested in entering in large seed markets, and the production structure and 
political representation of cotton producers is fragmented. In the mid-2000s, the value of the 
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commercial seed market was estimated around $ 1 billion, cotton seed comprising a fourth of the 
total market (Murugkar et al 2006). Typically between a fifth and fourth of all the world’s cotton 
is produced in India. A majority of the product is consumed domestically, as raw material for the 
textile industry, and the rest is exported mostly to other Asian countries. “[C]otton plays a major 
role in sustaining the livelihood of an estimated 5.8 million cotton farmers and about 40-50 
million people engaged in related activities, such as cotton processing and trade”.322 The 
commodity is particularly important in the states of Gujarat, Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh 
from where three thirds of national cotton output regularly comes.  
Most of the production is done in small farms by tenant farmers (Lalitha et al 2009). 
Farmer representative associations tend to be regional, with limited political influence. Through 
the cotton production chain, agricultural producers tend to be subordinated to better-organized 
interests downstream, such as ginners, trade agents and textile manufacturers (Harriss-White 
1984, World Bank 1999, Kondo 1997).  
 
Enter Biotechnology: Emerging Epistemic Coalitions 
Bureaucratic Reception of TNC Offers 
From the very beginning, conflicts over IPR marred the biotechnology firms’ entry to 
Indian agriculture. Indian agricultural science and policy community debated the promise of 
genetic engineering starting from around the same time as in the USA. In 1983 a National 
Biotechnology Board was formed to identify priority areas and develop strategy; in 1986 the 
Board became the Department of Biotechnology (DBT) within the Ministry of Science and 
Technology. It was to the DBT that Monsanto first approached to offer a partnership for 
                                                 
322 Cotton Market and Sustainability in India, WWF Report 2012, available at 
http://awsassets.wwfindia.org/downloads/cotton_market_and_sustainability_in_india.pdf.  
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developing and commercializing GM cotton in India. Because insect pests are a major problem 
in Indian cotton production, GM seeds embodying the insect-resistant Bt genes could be an 
option. In 1990 Monsanto offered DBT a partnership for technology transfer that would involve 
back-crossing a genetically modified American cotton variety (Bt Bollgard) to a local variety, 
creating Bt cotton adapted for India. 
However, the idea fell through in 1993 due to the Indian side’s concerns over exploitation 
of public resources by a transnational corporation. DBT’s evaluation committee concluded that 
the technology fee demanded was “ridiculously high”.323 Monsanto’s initial offer asked Rs 60 
crore (60 times ten million Indian rupees) to be paid from Indian public monies for inserting its 
genetic event into Indian cotton hybrids and training Indian personnel. When pressed for 
negotiation, the company cut the figure to a bit over Rs 30 crore, suggestive of the high mark-up 
margin of the initial offer. Pushpa Bhargava, a scientist involved with the evaluation, notes, 
“many of us [at the DBT] were upset about this … when we could have developed this 
technology for less than Rs 3 crore, be it in the public sector or the private sector” (2003: 3541). 
Monsanto’s push seemed exploitative to Bhargava, who drew parallels with Western 
corporations using third world countries as cheap toxic waste disposal sites, and even with 
colonial ventures of earlier epochs: “[It is as if] [w]e must … open the business of producing and 
marketing seeds that are a product of new technologies such as genetic engineering to the 
[multinational corporations] without any reservations and without asking any questions for they 
know it all better than us—just as the British stated during their rule in India that they know 
better than us what was good for us” (2003: 3541). In any event Monsanto’s offer was rejected. 
At the time R&D to produce Bt cotton was underway in the public Central Institute of Cotton 
                                                 
323 The evaluation of V. L. Chopra—agricultural scientist leading the committee, reported by Bharathan (2000: 
1068).  
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Research, and it was seen to be deserving greater support than technology transfer from a foreign 
company (Bharathan 2000, Indira et al 2005, Ramanna 2006).  
A few years after rejecting Monsanto’s offer, the public commission DBT gave 
permission for Mahyco, a private Indian seed company, to do basically what Monsanto had 
offered earlier: import 100 gr of Bollgard seeds from the USA and back cross it to local varieties, 
and then perform field trials for their environmental release. This meant that Monsanto was not 
going to charge a technology fee—not to be paid out of public monies, anyways—for the gene 
transfer (Bharathan 2000). In 1998, nonetheless, Monsanto again made itself part of the game by 
acquiring a share of Mahyco and later forming with it a joint venture called Mahyco-Monsanto 
Biotech (MMB) in order to market seeds in India. 
 So, price and transnational control issues related to the IPR dimension of the technology 
defined the policy debate within bureaucratic circles from the beginning. An initial rejection led 
Monsanto to re-adjust its market entry strategy to a policy terrain defined by Indian 
developmental priorities, to some extent. 
 
No to Corporate Biotechnology: Arguments and Strategies of Civil Society Activists 
While field trials for Mayhco’s (later MMB) Bt cotton were underway, India witnessed 
the emergence of influential civil society activism concerned with the adverse impacts of GMOs. 
The main GMO-skeptic activist groups in India are listed below. 
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Table 26: GMO-skeptic activist groups in India 
Organization Leader/main spokesperson 
KRRS (Karnataka Rajya Raitha Sangha) 
Prof. Mahantha D. 
Nanjundaswamy  
Research Foundation for Science Technology and Ecology  Dr. Vandana Shiva 
Navdanya Dr. Vandana Shiva 
Gene Campaign Dr. Suman Sahai 
Forum for Biotechnology and Food Security Devinder Sharma 
ASHA (Alliance for Sustainable & Holistic Agriculture) Aruna Rodriguez 
 
Source: Bharathan (2000), Indira et al (2005), Ramanna 2006, Herring (2007), Scoones (2008), 
Stones (2012) 
 
Three things characterize civil society mobilization in India, explaining the particular 
contribution it made to Indian policy debates. First, from the onset, mobilization was dominated 
by fears relating to the corporate control of the technology, as captured in the “terminator seeds” 
image. Secondly, all major opposition NGOs put the countryside at the center of their discourse, 
trying to engage with the policy debate from the vantage point of how rural communities and 
small farmers would be affected by the introduction of this technology. This is manifestly 
different from the largely urban opposition observed in Turkey or Brazil, which have been 
focused on biosafety concerns in relative isolation from its relationship to rural welfare. Third, 
activists have displayed heterogeneity in regards to policy positions: while some organizations 
such as Dr. Vandana Shiva’s Navdanya have translated their misgivings to a wholesale 
oppositional stance, others such as Dr. Suman Sahai’s Gene Campaign have been careful to 
differentiate corporate biotechnology from biotechnology itself, providing a discursive space 
where heterodox policy approaches for the appropriation of the technology could be justified. 
Again, this is not observed in comparable cases. The Gene Campaign has simply no counterpart 
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in Turkey or, arguably, in Brazil.324 Conversely, while organizations concerned with food safety 
(such as the Europe-inspired Slow Food or the Halal-focused Food Safety Movement in Turkey 
and IDEC in Brazil) came to dominate the GMO debate in those countries, they were 
conspicuous by their absence from Indian debates.  
I will now explain these three features of Indian civil society mobilization, starting from 
the “terminator seeds” controversy. Prior to the full-scale outbreak of the GMO debate, India had 
already had social movements questioning the virtues of modern seed varieties introduced with 
the Green Revolution and wider issues arising from corporate ownership of natural assets. In 
such a context, the image of terminator seeds would become an ingredient linking these concerns 
to new developments in biotechnology, and to the ongoing interest of the transnational Monsanto 
to penetrate India.  
The term “terminator” was coined by RAFI, a Canadian NGO, referring to a new genetic 
use restriction technology (GURT) developed in the USA. This genetic engineering technique 
would inhibit germination of harvested seed, thus preventing farmers from sowing that seed for a 
second crop. Shortly after RAFI publicized the news about GURT in March 1998, widespread 
alarm emerged in India regarding the socio-economic implications of GM seeds, which were 
then being tested in field trials. In Indian public discourse, terminator seeds, other GM seeds, and 
Monsanto became conflated and merged into one threat. The conflation generated the erroneous 
belief that all GM seeds embody this trait, and fueled self-contradictory fears about the gene for 
sterility escaping to the environment and through pollination making other plants sterile too. 
Nonetheless, despite assertions by some pro-GMO writers, GURT (or the so-called “terminator”) 
                                                 
324 A focus on rural sector interests and heterodox policy approaches for the adoption of GM seeds were largely 
missing in the early phases of mobilization in Brazil, which was rejecting the technology on biosafety grounds. 
However, as GM seeds become more and more a reality to reckon with in Brazil, a new kind of opposition might be 
emerging. Activities of recent organizations such as ABRANGE may be signs of such a shift. More time needs to 
pass to fully evaluate the extent of such a change. See the chapter on Brazil for details. 
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does exist, and it was developed with the explicit aim of solving the IPR enforcement problem in 
developing countries’ seed markets for American proprietary interests.325 Indeed, the US 
Department of Agriculture, which had co-developed the technology with the private seed 
company Delta & Pine Land —now owned by Monsanto—filed a patent plea for this technology 
in India late in December 1998.326 Indian government took the step of issuing a memo banning 
the entry of terminator, and questions on the technology were raised in both houses of 
Parliament.327  
The civil society opposition also linked the image of “terminator seeds” to the long-
existing problem of farmer suicides in India, coining the neighboring phrase “seeds of suicide.” 
Most conspicuous in this regard has been the work of Navdanya founder Vandana Shiva, who 
has been publishing since 1997 reports on farmer suicides. The number of farmer suicides in 
India is in the order of tens of thousands every year. In Navdanya discourse, “[t]he consequences 
of giving seed companies a free hand through privatisation and deregulation has been increasing 
the costs of seeds and agrichemicals for farmers, increasing farm debts and increasing crop 
failure. Farmers suicides are the extreme result of these policies of market freedom”.328 When Bt 
cotton in India became public knowledge, Shiva started to associate farmer suicides with Bt 
cotton (even before the seeds were available to Indian farmers outside trials sites), and also make 
use of terminator vocabulary: “They are in an ecological sense terminator, which terminates 
biodiversity and the possibilities of ecological and sustainable agriculture” (Shiva et al 1999).   
 
                                                 
325 See Chapter II. 
326 Bharathan (2000). 
327 Ramanna (2006: 10). 
328 Shiva and Jalees (2006). 
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When the sites of Bt-cotton field trials became public knowledge in November 1998, 
having been alarmed to the possibilities of the entry of terminator into India, activists destroyed 
trial fields in Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka. The attacks were organized by the Karnataka’s 
farmer movement KRRS (Karnataka Rajya Ryota Sangha), led by the influential Professor 
Mahantha Devaru Nanjundaswamy, under slogans such as ‘Stop Genetic Engineering’, ‘No 
Patents on Life’, ‘Cremate Monsanto’ and ‘Bury the WTO.’ “He gave notice that all trial sites in 
the southern Indian state of Karnataka would be burned, with the media in attendance. The US 
embassy, in turn, requested police protection for US companies in Bangalore, and the High Court 
of Karnataka ruled to protect sites and the property of the Mayhco seed firm [in which Monsanto 
was now a shareholder]” (Scoones 2008: 319). Furthermore, opposition activists operated not 
only by challenging extant law with attacks on property, but also through it. The Research 
Foundation for Science, Technology and Ecology, another NGO led by Vandana Shiva, started a 
public interest litigation against DBT, Monsanto and Mahyco on the grounds that, starting from 
the import of lab material from the USA through the field trials, bio-safety regulations were 
flouted and the Genetic Engineering Approval Committee (GEAC) governed by the Ministry of 
Environment and Forests (MoEF) was left out by institutions without proper authority.329 KRRS 
also threatened to launch a criminal case against Monsanto on the basis that the trials were 
illegal.330 Demonstrations against Monsanto by Indian activists in Europe followed: the Inter-
Continental Caravan of protest toured against the World Trade Organization headquarters in 
Geneva, the European Commission in Brussels and the OECD in Paris, during summer of 
1999.331 These demonstrations popularized the terminator image, making this Canada-origined 
                                                 
329 Bharathan (2000: 1073). See Shiva et al (1999) for details. 
330 Scoones (2008). 
331 Bharathan (2000). 
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meme effectively a re-export of India. 
The “terminator” and “seeds of suicide” narratives defined the orientation of the Indian 
GMO-skepticism. Concerns with the technology have centered on the prospect that it would take 
the control of essential means of agricultural production away from farmers and give it to 
transnational companies, putting the farmers in a cycle of indebtedness and dependency.  
This brings us to the second point. Despite their differences, and the decisively urban and 
upper class/caste origins of some among their number, all major opposition leaders put the 
countryside at the center of their discourse, trying to engage with the policy debate from the 
vantage point of how rural communities and small farmers would be affected by the introduction 
of this technology. According to Ramanna, influential opposition activist Vandana Shiva’s 
criticism of GM crops rested on four arguments: “biotechnology would enable corporate control 
and monopoly of seed … firms are profit driven and through advertising they would trap the 
farmer and also enslave him through contracts … monocultures further increase the vulnerability 
to pest attacks,” and “the claims of Bt cotton to produce high yields and fight pests are 
unfounded” (Ramanna 2006: 9).332 As for KRRS, which had led the opposition until the death of 
its founder Prof. Nanjundaswamy in 2004, Herring describes it as “a farmer organisation 
specifically dedicated to protecting Indian farmers—and India—from globalisation, personified 
by Monsanto” (Herring 2007: 137; also see Omvedt 2005). Activist literature is populated by 
competing claims over the economic performance of GM crops, as opposed to the food safety 
and environmental preservation concerns that dominate Turkish and Brazilian activist discourse. 
Field incinerations, rather than urban rallies, are the center of opposition activism. “No one gives 
                                                 
332 Also see Shiva et al (1999) for an impression. This piece, which appeared in the influential Indian periodical 
Economic and Political Weekly, warns that “a few varieties will dominate the seed market” (Shiva et al 1999: 601) 
and that “[genetically engineered] seeds … will lead to complete erosion of the agricultural biodiversity and 
adversely affect the socio-economic status of the farmers” (1999: 605). 
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a damn for farmers,” the title of an article by the leader of the anti-GMO organization Forum for 
Biotechnology and Food Security Devinder Sharma, is a rallying call for activists in India, while 
it could pass as an almost fair description of the GMO debate in Turkey.333  
It is also important that most of the NGOs vocal in the Indian GMO debate had already 
existed prior to it, and they made this particular issue part of their broader contention against the 
exposure of the Indian countryside to capitalist globalization. When a national public debate 
began in 1998, M. D. Nanjundaswamy had been well known in India for decades as a rural 
activist and politician334 and Vandana Shiva had international fame as an author, activist, and 
occasional contributor to FAO.335 In comparison, the GMO debate saw the emergence from 
scratch of new NGOs in Turkey, such as Fikir Sahibi Damaklar (also known as Slow Food 
Turkey) or Gıda Güvenliği Hareketi (“Movement for Food Safety”), and new epistemic brokers 
such as Professor Kenan Demirkol who rose to public eminence through their contributions to 
the debate from the food safety perspective. 
 Thirdly, maintaining a broader discourse going beyond GMOs and food safety allowed 
Indian activists to display heterogeneity in policy positions. “Many campaign-focused NGOs 
[began] to see the anti-GM campaign as inherently limiting, and were keen to provide the other 
side of the story, developing a narrative about possible alternatives” (Scoones 2008: 320). Gene 
Campaign, led by Suman Sahai, is an influential organization that questions the corporate vision 
of agricultural production in a way that challenges the for/against dichotomy. Gene Campaign 
describes itself as an organization that “has been responsible for raising the national debate on 
                                                 
333 Devinder Sharma, “No one gives a damn for farmers,” Ground Reality, 29 December 2015, http://devinder-
sharma.blogspot.com.tr/2015/12/no-one-gives-damn-for-farmers.html  
334 See the obituary by John Vidal, “MD Nanjundaswamy,” The Guardian, 6 February 2004, 
http://www.theguardian.com/news/2004/feb/06/guardianobituaries.globalisation.   
335 Vandana Shiva, "Most Farmers in India are Women", FAO, 1991. 
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the dangers of seed patents and its threat to food sovereignty.” Accordingly, “Gene Campaign 
has not taken a ‘for’ or ‘against’ position in the highly polarized debate on GM crops. It demands 
stringent biosafety transparency and democratic decision making in this crucial field that has 
significant implications for food, livelihoods and environmental security. It seeks accountability 
and greater competence in the regulatory systems”.336 A major point of contention put forward 
by Gene Campaign early in the biosafety debate, for example, was that the base (non-GM) cotton 
used to create the Bt varieties that Monsanto planned to market in India was of low quality, thus 
likely to under-perform and fail farmers economically.337 Such an approach allows for imagining 
legitimate ways in which genetic engineering technology can be delivered to Indian markets. 
These qualities of the Indian civil society opposition affected the ways in which both Monsanto 
developed its strategies and the way Indian government elites reacted to the policy debate.  
In response to civil society activism questioning the virtues of GMOs and associated 
corporate property rights, Monsanto and other biotech industry players tried to offer an 
alternative discourse centering on agrarian development and drawing parallels with India’s 
success in information technologies, captured in the slogan “biotechnology for the poor.” The 
discourse was not only disseminated through publications, but starting from the turn of the 
century was also grounded in collaborative projects with TERI (The Energy Research Institute) 
and Indian Institute of Science towards the development of high-vitamin A “golden mustard” 
and other public interest-oriented biotechnology research. As Ramanna notes, “[t]hese alliances 
were significant and strategic in influencing the policy process … [O]rganizations like TERI 
organized ‘stakeholder dialogues’ inviting participants from NGOs, industry and farmers to 
                                                 
336 “About Us,” Gene Campaign, http://genecampaign.org/about-us/, last accessed December 2015. 
337 See writings of Suman Sahai at http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/edit-page/Seeds-of-
discontent/articleshow/1705854.cms and Sahai and Rahman (2003). 
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debate biotechnology. Although these forums spoke to those who perhaps were already 
convinced about biotechnology, they did provide some substance to the position that policy was 
being initiated with ‘wide consultations’” (2006: 7). 
 
Government Response 
Government Response to the Biosafety Challenge  
The partial resolution of the polarized debate over GMOs in India was facilitated as much 
by events in informal markets as debates at official institutions. In November 2001, while the 
authorization for Mahyco’s field trials were being challenged in courts by opposition activists, a 
cotton variety marketed by a local company called Nevbharat was observed to withstand the 
powerful bollworm attack in Gujarat. Due to the already existing debates over the technology, 
the seeds were tested and found to contain the same kind of Bt event (expressing the Cry1Ac 
gene) that Mahyco-Monsanto was intending to legally introduce (although incorporated into a 
different cotton variety than the one they were testing). Since then, Nevbharat has been both 
celebrated as the Robin Hood of agricultural biotechnology—beating Monsanto to the market 
and delivering the technology to small farmers with lower prices (Tripp 2009d); and suspected to 
have acted as the biotech giant’s Trojan horse in releasing the technology in India with a fait 
accompli (Bhargava 2003). The company itself claimed ignorance of the genetically engineered 
nature of the seeds. In any event, they were prosecuted for violating biosafety laws and forced to 
stop selling their illegal Bt variety, upon a complaint by Mahyco-Monsanto.338  
In response to the discovery of Bt cotton in Gujarat, the Genetic Engineering Approval 
Committee (GEAC) in Delhi ordered not only burning of the crop and collection of the lint for 
                                                 
338 Pray et al (2005). 
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testing, but also mandated retrieval and destruction of seeds from farmers’ houses and ginning 
mills, and measures to sanitize the fields. Expectedly, farmers protested.339 At this point, as 
Herring notes, “regulation encountered the light-switch problem: a switch is thrown but it is not 
connected to anything. Gujarat state had not set up a biosafety committee, as all states were 
mandated to do; the GEAC itself has no police powers” (2007: 133). Hence, the orders were not 
carried out. It may be tempting to see this outcome as being caused by India’s federal structure, 
but that would be misleading. The GEAC was overridden by political orchestration at the union’s 
capital: “The central government provided little political support for the hard line originally 
adopted by the GEAC … Appropriately enough, Gujarat’s decision to do nothing to enforce the 
order was announced in Delhi by the Union [i.e. Federal] Minister for Textiles, Kashiram Rana 
immediately after a meeting with the Chief Minister of Gujarat, Narendra Modi. Delhi has a deep 
national interest in cotton production. Textile Minister Rana could see nothing wrong with the 
controversial seeds; he reasoned that since the Bt seeds reduced pesticide use and were favoured 
by farmers, opposition must be coming from the pesticide lobby … The consensus, across state 
and national governments, and eventually the GEAC itself, articulated by Secretary of the 
Department of Biotechnology Manju Sharma, was that the ‘interests of farmers’ would not be 
harmed” (Herring 2007: 133). 
These events turned the terms of the debate against the GMO-skeptics. “GM as the 
farmers’ choice” became a powerful story line on which the biotech industry quickly capitalized 
(Ramanna 2006: 11). Their case was strengthened by mobilization of certain farm sector leaders. 
Among them was Sharad Joshi, influential within the nation’s chief agricultural organization 
Kisan [agriculturalist] Coordination Committee (KCC). Joshi was arguably the foremost, 
                                                 
339 See farmer leader Sharad Joshi’s (2001) account. 
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although controversial, farmer leader in India at the time, known for several decades for his 
classic liberal views against government intervention to agriculture.340 On the question of 
patented biotechnology applications, Joshi thought “I prefer to pay royalty for good quality seeds 
than pick up bad subsidised ones”,341 and “[i]f the farmers can have immediate access to frontier 
technologies on payment for a period of twenty years and free of cost after that, we ought to be 
grateful to the developed world for that”.342 Such views by Sharad Joshi on intellectual property 
were probably not shared by many fellow-farmers, but his enthusiasm for access to new 
technology was. On 25 March 2002, farmer representatives led by Joshi threatened to launch a 
civil-disobedience movement (by cultivating transgenic varieties regardless of official approval) 
if Bt cotton were not approved by Delhi, and KCC representatives from cotton-growing states 
across India—Gujarat, Maharashtra, Punjab and Andhra Pradesh—rallied in support. Not all 
cotton farmers were equally interested in the GM seed debate. As Damodaran (2011) notes 
“Farmer leaders of recent years … have tended to espouse causes—either extreme aversion or 
uncritical support for GM and other new technologies—far removed from the farmers' day-to-
day concerns of erratic [electricity] power, timely availability of fertiliser and credit, and 
marketability of produce.” However, action by the KCC must have persuaded government 
                                                 
340 On Joshi’s importance in Indian rural politics see obituaries on The Hindu 
(http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/shetkari-sanghatana-founder-sharad-joshi-passes-awayshetkari-
sanghatana-founder-sharad-joshi-passes-away/article7981677.ece#comments) and The Hindu Business Line 
http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/news/farmers-leader-sharad-joshi-passes-away/article7980287.ece) following 
his recent death in December 2015. The GMO-skeptic Lobby Watch concedes Joshi’s importance, but notes his 
isolation even in his own organization Shetkari Sanghatna for his enthusiastic support for GMOs and IPRs, see 
“Kisan Coordination Committee (KCC)” article at http://www.lobbywatch.org/profile1.asp?PrId=70. Perhaps it is 
best to understand Joshi as a relatively major figure in the context of dwindling rural political mobilization in India, 
as noted earlier, see Damodaran (2011). 
341 Lekha Rattanani, “Knowing His Onions, ” India Today, 15 January 1994, 
http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/shetkari-sanghatana-leader-sharad-joshi-for-converting-peasants-into-
entrepreneurs/1/292630.html, last accessed December 2015. 
342 Sharad Joshi, “Visionaries of a New ‘Bharat’,” 
http://www.sharadjoshi.in/sites/default/files/Visionaries%20of%20Bharat-PDF%20File.pdf, last accessed December 
2015. 
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authorities of the existence of significant interests in the countryside strongly in favor of 
permission. The following day and no later the GEAC announced the approval of three varieties 
of the Mahyco–Monsanto Bt cotton.343 The formal decision came ten days later as a conditional 
clearance valid for three years, subject to the evaluation of annual reports on insect resistance 
and tests for cross pollination. Opposition activists thought that the trials were far from complete. 
As Vandana Shiva puts it, “In effect, the commercialisation was an experiment” (Shiva et al 
2006: 85). 
Consequently, the formal release of Bt cotton provoked more protests. “Attempts at crop 
burning during 2002 had mixed results, with some farmers accepting compensation from KRRS 
protestors for the public destruction of their crop, while others firmly refused such advances and 
called in the police (Scoones 2008: 320). Soon, an epistemic struggle to control the narrative 
about the “truth” about the GM seeds emerged: “In 2003 and 2004 protests continued, but many 
activists had their eye on the three-year review of the Bt cotton results in 2005. Much was 
invested in providing alternative evidence based on surveys in the cotton areas, which would 
demonstrate the limits of the technology” (Scoones 2008: 320).  
The impact of the technology thus became subject to high-profile debate involving 
scientists, social scientists, and activists. Epistemic coalitions confronted each other over rival 
narratives. As Stone describes, “The ‘triumph narrative’ flows mainly from economists and the 
biotech industry (and its academic allies), including more peer-reviewed writing … It claims Bt 
seed to be a ‘remarkable success’ … and a revolution that has raised yields by 70% … The 
counter- narrative comes largely from non-governmental organisations (NGOs) along with some 
journalists and academics, usually in non-peer-reviewed writing; it depicts Bt cotton as a failure, 
                                                 
343 Herring (2007). 
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a farce, and a cause of farmer suicides” (Stone 2012: 62-63).  
The debate was waged not only through normative arguments or abstract claims, but also 
via disputes over the methodology of the field and farm surveys. Early studies found very high 
yield increases from Bt cotton based on trial data provided by the biotech company itself; 
contributing to the marketing buzz for the seeds; however, the validity of the results have been 
disputed because most studies came from few scholars, examining few genetic events or seed 
varieties, and utilizing methods featuring similar biases (Stone 2012, see Herring 2014 for the 
counter perspective). It may be interesting to note that Bt cotton was not even designed to 
increase yields at the first place: it aimed at cost reduction via fewer pesticide applications. 
However, in the Indian context yield increase through better pest management seems to be a 
reality, because pesticide use by the smallholding cotton farmers had been inadequately low or 
ineffective to begin with. Indeed, even relatively conservative estimates documented significant 
yield increase impact, at least in the short term, although finding high variation across regions 
(for an overview see Smale et al 2009). A detailed meta-analysis by the International Food 
Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) concludes that “on average Bt cotton has had a significant 
positive effect on cotton productivity in India, raising farmers’ income via an increase in yields 
and a reduction in pesticide use, despite increasing overall production costs” (Gruère et al 2008: 
42), and “[t]he loss observed in some studies is largely due to the lack of adequate Bt varieties, 
… the lower quality of cotton with some of these varieties, the high price of seeds compensating 
for the reduction in pesticide costs, and the improper use of the technology associated with the 
limited knowledge of the technology among cotton growers (for example, use of the wrong 
variety, improper pesticide use, and the perception of Bt as a ‘silver bullet’)” (Gruère et al 2008: 
17). The study also states that Bt cotton is neither sufficient nor necessary cause for farmer 
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suicides, which stems from the broader problem of indebtedness. 
With input from studies like those reviewed in the IFPRI report, the GEAC evaluated the 
three-year experience of Bt cotton in India in March 2005. It decided to renew the Mayhco-
Monsanto license for selling these seeds in Central and Northern states, but withheld it in Andhra 
Pradesh (AP), where there was greater crop failure. “The decision not to allow the three [Bt 
varieties] in AP was taken on receiving adverse [scientific and other] reports from the State 
Government as well as some 20 farmers’ organizations in the State” (Ramanna 2006: 13). The 
Government of Andhra Pradesh signed a memorandum of understanding with seed companies, 
asking Monsanto to pay compensation to the farmers for losses. Andhra Pradesh would later 
allow GM cotton again but also become the first state to introduce price caps for the expensive 
seeds. The price caps are part of the broader contestation over the proper value added by this 
technology and the question of who has the right to appropriate it, which I am taking up in the 
section below. 
Government Response to the IPR Challenge 
In India, the biotech TNC has encountered significant problems of IPR enforcement and 
failed to shape policies after its own design. This is despite that the genetically modified Bt 
cotton varieties sold in India use hybrid seeds as their base. 344 In hybrid varieties, the harvested 
F2 (second generation) seed lacks vigor, so farmers are supposed to procure seeds externally on 
an annual basis. Given such a context, the biotech TNC could have been expected to face no 
problems in enforcing IPR and collecting high technology rents. However, three things have 
limited their ability to do so. All involve political and institutional barriers that test the power of 
                                                 
344 The use of hybrid cotton was already common among Indian farmers prior to the entry of GM varieties, though 
the latter facilitated it further. Shiva and Jalees (2006: 11) reports hybrid use as 23% in 1997. 
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the TNC in a developing country—barriers that arise from a selective use of state capacity, and 
lack thereof, by Indian political elites answering to domestic stakeholders. 
First, because of high official prices for Bt seeds, farmers find it expedient to plant even 
the under-performing second generation Bt seeds rather than buying them anew on the market.345 
To prevent this, Monsanto would need a law to prohibit replanting of commercially licensed 
seeds (like they tried to enact in Argentina), establish a point of delivery royalty payment system 
(like they did in Brazil), or introduce “terminator” GURT seeds that would be completely sterile 
in the second generation. Given an Indian agrarian context marked by poor smallholding 
farmers, Monsanto’s claims to push “biotechnology for the poor,” widespread dissent against the 
idea of terminator seeds, and perhaps the limited commercial impact of the problem, such 
solutions would be politically unappealing, and they do not seem to have been discussed as 
concrete projects. 
Secondly, the market for Bt cotton seed is flooded by varieties produced by pirate seed 
companies operating without a license from Mahyco-Monsanto and therefore pass no royalty 
fees to it for each bag of seeds sold. These companies either multiply the officially approved 
seeds and sell them at below-official market prices, or they follow the example of Nevbharat in 
crossing official seeds with other varieties to develop new, illegal varieties of GM cotton. The 
resulting seeds may possibly address a greater variety of agricultural needs but also release 
unregulated risks to the environment, making biosafety regulations meaningless. Sold under 
banners that covertly hint at GM traits (such as “BesT seeds”),346 they come with no liability and 
expose farmers to the economic risk of spurious seeds. Nonetheless, surveys in Gujarat found 
that illegal Bt seeds yield similarly to legal ones and bring down overall production costs in 
                                                 
345 Lalitha et al (2008). 
346 Herring (2007). 
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comparison 347 (and they are preferred especially by farmers operating smaller and less well-
irrigated farms).348 In any case, from the vantage point of the biotech TNC they represent a 
leakage in the IPR enforcement chain, and an important one at that.349  
To what extent is the existence of this “cottage-industry” of GM seeds, as Herring (2007) 
calls it, a political outcome? In a study made for the Indian Statistical Institute, Lalitha et al 
(2008) conclude that “The underground seed economy does not seem anarchic or devoid of 
organization… The government possesses the information and means to enforce the law … Our 
analysis of government institutions and the nature of hybrid seed production suggests that 
regulations could have been enforced” but they have not been enforced. Neither the states nor the 
national government deployed their institutional capacity to enact what would be an unpopular 
measure among farmers in order to protect the intellectual property of a transnational company. 
Third, the official seed market itself is regulated with publically mandated price caps. 
When the first approved GM seeds (Bt Bollgard) were brought to the market by Mahyco-
Monsanto, their price was set at four times the price of conventional hybrids.350 The price was 
first contested in late 2005 by the South India Cotton Association and then other farmer 
                                                 
347 Reported in Lalitha et al (2008). 
348 Lalitha et al (2009). 
349 The importance of this leakage is multiplied by the status of Indian IPR law. To enforce its monopoly over the 
technology during the Bt event’s introduction phase, Monsanto-Maycho (MMB) was not able to assert IPR per se. 
The Plant Varieties and Farmers Rights Act, although enacted in 2001, was not implemented with regulations until 
2006.  And it was not clear whether the recently changed Indian Patent Law would allow the patenting of genes. 
Therefore, to collect rents while licensing the use of the gene to other seed companies, MMB had to rely on its 
exclusive ownership of biosafety data for the transgenic event, which would be required for the regulatory approval 
of any seed variety containing the gene. When biosafety regulations are short-circuited through the illegal market, 
this proxy property protection instrument fails. See Lalitha et al (2008). An official patent became more significant 
later when royalty fees became a point of dispute as state governments instituted price caps for GM seeds and MMB 
protested: By 2010 a journalist was writing “MMB is bolstering its argument with a new weapon—a patent that it 
holds in India for its Bt technology. The patent, granted in 2008, will run till 2019. Will this have any bearing on the 
case?” (Latha Jishnu “Bt cotton: Monsanto is back in courts over royalty,” Rediff Business, 1 April 2010, 
http://www.rediff.com/money/column/guest-bt-cotton-monsanto-is-back-in-courts-over-royalty/20100401.htm, last 
accessed December 2015). 
350 Lalitha et al (2009). 
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organizations, which encouraged the state government of Andhra Pradesh to approach the 
Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Commission (MRTPC), claiming that the price 
charged by Mahyco-Monsanto was “exorbitant” and “unscientific”.351 The Union’s (Federal) 
Ministry of Agriculture backed the claim, and the MRTPC ordered the seed price to be halved.  
Expectedly, Mahyco-Monsanto appealed the Monopolies Commission’s (MRTPC) 
decision. As Gene Campaign leader Suman Sahai explains, “Mahyco-Monsanto has challenged 
the locus standi of the MRTPC, saying that it can only deal in trade in goods and that it has no 
jurisdiction to adjudicate on intellectual property rights (IPR) issues, in the present case, the cost 
of proprietary Bt technology. By introducing IPRs into trade via the Trade Related Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS) of the WTO, the WTO has, in fact, made IPRs tradable goods, so 
Mahyco-Monsanto's position is untenable”.352 Following the same reasoning, the Indian 
Supreme Court upheld the legality of the Andhra Pradesh price cap, and other state governments 
including Gujarat and Maharashtra followed with similar measures, bringing down seed prices. 
An impact study by Sadashivappa and Qaim (2009) finds that the price caps have increased the 
profits farmers derived from adopting Bt seeds, and they probably also contributed to a decline in 
the share of illegal Bt seeds in the market. 
Price caps can be seen as an institutional solution devised to combat monopoly power 
over determining the price of a technology whose impacts are much disputed. They also manifest 
a distributional conflict between not only farmers and Monsanto, but also the upstream biotech 
giant and its Indian subcontractors. The high original price of the seed was driven by the 
transgenic trait royalty fee, which comprised two thirds of the seed price and which went to 
                                                 
351 Sadashivappa and Qaim (2009: 174). 
352 Suman Sahai, “Seeds of Discontent,” The Times of India, 5 July 2006, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/edit-
page/Seeds-of-discontent/articleshow/1705854.cms, last accessed December 2015. 
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Mahyco-Monsanto mostly. The price reduction would now be realized by cutting specifically the 
royalty fee portion.353 The expected effect would be an increase in the quantity of seed sold and 
therefore revenues to the companies crossing the Mahyco-Monsanto variety (legally, with a paid 
license) with their own germplasm, and seed distributors further down the line. Indian press 
claimed it “an open secret” that, in addition to farmer lobbying, “Indian partners of Monsanto 
companies were behind the campaign to get trait [royalty] fees reduced because it was reducing 
their margins”.354  
In short, farmer-saved seed, illegally sold seed, and mandated price caps on intellectual 
property remuneration, all arising out of political omission or commission, limit the biotech 
TNC’s ability to collect technology rents in India, generating negotiated, rather than unilaterally 
imposed, terms of access to GM seeds.  
In addition to these explicit and stealth ways of challenging monopoly power, the Indian 
government has been interested in changing the monopolistic market structure, by providing for 
competition in transgenic trait supply. Whereas Bt cotton first spread in India through varieties 
sold by Mahyco-Monsanto or their licensee firms, transgenic constructs developed and patented 
by the public Indian Institute of Technology were also soon commercialized.355 Because of 
ongoing debates over price and IPR, public research then focused particularly on developing Bt 
                                                 
353 “Andhra wins case against Monsanto,” Business Standard, 11 May 2006,  http://www.business-
standard.com/article/economy-policy/andhra-wins-case-against-monsanto-106051100028_1.html, last accessed 
December 2015. 
354 Latha Jishnu, “Bt cotton: Monsanto is back in courts over royalty,” Rediff Business, 1 April 2010, 
http://www.rediff.com/money/column/guest-bt-cotton-monsanto-is-back-in-courts-over-royalty/20100401.htm. As 
of 2015, eight of these licensee companies were in open dispute with Mahyco-Monsanto, because while the latter 
demanded trait royalty fees to be paid as per the original contracts, the companies argued that with the government 
mandated price caps, the contracts ceased to be private business, threatening legal action if Mahyco-Monsanto did 
not go along. “Monsanto, cotton seeds firms at war,” Business Standard, 20 October 2015, http://www.business-
standard.com/article/companies/monsanto-cotton-seeds-firms-at-war-115101901068_1.html, last accessed 
December 2015. 
355 Tripp (2009c). 
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non-hybrid cotton, which could be saved and replanted by farmers without loss of vigor. By 
2011, such varieties had been officially approved and were in circulation.356   
 
Disputed Technology Performance and Continued Epistemic Debates 
Lately, the performance of Bt cotton in India has been subject to renewed debate. When 
Bt cotton was first spreading in India, national aggregates showed remarkable increases in cotton 
yields and decreases in pesticide use. However, as Bt seed adoption approached universal levels 
in the late 2000s, yields plateaued and the insect problem was coming back. In some regions, the 
pink bollworms targeted by the insecticidal trait seemed to develop resistance to it, in others, 
new insects started to fill the niche left over by the disappearing pink bollworm. Social and 
natural ecology conspire to generate such results; and all policy stakeholders function as the 
agents of conspiracy through their short-sighted actions: the disregard of the publicly mandated 
refuge requirements by the farmers, low insecticidal protein expressed in illegal spurious seeds—
which function like vaccine for the insects and accelerate resistance buildup, lack of good 
stewardship by the technology provider, and the absence of adequate public extension service to 
compensate for that.357 The worsening record must also be, to some extent, arising from the 
eventual spread of innovation to the most laggard sections of the rural sector, who work with 
marginal land and poor resources, and for whom the technology may not be appropriate.358 (Note 
that the same selection bias makes the early impressive results less representative, too, see Stone 
2012). 
                                                 
356 Linton and Torsekar (2011). 
357 See Herring (2007), Tripp (2009a), Stone (2012), Gutierrez et al (2015) for these points. 
358 Indeed, a critical article (Gutierrez et al 2015) finds that Bt cotton may be economic in irrigated cotton (indicative 
of better resources), whereas costs of Bt seed increase the risk of farmer bankruptcy in low-yield rainfed cotton. 
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 For our purposes, of interest are the political dimensions entangled with the uses and the 
construction of scientific “stylized facts” in this debate. If technology performance is found to be 
disappointing this becomes ammunition for the technology-users in negotiations against the 
monopolistic technology provider over the price and terms of access. It also gives courage to 
those who object to the use of this technology and argue for a ban. And the construction of 
science too incorporates political elements. Validity of data is contested, and researchers draw 
different conclusions from the same data, in ways that do not seem to be independent from the 
political narratives they espouse. The data reported below, for example, are taken from an 
influential article published in European Environmental Sciences, which declares that pesticide 
use in India have recently risen back to the levels observed in the pre-Bt cotton period, failing to 
mention that cotton cultivation has increased even more. In another way of looking at the same 
data, insecticide use on land cultivated with cotton shows a remarkable decline from 130 to 60 
kilograms per hectare between 2003 and 2012, while Bt share jumped from 1 to 94 percent of all 
cotton cultivation, and yields also improved. (This particular article includes the verdict about 
pesticide use in the abstract and the open-source main text, but relegates the relevant data to a 
less accessible appendix). 
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Table 27: Performance of Bt cotton in India, national averages 
  
(A) 
Bt share in 
cotton area 
(%) 
(B)  
Yield 
(kg/ha) 
(C) 
Total 
cotton 
cultivation 
area (ha) 
(D) 
Total 
insecticides 
on cotton 
(tonnes) 
(D)/(C) 
ratio 
2000 . . . 10988 . 
2001 . . . 13176 . 
2002 0.38 331 78000 6863 0.09 
2003 1.2 387 77850 10045 0.13 
2004 5.59 463 89200 9367 0.11 
2005 11.51 468 88170 5914 0.07 
2006 37.73 519 91730 4623 0.05 
2007 67.1 567 94390 5543 0.06 
2008 80.8 524 94060 5057 0.05 
2009 81.76 486 101520 6726 0.07 
2010 91.54 495 111410 7885 0.07 
2011 91.87 496 121910 6828 0.06 
2012 94.23 552 115530 7234 0.06 
2013 95.66 567 119780 11598 0.10 
 
Source: Columns A to D is reproduced from Gutierrez et al (2015) additional file Table 1; the 
last column is author’s elaboration 
 
Such disagreements over the interpretation of data have directly distributional 
implications and, if politics is about “who gets what, when, and how” (Lasswell 1936), they thus 
become political arguments. Monsanto calculates transgenic trait royalty fees charged for the 
seeds on the basis of cost savings the seeds generate (by substituting for pesticides), and the 
public price caps are justified with alternative calculations of the same. “The … problem,” as a 
journalist comments, “is that estimates of the cost of inputs vary widely as a series of studies 
made by agriculture universities, research institutes and government have shown. So whose 
figures of cost savings are to be accepted?”.359 Each new release of technology renews these 
debates as they typically come with claims of superior performance and attempts at increasing 
                                                 
359 Latha Jishnu, “An Odd Royalty Calculus,” Business Standard, 24 June 2010, 
http://www.gmwatch.org/index.php/news/archive/2010/12317-monsantos-odd-royalty-calculus. 
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the price. In 2007 Mahyco-Monsanto wanted to introduce Bollgard II at three times the 
conventional hybrid price, even though the biosafety regulations now required two pockets of 
non-GM refuge (as opposed to one as mandated earlier) for each packet of GM seed being sold 
due to insect resistance against the Bt trait developing in time—therefore, the new technology 
had to be much more effective than the old one to justify the higher price. The state governments 
intervened again and brought the price to the same level as Bollgard I.360 The price caps were 
contested by the company in courts, sometimes with adverse consequences. In August 2012 the 
Maharashtra government declared all trade activities of Mayhco-Monsanto in that state illegal. 
The state government justified the decision by stating, “We have given fair chance to the 
company and all charges of unfair trade practices have been proved. Hence, under the existing 
cotton seed act we have taken action.” The state was also commissioning a scientific study of the 
impacts of Bt cotton in the state to consider banning GM seeds sold by any and all firms.361  
Recently, the debate over the worsening record of Bt cotton combined with ongoing IPR 
disputes have strengthened GMO-skeptic circles and caused a renewed hesitation among public 
decision-makers. By Fall 2009, the country had come close to permitting its first GM food crop: 
a Bt eggplant was evaluated and recommended for approval by the regulatory body GEAC. 
However, the Ministry of Environment and Forestry (where GEAC is housed) announced a 
moratorium on this decision, based on a series of nationwide public meetings organized by the 
                                                 
360 Latha Jishnu, “Battle royal over Bt cotton royalty,” Business Standard, 28 May 2010, http://www.business-
standard.com/article/economy-policy/battle-royal-over-bt-cotton-royalty-110052800037_1.html, last accessed 
December 2015. Also see Tripp (2009c: 147). 
361 “Maharashtra State Revokes Monsanto’s Cotton Seed License,” Environment News Service, 9 August 2012,  
http://ens-newswire.com/2012/08/09/maharashtra-state-revokes-monsantos-cotton-seed-license/, last accessed 
December 2015.  
 252 
Centre for Environment Education, an environmental NGO.362 Because the Bt eggplant was 
developed by inserting Mahyco-Monsanto’s patented transgenes into local varieties of eggplant, 
whose global center of diversity is India, it was feared that the spread of patented genetic 
material across the eggplant population could open way to “illegal proprietary claim” on “India's 
biological resources”.363 In July 2011, GEAC itself took a step towards tightening the biosafety 
regime when it introduced new procedures for authorizing field trials, requiring applicants to 
obtain a ‘no objection certificate’ from the relevant state government, upon which several states 
declared themselves GM-free.364  
By early 2012 an internal advisory report of the Union’s Ministry of Agriculture leaked 
to the press was stating “Cotton farmers are in a deep crisis since shifting to Bt cotton. The spate 
of farmer suicides in 2011-12 has been particularly severe among Bt cotton farmers”.365 
Although denounced by the Minister himself, the report was interpreted as sign of discord within 
policy bureaucracy. In August 2012, a publicly commissioned scientific investigation discovered 
serious errors in Bt cotton biosafety evaluations. Certain queries in the investigation generated 
doubts about how well regulatory scientists knew what they were doing. An example: 
                                                 
362 The ‘Jairam Ramesh Report’ of February 2010. See http://www.scidev.net/global/gm/editorials/indian-
government-still-flip-flopping-on-gm-trials.html and 
http://www.nature.com/nbt/journal/v33/n9/full/nbt.3331.html?referral=true .  
363 The quotation is from a criminal court petition submitted to Karnataka High Court. See Priyanka Rastogi and 
Anshul Bansal, “India: Patenting Of Genetically Modified Crops In India Vis-À-Vis International Decisions,” 
Mondaq, 17 March, 
http://www.mondaq.com/india/x/300270/Patent/Patenting+Of+Genetically+Modified+Crops+In+India+VisVis+Inte
rnational+Decisions.  
364 See USDA FAS GAIN report #IN4059 “India Agricultural Biotechnology Annual 2014,” dated 7/11/2014, 
available at 
http://gain.fas.usda.gov/Recent%20GAIN%20Publications/Agricultural%20Biotechnology%20Annual_New%20De
lhi_India_7-11-2014.pdf, last accessed December 2015, for these developments. 
365 Internal communiqué SJ/FA-2/1a/i dated January 9, 2012, reported in Yogesh Pawar, “Has Bt Cotton Helped 
Farmers? Sharad Pawar Says Yes, His Ministry No,” DNA, 22 March 2012, http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report-
has-bt-cotton-helped-farmers-sharad-pawar-says-yes-his-ministry-no-1665671, last accessed December 2015. 
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Question by investigator: “Was there a reason for choosing an STR instead of single 
copy gene [i.e. particular methods for sampling biological material] for this analysis?” 
Answer by regulatory scientist: “Sir, we were not sure about the method to be followed at 
that time. This method was decided by the firm”.366 
The same month the Parliamentary Standing Committee recommended a ban on all GM 
crops. Around the same time the Supreme Court of India decided to consider a 2005 petition by 
anti-GMO activists and appointed a Technical Expert Committee to review and recommend 
biosafety risk assessment studies for GM crops. The Expert Committee recommended a 
moratorium on field trials, a ban on the environmental release of any GMO where India is the 
center of origin or diversity, and an overhaul of the biosafety system. According to US sources 
both the government and “industry stakeholders” objected to the report in hearings.367 According 
to the press the Minister for Environment and Forests Jayanthi Natarajan was opposing 
Agriculture Minister’s views in favor of GMOs, which was dictating the government’s 
arguments in the case. Natarajan thought, “The scientific community is, in fact, split vertically 
down the centre in its views on these issues, and robust, proven failsafe scientific protocols to 
prevent damage from GM crops are yet to be developed in our country”.368 (As of Summer 2015, 
more hearings were expected and the Court’s decision was pending).  
                                                 
366 See p. 51 of the so-called Sopory Report: “The report,” Committee To Examine Scientific Claims Made With 
Regard To The Bnla106 Event (Genetic Transformation Of An Elite Indian Genotype Of Cotton, Gossypium 
Hirsutum L.) For Insect Resistance, August 2012. The report can be accessed at the Indian Council of Agricultural 
Research website http://www.icar.org.in/files/BN-Bt-cotton-report.pdf. Note that this investigation was about 
biosafety tests for publicly developed Bt cotton, and not Mahco-Monsanto’s.  
367 We know that the government said the report was scientifically flawed and did not address the terms of reference 
and merits outright rejection since it has exceeded its mandate. Later, the apex court appointed Dr. Rajendra Singh 
Paroda as a member who submitted a separate dissenting report when the five other TEC members submitted theirs 
in July 2013. http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/battle-lines-sharpen-over-gm/article6268776.ece 
368 Nithin Seti, “Jayanthi Natarajan opposes Pawar’s views on GM crops, wants field trials put on hold,” The Hindu, 
3 August 2013, 
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Just as Indian regulatory system seemed to be taking a more precautionary direction, the 
voting into office of Narendra Modi’s BJP government in May 2014 changed things, and 
precipitated a counter-attack by the pro-GMO epistemic coalition. On 3 June 2014, the 
Intelligence Bureau (IB), India’s national spy agency, got involved with the GMO debate. In an 
inflammatory report leaked to press, the IB was accusing “concerted efforts by select foreign 
funded NGOs” for undermining Indian development projects, with an alleged negative impact on 
GDP growth at the order of 2-3 % per annum. According to the report, in the area of agricultural 
biotechnology, “NGOs were active facilitators of news articles, liaison with other activists and 
social media activism, which contributed to the … moratorium on Bt brinjal [eggplant] and the 
ban/moratorium regimes recommended by the Parliamentary Standing Committee … and the 
Technical Expert Committee (TEC) appointed by the Supreme Court …”369 Much of their work, 
it said, was funded by the US-based Centre for Media and Democracy.  
In response, the anti-GMO groups returned the accusation of foreign manipulation: “The 
strategy of the global GMO seed industry with their patents & IPRs (Intellectual Property Rights) 
is to bend regulation and influence governments and regulators to approve GMOs … It is 
difficult to avoid the conclusion that the IB report has been influenced by those who have most 
to gain by undermining our seed and food sovereignty ie. the foreign corporations”.370 According 
to the activists, “the leaking of the IB report [was] timely. The new Modi administration seeks to 
                                                                                                                                                             
http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/jayanthi-natarajan-opposes-pawars-views-on-gm-crops-wants-field-trials-
put-on-hold/article4982776.ece?ref=relatedNews  
369 Quotation from the report taken from the note by ASHA (Alliance for Sustainable & Holistic Agriculture), one of 
the NGOs singled out in the report.  http://www.kisanswaraj.in/2014/06/15/ashas-statement-on-the-ib-report-indias-
gmo-free-movement/ 
370 Statement signed by activist leaders Vandana Shiva, Aruna Rodrigues, Kavitha Kuruganti, 
http://seedfreedom.in/foreign-hand-in-the-ib-report-joint-statement-from-vandana-shiva-aruna-rodrigues-kavitha-
kuruganti/ 
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speed up projects”.371 Two weeks after the report surfaced the Indian government banned direct 
foreign funding of local campaign groups.372 In the meantime the new Minister of Environment 
revived the GEAC, which gave approval for field trials for several crops that had been previously 
suspended because of the still ongoing case at the Supreme Court.373 The government attitude 
receives criticism even from close quarters. Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, a nationalist civil 
society organization that is regarded as the parent body of the ruling BJP, termed the decision of 
the government as “betrayal of people’s trust … People of India who have elected BJP to power 
are feeling deceived”.374 “And in any case, why should we hand over our agriculture to some 
foreign companies?”375 BJP had promised in its election manifesto that GM food would not be 
allowed without an evaluation of its long-term effects. Nonetheless, so long as BJP blocks GM 
seeds for food crops, it may find it easy to justify the resumption of biotechnology applications 
in cotton. India still does not allow the importation of any genetically modified food except in 
the form of soy oil, either.376  
 
 
 
                                                 
371 “Criminalising Dissent In India Against GMOs And Monsanto, 20 June 2014, 
”http://www.colintodhunter.com/2014/06/gmos-ngos-and-activism-criminalising.html 
372 Dean Nelson, “India targets Prince Charles' aide in war on Greenpeace,” The Telegraph, 22 June 2014, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/india/10917731/India-targets-Prince-Charles-aide-in-war-on-
Greenpeace.html  
373 USDA FAS GAIN report #IN4059 “India Agricultural Biotechnology Annual 2014,” dated 7/11/2014, available 
at 
http://gain.fas.usda.gov/Recent%20GAIN%20Publications/Agricultural%20Biotechnology%20Annual_New%20De
lhi_India_7-11-2014.pdf, last accessed December 2015 
374 “Modi govt condemned for allowing GMO field trials,” 23 July 2014, GMWatch, 
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375 “Modi bets on GM crops for India's second green revolution,” Reuters, 23 February 2015, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-india-gmo-insight-idUSKBN0LQ00Z20150223  
376 USDA FAS GAIN report #IN4059 “India Agricultural Biotechnology Annual 2014,” dated 7/11/2014. 
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Conclusion: Assessing Epistemic Coalition Input 
In short, the Indian biosafety regime remains contested. Many varieties of GM cotton 
have been approved for cultivation, but no approvals have been given for other plants. For 
cotton, several kinds of IPR enforcement problems are in place, most notably mandatory price 
caps limiting the royalty fees companies can charge on seeds. In other words, the biotech TNC 
has made some inroad into this important market, but has not been able to shape either the 
biosafety or the IPR regime to its liking. 
How is this outcome to be explained? India’s great size, and especially the great amount 
of cotton being produced in the country, despite low levels of average income, signifies huge 
market opportunities for biotech companies. Monsanto in particular have been very interested in 
penetrating this market and starting from early 1990s lobbied Indian public institutions for 
marketing GM cotton varieties adapted for India. This company’s efforts, together with other 
transnational and local biotechnology companies (together represented by All India Biotech 
Association), have provided for the strongest source of the push towards a permissive regime for 
GMOs in India. The other potential source of pro-GMO lobbying, the agricultural producers 
themselves, have been less enthusiastic, and their activity seems to have been in the form of local 
defensive reactions against attempts at restricting access to seeds after they have already spread. 
Organized pressure on the government by peak agricultural organizations in the way observed in 
Argentina or Brazil seems absent, comparatively speaking. This, I argue, has to do with the 
already low level of organizational capacity and cohesion of Indian agriculturalists, especially 
cotton producers, who are mostly smallholding, resource-poor tenant farmers. The same qualities 
also make farmers more vulnerable to price volatility risks and such, increasing the salience of 
IPR claims that raise input prices. Therefore due to greater uncertainty of interests, and lesser 
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capability to pursue them, farm sector positioning on GM crop debate has been less determinate. 
This makes India different from the New World cases. 
What makes India different from Turkey, another country with indeterminate farmer 
stance on GM crops? An exhaustive explanation of this difference has to incorporate several 
reasons. But one important thing India had and Turkey did not, was civil society mobilization 
oriented towards agrarian questions and the place of GMOs in them. Three things characterize 
civil society mobilization in India. First, from the onset, mobilization was dominated by fears 
relating to the corporate control of the technology, as captured in the “terminator seeds” image. 
Secondly, all major opposition NGOs put the countryside at the center of their discourse, trying 
to engage with the policy debate from the vantage point of how rural communities and small 
farmers would be affected by the introduction of this technology. Third, activists have displayed 
heterogeneity in regards to policy positions: while some have translated their misgivings to a 
wholesale oppositional stance, others have been careful to differentiate corporate biotechnology 
from biotechnology itself, providing a discursive space where heterodox policy approaches for 
the appropriation of the technology could be justified. The result was a GMO-skeptic opposition 
orientation that vilified the transnational companies more than the transgenes, and worried more 
over food security and sovereignty than over food safety. Not only for cotton, but for food crops 
too, this worry applied: IPR over food crops could endanger access to food, as it was argued 
most concretely in debates over GM eggplant. This particularly IPR-sensitive and pro-farmer 
attitude of the epistemic coalition aligns with (and I argue, causally contributes to) the 
subsequent government policy for allowing widespread use of Bt cotton seeds in a weak IPR 
enforcement environment, even at the risk of greater biosafety threats (arising from government-
tolerated illegal seeds and farmer managed seed). 
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The India case is a good illustration of the strength of the epistemic coalition concept. In 
India various arguments for and against allowing for GM cotton, and appropriate forms of IPR 
for it, find their justification in scientific stylized facts about how much these seeds contribute to 
cost savings. The debate had obvious distributional consequences, however, arguments going 
into it are made in the form of truth statements about how nature and markets work. Various 
sides accuse their detractors for not knowing enough, or at best feigning ignorance of truth.  
Existing literature on the relationship between science and politics is structured around 
the question of whether or when power listens to truth. “Epistemic communities” approach 
argues that power listens to truth often, and investigates the ways in which this could be 
facilitated further (Haas 2015). Its detractors argue that power listens to truth only where its 
interests are already aligned with it—interests that are determined by coercive imperatives or 
material incentives (Toke 1999, Krebs 2001). On GMOs, the latter approach is aligned with the 
claim that there is a global epistemic community consensus over the merits of the GMOs, which 
the policy-makers disregard with their less-than-enthusiastic approach, as claimed by Drezner 
(2008), and Paarlberg (2009). Unlike these authors I find it untenable to speak of a global 
scientific consensus over GM crops’ appropriateness, especially at the level of regulatory 
detail—the case of India particularly provides striking instances of the absence of such 
consensus. And it is also not true that policy-makers disregard scientific truth. What happens is 
that policy-makers holding power listen to various claims of truth, each with certain scientific 
stylized facts in their support. The epistemic coalition concept allows for the possibility of such 
contending epistemic claims to scientific authority, and a broader set of participants in the 
making of those claims. In a certain sense, an epistemic coalition is a “bastardized” form of an 
epistemic community, which is best imagined as a group of scientists isolated from material 
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conflicts of interest and political motivations. In the conclusion chapter I will discuss broader 
implications of this distinction, between epistemic (bastardized) coalitions versus (pure) 
communities.  
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CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSION 
 
Below I will first summarize the findings of the study and address possible limitations, as 
far as the current research questions are concerned. I will then comment on the theoretical and 
practical implications of the study for broader questions of international and comparative 
politics. 
 
What the Study Did and Why 
Summary 
What has the study achieved so far? What have we learnt? 
I have studied policies regulating GM crop cultivation in Argentina, Brazil, India, and 
Turkey. Most conservatively, this study can be read as an informative account of the political 
reactions provoked, and some of the social-economical outcomes generated, by a controversial 
agricultural technology in major agricultural producer countries of the global South—in other 
words, a historiographical study of an instance of what Joseph Schumpeter (1942) called as 
“creative destruction”. I have traced the trials and tribulations of Northern biotech companies as 
they ventured to introduce GM seeds into countries with differing social and natural ecosystems 
and claim royalty fees for their use. Throughout, we have witnessed reactions to this technology 
among export- versus domestic-market oriented producer groups, large farmers and small, 
growing crops with biological characteristics that pose a variety of biosafety and intellectual 
property rights (IPR) enforcement problems to be addressed. This can be seen as a contribution 
for development policy; science, technology and society studies; and future economic history. 
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At a further level, the study pursues analytical questions that this historical episode 
generates for political science. There is an emergent international regime complex regulating 
various aspects of GM agricultural production, but elements of the complex are in contradiction 
with each other, and they generate regulatory gaps (Raustiala and Victor 2004). Scientists also 
debate the merits of this technology, and even if a view broadly in favor of the safety of GMOs 
has been arguably gaining greater acceptance, there was disagreement regarding the design of 
appropriate regulatory measures during the earlier phase of the debate (Jasanoff 2011). How 
have policy-makers made use of a fragmented international regime complex while adopting 
national policies to regulate GM agriculture, and in the absence of clearly defined global legal 
and scientific imperatives what other reasons have driven individual countries’ policy choices, 
are the questions of interest at this level.  
In pursuing these questions my theoretical motivation has been to contribute to debates in 
political science about the place of ideas, cognitive frames and social learning in comparative 
public policy or international cooperation (Skocpol and Weir 1985, Hall 1989, March and Olsen 
1989, Sikkink 1991, Katzenstein et al 1998, Wendt 1999, Berman 2001, Blyth 2002 and 2006, 
Parsons 2003, Schmidt 2008, Woll 2008, Abdelal et al 2010, Nelson and Katzenstein 2014). 
Social constructivism suggests that public decision-makers react to the same challenge in varying 
ways because of how they perceive it, and they perceive it differently because of different ideas 
they hold. This is a simple and reasonable premise with a powerful implication: With different 
ideas, different policies are possible, and so long as ideas do not simply follow from hardwired 
economic interests or practically immutable features of institutional architecture we could 
generate better policy outcomes by spreading better ideas among the actors that matter—be them 
lobbying groups or autonomous state managers. In this study I aimed at demonstrating the 
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strength of this premise. However, the plausibility of the premise is challenged by alternative 
possibilities: that ideas rationalize and justify policy choices rather than causing them, that they 
are ineffective when their implications run against powerful material interests, or that it is the 
material context that selects for the ideas that gain traction at the first place. Conceded that these 
points hold true quite often, the challenge is to delimit when and how it is that ideas, and idea-
generating or idea-propagating agents, can become effective as autonomous forces. In any case, 
nonetheless, where one claims that ideational factors are animating public decisions, they face 
the null hypothesis that it is actually material interests all the way down. Hard and crucial tests, 
and systematic comparative inquiry would be required to show that this hypothesis is not 
confirmed, i.e. that ideas are making a difference in ways that self-evident material factors are 
not accounting for.  
These criticisms can be applied in specific ways to particular research programs studying 
the causal influence of ideas, such as the epistemic communities program, which is of special 
interest for policy questions that have to do with science, technology, and the environment 
(Ruggie 1975, Adler and Haas 1992, Haas 1992). The program rests on the premise that in areas 
such as environmental policy-making and cooperation, causal ideas and associated norms 
propagated by “epistemic communities” of scientific experts may contribute to better policy 
outcomes by changing the way political power holders view an issue, where the experts are 
perceived as impartial. Although the strength of the concept has been widely recognized, 
critiques have pointed to a number of limitations, centered on what Dunlop identifies as “the 
approach’s failure to engage with the real world of politics and interest-group bargaining” and “a 
lack of critical empirical testing” (2000: 142). Sebenius argues that the actual influence of 
epistemic communities is ultimately exercised through bargaining, and yet there is no theory of 
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bargaining elaborated in the approach (1992: 326). Liftin argues that epistemic communities 
approaches downplay the ways in which scientific information may simply rationalize or 
reinforce existing political conflicts (1994: 12). Krebs argues that members of epistemic 
communities may just be after their own personal or professional self-interest (2001: 225-6). 
Toke argues that the influence of epistemic communities has been probably overstated (1999: 
97-102). 
To address such criticisms, a convincing empirical study of ideas has to build on a good 
sub-theory informing the choice of comparative counterfactuals. In studying ideas Parsons 
(2002) urges us to ask, “What was the range of possibilities without these ideas?” Equipped so, 
the study could then address the crucial question: Do different ideas follow from similar material 
settings, and do they generate different policies—policies that matter materially?  
To pursue this question, I have studied the engagement of civil society actors, scientific 
experts and the public decision-makers they try to influence, with a debate on agricultural 
technology; and I have done this in different agricultural contexts, in order to avoid 
generalizations based on what may be exceptional experience, and provide limited empirical 
tests for some of the critical questions above. To do it in a concrete manner, I have generated two 
research questions that capture the foremost dimensions of GMO policy as it applies to 
developing countries: 1) Why have some countries banned GM crop cultivation in their territory, 
while others encouraged it? 2) Why have they built varying IPR enforcement systems? The 
overall hypothesis was that ideational engagement preceding these policy decisions would have 
traceable marks on the decision-making process, with material outcomes. The contribution of 
scientific experts to ideational engagement between the policy stakeholders and policy-makers 
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was expected to be significant, and it was an open question whether this would take the precise 
forms predicated in the epistemic community concept. 
Here is how the analysis proceeded. I have focused on the experience of those countries 
where (because of their agricultural production profile) the biotech TNCs marketing the 
technology have significant interest in lobbying for policy change towards 1) permissive 
biosafety policies that would facilitate GM crop cultivation, and 2) IPR policies that would allow 
the extraction of technology fees from cultivators. The US Foreign Service lends diplomatic 
support to this lobbying effort. In these settings, the most important obstacle the TNCs face is the 
fact that the greater public perceives significant risks from the spread of GM crops and little if 
any gain, and there are activists campaigning against them by pointing to those risks. This makes 
permissive policies a hard sell for national policy makers. The TNCs face a potential ally in 
domestic agricultural producers, who may be interested in accessing a potentially productivity-
enhancing technology. A TNC-domestic producer alliance is therefore necessary to effectively 
push for policies permissive of GM crop cultivation. However, the TNCs and the domestic 
producers have conflicting interests in IPR enforcement defining the terms of access to the 
technology: TNCs want stronger IPR enforcement (which pays for them) than the producers 
(who pay for it) do. In the absence of an ally, the domestic producers are likely to lose out in this 
conflict, because the TNCs, supported by US diplomatic pressure, are strong, A domestic 
producer-activists alliance is therefore necessary to apply pressure on and convince policy-
makers to adopt policies that prevent the terms of access from turning against the producers. 
These were the postulates of my sub-theory. 
What brings out a TNC-domestic producer alliance? I theorized that where most of the 
domestic agricultural production is being done in big farms by capitalist farmers, this alliance 
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would be more likely and efficacious. Where smallholding peasantry dominates, the domestic 
producers would be less interested, and less able, to politically defend such an alliance position, 
because their potential gains from technology permission is uncertain (which follows from 
agricultural microeconomics) and at best small compared to the costs of political mobilization 
(which follows from collective action theory). A more consolidated, capitalist producer sector, 
therefore, is expected to be more strongly in favor of permissive biosafety policies. This was the 
prediction of my sub-theory. 
I then comparatively pursued my study in two pairs of countries, one pair where such 
producers are found, and one where they are not. Significant differences in policy experience 
were indeed observed between the pairs, which attest to the importance of the material context in 
defining the strength of the producer sector: A formidable TNC-farmer alliance pushed for and 
eventually obtained permission for GM crop cultivation quite easily in Argentina, and after some 
contestation but quite decisively in Brazil too. In the small farmer-context of Turkey and India, 
farmer associations were relatively missing from the debate, or took defensive positions that did 
not translate into a clear alliance with the biotech TNC. The result has been precautious, limited 
permission as in India or a complete ban as in Turkey. The implication of this between-pair 
comparison is that a frontal campaign against the GMOs (spearheaded whether by civil society 
activists or their allies in official circles) is likely to be doomed to irrelevance where the 
domestic producers are strong because the stars are then aligned for permissive policies as two 
favorable stakeholders meet. Indeed, such a campaign succeeded in Turkey, yet failed in Brazil.  
What brings out a domestic producer-activist alliance? It comes about when GMO-
skeptic activists decide to ally with the producers and frame the GMO threat in terms of property 
claims rather than purely consumer risks. Such a frame, and campaign strategies aligned with it, 
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help change perceptions among the producer groups, and the state officials they talk to, about 
which demands concerning IPR claims are legitimate, and what can be achieved against the 
TNCs. Campaigns with such a focus were effective in Argentina and India, to such an extent that 
the TNCs have expressed great dissatisfaction about IPR enforcement in these places. The case 
studies demonstrate that the effect of epistemic coalition activism was particularly pronounced in 
India where the agricultural sector interests are less well-articulated organizationally, while in 
Argentina a very strong agricultural sector acted more independently to defend its perceived 
interests with less need for an ally. Without such campaigns producers lost access to technology 
in Turkey, or found themselves alone vis-à-vis the TNCs in their contention over intellectual 
property claims in Brazil. The implication of the within-pair comparison is that activists can help 
the domestic producers to obtain more favorable terms of access to the technology if they 
recognize such access as a legitimate demand. Orthogonal to the material agrarian context, then, 
the ideational orientation of the oppositional activists is a variable that affects the policy 
contestation. The differences in policy experience observed within pairs (between countries that 
are similar on agrarian structure characteristics) attest to this.  
In other words, if you are campaigning against the GMOs altogether, you may hope to 
win in a context where well-organized farm interests are lacking. Where they are not lacking, a 
campaign orientation against corporate property claims over technology, rather than a categorical 
rejection of the technology itself, may be a safer bet for success in policy influence. These claims 
about the outcomes of opposition orientation are causal claims, which stand confirmed by the 
current sample; however, because of limitations with the sample and the data it is safer to 
conceive them as probabilistic, rather than deterministic relationships.377 This conclusion is 
                                                 
377 Because of certain claims about particular forms of QCA analysis (Ragin 2014), sometimes scholars associate all 
qualitative social science with the analysis of deterministic relationships. Obviously, there is no theoretical reason 
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illustrated in Figure 12, which reproduces Figure 1, this time adding the social-economic results 
of the policy decisions. 
 
Figure 12: Causal pathways to policy decisions and their economic outcomes 
From secondary literature reviewed in the case studies above we can observe that 
different policies are associated with different social-economic outcomes: Under strong IPR, 
                                                                                                                                                             
for this (since “qualitative” is not a theoretical category but a mode of academic practice). What qualitative 
researchers lack is not the common sense notion that things may happen with a probabilistic chance, but precise 
ways of estimating and reporting the probabilistic strength and the uncertainty of the inferences made. To do so, we 
have to fall back on ordinary language, employing phrases like “to the extent that” and “probably.”   
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impact studies can barely document any extra profit gain from adopting GM seeds for farmers, as 
in Brazil (da Silveira and de Carvalho Borges 2007). With weak IPR, those gains look more 
substantial, at least in static terms,378 as in Argentina (Qaim and de Janvry 2003, Trigo and Cap 
2003, Sztulwark 2012) and India (Lalitha 2008, Sadashivappa and Qaim 2009). With a 
categorical ban there are opportunity costs of non-adoption (Brookes 2012, Aydin et al 2013), 
but also preemption of relevant biosafety risks, as in Turkey. 
What determines the orientation of the opposition then? Why did Indian activists focus 
their discourse and their campaign strategies on considerations of rural welfare and farmer 
vulnerability vis-a-vis IPR demands, while Turkish or Brazilian activists remained more 
interested in biosafety threats? In response to this question, historically contingent, ex post facto 
descriptions can be provided, drawing on the biographies of the activists and such, and they are 
found in the chapters above. Generalizing from these descriptions with an effort towards a causal 
explanation of activist orientation would result in an explanation as rich (therefore as explanatory 
as, and not more than) the descriptions themselves. Stopping short of infinite regress, my causal 
analysis ends where activists develop different orientations. In other words, ideas can be taken as 
dependent variables in other studies, the point in this one is that the ideational orientation of the 
activists is an independent variable that affects policy contestation. 
 
Conceptual Innovation: Epistemic Coalitions 
My contribution with regards to making sense of how the activists orient themselves is 
rather a conceptual one. I have proposed the concept of “epistemic coalition” as a container term 
                                                 
378 For a more dynamic evaluation, one would need to take into account the effects of weak IPR over incentives for 
innovation in plant biotechnology in the longer term. TNCs constantly threaten to quit weak IPR environments, but 
given the large market size in these places, those threats may prove to be bluffs. As for the rate of innovation, there 
is surprisingly little scholarly evidence for the commonplace expectation of more innovation from stronger IPR. See 
Hudson and Minea (2013) for a review. 
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for describing the relationship between activists, the scientific knowledge sources they utilize on 
the one hand, and the public decision-makers they try to influence on the other. The coalition 
brings together scientists, civil society activists, and pro-active bureaucrats. They strategically 
mix selective scientific evidence with ideological narratives and social norms to produce truth 
statements over the nature of the policy challenge in question, under conditions of incomplete 
scientific consensus. These statements are made in the form of claims on how nature and markets 
work, providing descriptions about “how GM seeds reproduce themselves,” “how much they 
actually contribute to costs savings” and the like. Competition between rival epistemic coalitions 
occurs through a contestation over such truth claims. Instead of simply appealing to interests, 
epistemic coalitions accuse their detractors for not knowing enough, or at best feigning ignorance 
of truth. This is what is epistemic about those coalitions.  
Investment in claims of knowledge makes it necessary for the epistemic coalition to enlist 
the input of scientific experts. Experts can participate in epistemic coalitions and influence policy 
in four ways. First, experts communicate with and give ideas to civil society actors, such as 
activists organized in NGOs, who may then affect policy. Secondly, experts in the capacity of 
consultants communicate with and give ideas to public policy-makers. Third, experts are 
employed or appointed in public committees in the capacity of regulatory scientists, and put their 
ideas directly to work. Fourth, many civil society actors and government bureaucrats or even 
elected politicians active in this area themselves are experts, with advanced degrees in life 
sciences, medicine, or agricultural engineering. To the extent that they fall back on their expert 
knowledge in forming their opinions, they represent expert influence over policy. The 
relationships between scientific experts and the other actors they communicate with are causally 
complex and multidirectional, in ways that go beyond the oft-used metaphor of “speaking truth 
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to power.” A governmental or non-governmental organization may be following the advice of 
certain scientific experts in their conduct, but they might have chosen to consult that particular 
group of experts on the basis of the latter’s expected congruence with the organization’s conduct. 
Also, ideas developed by experts themselves rest on kinds of knowledge other than purely 
scientific expertise. Their conduct is underpinned by a sense of responsibility of the wider 
economic and political implications of their views, gleaned through their conversations with non-
scientist participants in the debate. This is why they are not “epistemic communities” (Adler and 
Haas 1992) and instead given the looser name coalition in an effort at concept differentiation. 
To understand what this term is intended to convey, remember the following episode on 
the decision to approve, for the first time, the cultivation of a genetically modified crop in 
Argentina. Because it is never possible to establish with hundred percent certainty the absence of 
harm from a product, the scientists involved with this decision reportedly did not feel that they 
have exhausted all the possible test questions. One close observer remembers, “when the 
decision to liberate the [genetically modified] soybeans came up there were still doubts and 
worries. The CONABIA [biosafety committee] experts went and talked to the [Secretary of 
Agriculture] Felipe Solá, and said ‘It looks good to us, though maybe we should also do this and 
that [test], etc. Solá [himself an agricultural engineer and a university professor] said to them ‘I 
am willing to sign this, but you are the experts, you have to take a decision and tell me whether 
this is good or bad’… It was the CONABIA people who took the responsibility to go forward, 
Vicién [scientist chairing the committee] being a chief figure.” Dr. Vicién sees herself as among 
a larger coalition who approached the issue with a foremost concern for agricultural productivity 
and contextualizes her input with reference to opinions in that circle: “There was a group of 
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people at the National Institute for Agricultural Technology, the Secretariat of Agriculture, and 
the private sector, who thought that this technology could be useful for the country”.379   
Two things can be inferred from this episode. First is that the input from the regulatory 
scientist, in the capacity of an expert, indeed mattered. Yet, secondly, her input was not derived 
exclusively from science, and instead was grounded on her understanding of Argentina’s 
national economic interests. These lessons negate two alternative ways of making sense of this 
historical episode. First is a story of merely political struggle, where expert opinion receives lip 
service, and serves to justify already existing preferences driven by interest group politics or 
ironclad ideological views (as much of the mainstream political science would imply). Second 
one is a story of social learning where expert opinion speaks the scientific truth to power and 
leads it to rule on that basis (various cognitive evolution and social learning approaches). The 
first story presumes that political actors already know well what they want and how to get it, 
with little use for additional policy knowledge. The second story is set in a crisis situation where 
this presumption does not hold, and argues instead that scientific input can bring cognitive order 
into an otherwise uncertain world, thanks to the consensual nature of the validity tests it relies 
on. Epistemic coalitions operate in a third universe, some kind of purgatory, where uncertainty is 
indeed significant, but so are struggle and negotiation, due to a lack of consensus over the precise 
implications of expert knowledge. The concept therefore invites attention to the strategic 
interaction of competitive coalitions, each with their own attempt at recruiting some expert 
knowledge in support of their policy agenda.  
Recast in these terms, what I have done is a study of the struggle between epistemic 
coalitions that put forward rival kinds of policy knowledge towards policy influence. The 
                                                 
379 See Chapter IV for references. 
 272 
struggle is between those who accept the biotech TNCs’ narrative that there is little reason to 
worry about the spread of GM crops and the proprietary claims associated with them, and those 
who oppose this vision for various reasons, the latter coming in various forms on the basis of 
particular reasons they emphasize. I document the participation of scientific experts in these 
coalitions, but I am skeptical that it is the experts that are chiefly responsible for ideas dominant 
in each coalition. What I do argue is that 1) the ideas of epistemic coalitions are not simple 
functions of their material settings, they are not derived from economic interest groups, and 
instead they represent an autonomous social force, and 2) they are causally influential on policy-
making, in a manner orthogonal to variables associated with the relevant economic structure. I 
empirically demonstrate the plausibility of this argument by tracing the policy processes. To add 
validity to the findings, I do it through structured comparisons across countries where the 
material setting and the relevant economic interest groups vary in theoretically meaningful ways. 
The policy outcomes observed imply that the policy process has been in a wide sense a process 
of learning and cognitive evolution, but not necessarily towards better outcomes; because in 
formulating a narrative of policy knowledge, epistemic coalitions mix scientific and non-
scientific ideas, good ideas and bad, and governments act on this knowledge inconsistently.  
Before discussing the implications of my findings at greater length, I will first address 
possible empirical limitations of the study. If the explanations and the concepts I am offering are 
not suitable matches to the present research questions, there would be all the reason to doubt 
their implications for more remote contexts.  
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Validity, Adequacy, and Alternative Explanations 
 Is it possible that I am missing simpler adequate explanations of the choices each country 
made regarding GM crop cultivation? Am I omitting some fundamental difference that drives the 
variation among cases, which would challenge the validity of my account?  
What about state autonomy (Evans et al 1985), for example? In this analysis I have 
deliberately treated state autonomy as residual; taking the pressure from civil society actors as 
the primary explanatory factors. This is not because state autonomy does not matter, but without 
a theory of the autonomous interests of the state managers in a given field, any result can be 
expected from autonomy; it would be affecting policy-making processes in contingent, ad hoc 
fashion. It is true that greater state autonomy vis-à-vis transnational pressures would result in 
policies defiant of TNC interests more often, but I have explained that such policies could be 
realized in a variety of ways, such as banning GM crop technology or adopting heterodox IPR 
policies for its appropriation. Which way, is to be decided. In other words, rather than being 
explanatory, state autonomy stands here as something to be explained with regard to its direction. 
Epistemic coalition is the interface through which activists infuse ideas into public decision-
makers in a way that help determine that direction, influencing the adoption of particular 
policies. 
Similarly, the primarily society-based explanatory mode employed here may be criticized 
as lacking enough state-institutional component. Institutional causes are in essence historical 
causes crystallized and reproduced in current practices through the continuous application of 
established rules regardless of the change in human cohorts and the issues they face. Historical 
(Thelen 1999) and sociological institutionalism (DiMaggio and Powell 1983, March and Olsen 
1989) therefore stress that institutional behavior is influenced to a greater extent by historically 
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inherited preferences and styles than by present external factors.380 In this study, we face a 
different image; institutions bewildered by novelty, and established practices upset by new 
international-legal and scientific predicates. Consequently, here political institutions are rather 
treated as part of the terrain that interest and opinion groups traverse as they try to formulate and 
articulate their interests to decision-makers. Although in the close-up ideographic view 
institutions appear to be connecting actions to reactions and to outcomes, they are not causal 
variables that systematically tilt the outcome to one particular direction. 
This is not to say that we are dispensing with official state institutions while explaining a 
question of policy. Indeed, plenty of empirical material in the chapters above report on inter-
institutional interaction in order to document the inner workings of the state machinery; a glance 
at figure 10 above would give an idea about the degree of detail with which this has been done. 
In all countries examined, farm groups focused their lobbying activity at the Ministry of 
Agriculture, biotech companies did so too but also courted Ministries of Foreign Affairs, 
Treasury, and if there is one, Science and Technology, and NGO activity was focused more on 
the Ministries of Health and Environment. At a further level of detail, for example, when the 
TAGEM unit of the Turkish Ministry of Agriculture proved to be uncooperative to agrifood 
industry, the industry encouraged the unit called Directorate-General of Protection and Control—
to whom they always had more regular contact—to develop expertise and acclaim a greater role 
over the policy decision. Such institutional choices made by the actors may have affected the 
outcomes in specific ways in particular contexts. But if this is so, the cause lies in the choice, and 
the strength of the actors making the choice, not the institutional channel chosen. For example, 
                                                 
380 “Rational choice institutionalism” as it is called by political scientists, or “new institutional economics” as called 
by economists, on the other hand, is more interested in how purposeful actors design institutions to achieve certain 
ends, and once institutions are established how individual behavior is adjusted in rational anticipation of institutional 
constraints. 
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perhaps it has made a difference that the Indian biosafety regulatory body GEAC remains under 
the Ministry of Environment, which enjoys veto power for biosafety approval decisions. An 
independent GEAC could be expected to be more permissive. However, such an argument 
generates the question why GEAC has remained under the said Ministry. The time period I have 
studied is long enough for institutional re-adjustment for political aims, so I believe that the 
answer would lie in the wider societal context. In a country where the pro-GMO lobbying groups 
were more cohesive and stronger, institutional change could have been engineered to make the 
regulatory agency independent or otherwise more compatible with permissive policies. Indeed 
this has been the case in Brazil, where the lobby was stronger, but not in India.   
Readers from different traditions may find the above theoretical point more, or less, 
compelling. The methodological point that we may have to agree on is the following: A study 
interested in demonstrating the effect of particular political institutions on policy would follow a 
different research design; selecting cases purposefully on the basis of varying institutional 
characteristics—and not agrarian characteristics. On the contrary, in order to bracket the 
influence of polity and institutional characteristics, I have excluded such substantially interesting 
countries as China, and limited my sample to countries with a roughly similar polity profile: 
relatively democratic, open to Western influence, with a history of state-led capitalist 
development and corporatist consultation between the state and interest groups. For the present 
research design it is enough to demonstrate that my explanatory variables (producer sector 
strength, and epistemic coalition orientation) are not unidirectionally generated by the state 
institutions they encounter (i.e. that there is no omitted variable bias).381 In the case of producer 
strength this is obvious enough: all of these troubled democracies have witnessed major 
                                                 
381 For omitted variable bias to occur, the omitted variable need to be strongly associated not only with the 
dependent (outcome, “left-hand side”) variable, but also with an independent (explanatory, “right-hand side”) 
variable.  
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restructuring of their polity several times over the last decades only, during which agrarian 
structure and farmer organizations have evolved more slowly. (There is even reason to think that 
the inverse relationship would be significant: consider the kind of agrarian structure that would 
generate a Ministry of Agriculture that is consistently stronger than the Ministry of Health). That 
epistemic coalitions emerged in the way they did and took the discursive and mobilizational 
routes they took primarily because of particular state institutions they faced, appears to me as a 
farfetched assumption, and the evidence I encounter does not seem to vindicate that. In short, 
polity institutions may have had some causal influence, but they have not been overwhelming. 
Instead of trying to detail their influence, I paid enough attention to them to make sure that my 
explanation is not biased by their omission from the story. 
A partial exception to this could be institutions of federalism. In a federal structure it is 
more difficult to enforce a sweeping policy of the more radical kind, as local governments may 
try and deviate from it. It would therefore be more difficult to find federal countries as extreme 
cases on a policy question. Indeed, my extreme cases on biosafety policy are the staunchly 
unitary Turkey, and Argentina, a country where federalism is not taken as seriously as in either 
Brazil or India. Federal versus state government contestation comprises part of the reason why 
Brazil and India are classified as “contested policy” cases. In all countries though, most of the 
governmental contestation has been horizontal—between different ministries of the federal 
government—anyways. As explained before, the propositions and evidence I am considering are 
much about the contestation process and not strictly about cross-country differences in outcomes. 
Furthermore, the implications of federalism may be less predictable than it first appears: scholars 
have compared federal systems with each other to find how GMO biosafety policy is affected by 
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the design of federalism, and not the degree of federalism per se (Bernauer 2003, Sheingate 
2009). 
What about partisan divides? Perhaps on this policy question the party in office is 
reproducing its overall approach to agriculture and economic policy: the left-wing goes left, 
while the right-wing goes right, and so on. While this must be part of the story it does not yield 
clear predictions, as it is not clear how one would derive policy positions on a complex question 
such as the regulation of GMOs from broad ideological commitments. Besides, the time period I 
cover allows for variation in government orientation, and process-tracing yields counter-intuitive 
evidence. In both Argentina and Brazil, GM crop cultivation enjoyed expansion under the 
government of urban-based left populist parties that historically had an uneasy relationship with 
farmers, yet the latter still made its influence felt. In Brazil in particular, the Worker’s Party (PT) 
came to office with explicit promises of fighting transgenic agriculture, contrary to the previous 
Cardoso government’s position. Yet, as narrated in Chapter V in detail, the PT government was 
forced to change its position after being pressured by the agricultural producers and persuaded of 
the legitimacy of their demands by epistemic brokers. 
Is it that some broad-brush cultural differences underlie differences in the public 
reception of GMOs, which then drive the variation in policy? Maybe “Western” societies are 
more permissive towards products of modern biotechnology, whereas in places like Turkey or 
India religious or philosophical objections carry greater weight, it could be argued. But, as 
explained in each respective chapter, in all of these countries opinion surveys documented that 
the majority of the public preferred non-GM to GM food and even favored a total ban, including 
in Brazil and Argentina. The question is why the opposition of the general public is overridden 
by the demands of particular stakeholders in only some cases. Also, while it is true that 
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opposition groups make use of various religious and cultural motifs to construct their narratives; 
the same motifs can be used, and are used, to support different kinds of narratives too. Some 
Islamists in secular Turkey justify their opposition to GMOs on religious grounds, while the 
Islamic Republic of Iran promotes ambitious R&D programs for GM crop development. 
Particular cultural motifs may serve as language to articulate views, but they are probably not 
determinants of them. 
Apart from these political and social factors, certain technical reasons could be evoked as 
alternative explanations. Is it that countries have chosen their regulatory regimes through an 
automatic alignment with the approach dominating in their export markets? European skepticism 
towards GMOs must surely have affected those who export to Europe, it could be conjectured. 
But EU regulations do not ban GMOs, it only discriminates against them. Besides, all these 
countries export to Europe, with Brazil and Argentina leading the pack—why the 
counterintuitive variation in policies? Turkey chose to ban GM crop cultivation completely, 
instead of allowing (like Argentina and Brazil did) those varieties approved in major export 
markets. Besides, even at the doorstep of Europe, Turkey does not really export crops to Europe, 
or much anywhere else for that matter—it is an exporter of horticulture, for which GM varieties 
are irrelevant; and some cotton, whose major producers lobbied for GM seeds. For India the 
main agricultural market of interest is India. No, export markets do not explain the story. And it 
is not that some of these countries needed GM seeds obviously more than the others for 
agronomic reasons. As explained in the empirical chapters, each one of these countries were 
approached by the TNCs for the commercial release of GM seeds adopted to their ecosystems. In 
some of these countries the chief technical problem in the farm is crop blight due to insects, in 
others it is undesirable weeds and the costly or cumbersome tasks required for removing them. 
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But GM applications for each of these problems exist in the form of insect-resistant Bt (Bacillus 
thuringiensis) or HT (herbicide-tolerant) crops. It is also not the case that these issues were being 
decided by technocrats in boring meetings behind closed doors, with no public interest. In all 
these countries, the regulation of GMOs was a high-stakes issue that taxed the attention of 
activists and politicians alike, in addition to scientists. In the capital, Prime ministers and 
Presidents had to get involved with the issue first-hand. In the countryside, murders and suicides 
were allegedly associated with the debate. When Argentinian and US Presidents met to discuss 
how to restructure Argentina’s fabled external debt, IPR over GMOs were among the top items 
they put on the negotiation table. While complex and technical, the regulation of GMOs was not 
a technocratically resolved issue—it was deeply politicized. 
Lastly, due to the importance of certain critical junctures in defining the policy trajectory 
in path-dependent fashion in each case, one could argue that policies were driven by random 
historical happenstance, and not by the sort of factors analyzed here. The fait accompli of illegal 
spread of GM seeds in Brazil and India for example, changed the tone of the policy conversation 
in these places. That is true, but instances of illegal entry of GM seeds have been detected in 
Turkey too. In these cases, the government bureaucracy responded harshly with police measures, 
made sure that the response was well-publicized, and made it clear that it would not allow the 
policy to be defined by such events.382 An ocean of uncertainty and randomness surrounds the 
actors at all times but they also enjoy some degree of purposeful action that lends itself to 
comparative analysis.  
                                                 
382 Fearful of the unauthorized release of GM varieties, Ministry of Environment issued a communiqué in June 1999 
asking governors to inspect the production and sale of unregistered seeds. Since then, incidents of security forces 
interceptıng unauthorized importation of GM food or seeds have been publicized several times. For an instance, see 
“6 bin 600 ton GDO'lu mısır Türkiye'ye girerken yakalandı,” Hürriyet, 5 July 2011, http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/6-
bin-600-ton-gdolu-misir-turkiyeye-girerken-yakalandi-18175626. Crucially, despite ongoing rumors about the 
illegal cultivation of GM crops in certain areas, this has not fuelled pressure for policy change presumably because 
the stakeholders do not expect the government to respond to such pressure favorably. 
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In short, policies regulating GM crop cultivation were not determined by technocratic fiat 
in a way that is isolated from societal input. They did not come about through an automatic 
alignment with policies in export markets. They do not seem to follow simply from partisan 
orientation of the government in power, or the institutional design of the state machinery they 
run. They are not explained by “national culture” or religion either. Instead, policies were made 
as a result of social contestation, through the interplay of biotech TNCs (with a certain interest in 
permissive biosafety and strong IPR policy), local agricultural producers (with a potential 
interest in permissive biosafety and weak IPR policy), and the epistemic coalitions trying to 
articulate the public interest (towards broadly strict biosafety policies). With TNC lobbying a 
constant; public decisions materialized as a resultant of the political strength of the agricultural 
producers, and the particular orientation of the influential epistemic coalition. Both of these 
factors—structural and voluntaristic; matter. Economic structure determines the strength of the 
local producer sector to an important extent, but determines its interests to a lesser extent. If 
GMO-skeptic epistemic coalitions can attach themselves to producer sector discourse, they may 
help define those interests. If they do not do so, and if the producer sector happens to be strong, 
the GMO-skeptics become irrelevant, and the TNC vision becomes likely to win over policy. 
 
Does it Matter? Theoretical and Practical Implications 
Epistemic Coalitions, Communities, and Policy Knowledge 
The first implication would be suggested conceptual improvements in regards to the 
literature on social learning and public policy. With the epistemic coalition concept I have built 
on the epistemic community (Haas 1992, 2001, 2015) by focusing on agents utilizing expert 
knowledge to change causal beliefs in order to influence policy, but relaxed some of the 
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assumptions about what defines such agents and included a broader set of participants; drawing 
on other concepts such as the “advocacy coalition” (Sabatier 1988), the “discourse coalition” 
(Hajer’s 1995), and the “transnational advocacy network” (Keck and Sikkink’s 1998). The 
coalition is wider than the community.  
Social scientists are advised to keep a “conservative bias with regards to concept 
formation” (Snyder 1998: 227) since “the proliferation of new terms and concepts” is likely to 
result in “conceptual confusion” (Collier and Levitsky 1997: 451). However, conceptual 
stretching—inappropriately trying to fit new phenomenon in existing concepts—is at least as 
important a peril, and new concepts should be coined where it is necessary to avoid it. The 
pressure groups investigated in this study are too much invested in claims of scientific truth to 
count as simple political advocacy coalitions. Yet they are too much involved with ideological 
narratives, and too selective and partial in their use of scientific knowledge, to be recognized as 
veritable epistemic communities. “Epistemic coalition” would be a term to contain these 
qualities that would not seem to fit with existing concepts. 
With conceptual innovation I aim to overcome certain criticisms of the epistemic 
community research program explained earlier. Reviewing the criticisms, Cross puts forward 
constructive suggestions for improving the viability of the research program. Accordingly, future 
research in this area “should account for a number of things, including domestic politics (why 
some epistemic communities’ ideas gain traction over others); competition among epistemic 
communities or with other actors; the context within which epistemic communities operate, 
especially the major political interests of a given time period; the varying degrees of power that 
epistemic communities might have; and the relationship between scientific knowledge and 
political preferences” (2013: 146). With a similar aim, Dunlop recommends “[a]ssuming greater 
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elasticity in the structure of an epistemic community and borrowing ideas from the advocacy 
coalition framework” (2000: 142).  
These improvements would make sense, but if simply added on top of the existing 
definitions of the “epistemic community” term, they may end up making it unrecognizable. The 
attractiveness of the original concept was in its simplicity and the theoretical leverage that came 
with it; and contaminating the concept with auxiliary ingredients implies a loss of leverage. In 
order to further the research program without such contamination or stretching of the concept, 
we may need to recognize distinct variants or mutants observed in the neighborhood around it. 
Epistemic coalition would be a variant. Where an epistemic community is unable to form a 
consensus view and become influential over policy, the struggle over the scientific truth narrative 
may take the form of a contestation between rival epistemic coalitions. In the seminal article 
where Peter Haas described epistemic communities at length, he differentiated the term from its 
neighbors based on four characteristics. Below I reproduce the tabulation of this comparison, 
inserting the “epistemic coalitions” as the bottom row, which fills a discrete logical place there.  
Table 28: "Variables discussed in the literature on policy coordination" in Haas (1992: 21); the 
bottom row added by the author 
 
Variable 
 
Defining characteristics of variable 
Principled 
beliefs 
Causal 
beliefs 
Validity 
tests 
Policy 
enterprise 
Epistemic communities x x x x 
Ideas x        or x 
  Belief systems, operational codes, and 
cognitive maps x        or x 
  Consensual knowledge 
 
x x 
 Policy networks 
 
x 
 
x 
Transnational and transgovernmental 
channels and politics 
   
x 
Institutions and organizations 
   
x 
Epistemic coalitions x x 
 
x 
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In these terms, epistemic coalitions are groups who propagate causal ideas and principled 
beliefs in the service of a policy enterprise, yet whose standards of validity are contested by at 
least another coalition of the same kind.  
 Concepts come with associated empirical territories. Most epistemic community research 
has been devoted to analyzing policy influence at the level of international negotiations, trying to 
understand how experts may contribute to international coordination on transboundary problems 
(see Haas 2015, Cross 2013 for review). The empirical territory more appropriate for the concept 
of epistemic coalition could be analyses of how states translate common international 
obligations, norms and challenges at large into national policy (Chayes and Chayes 1993, Evans 
et al 1993, Downs et al 1996, Fearon 1998, Haas 1998; Borzel et al 2010). Epistemic 
communities help states to learn the same lessons, to the effect that they have similar policies or 
otherwise policy coordination. Epistemic coalitions may result in the learning of different 
lessons. The image that shines forth through the community concept is policy isomorphism, 
animated by consensual knowledge. For the coalition concept, it is policy differentiation, fueled 
by disagreements and contested knowledge. 
 
Globalization, National Policy and Development  
The questions of isomorphism and differentiation are of substantial interest to debates in 
international development since observers disagree about whether common global standards or 
discrete policy approaches serve developing countries better, and the policy issue examined here 
has a substantively important place in these debates. When the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) was founded in 1995, it came with treaties like TRIPS, TRIMS, SCMs, and GATS 
making intellectual property protection, investment measures, and trade in services part of the 
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broader package of global trade integration, which had been hitherto squarely focused on (and 
intellectually justified by theories of) trade in goods. Developmental scholars warned that by 
imposing a one-size-fits-all straitjacket, these treaties were ruling out industrial policy tools that 
Asian tigers such as Taiwan and South Korea had successfully used before. For the Korean 
economist Ha-Joon Chang (2002), this amounts to “kicking away the ladder” on behalf of the 
advanced industrialized countries, which had grown by using similar tools during their own 
development. Robert Wade argues that these treaties implied that “development space”, i.e. the 
room for discrete policy-making for national developmental priorities, was shrinking. Birdsall, 
Rodrik and Subramanian declare, “An international community that presides over TRIPS and 
similar agreements forfeits any claim to being development-friendly” (2005: 144). Braithwaite 
and Drahos comment that for advanced industrial countries, it was clearly a “remarkable 
accomplishment to persuade a hundred countries who were net importers of intellectual property 
to sign an Agreement to dramatically increase the cost of intellectual property imports” (2000: 
203-04). Studies of the relevant negotiations demonstrate that technology-importing country 
delegates were not much illusioned about the merits of the agreement and they resisted it (Adede 
2003). Rather than being a negotiated outcome itself then, it is probably accurate to describe 
TRIPS as a sacrifice that the developing countries have made for the broader negotiation towards 
the formation of the WTO. Moreover, countries like the USA have been promoting “TRIPS-
plus” IPR standards that go beyond the globally agreed minimum as a condition for concluding 
bilateral trade and investment treaties. 
It should be therefore no great surprise that actors in developing countries have been 
interested in going around some of the formal commitments to IPR protection, either by using 
reservations in the TRIPS itself, references to other agreements, or through administrative 
 285 
measures with ambiguous connection to international law. This has been particularly 
conspicuous, and studied most, in regards to pharmaceuticals. In India, Brazil, Turkey and 
Thailand either the governments have broken patents and forced the TNCs to compulsory 
licensing in order to facilitate generic production of branded drugs, or the threat of such 
measures has led to negotiated drug price reductions (Attaran 2004, Krikorian 2009, Dorlach 
n.d.). Due to the moral strength of appeals to a human right to health, heterodox policies are 
recognized to be easier to pursue in the area of pharmaceuticals than in industrial upgrading at 
large (Shadlen 2009).  
In this study I have investigated the room for maneuver in IPR enforcement with regards 
to plant genetic sources in agricultural inputs. Not unlike pharmaceuticals policy, arguments that 
appeal to a right to food, and a somewhat romantic view of rural cultivators as deserving 
protection from market forces, give debates in this area a moral quality that is otherwise lacking 
from discussions of industrial policy. Indeed, the countries I have studied have defied, to varying 
extents, the TNC demands for recognizing biotech patents applying to plant genetic 
transformations, or the particular commercial claims associated with them. In justifying these 
measures, public decision-makers have made use of a variety of arguments, some drawn from 
international agreements that may be interpreted to contradict TRIPS. The “farmer’s privilege” 
clause of the older UPOV conventions—allowing for farmer-saved seed, for example, continue 
to provide reference for seed laws around the world. The mere existence of such clauses do not 
guarantee results; the soybean farmer associations in Southern Brazil, for example, refer to the 
same clause, enshrined in the Brazilian Seed and Seedlings Act, to argue against the legality of 
royalty fees collected by Monsanto, yet it is not clear if the Brazilian courts will ultimately 
vindicate their argument. However, while not sufficient, a fragmented international regime 
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complex with such contradictory clauses may be a necessary condition for actors in developing 
countries to successfully challenge unwelcome IPR demands. By forum-shopping, i.e. seeking 
the international forum with the most desirable clauses for one’s ends, actors may make the most 
of their existing strength in international and transnational interaction (Helfer 2009). In the 
evocative phrase of a Turkish bureaucrat referring to the differences between the WTO and the 
Cartagena regimes, “They [USA] want us to play football, yet we insist on soccer, because that’s 
what we are good at”.383 The policy implication is that, if—as reputed development economists 
argue—discrete developmental space is a good thing; policy-makers in developing countries 
should then be making use of forum-shopping opportunities to retain that space. 
Nonetheless, as conservative economists would hasten to emphasize, discrete 
developmental space need not be a blessing even for developing countries themselves, since it 
increases the room for deviation from “sound” policies. In any case, forum-shopping is after all a 
clever way of defecting from certain international commitments, and it undermines mutual gains 
that would arise from policy convergence. A more collectively desirable solution would be a 
coordinated one. The implication is that if treaties like TRIPS are encouraging developing 
countries to defect from formal commitments, fairer treaties could provide more realistic 
candidates for true coordination points. This should be kept in mind for the design of future 
treaties, such as the proposed Substantive Patent Law Treaty.  
It should be also kept in mind that even for purposes of effective intellectual property 
protection; high-profile, strict IPR law may not be the most productive option. More than all 
property, intellectual property is relational in the sense that its effective reality ultimately rests on 
how negotiations between market actors unfold, and what governments choose to enforce. This 
                                                 
383 Author’s interview (August 2012, Ankara). 
 287 
means that high-profile IPR treaties and laws can be counter-productive by provoking reactions 
from those concerned with exploitation of developing country resources through technology 
rents, and by driving technology transfer negotiations into undesirably conflictual terrain. As I 
have demonstrated in this study, it may also complicate issues of technology acceptance. 
Moreover, market practices such as branding, physical protection of trade secrets, or research 
prizes, are often more effective than formally mandated IPR rules (which are, after all, publicly 
granted monopolies) in protecting commercially valuable knowledge from unauthorized 
reproduction and incentivizing innovation (Gallini and Scotchmer 2002, Attaran 2004, Boldrin 
and Levine 2008, Hauns and Shadlen 2009). High-profile IPR law is not only politically 
explosive; it may be economically unnecessary. 
 
Prospects for Agricultural Biotechnology 
Although passing a verdict on the appropriateness of GM crops as a technology is not the 
objective of this study, my findings point to the need for a more nuanced view of the policy 
challenges in this area than what is available in current policy advocacy writing. Both simplistic 
pro- and anti-GMO narratives are wrong in assuming that the technical characteristics of the 
technology will solely determine its impact. “Kranzberg’s first law of technology” seems 
pertinent to the debate: “Technology is neither good nor bad; nor is it neutral” (Kranzberg 1986: 
546). Technology is not neutral because it surely has a fundamental impact on relations of 
production, exchange, and public health but the shape of this impact will depend on the social 
and institutional context in which it is incorporated into markets (Boyce 1987, 1988). While 
critical scholars may have exaggerated fears concerning corporate ownership of technology, they 
correctly identify a major fault line. In the four countries examined here the biosafety and IPR 
 288 
aspects of policymaking have been indeed closely linked, concerns over IPR abuse in a context 
of monopoly have complicated GM crop acceptance, and biosafety concerns in turn have become 
instrumental in challenging IPR claims. The resulting policies defy, to varying extents, the TNC 
vision of how the technology should be deployed in the market.  
Perceptions about the safety of genetically modified agricultural crop varieties would 
have been probably much different if they had initially come, as with the Green Revolution of 
the 1960s and 1970s, from a consortium of public interest-oriented institutions, through public 
distribution and extension services; and if they had been part of a broader effort for sustainable 
agricultural development instead of being marketed as a singular silver bullet. In fact, the 
technology has become synonymous with the few TNCs marketing it, and this has greatly 
contributed to opposition. It is not that there are no reasonable biosafety concerns, but conflating 
such concerns with problems of market structure may hinder a proper scientific understanding of 
either area of concern.  
Nonetheless, this may start to change soon. Currently the market for genetic engineering 
is under pressure of both “spread” and “backwash” effects; as economist Gunnar Myrdal (1957) 
called them. New companies, some from the global South, come up with patented genetic 
transformation events every year, but in response leading TNCs follow an aggressive merger and 
acquisition strategy to absorb newcomers and even established rivals—as can be seen in 
Monsanto’s recent $47 billions-bid to take over the forerunner company in the field, Syngenta. It 
is difficult to judge which one of the countering trends will prevail in the next decades, but 
further spread of effective innovation capacity to the global South looks likely, especially among 
those countries with substantial financial and human resources such as those examined here. If 
and when that happens, based on this study we may expect to observe a change in the overall 
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orientation of the policy debates, as the IPR fault line between the TNCs and certain domestic 
commercial interests will be blurred and therefore pressure for permissive biosafety policies will 
effectively increase. 
For the time being, however, as Karl Marx remarked about the machine-breaking 
Luddites, it will take “both time and experience before the workpeople [learn] to distinguish 
between machinery and its employment by capital, and to direct their attacks, not against the 
material instruments of production, but against the mode in which they are used” (Marx 2011: 
468). So far, many GMO-skeptics have translated their dislike of corporate control over the 
currently available genetic engineering applications to a Luddite-like rejection of this platform 
technology en masse. In the meanwhile, in pro-GMO accounts the appreciation of genetic 
engineering leads to a downplaying of the policy challenges associated with the corporate-
institutional package in which the technology is deployed. Many writers simply do not notice 
that a historically unprecedented extension of formulaic IPR law to plant genetic sources, 
combined with the monopolistic market structure in transgenic technology supply, is problematic 
from a political and economic viewpoint.384 Others, while recognizing the problem, point to 
“local anarcho-capitalistic” practices such as illegal seeds as indication that monopoly power is 
not fully realized in actually existing markets (Herring 2006, also see Paarlberg 2009). This is 
true; however, those practices have existed not thanks to but despite the biotechnology TNCs and 
the emergent global IPR regime; and their future survival depends on the extent to which 
                                                 
384 Perhaps they would have thought differently had they read Adam Smith more often: “Country gentlemen and 
farmers are, to their great honour, of all people, the least subject to the wretched spirit of monopoly. They have no 
secrets such as those of the greater part of manufacturers, but are generally rather fond of communicating to their 
neighbours and of extending as far as possible any new practice which they have found to be advantageous … 
Country gentlemen and farmers, dispersed in different parts of the country, cannot so easily combine as merchants 
and manufacturers, who, being collected into towns, and accustomed to that exclusive corporation spirit which 
prevails in them, naturally endeavour to obtain against all their countrymen the same exclusive privilege which they 
generally possess against the inhabitants of their respective towns.”  See The Wealth of the Nations, Book IV, 
Chapter II. 
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political realities in each producer country dissipate corporate pressures towards extinguishing 
them. Besides, since such practices work around biosafety regulations they are far from the best 
way to counter monopoly power.  
A more ideal and realistic way would be to increase the public sector’s involvement with 
research, development, and extension as well as the regulation of agricultural biotechnology. 
Greater public involvement could direct research priorities for more public interest-oriented 
goals (drought-tolerance and biofortification instead of the commercially-oriented herbicide 
tolerance trait, improving crops other than cash crops, promoting integrated pest management, 
and so on), keep the technology inexpensive for the farmers, and possibly contribute to better 
oversight of biosafety risks. The state’s capacity to fulfill these tasks efficiently, especially in 
developing countries, should not be exaggerated, so these are only potential, if plausible, 
improvements. Nonetheless, the same capacity limitation perhaps applies at least equally to the 
state’s ability to properly regulate the private sector, as Chaudhry (1993) reminds: Heavy public 
presence in the economy, instead of being a sign of developmental hubris, may be a 
compensation for the state’s incapacity in effectively overseeing private actors; which can be a 
more difficult job in a context of weak legal and administrative institutions. In any case, public 
agricultural extension services (i.e. services to carry technology, knowledge, and best practices to 
agriultural producers), emaciated in most of the developing world since the neoliberal turn, 
should be reinforced. This is necessary to enforce such seemingly mundane but fundamental 
biosafety measures as proper “refuge” management (planting non-GM variants near GM crop 
plantations to hinder the undesirable evolution of pest and weed populations), which are 
currently mostly ignored by farmers and private technology suppliers. 
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Such reorientation of public policy would need a social base for political support and for 
policy knowledge. In other words, an epistemic coalition needs to coalesce around this policy 
agenda. Such an epistemic coalition may have to engage with, instead of confronting or simply 
ignoring, “productivist” concerns and domestic economic interest groups because those groups, 
if they are strong, are likely to substantially influence public policy anyways, as shown in this 
study. Engagement may increase not only the chances of success for activists, but also the 
quality of public policies, for we need technology skeptics as much as we need technology 
enthusiasts and the markets generate many incentives for the cultivation of the latter and few for 
the former. Skeptic activists, if they are to build epistemic coalitions with desirable impact on 
public policies, have to consider—just as social scientists are advised to do—counterfactual 
comparisons: What is the status quo that we fall back on when we reject a certain proposal? 
What are the resources and the ideas that we need in order to change the status quo in alternative 
ways? What is the realistic utopia that we can pursue and what kind of constructive critical 
thinking do we need to get there? The findings of this study justify a call for critical realism: an 
urge to be more critical for those who see themselves as realists, and to be more realist for those 
who are critical. In evaluating such calls, Max Weber’s (1949: 53) reminder may prove to be a 
useful guide: “Science can make [the individual] realize that all action and naturally, according 
to the circumstances, inaction imply in their consequences the espousal of certain values—and 
herewith—what is today so willingly overlooked—the rejection of certain others. The act of 
choice itself is his own responsibility.”  
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APPENDIX A 
 
INSTITUTIONS LIST FOR ARGENTINA 
Exemplary institutions list for the Argentinian grain production chain, author’s elaboration 
Abbreviation Description 
Public Institutions 
 
SAGPyA Ministry of Agriculture 
INTA Agricultural research  
INASE Seed trade regulation 
CONASE Corporatist council for seed sector representation 
CONABIA Biosafety regulation 
SENASA Food safety regulation 
INPI General IPR regulation 
Private Institutions 
  
Agricultural producers 
  
Sector-wide associations 
  
SRA Mostly major producers of the Buenos Aires province 
FAA Mostly small and medium producers of the Santa Fe province 
CRA Mostly producers of the interior regions 
CONINAGRO Mostly small and medium producers  
Particular associations or major firms  
  
AAPRESID Promoters of no-tilling agriculture 
AACREA Agricultural technology extension  
MNCI Association of indigenous farming communities 
FONAF Association for family agriculture 
Los Fortabat Private firm 
Grobocopatel Private firm 
Seed and biotechnology 
  
Sector-wide associations 
  
ASA Seed industry 
ARPOV Plant-breeders 
ArgenBio Multinational biotechnology firms 
Prosoja Soy plant-breeders 
CASEM Local seed multipliers 
Firms   
Monsanto TNC 
Syngenta TNC 
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Dow Agro Science TNC 
DuPont TNC 
Bayer TNC  
BASF TNC 
Nidera National seed, a leader in soy 
Relmó National seed, pioneers in soy 
Buck National seed, specialized in wheat 
Klein National seed, specialized in wheat 
Don Mario National seed, a leader in soy 
Morgan National seed, specialized in corn 
BioGenesis National biotech 
BioSidus SA National biotech 
Bioceres National biotech 
Agrifood sector 
  
Sector-wide associations 
  
CIARA Oilseed industry 
COPAL Food industry 
ACSoja Soy chain association 
Firms 
  
Cargill TNC 
Bunge TNC 
Dreyfuss TNC 
ADM TNC 
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APPENDIX B 
 
CONTACTS LIST FOR BRAZIL 
Exemplary contacts list for Brazil, source: www.ctnbio.gov.br/upd_blob/0001/1095.doc, last 
accessed December 2015 
 
NAME INSTITUTION 
Adriana Cheavegatti Gianotto Alellys S.A. 
Alda Luiza Santos Lerayer Conselho de Informações sobre Biotecnologia - CIB 
Alessandra Bortoni Ninis Universidade de Brasília 
Aléssia Barroso Lima Brito Campos 
Chevitarese 
Uniceub 
Alvaro Miguel Rychuv Casa Civil da Governadoria – Palácio das Araucárias 
Ana Cristina Oliveira de Almeida Federação dos Estudantes de Agronomia do Brasil 
André Abreu Bayer  S.A. 
André de Sousa e Silva RiCon Consultoria e Assessoria 
Andrea Lazzarini Salazar Idec - Instituto Brasileiro de Defesa do Consumidor 
Andressa de Sousa e Silva RiCon Consultoria e Assessoria 
Antonio Carlos Cunha Cavalcanti 
COOPLANTIO - Cooperativa dos Agricultores de 
Plantio Direto 
Antônio Celso Villari Conselho de Informações sobre Biotecnologia 
Ariano Martins de Magalhães Júnior Embrapa Clima Temperado 
Arno Cleri Reinstein Schoroder Associação dos arrozeiros de São Sepé ( AASS) 
Augusto Santos Edelman 
Bernhar Gobbi Rocha Coimbra   
Caio Cesar Silva Lopes IF SERTÃO PERNAMBUCANO 
Carine Torres Galindo BASF S/A 
Celso Brum de Moraes Associação dos Arrozeiros de São Sepé ( AASS) 
Cezar Marques Santiago Filho Associação dos Arrozeiros de Santa Maria 
Claudia David Bayer CropScience 
Claudio Martin Damboriarena Escosteguy Produtor Rural, Assessor Técnico Privado 
Cristhiane Abegg Bothona Syngenta 
Daniela Gazoto Contri BASF S.A. 
Dária Pimenta de Oliveira Alellyx SA 
Debora Bartcus Marques Conselho de Informações sobre Biotecnologia 
Débora Moreira Pescarini BASF S.A. 
Denis Ubeda de Lima Bayer S/A 
Denise Gallo Pizella 
Centro de Recursos Hídricos e Ecologia Aplicada - 
EESC-USP 
Eliane Suzuko Hiratsuka Kay AGROBIO 
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Ellen Carolina da Silva Luchesi Advogados (Bayer S/A) 
Ernesto Donizete da Silva 
ABCDA - Assoc. Brasil. Combate a Degradação 
Ambiental 
Eron Cassol Argenta Associação dos Arrozeiros de São Sepé 
Fabiana Branda Santigo 
Associção dos Arrozeiros de Santa Maria -RS 
(AASM) 
Fabiana Pinho Bayer CropScience 
Fernanda Soares Ferment   
Fernando Ajudarte Neto CIB - Conselho de Informações sobre Biotecnologia 
Francisco Lineu Schardong Câmara Setorial da Cadeia Produtiva do Arroz 
Gabriel Bianconi Fernandes as-pta 
Gabriella Casimiro Guimarães Universidade de Brasília - UNB 
Geraldo U. Berger Monsanto do Brasil Ltda. 
Gesmar Rosa dos Santos Universidade de Brasília 
Gilles Ferment NEAD/MDA 
Giovane Corrêa Machado Associação dos Arrozeiros de São Sepé 
Gutemberg Delfino de Sousa Du Pont do Brasil 
Helvio Missau RiceTec Sementes Ltda. 
Ivan Dotto Ritter Associação dos Arrozeiros de São Sepé 
Ivo Lessa Silveira Filho 
FARSUL - Federação da Agricultura doEstado do 
Rio Grande do Sul 
Jesus Aparecido Ferro Alellyx S.A. 
João Alberto Reinstein 
SchoroderAssociação dos Arrozeiros de São Sepé 
(AASS 
João Batista Amadeo Volkmann Fazenda Capão Alto das Criúvas 
Jorge Henrique Cordeiro Greenpeace 
José Alberto Noldin Epagri/Estação Experimental de Itajaí 
José Antônio Pereira Lisboa Sociedade de Agronomia de Santa Maria (SASM) 
José Mário Tagliapietra Cooperativa Agrícola Mista Nova Palma Ltda. 
José Rogério Carvalho Tomaz Junior 
Núcleo de Estudos Agrários e Desenvolvimento 
Rural (NEAD) 
Juliana Ribeiro Alexandre MAPA 
Juliana Vansan ArborGen Ltda 
Leonardo Agostini Novo Ministério da Agricultura, Pecuária e Abastecimento 
Liliana A. Soares de Mello Suzano Papel e Celulose S/A 
Lisiani Gonçalves da Rosa Movimento de Mulheres Camponesas 
Lucia Helena Oliveira de Souza ANBio - Associacao Nacional de Biosseguranca 
Luciana Di Ciero Amyris Crystalsev Biocombustíveis Ltda 
Luciana Pimenta Ambrozevicius Ministério da Agricultura Pecuária e Abastecimento 
Luis Gustavo de Paoli 
Bayer S.A. 
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Luiza Chomenko 
Museu de Ciencias Naturais - Fundação Zoobotanica 
(MCN/FZB-RS) 
Marcelo Giuliane Associção dos Arrozeiros de Santa Maria 
Marcelo Gravina de Moraes Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul 
Marcio de Jesus Souza   
Maria das Graças Santos 
ASSOCIAÇÃO DAS DONA DE CASA DO 
ESTADO DE GOIAS 
Maria José da Costa Asssociação Nacional de Pequenos Agricultores 
Marina Cardoso Galvão BASF S.A. 
Mario Luis Silva Sociedade Agronomia de Santa Maria ( SASM) 
Markus Richard Ritter RiceTec Sementes Ltda 
Mel Mansur Edelman 
Mônica Cristina Altaf Julien de Sousa CONAB 
Nauro da Silveira Junior   
Rafael Georges da Cruz Greenpeace 
Reinaldo Montrazi Barata CTC - Centro de Tecnologia Canavieira 
Renato Caiaffo da Rocha 
Federação das Associações de Arrozeiros do RS – 
FEDERARROZ 
Roberta Marins de Sá Ministério do Desenvolvimento Agrário, SDT 
Robertinho Luis Meneghetti Associação dos Arrozeiros de Santa Maria (AASM) 
Robinson Cannaval Jr. ArborGen Tecnologia Florestal Ltda 
Romario Costa de Sousa   
Ronaldo Alfredo Schroter Terra Consultoria 
Rosangela Piovesani Cordeiro Associação Nacional de Mulheres Camponesas 
Rutneia de Paula Pessanha Ministério da Saúde – SCTIE 
Sarah Zanon Agapito Tenfen Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina 
Teresa Cristina Nascimento Mazzotini AGROBIO 
Valmir Gadke Menezes Instituto Rio Grandense de Arroz 
Verena Glass Reporter Brasil 
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